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Executive Summary 
 
Background 
This summary presents the findings and analysis from a study commissioned by the 
NIHR Service Delivery and Organisation Programme (SDO).  
Decentralisation remains a strong theme within English health policy, most recently 
focusing on autonomy for high performing local organisations. Policies such as 
Foundation Trusts illustrate this. The study examined the impact of national policy 
(especially autonomy) and local organisational collaboration in terms of the room for 
manoeuvre in local health economies (LHEs).  It also examined the ways in which 
performance was measured and managed across the local health economy, and 
effects of measurement on behaviour and outcomes. Incentives such as Payment-
by-Results (arguably a centralising measure) have, it is claimed, enabled local 
autonomy.  
The study’s methodology was a longitudinal comparative case-study of two 
contrasting LHEs. The study was conducted between 2006 and 2009. Within each 
case-study, data were collected through in-depth interviews, observation of 
meetings and documentation.  
 
Aim 
To investigate the relationship between decentralisation, governance, incentives and 
performance in LHEs.  
 
Objectives: 
a. To examine the impact of decentralisation upon performance; 
b. To describe the local interaction of governance mechanisms;  
c. To evaluate the degree of autonomy available to local health-care organisations; 
d. To assess the incentives associated with different policy initiatives; 
e. To provide lessons for policy-makers and managers at all levels  
 
About this study 
This study was an in-depth examination of the ways in which decentralisation in the 
English health system was interpreted and implemented locally. It described and 
explained the relationship between autonomy and performance, mediated by 
incentives, in two contrasting LHEs. It drew on theoretical models and frameworks 
to provide the conceptual context within which the empirical findings are presented 
and interpreted. The study used a comparative case-study methodology, involving 
in-depth interviews, observation and documentary analysis between 2006 and 
2009. It found that freedom from the centre did not always facilitate freedom to 
innovate or be responsive to local needs because local practitioners may have been 
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unable but were not always willing to exercise autonomy. The emphasis on formal 
performance (eg. activity or financial metrics) tended to overlook the role played by 
informal performance (eg. goodwill and trust). The study has implications for the 
design and implementation of health system reforms in England.  
 
Key findings 
1. Decentralisation:  
a. Decentralisation is evident in many English health policies, notably granting 
autonomy to Foundation Trusts (FTs).  
b. Decentralisation can be sub-divided into inputs, process and outcomes to 
clarify `what’ is being decentralised.  
c. Whilst greater local autonomy over input and process illustrates 
decentralisation, centralisation is also evident in terms of tighter control over 
outcomes through performance management and regulation.  
d. The mix of decentralisation and centralisation has created ambiguity and 
uncertainty for policy-makers (centrally) and practitioners (locally).   
 
2. Autonomy:   
a. Local decision space (room for manoeuvre) is the sum of vertical (from the 
centre) and horizontal (from other local organisations) autonomy. Health 
policy has focused mainly on vertical autonomy.   
b. Without freedom to be innovative or responsive locally, freedom from the 
centre may be compromised. This will affect the local implementation of 
health system reforms because both the ability and willingness to exercise 
autonomy are essential to deliver these reforms.  
c. Our evidence suggests an unwillingness to exercise autonomy because of 
centralising tendencies, risk-averse behaviour, an uncertain policy 
environment and an aversion to destabilise the LHE.  
d. We also found that organisations without FT status criticised the benefits 
available to FTs, as an example of on `uneven playing field.’ 
 
3. Performance:  
a. The current version of decentralisation (to organisations) has been 
conditional upon their `good’ performance, the measurement of which is 
often disputed. Moreover, official performance measures are inadequate to 
inform local decision-making (as data are retrospective and incomplete for all 
areas of responsibility).   
b. The distinction between formal and informal performance is useful. Formal 
performance (eg. activity or finance metrics) provides a safety net for poorly 
performing organisations but offers weak incentives for high performing 
organisations. Informal performance (eg. reputation, trust) substitutes for 
and/or complements formal performance, offering rich insights but lacking 
consistency.  
c. Where informal performance was positive (indicating high trust and 
goodwill), our evidence showed how some additional de facto autonomy was 
apparent (where trust underpinned inter-organisational relationships) in the 
absence of formally-granted autonomy.  
 
4. Local health economy:  
a. The LHE is the setting for the local implementation of national policy reforms. 
So, the success of these reforms will depend on the quality of local inter-
organisational relationships. The LHE is thus where national policy intersects 
with local organisational politics.  
b. The NHS is highly localised (eg. in terms of commissioning patterns), 
creating complex inter-organisational relationships within LHEs. 
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Organisations in LHEs are thus often highly dependent on each other (eg. 
PCT and NHS Trusts) even despite FT status.  
 
Conclusions 
Recent English health policy has aimed to increase local autonomy and enhance 
organisational performance. Decentralisation, it is often claimed, can solve multiple 
organisational and policy dilemmas. However, it is not be a panacea for these 
shortcomings. The success of this policy will depend on the impact of vertical 
autonomy and horizontal autonomy.  The broad conclusions are as follows: 
 
1. Decentralisation is a means to an end 
a. Policy objectives need to be clearly defined  
 
2. Decentralisation and centralisation usually exist together 
a. Policy attention on decentralisation can mask the centralisation taking place 
at the same time 
 
3. Clarification is required about `what’ is being decentralised/centralised 
a. Decentralisation has usually been applied in terms of inputs and processes 
b. Centralisation has usually been applied in terms of outcomes.  
 
4. The impact of decentralisation will depend on the nature of the local health 
economy 
a. Decentralisation does not automatically lead to `improvements’ 
b. Its success will depend on the local context including the nature and quality 
of collaboration between local agencies 
 
5. Decentralisation must be accompanied by regulation  
a. Decentralisation implies more local autonomy which has the impact of 
fragmenting health systems 
b. Regulation and performance management (forms of centralisation) are 
required to ensure that system-wide objectives are met 
c. Regulation may stifle local autonomy, if not sensitive to local contexts. 
 
6. Decentralisation cannot achieve specific outcomes always and everywhere 
a. Decentralisation has mixed benefits 
b. Policy compromises must be made (say, between equity or efficiency)   
 
7. The study’s findings have implications for implementation of the current health 
reform agenda and the ways in which the NHS will navigate through an era of 
fiscal constraint.  
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The Report  
1 Introduction:decentralisation in health 
policy. 
 
Where should power and responsibility lie in health systems? How should different 
levels in the health system relate to one another? The choices about such decisions 
are important because they not only determine the type and nature of health 
services that are available but they also signify the character of the system itself.  
Reflecting the latest pre-occupation with decentralisation, English health policy has 
recently been dominated by approaches which seek to devolve power to new 
organizational forms and to individuals.  Echoing familiar policy and organizational 
themes, the latest version of decentralisation has also (re-)introduced new themes, 
namely, autonomy and performance.  
 
In this report, we seek to assess the role that decentralisation plays in 
contemporary local health systems – here, termed local health economies (LHEs). 
We examine the impact of decentralisation upon autonomy and upon performance, 
both mediated through the intersection with incentives. We do so using in-depth 
qualitative methods in two contrasting LHEs, conducted over 3 years (2006-2009). 
 
The first chapter introduces decentralisation in the context of public service reform 
generally and health policy reform specifically. We review the history of 
decentralisation in the NHS, noting the recurrence of familiar policy themes and the 
disputed interpretation of reforms. We pay particular attention to health policy in 
the past decade, featuring key features which are illustrative of the policy direction.  
This includes an assessment of the usage and application of the term `local health 
economy’ which lies at the heart of this study.  
 
 
1.1. Setting the scene: decentralisation in 
contemporary public services 
Inquiry into decentralisation has a long and rich tradition, reflecting its role in public 
administration. Decentralisation concerns the relations between the centre(s) of 
power and sub-ordinate tiers of administration; hence it is concerned with both the 
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state of and process relating to inter-governmental relations and central-local 
relations. Decentralisation can be defined as:  
 
“…the transfer of authority and power from higher to lower levels of 
government or from national to sub-national levels”  (Saltman et al, 2007, 
p.10). 
 
(Decentralisation definitions are discussed more fully in chapter 2). The resonance 
of decentralisation as an organising principle has been no less strong in recent 
years. It has been revived in order to address perceived shortcomings in the 
organisation, management and delivery of public services.  Indeed, politicians, 
policy-makers, practitioners and, to some extent, the public have had to re-discover 
the perennial policy tensions and organisational dilemmas in each round of 
decentralisation. Given the swings of the policy pendulum (or the revolving door; 
Klein, 2003), the inadequacies of the former regime become increasingly apparent, 
so does the attractiveness of the alternative. Decentralisation (and centralisation) 
illustrates well this oscillation. As such, decentralisation can involve a search for 
greater efficiency, equity, effectiveness (or other objective) (de Vries, 2000) – 
though it is often claimed to achieve all of these (and more). Indeed, Saltman et al 
(2007) claim that  
 
“It thus appears that decentralisation covers the full range of possible 
judgements, with what seem to be broadly positive outcomes to some authors 
or in certain contexts, becoming broadly negative to other authors or in other 
contexts” (p.9). 
 
Decentralisation has multiple objectives but, as the discussion above denotes, it is 
also beset by controversies.  
 
Table 1.1. Objectives, rationales and controversies of health 
decentralisation 
Objectives Rationale Issues and 
controversies 
To improve technical 
efficiency 
1 Through fewer levels of 
bureaucracy and greater 
cost consciousness at the 
local level.  
2 Through separation of P&P 
functions in market-type 
relations 
1 May require certain 
contextual conditions 
to achieve. Incentives 
are needed for 
managers. 
2 Market-type relations 
may lead to some 
negative outcomes. 
To increase 
allocative efficiency 
1 Through better matching of 
public services to local 
preferences.  
2 Through improved patient 
responsiveness 
1 Increased inequalities 
among admin units. 
 
2 Tension between 
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central and local govt 
To empower local 
governments 
Through more active local 
participation 
Unclear concept of local 
participation 
To increase 
innovation of service 
delivery 
1 Through experimentation 
and adaptation to local 
conditions. 
2 Through increased 
autonomy of local 
government and institutions  
Increased inequalities  
To increase 
accountability 
1 Through public participation. 
2 Transformation of role of 
central govt 
Unclear concept of local 
participation 
To increase quality 
of health services 
1 Through integration of 
health services and 
improved information 
systems.  
2 Through improved access to 
services for vulnerable 
groups 
 
To increase equity 
1 Through allocating resources 
to local needs Reduces local autonomy, 
decentralisation may 
improve some equity 
measures but may worsen 
others 
Source: Saltman et al, 2007, p.16 
 
However, in addition, decentralisation can also involve a search for new forms of 
legitimacy. Most recently, this search has centred on public policy and 
organisational change relating to: 
 network-based organisations,  
 governance,  
 private sector involvement,  
 political devolution, and  
 state restructuring. 
 
Decentralisation is an important worldwide concept in the public sector in general 
and the health service in particular (Atkinson, 1995; Bossert and Beauvais, 2002; 
Khaleghian, 2003; Levaggi and Smith, 2004; Robalino et al, 2001; Saltman et al, 
2003, 2007; de Vries, 2000). Levaggi and Smith (2004, p.1) write that the most 
appropriate decentralisation of policy-making powers is an important unresolved 
policy question for most health systems. However, the trend towards 
decentralisation has varied over time, characterised as ongoing cycles by de Vries 
(2002) and as the organizational pendulum by Axelsson (2000), with recent moves 
to re-centralisation in some countries (Levaggi and Smith, 2004; Saltman et al, 
2007; de Vries, 2000).  
 
The UK is generally described as a ‘command and control’ system. However, Klein 
(2006) argues that the cycle of experiments with delegation quickly followed by 
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reversions to centralisation is one of the defining themes running through the 
history of the NHS. Many governments since 1948 have claimed that they wish to 
decentralise the British NHS, with the current Labour government stressing 
decentralisation and the ‘new localism’ in the NHS (Allen, 2006; Exworthy, 1998; 
Exworthy and Frosini, 2008; Exworthy and Greener, 2008; Goddard and Mannion, 
2006).  
  
Bossert (1998, p.1513) points out that ‘a comparative analytical framework should 
provide a consistent means of defining and measuring decentralisation in different 
national systems.’ However, many commentators agree that there are problems of 
defining decentralisation (eg. Atkinson, 1995; Exworthy, 1994; Gershberg, 1998; 
Hales, 1999; Levaggi and Smith, 2004; Saltman et al, 2003, 2007). As Gershberg 
(1998, p.405) put it, the concept of decentralisation is a slippery one; a term - like 
‘empowerment’; or ‘sustainability’- empty enough on its own that one can fill it with 
almost anything. Likewise, Saltman et al (2007) summarise this complex nature of 
decentralisation thus: 
 
“The single seemingly simple character of decentralisation, when probed 
more deeply, opens up into a broad array of concepts, objectives and 
consequences” (p.1). 
 
The term of decentralisation has been used in a number of disciplines such as 
management, political science, development studies, geography and social policy, 
and appears in a number of conceptual literatures such as public choice theory, 
principal agency theory, fiscal federalism and central-local relations. It has links 
with many cognate terms such as autonomy and localism which themselves are 
problematic (Boyne, 1993; Page, 1991; Pratchett, 2004; Saltman et al, 2007; 
Stoker, 2004). Second, much of the literature refers to elected local government 
with revenue-raising powers. Application to a national health service which is 
appointed and receives its revenue from central grants is problematic. As Klein 
(2001, p.106) puts it, ‘everybody paid verbal homage to the principle of 
decentralisation, but how was this going to be achieved in a nationally-financed 
service?’ 
 
A number of frameworks to understand decentralisation have been proposed 
(Bossert, 1998; Burns et al, 1994; Hambleton et al, 1996; Pollitt et al, 1998; 
Rondinelli, 1983; Saltman et al, 2007; Vancil, 1979). Though these are explored in-
depth in chapter 2, a number of preliminary points can be made about these 
frameworks at this stage (Peckham et al, 2008). First, there is a high degree of 
ambiguity in definitions used, with some frameworks not defining their terms in 
sufficient detail, while others use the same terms with different meanings.  Second, 
most frameworks are highly contextual in terms of time and place; transferability 
and generalisability are thus limited. Third, emphasis tends to be placed on 
decentralisation from national government to provincial/regional/local government, 
and tend to overlook the potential for decentralisation to individuals and/or 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 15  
centralisation beyond the nation state. Finally, there is little indication of how to 
operationalise decentralisation. Most frameworks are typologies or lists, and do not 
give much assistance in comparing decentralisation beyond nominal categories.  
 
 
1.2. Decentralisation in English health policy 
 
Any assessment of the level or nature of decentralisation in the NHS is fraught with 
difficulty. Different Health Ministers, for example, have held conflicting views. Enoch 
Powell argued that the centre had almost total control. Richard Crossman 
maintained that the centre was weak. Barbara Castle argued that the RHAs were 
‘pretty subservient’ (in Ham, 2004, p.174-5; cf. Lee and Mills, 1982, p.105). 
Similarly, commentators present different views. For example, during the 
Conservative period of office (1979-1997), it appeared that the NHS was moving in 
two different directions at once. Some commentators claimed that the national 
character of the health service was undermined (eg. Mohan, 1995) while others 
argued that the NHS was effectively nationalised (eg. Klein, 2006). Similarly, Labour 
health policy (1997 onwards) has stressed the importance of both the national and 
the local (Baggott, 2004; Klein, 2006; Powell, 1998). As Butler (1992, p.125) 
writes, it is unclear whether the NHS is a central service that is locally managed or a 
local service operating within central guidelines. Governments have tended to claim 
the latter, whilst actually willing the former.  
 
This section examines the conventional wisdom on decentralisation in the NHS 
according to the main health policy and management texts (see also Peckham et al, 
2005). It summarises the results of a literature review.  The search strategy 
focused on authored (rather than edited) texts that covered a wide period of time 
from 1948 onwards. Although it was not a ‘systematic review’ of journal articles 
with search terms and inclusion criteria (in part because few texts have 
‘decentralisation’ in the title), it was fairly wide-ranging. The aim was to provide a 
crude content analysis of decentralisation in the texts, but it quickly emerged that 
decentralisation (or cognate terms) rarely appeared in the indices, which meant that 
the texts needed to be read in full. It is clear that, while decentralisation and 
devolution tend to be the dominant terms, they are rarely defined or measured, or 
linked to the conceptual literature. Also, the terms tended to be used 
interchangeably. The discussion is presented by broad period. 
 
1.2.1. The classic NHS (1948-79) 
Although the NHS has often been seen as a ‘command and control’ model, the 
situation is more complex, with the first few decades more accurately described as 
‘exhort and influence’ (Klein, 2001, p.216). Although Bevan  saw local bodies as 
‘agents’, he hoped to give members ‘substantial executive powers’ (Allsop, 1995, 
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p.44) and  wished to see maximum delegation to local bodies (eg. Webster, 2002, 
p.19; Small, 1989, p.15-6). Brown (1979, p.11) argues that for at least half of the 
1948-74 period Ministers of Health had neither the will nor the means to intervene 
in the work of health authorities. The early NHS was characterised by ‘laissez faire’ 
(Flynn, 1992, p.105). Baggott (2004) and Ham (2004) also see some 
decentralisation in the 1950s. Harrison et al (1990, p.7-8) state that the ‘shared 
vision’ of studies suggested that the centre possesses little direct operational control 
over the implementation of most national policies. 
 
The 1960s saw increased central control (Allsop, 1995, p.39-40; Brown, 1979, p.13, 
19), with the 1962 Hospital Plan eroding the autonomy of Hospital Management 
Committees (HMCs) (Small, 1989, p.20-1; Harrison et al, 1990, p.86).  
 
Brown (1979, p.185) writes that, while greater delegation was one of the professed 
objectives of the 1974 Re-organisation, one of its features was tight central control, 
and the new planning cycle attempted to exploit the hierarchical structure of the 
NHS (p. 36; also Flynn, 1992, p.105). Mackenzie (1979, p.162) argues that the re-
organised structure was strictly hierarchical in form, making clear the chain of 
command. He regards the re-organisation’s claim that ‘delegation downwards 
should be matched with accountability upwards as `an ‘utterly unintelligible 
proposition’ (p.171; cf. Webster, 2002, p.101). Allsop (1995, p.59) argues that, 
despite its faults, the 1974 re-organisation began the transformation of the NHS 
into a national service with national standards. Harrison et al (1992, p.122) regard 
the ‘Priorities’ document (DHSS, 1976) as the ‘high water mark’ of the command 
model but, on the whole, the centre failed to constrain traditional local autonomy.  
Table 1.2 summarises interpretation of decentralisation in the classic NHS by 
leading commentators. It shows that there is broad agreement that devolution in 
the early NHS moved towards centralisation in the 1960s and 1970s. However, 
there are some gaps in our knowledge (as indicated by empty cells in the table), 
and the concepts and evidence on which judgment is based is often lacking.  
 
Table 1.2. Extent of decentralisation in the “Classic NHS”, as interpreted 
by leading commentators 
 1948 1950s 1960s 1970s 
Allsop D D C C 
Brown D D C C 
Flynn D D - C 
Ham D D -  
Harrison et al 
(1990, 1992) 
D D C C 
Haywood and 
Aleszewski 
- - - C? 
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Hunter D D  - 
Klein D D C? - 
Lee and Mills - - - C? 
Mackenzie - - - C 
Small D D C - 
Strong and 
Robinson 
D D - - 
Webster D D - - 
Key for tables 1.2-1.4: C=centralisation; D=decentralisation 
 
 
1.2.2. Conservative health policy (1979-1997) 
Most commentators agree that the 1979 consultation document, ‘Patients First’ (DH, 
1979) and the resulting 1982 re-organisation stressed decentralisation (Allsop, 
1995, p.56; Baggott, 2004, p.100; Flynn, 1992, p.61; Harrison, 1988, p.21; 
Harrison et al, 1990, p.79, 85-6; Pettigrew et al, 1992, p.49) or ‘laissez-faire’ 
(Harrison et al, 1990, p.86). However, this was followed soon afterwards by a 
dramatic move towards centralisation with a number of measures including central 
performance management, planning systems, `circulars’ and contracting out 
(Pettigrew et al, 1992, p.50; Small, 1989, p.53, p.153-5; Strong and Robinson, 
1990, p.22; Flynn, 1992, p.106-8; Klein, 2001, p.121-3). 
 
There is less consensus on the implications of the 1983 Griffiths Report (DHSS, 
1983) that recommended that appointment of general managers at all levels in the 
NHS. On the one hand, some commentators argue that they increased 
centralisation (Baggott, 2004; Harrison, 1988; Klein, 2001; Small, 1989, p.53, 
p.155; Strong and Robinson, 1990). On the other hand, Allsop (1995, p.158) writes 
that the Griffiths Report was concerned with freeing managers at the centre and 
periphery. Harrison et al (1992, p.80) wrote that the Griffiths reforms were 
supposed to produce a clearly defined hierarchy of control but there was textual 
ambiguity, with both Fordist and post-Fordist language.  
 
The White Paper, ‘Working for Patients’ (DH, 1989) and the 1990 Act proposed a 
purchaser / provider split, with decentralised institutions of self-governing NHS 
Trusts and General Practitioner Fund Holders (GPFH) (McNulty and Ferlie 2004; 
Robinson and Le Grand, 1994). Although much of the rhetoric was decentralist, with 
the exception of local pay bargaining (Klein, 2001), many of the implications were 
centralist (Allsop 1995: p.188; Harrison et al, 1992, p.119; Klein, 2001, p.167, 
p.182-3; Paton, 1998, p.151-2; Flynn, 1992, p.180). Like `Working for Patients’ 
and despite the decentralist rhetoric, most commentators agree that the move in 
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the mid-1990s from Regional Health Authorities to Regional Offices of the NHS 
Executive was centralist (Baggott, 2004; Ham, 2004, p.164; Webster, 2002).  
 
In short, the Conservative period saw decentralisation rhetoric and reality in some 
periods and in some spheres such as devolution of actual purchasing budgets (if not 
of real power in determining priorities) and of local pay (Paton, 1998, p.138-9).  
 
Table 1.3 suggests that, after the early decentralist direction of Patients First, most 
commentators point to varying degrees of centralization for most of the 
Conservative reforms, with some policies being the centralist `wolf’ in the 
decentralist’s `clothes.’ Like Table 1.2, there are some gaps in our knowledge; 
concepts and evidence are often notably lacking. Unlike Table 1.2, there are some 
disagreements on the `Working for Patients’ and Griffiths reforms. 
 
Table 1.3. Extent of decentralisation in Conservative health policy 
(1979-1997), as interpreted by leading commentators 
 Patients 
First 
Griffiths 
general 
manager
s 
Performanc
e indicators 
Working 
for 
Patients 
Regiona
l Offices 
Summar
y 
Allsop D D - C - C 
Baggott D C - - C C 
Flynn D - C C - C 
Ham - - - - C C 
Harrison D C - - - - 
Harrison 
et al 
(1990, 
1992) 
D Both  
C & D 
- Both  
C & D 
- Both  
C & D 
Klein D C C C - C 
McNulty 
and 
Ferlie 
(2004) 
- -  D - C>D>C 
Paton - - - C  C 
Pettigrew 
et al 
D  C - - - 
Small  C C - - C 
Strong 
and 
 C C - - C 
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Robinson 
Webster - - - - C C 
Key: PF= Patients First (DHSS 1979); Griffiths = Griffiths management reforms 
following DHSS (1983); PIs = performance indicators; WFP = Working for Patients 
(DH 1989); RO= Regional Office; > = leading to. 
 
1.2.3. Labour health policy (1997-present) 
In its first term, the Labour government's 'Third Way' approach tended to stress 
both centralisation and localism (decentralisation)(cf. Rawnsley, 2009). According to 
Paton (1998, p.177), the different agendas embraced by the Labour government led 
it to face both ways. In some ways, the Labour government stressed localism, an 
emphasis on diversity rather than national uniformity, and there has been some 
measure of devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (Klein, 2001, p.193; 
Ham, 2004; Webster, 2002, p.239-40). However, on the other hand, the `New 
NHS’ document (DH, 1997) aimed ‘to renew the NHS as a genuinely national 
service’ (emphasis added). New central institutions such as the Commission for 
Health Improvement (CHI, later to become the Healthcare Commission and more 
recently, the Care Quality Commission) and the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) were set up. National Service Frameworks (NSFs) were 
emphasised. The Labour government aimed to achieve a ‘one-nation’ health service, 
offering ‘fair access’ to services irrespective of geography and to counter claims of a 
`postcode lottery.’ The importance of hierarchical controls was never greater than 
in the period after the election of the Blair government in 1997 (Ham, 2004, p.245; 
cf. Baggott, 2004, p.361, p.365; Klein, 2001, p.208).  
 
The second term showed a clear rhetorical trend to decentralisation (Exworthy and 
Greener, 2008). This was started by the NHS Plan (DH, 2000) towards the end of 
the first term, with more flesh put on these bones by subsequent documents, 
notably ‘Shifting the Balance of Power’ (DH, 2001), and Secretaries of State Alan 
Milburn and John Reid stressing decentralisation and the ‘new localism’ (Greener, 
2004; Stoker, 2004).  
 
While the government stressed financial decentralisation (for example, giving more 
of the NHS budget to PCTs), and ‘earned autonomy’ (Mannion et al, 2007)), there 
were clear limits to this devolution (Baggott, 2004, p.121, p.174-8; Klein, 2006, 
p.214). Ham (2004, p.267-8) claims that it was only with the emergence of 
proposals to create NHS Foundation Trusts (FTs) that policy-makers showed any 
interest in genuinely devolving responsibility for decision-making, representing 
‘potentially the most radical organisational innovation in the history of the NHS 
since its inception’ (p. 66). In particular, the traditionally available default was the 
reserve powers of the Secretary of State. With the advent of Monitor and FTs, the 
Secretary of State did not have such powers. Autonomy might thus be more 
genuine than before.  
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In 2006, PCTs were ‘reconfigured’ – ie. amalgamated- and reduced from 303 to 
152. Similarly, the number of SHAs was reduced to 8 in “what looked remarkably 
like the reinvention of the regional offices that had been abolished earlier” (Klein, 
2006, p.241-2). The Labour government has continued to use decentralist rhetoric, 
although the precise meanings are not always fully clear.  
 
Overall, it is generally considered that the Labour government has further 
centralised the NHS (Baggott, 2004; Klein, 2006, p.262). McNulty and Ferlie (2004, 
p.355, p.357-60) regard many Labour policies (such as performance management, 
Commission for Health Improvement and NSFs) as top-down and target driven ‘NPM 
mark 1.’ Table 1.4 shows that, while there have been some decentralist elements 
within Labour’s approach, policy as a whole is characterised as centralist. It also 
shows more gaps in our knowledge, and a mix of centralising and decentralising 
policies. 
 
Table 1.4. Extent of decentralisation in Labour health policy, as 
interpreted by leading commentators 
 PCG
/Ts 
NIC
E 
CHI / 
CHAI  
PAF NHS 
Plan 
EA SBOP FT Dev Sum
-
mar
y 
Baggott C/D - - C C - - - - C 
Ham - - - C - - D D D C 
Klein - C C C  C? - - D  
McNulty
& Ferlie 
- C C C C?  - - - C 
Paton - - - - - - - - - C 
Webster - - - - - - D - D - 
Key: PCG/T: Primary Care Groups/Trusts; NICE: National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence; CHI: Commission for Health Improvement (CHAI: Commission for 
Health Audit and Improvement, and subsequently HC: Healthcare Commission, 
CQC: Care Quality Commission); PAF: Performance Assessment Framework; EA: 
Earned autonomy; SBOP: Shifting the Balance of Power (DH 2001); FT:= 
Foundation Trusts; Dev: Devolution 
 
This section has provided a brief review of decentralisation policy drawing out key 
themes. In particular, the ongoing tension between centre and locality and the co-
existence of both centralising and decentralising policies were identified. As Saltman 
et al (2007) have observed, the co-existence of centralising and decentralising 
processes and policy is not a unique feature of the English or even UK health 
system. Previous analysis of decentralisation policies in health systems has clearly 
demonstrated the constant shift between centre and locality both historically and by 
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function (Peckham et al, 2005).  It is also important that in the UK discussions of 
decentralisation in health systems are seen within the wider context of political 
devolution and the development of four health systems in the UK creating different 
contexts for both local approaches to health care and the role of the centre(s) 
(Greer, 2009). The concern here though is to examine the current context of 
decentralisation within the English health system and how this affects autonomy 
and performance at the local level. 
 
 
1.3. Contemporary policies on decentralisation in the 
English NHS. 
 
Policy in the latter years of the Labour government has espoused to be decentralist 
in rhetoric and indeed, reality.  However, it is notable that such policy rhetoric and 
organisational change have been driven much more centrally than in many other 
previous attempts. This is evidence of the co-existence of decentralisation and 
centralisation. It not only requires a centre willing to devolve power (to localities) 
but also to assume new regulatory and oversight powers to ensure local power is 
deployed `appropriately’ and does not contravene other cherished objectives (such 
as equity of access). Yet, questions can be raised as to whether such centralisation 
is effective, especially in the light of recent English health policy which, as this 
section argues, has been marked by organisational autonomy, Patient Choice and a 
performance culture of targets (inter alia).  
 
Exworthy and Greener (2008) identified the early 2000s as a pivotal period in which 
English health policy shifted away from centralisation towards decentralisation. The 
limitations of previous centralisation and the policy shift were also observed by 
Harvey et al (2007):  
 
“Neither enhanced performance targets, nor strong investment in 
modernisation processes, nor massive increases in funding proved sufficient 
to deliver the transformation the government wanted to see in the NHS. The 
service remained largely unresponsive to the needs and preferences of 
patients, with a limited ability to respond to rising consumer expectations 
and to secure innovation and productivity from providers (p.13) 
 
Yet, they also noted that, like the quasi-market in the 1990s (Le Grand et al, 1998), 
the incentives to secure the stated policy objectives were inadequate. Harvey et al  
(2007) noted that the “contract [between purchaser and provider] itself and the 
potential for patients to transfer between practices. Neither has so far proved very 
effective” (p.35). 
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It is significant that health policy since, say, 2001 has sought to portray a “unifying 
narrative” (King’s Fund, 2008), one which foresees: 
 
“…a self-improving health care system – one that is much more 
decentralised and much more responsive, where day-to-day ministerial 
involvement in its operation becomes redundant and the need for centralised 
performance management is much reduced” (p.x). 
 
This “unifying narrative” has depicted the elements of reform as a coherent 
programme (see figure 1.1.)(Allen, 2008).  
 
 
Figure 1.1. A unifying narrative of health reform?  
 
The key features of this programme include: 
 Centralisation in the form of a regulatory regime comprising centrally-defined 
standards, clinically-based frameworks, and rules about the degree of 
competition; 
 Decentralisation in the form of (i) PCT commissioning decisions as a lever for 
local change, (ii) greater freedom to innovate in the search for services that are 
responsive, cost effective and of continuously improving quality” (King’s Fund, 
2008, p.xi)  and (iii) patients’ decisions about the location and type of 
treatments.  
This `loose-tight’ structure reflects the strategic-operational division, advocated by 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) and summed up by the King’s Fund (2008): 
Fig.1.1. A unifying narrative of health 
reform?
Better care
Better patient experience
Better value for money
Demand-side reform
Patient Choice
Voice
Supply-side reform
Autonomy
Diversity of providers
Transactional reform
Payment by Results
System management reform
Regulation
National frameworks
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“Ministers and the Department of Health will still be responsible for setting 
standards, goals and priorities. But day-to-day operation, and precisely how 
those goals are achieved, becomes a matter for the service” (p.x). 
 
The raft of health policies relating to such a strategic framework is increasingly 
inter-related but it is possible to enumerate them:  
 Patient Choice 
 Foundation Trusts and Monitor 
 Practice-Based Commissioning 
 Payment by Results 
 Quality and Outcomes Framework 
 Cooperation and Competition Panel 
 Commission for Health Improvement / Healthcare Commission / Care Quality 
Commission 
 National Service Frameworks 
 National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
What follows is an illustration of one thematic policy area (organizational autonomy) 
and two specific policy topics (Patient Choice and Darzi `Next Stage Review’) in 
order to determine the extent to which the narrative is indeed unifying.  
 
● Organisational autonomy 
The current commitment to local autonomy has been set out in a number of DH 
policies over the last few years.  Since the NHS Plan in 2000, there has been a 
move to change the structure and organisation of local health services towards a 
more autonomous system.  At the heart of these reforms has been the sharper 
development of the purchaser/provider split and the designation of Foundation Trust 
status for health care providers. NHS Foundation Trusts have additional freedoms 
and governance arrangements to NHS trusts. There are, however, national 
monitoring arrangements and clear rules of ‘entry’ to foundation status overseen by 
‘Monitor’ the national regulator. FT status was initially sought for all Trusts by 
December 2008 but, given on-going difficulties in raising performance, this goal was 
missed.  
 
Since 2006, PCTs have been given freedom to define local performance targets for 
themselves and, recently, can designate a number of local performance targets 
within the Quality and Outcomes Framework for general practice. The NHS 2005/06 
Planning Framework did not give prescriptive guidance on what local targets should 
be developed by PCTs but instead set out a framework of principles within which 
organisations were to consider their local needs and priorities. PCTs had to agree 
the local targets with Local Authorities and other partner organisations. While the 
DH did not monitor performance against these local targets, they were subject to 
assessment by the Healthcare Commission. Local targets had to be evidenced based 
and take into consideration NICE guidance.  
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Since being elected in 1997, the Labour government has supported and promoted a 
number of approaches to developing local partnerships for public health and health 
and social care delivery. A key element of these approaches has been an emphasis 
on increased local decision-making  and the formation of formal local partnerships – 
between organisations and with local communities. Most recently, since April 2008, 
there has been a new statutory duty of partnership on local authorities and PCTs to 
work together with their local partners to produce a joint strategic needs 
assessment (JSNA). The purpose of these JSNAs is to identify the unmet health and 
well-being needs and inequalities of the whole local population, and to provide a 
sufficiently broad joint evidence base for a locality to develop its own responses to 
local problems (DH, 2007a). The aim was to enable increased joint working and co-
operation among all local organisations leading to improved outcomes for local 
populations. There are a number of key objectives: 
 To influence strategic planning over a range of timescales – annual, medium 
and long-term, 
 To involve a wide range of local stakeholders other than the local authority and 
PCT(s), 
 To engage explicitly with the public, 
 To inform the sustainable community strategy and local area agreement (LAA), 
and 
 To publish (in the public domain) and make widely available in appropriate 
formats. 
 
These local arrangements are, however, overseen by a joint assessment system. In 
addition, the process also means that the actions of any individual organisation are 
restricted by the need to work collaboratively possibly limiting individual room for 
action (ie. autonomy). While the results of such local area agreements may produce 
new local approaches, the goals are, to some extent, set and monitored by central 
government. For example, Local Public Service Agreements included targets agreed 
with central government and included a common set of outcomes and indicators, 
targets to improve a number of these over a three-year period (Coulson, 2009). 
This is despite the fact that the government has placed emphasis on developing 
stronger local accountability through new governance arrangements for FTs and 
changes to the arrangements and processes for patient and public involvement. In 
reality, while there have been a number of structural changes to arrangements for 
patient and public involvement and development of new governance arrangements, 
there has, to date, been little extension of local accountability. As Barnes et al 
(2008) argue such new approaches to public engagement: 
 
“…. do not directly address issues of formal decision-making and of 
accountability – both of public bodies to their publics and of citizen 
participants to their constituencies. Nor is it clear that approaches that are at 
least intended to enable greater accountability can do so.” (p.67). 
 
Autonomy is considered in more detail in chapter 2. 
 
● Patient Choice 
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Another key policy objective has been to promote personalisation – a form of 
responsiveness to the individual. This reflects a level of decentralisation beyond the 
organisation (traditionally, the destination of decentralised powers) to the 
individual. The NHS Improvement Plan set out this framework of personalisation 
explicitly with the objective that the  
 
“Patient chooses how, when and where they are treated” (DoH 2004: para 
2.17, original emphasis).  
 
By the mid-2000s, there was a strong emphasis on personalisation, an approach to 
service planning and delivery which gave stressed individual needs (DH, 2004). The 
theme of personalisation remains as a key component of the rhetoric of more recent 
policy at least. For example, in the introduction to the ‘Darzi Report’ (DH, 2008), 
Gordon Brown writes: 
 
“We need a more personalised NHS, responsive to each of us as individuals, 
focused on prevention, better equipped to keep us healthy and capable of 
giving us real control and real choices over our care and our lives”.  
 
However, Cutler et al (2007) note that, despite personalisation, professionals 
remain responsible for making choices in many aspects of services. Further 
questions about the underlying assumptions of `choice’ have also been raised 
(Exworthy and Peckham, 2006; Greener, 2007; Greener and Mannion, 2009).  
 
Whilst personalisation is potentially a broader strategy of reform, it has its most 
explicit expression in the Patient Choice policy. In the English NHS, ‘Patient Choice’ 
policy has been a central element of recent health reform that has focused on 
patients being able to choose the secondary care provider (DH, 2007b).  Patient 
Choice represents a key demand-side reform alongside a stronger voice for patients 
(see figure 1.1.). Policy-makers in England have promoted patient choice (including 
options for patients to ‘exit’ from one provider and transfer to another) as a key 
driver for improving quality and efficiency, and particularly for the reduction of 
waiting lists and lengths of wait for secondary care (Fotaki, 2007; Le Grand and 
Dixon, 2006). The policy was first introduced as a means of providing patients who 
were facing a long wait for surgery with the option to choose a provider with a 
shorter waiting list. Significantly, the list of (4 or 5) alternative providers also 
included a private provider. The policy reform objectives of Patient Choice and a 
competitive system were thus combined to reduce waiting lists and waiting times.  
 
However, while the mechanisms for choice exist, there is limited evidence on 
widespread choice in practice (Exworthy and Peckham, 2006; Ferlie et al, 2006; 
Fotaki, 2007). It is still not clear, for example, what choices patients can make 
beyond location of care or treatments offered by the NHS or individual NHS 
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practitioner.  In particular, patient choice seems at odds with a focus on developing 
clinical pathways, for example.   The DH consultation on choices for people with 
long-term conditions (LTCs) focuses on shifting away from a "one size fits all" to 
one maintaining independence and providing people with more choice and control 
over their care with benefits for patients and the NHS. Emphasis is placed on 
developing choices by engaging local users and organizations for people with LTCs, 
rather than as individual patients, to ensure an appropriate range of services that 
meet people's needs (DH, 2007c).  However, with regard to people with LTCs, the 
emphasis has been the development of clinical pathways and care management 
programmes (Ham, 2009), which limits explicitly the choice and which has not been 
influenced by service user input (McDonald et al, 2006a, 2006b). The DH has tried 
to reconcile choice and `pathways’ by emphasising patient and public involvement 
in service design. To date, there is insufficient evidence of the effectiveness of such 
approaches in influencing local service providers or commissioners (Lupton et al, 
1998; Harrison et al, 2002; Chisholm et al, 2007).  
 
For a number of years, some people receiving social care services have been able to 
manage their own funding resource as part of a formal agreement with the local 
social services department. Some 60,000 users of social care manage their own 
budgets for personal care, thereby allowing disabled and older people to buy 
assistance with dressing, washing or eating. The evaluation of individual budgets 
has been largely positive (Glendinning et al, 2009). While individual budgets can 
provide new approaches to care and innovative support, their operation requires 
complex support and development arrangements. In addition, there are concerns 
about how such developments influence the social care workforce. Questions also 
arise regarding the role of the funder in terms of their relationship with the budget 
holder and whether this is acting in a supportive advisory role or as a monitor and 
scrutineer of their budget management. In 2008-2009, there has been discussion 
about whether individual budgets could be extended to health care and proposals 
have emerged from the Darzi Review for a programme of limited ‘personal budget’ 
pilots. The DH has suggested that ‘personal budgets’ may be suitable for people 
with long-term conditions such as diabetes or asthma, and users of mental health 
services. It might also be extended to cover maternity services. While developing 
individual autonomy, this is within constraints set by local agencies. It also places 
constraints on local agencies as this means that they will be negotiating issues of 
their own and the service users’ autonomy in governance arrangements for the 
personal budgets. 
 
In summary, therefore, the current context for decentralisation is rather mixed. In 
relation to key themes of increased autonomy and greater performance, recent 
English health policy has been decentralist in nature but not exclusively so. Rather, 
aspects of health-care delivery and organisation have been decentralised – 
irrespective of recent organisational consolidations among PCTs and SHAs – but this 
has been achieved within what remains as a predominantly centralist framework 
that sets out the parameters of autonomy and at a local level the development of 
an increasingly complex set of local relationships within LHEs that may have also 
contributed to limits to autonomy.  
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● Lord Darzi and the Next Stage Review 
The Darzi Review (DH, 2008) is probably the foremost health policy of the last two 
years.  Professor Sir Ara Darzi, a respected cancer surgeon, was asked in 2006 to 
develop a health strategy for London by July 2007. In 2007, he was given peerage 
in recognition, and Lord Darzi joined Gordon Brown’s government ‘of all talents’ 
where he was tasked with conducting a similar health review across the entire NHS 
(Oborn et al, 2009). The Darzi reforms have generally been welcomed (eg. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7481155.stm). His appointment reflects the role 
of clinician engagement in strategic policy change as it is thought that clinical 
`ownership’ of policy reforms will enhance policy formulation and improve the 
likelihood of effective implementation. His vision is different to the “unifying 
narrative” (see above) but has some overlaps, notably in terms of the emphasis on 
autonomy and performance. 
Fig.1.2. Darzi reforms 
However, some concerns have been voiced. The King’s Fund argues that, in order to 
realize the Darzi vision, there needs to be  
“a decentralised health service, with less central control, leaving local 
organisations responsible for how they deliver care but accountable for its 
quality” 
(http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/what_we_do/press/the_kings_fund_1.html).  
 
Also, there is some concern that the projected annual savings of £1.4 billion may be 
over-optimistic (http://www.hsj.co.uk/figures-underpinning-darzis-london-review-
dodgy/311178.article - 6.12.07). 
Fig.1.2. Darzi reforms
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The Darzi reviews (initially London, then an interim report and a full report) 
illustrate clearly the tensions inherent in recent English health policy between 
decentralisation and centralisation. On the one hand, Darzi reforms are offering a 
national strategy of “high quality care for all” through polyclinics and acute sector 
reconfiguration, inter alia. On the other hand, the `Next Stage Review’ is replete 
with references to decentralisation, autonomy and performance; for example: 
 
“The freedom of NHS foundation trusts to innovate and invest in improved 
care for patients is valuable and essential... These autonomous organisations 
are ideally placed to respond to patient expectations of high quality care” 
(p.61) 
 
“We now need to give greater freedom to those working in community 
services. So far, they have not had the same opportunities for more 
autonomy.” (p.62) 
 
Indeed, chapter 5 is titled “Freedom to focus on quality” and chapter 7 defines the 
scope of an NHS Constitution. Also, Darzi’s interim report (published in October 
2007) had a chapter entitled `A locally accountable NHS.’ Moreover, SHAs have had 
the flexibility (autonomy) to interpret the Darzi vision according to regional 
priorities. However, in the light of the economic situation in 2009, SHAs have been 
told by the DH to review their `Darzi’ plans 
(http://www.hsj.co.uk/news/policy/regions-told-to-re-examine-darzi-
visions/5003183.article; 25 June 2009).  This resolution of this tension will be 
significant for the implementation of the Darzi reforms because, according to a 
survey of NHS managers by the Health Service Journal in 2009, the majority did not 
feel as if decentralisation had yet to been realised: 
 “56 per cent said they felt unable to influence the way health policy was 
implemented locally”, and  
 “70 per cent said NHS managers in general had not made enough of the 
opportunity to look out not up” 
(http://www.hsj.co.uk/news/policy/localism-takes-flight-as-managers-seize-the-
day/5003049.article; 25 June 2009). 
 
Clearly, implementation of Darzi reforms will require not simply the technical 
feasibility but also a change in attitude and perception of NHS managers. The scale 
of this challenge is underlined by the results of a similar Health Service Journal poll 
conducted in the run-up to the 2005 general election (28 April 2005).  
 58% disagreed / strongly disagreed that “A new Labour government would 
devolve power to local NHS organisations”; 
 60% disagreed / strongly disagreed that “A new Conservative government would 
devolve power to local NHS organisations.” 
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This survey also revealed that 65.8% of respondents agreed / strongly agreed that 
“the number of Primary Care Trusts should be significantly reduced.” The number 
was, of course, reduced from 303 to 152 in October 2006.  
 
 
1.4. Local health economy  
 
A prominent feature of contemporary English health policy has been the increasing 
reference to the `local health economy’ both in policy rhetoric and in the 
organisation of the NHS. However, there is no precise definition of what constitutes 
the LHE and even a brief review of how the term is used suggests that it can, on the 
one hand, refer to whole financial system (for example, within one SHA and with 
the government requiring the LHE to be in financial balance) and, on the other 
hand, refer to a small group of inter-connected local services. The LHE has both 
geographical and organisational characteristics but also refers to sets of inter-
organisational relationships. In deploying the LHE as its primary unit of analysis, 
this study poses the notion of LHE as problematic and seeks to explore the 
interactions between local organisations in `horizontal’ networks and between the 
centre and those local organizations.  This section provides a conceptual and 
empirical justification of the approach towards analysis of LHEs in this report.  
 
● Defining the LHE in policy and practice: 
References to the LHE are widespread across health policy documents and local NHS 
papers. Few definitions, however, have been offered in these papers and policies. 
The definition offered by the Pan American Health Organization and World Health 
Organization (1990) is an equivalent: 
 
“…a local health system [here, LHE] should be identified by its having an 
administrative structure responsible for managing the health activities in that 
particular [not specified] population. This means having the capacity for 
direct administration of certain resources and for coordination of all the social 
infrastructure assigned to health in a given geographical area, along with a 
structure capable of solving a significant proportion of the health problems of 
individuals, families, social groups, communities, and the environment and of 
facilitating social participation, all within the national health system, to which 
it gives vitality and new direction” (p.5). 
 
In the UK, the term LHE has been increasingly used since the 1990s.  However, 
over this period, it has rarely been clear what the reference to LHE means and 
whether this term is inter-changeable with terms such as `local health system’, 
`local health community’ or even the `NHS family.’ Each term implies different 
kinds of relationships as ‘system’, community’, economy’ or ‘family’ have their own 
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conceptual meanings. Application of the term also varies considerably in the UK with 
the DH referring to both PCTs and SHAs as LHEs (eg. DH, 2005; DH, 2007b). One 
application (which has been adopted in this study) is defining the LHE in terms of 
PCT financial flows with health-care providers. This is illustrated in figure 1.3. 
  
Fig.1.3. Conceptualising the Local Health Economy 
The focus on the LHE provides an antidote to the organisational fixation of most 
health policy (and, usually by consequence, health policy research).  
Notwithstanding the comment by the DH (2003) that “Hospitals are no longer seen 
as free-standing units able to work in isolation from neighbouring health and social 
care providers”, the organisational tier (such as the PCT or Foundation Trust) has 
been the level to which powers have usually been decentralised. However, it need 
not necessarily be thus. Alternatives include individuals (patients, as in the case of 
Patient Choice, or consultants, as in Enthoven’s original proposal for the quasi-
market). However, the LHE is an intermediate analytical level which remedies the 
lack of attention of inter-organisational relationships and dependencies between 
national policy and individual perspectives (such as clinicians’ response to 
incentives).  
 
It is, therefore, instructive to consider how an alternative to organisationally-based 
autonomy might operate across the LHE. Here, the notion of a “foundation health 
system” (as an LHE), with similar levels of autonomy to a Foundation Trust, might 
be one such alternative. The tension between autonomy and (local) partnership has 
been noted earlier and Davies and Stamp (2001) argued that one resolution would 
be  
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“to view foundation status as a positive opportunity to drive forward the 
development of integrated systems. Organisations that already have well-
developed links and mutual inter-dependency within a local health economy 
should be allowed to apply to become NHS Foundation Systems” (p.1). 
 
Davies and Stamp recognised that Foundation Systems would require new forms of 
governance but would balance “local operational autonomy” with governance which 
would foster integrated care (see 2.2.1.). Such systems would almost inevitably 
encompass current and aspirant FTs as well as poorly performing providers. The 
proposal has practical implications which prompt Davies and Stamp to ask:   
 
“is the necessary improvement in the performance of a lower-rated hospital 
most likely to be achieved by leaving that hospital as a stand-alone 
organisation, albeit with increased central support?” (p.2). 
 
The proposal was not adopted but FTs (based on single organisations) were 
implemented in 2004. In 2009, there are 121 FTs, over half of all NHS providers.  
However, this growing proportion (of all Trusts) might denote the de facto shift 
towards a different form of Foundation System. Many LHEs with be characterised by 
the presence of FTs to an increasingly large extent and PCT autonomy (along the 
lines of FT) are also mooted in 2009 (http://www.hsj.co.uk/5002473.article; 11 
June 2009), so it may be that LHEs are dominated by autonomous organisations, 
rather than being autonomous itself. This pursuit of (organisational as opposed to 
LHE) autonomy might, however, make partnership and collaboration (such as 
integrated care) more problematic.  
 
● Conceptualising the LHE: 
Academic usage of the term LHE is similarly inter-changeable and so, there does not 
appear to be any consistent use of the different terms. Yet, these terms are used to 
describe specific aspects of health care organisation or are used to contextualise 
activities (such as local markets and partnerships) (Greener and Mannion, 2009). 
Though frequently used, this loose usage of terms is unhelpful; the term seems to 
obscure as much as it enlightens.  
 
Clarity may come from disaggregating the constituent terms – local, health and 
economy. First, the use of `local’ rather than region, national, area etc. brings some 
meaning relating to the idea that ‘local’ refers to a geographical,  sub national area 
but one that which has sense as a political, social, or cultural measure that 
emphasises and places higher value on local and small-scale political and cultural 
phenomena. `Local’ has close links with the notion of community, a term which has 
long held positive attributes (Bell and Newby, 1971). The term might form part of a 
wider approach to localism – the extent to which health-care relationships (patients, 
clinicians, organisations) are locally embedded and mutually-reinforcing (Exworthy, 
1998). Second, `health’ is also a complex concept in its own right whose meaning 
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and definition has been widely dissected and debated (Bowling, 1997). However, 
here, health has more restricted application (ie. health services), focusing mainly on 
the NHS but increasingly on independent sector as well. Third, ‘economy’ has a 
more specific meaning relating to set of embedded institutional relationships. This 
would encompass the financial flows within the NHS, possibly to the neglect of inter-
organisational relationships. Reference to system or community (rather than 
economy) provides a looser concept and implies different relationships. A 
community is often defined by informal and formal ties with common interest of 
some kind although the definition of community itself is highly complex. The use of 
system conjures up the notion of an interlocking whole (or an invocation of one 
especially if it does not exist); boundaries to such a notion are inevitably 
problematic (Pratt et al, 2005).  
 
A lack of a common or shared conceptual framework is a problem both in terms of 
analysis and application in practice. The LHE may be observed empirically by the 
relationships, structures and other linkages between organisations in any one locale. 
A single empirical observation may not be a definitive assessment.  For example, if 
the LHE is defined by contractual relationships between different purchasers and 
providers, the other dependencies between organisations will be overlooked. These 
might included job markets for staff, procurement of services, joint working 
patterns, public views on locality (eg. patients’ willingness to travel and affiliations 
with local hospitals through, inter alia, leagues of friends) 
 
Thus, the LHE could be viewed as a `network’ of different organisations brought 
together around different economic (rather than social or political) relationships (eg. 
contractual arrangements, financial dependence or strategic investment). However, 
the basis for collaboration in networks focuses on reciprocal arrangements where no 
single stakeholder can act alone.  Reciprocity leads to notions of governance, 
mutually and trust. Only certain types of action require collaboration but policy 
statements pertaining to LHEs suggest that individual actors in the LHE need to 
consider the impact across the LHE as a whole. Thus we are left with a question of 
how to conceptualise the LHE. LHEs could be seen as the arena where 
organisational politics are articulated; the LHE thus becomes a microcosm of the 
NHS. Alternatively, LHE might be a sense-making device in constructing a meta-
narrative of health-care reform which, some see, might be lacking.  
 
The concept of governance does provide a set of concepts and theories that have 
applicability in trying to make sense of the LHE (Newman, 2001). Governance refers 
to the systems by which organisations or groups of organisations are directed and 
controlled. Institutional structures can be relatively durable and establish recurrent 
sets of working relationships between organisations. Such working relationships 
may be formalised by law, regulation or policy but may also develop informally 
between different groups (Rhodes 1997). For example, the idea of multi-level 
governance directly relates to the continued development of the NHS in the UK 
where there is a continuous interplay between national, regional, local and 
neighbourhood organisational levels (Exworthy and Powell, 2004). In addition the 
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application of different modes of governance (such as Type I (rational, evidence 
based, formal) and Type II (informal, stakeholder driven, negotiation)) provide 
useful ways of conceptualising decision making processes in health. While the more 
formal structures and relationships are often those that are most observable, 
relationships between organisations often rely on more informal negotiated 
processes of governance.  
 
Though governance helps to conceptualise the LHE, it says little much about how 
the LHE operates. Often, the inter-actions within the LHE are missing. However, 
drawing on concepts from complexity theory may help to address this shortcoming.  
Complexity theory suggests that rather than one system with different levels we 
need to think about nested systems in which all levels intersect and interact 
(Blackman, 2006). This provides some clarity in thinking about systems as it 
focuses on the inter-organisational aspects (within LHE and between hierarchical 
levels). Thus systems are seen as emergent and developing but that as the actions 
undertaken within the systems reverberate throughout the system, the results that 
are difficult to predict.  
 
Combining the essence of these approaches points towards a neo-institutional 
theory of LHEs, which would examine the patterns of economic interaction and the 
norms and behaviour of the actors involved. Here, the focus shifts to an 
examination of the ways relationships between organisations in the LHE relate to 
one another and how such relations are shaped by rules (both formal and informal), 
values and historical precedent. Such an approach has synergy with the preceding 
discussions of governance and complexity theory. Applying these concepts to LHEs, 
we would expect to them as: 
• operating within an NHS that is governed by many type I and formal rules and 
path dependencies; 
• yet being governed locally by codes of conduct and type II governance;  
• demonstrating a shift from simple administrative organisational frameworks to 
more complex nested systems to manage changes and relationships; 
• demonstrating actions within LHEs that reverberate across the LHE in 
unpredictable ways. 
 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 
This introductory review of decentralisation in the NHS has shown that there are 
significant gaps in extant knowledge, that there are some conflicts in judgments, 
partly because understandings are poorly linked to coherent conceptualisations. 
These lacunae fail to provide policy-makers and practitioners with cogent rationales 
for decision-making. However, to some degree, it is not the judgments on 
decentralisation that are contradictory but decentralisation itself; it consists of a 
number of dimensions that are often in conflict.   
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Klein (2006, p.263) argued that the balance between centre and periphery has 
provided a recurring theme in the history of the NHS. It has been shown not only 
that the direction of change - decentralisation against centralisation - has varied 
over time, but so too has the content and scope of decentralisation. Many of the 
problems surrounding decentralisation in the NHS stem from the ‘perennial 
question’ of attempting to reconcile national priorities and uniform services with 
local freedoms (Paton, 1998, p.177; cf. Klein 2006). While Klein (2001, p.37) views 
the NHS as attempting to reconcile national accountability and local autonomy, but 
he concludes that ‘the circle refuses to be squared’. 
 
The remainder of this report is divided into five chapter. Chapter 2 examines the 
literature relating to autonomy and performance. Chapter 3 considers the 
methodology which was employed for conducting empirical fieldwork. The findings 
of such fieldwork are presented in chapter 4. These findings are discussed and 
interpreted in the light of the extant literature in chapter 5. The concluding chapter 
explores the policy implications of the new knowledge generated in this study and 
proposes a research agenda for the future. 
 
 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 35  
 
2 Literature Review. 
2.1. Decentralisation 
2.1.1. Decentralisation in theory 
 
Peckham et al (2005) identified the diversity of academic approaches and the 
problems that this diversity poses: 
 
“There is an extensive literature on decentralisation, centralisation and 
devolution that covers a wide range of disciplines including politics, public 
administration, health services research, economics, management, sociology 
and organisational studies” (p.22).  
 
Given the multi-disciplinary nature of this literature and the use of a wide range of 
definitions, analysis of decentralisation is inevitably problematic. Here, a selective 
account of the literature on decentralisation is presented, not least because (a) the 
authors conducted an extensive review of the literature (prior to this study; 
Peckham et al, 2005 and Davies et al, 2005), (b) the focus of this study goes 
beyond decentralisation, and (c) space does not permit an fuller examination in this 
report. In particular, it seeks to draw out from the decentralisation those aspects of 
primary relevance to the themes, viz. autonomy, incentives and performance.  
 
Bossert (1998, p.1513) points out that ‘a comparative analytical framework should 
provide a consistent means of defining and measuring decentralisation in different 
national systems.’ Here, we focus only on the English health system. However, 
many commentators agree that there are problems of defining and measuring 
decentralisation (eg Atkinson 1995; Gershberg 1998; Hales 1999; Levaggi and 
Smith 2004; Saltman et al 2003, 2007). These problems are four-fold.  
 
First, as Gershberg (1998: 405) put it, the concept of decentralisation is a slippery 
one; a term - like ‘empowerment’; or ‘sustainability’- empty enough on its own that 
one can fill it with almost anything. The term of decentralisation has been used in a 
number of disciplines such as management, political science, development studies, 
geography and social policy, and appears in a number of conceptual literatures such 
as public choice theory, principal-agent theory, fiscal federalism and central-local 
relations. It has links with many cognate terms such as autonomy and localism that 
themselves are problematic (Boyne 1993; Page 1991; Pratchett 2004; Saltman et al 
2007; Stoker 2004).  
 
Second, Bankauskaite et al (2007) summarise the literature’s deficiencies in terms 
of measurement. It fails to address the measurement of decentralisation (as a state 
and a process), the measurement of the outcomes of decentralisation in health-
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care, and comparison of decentralisation between countries. (It might also be that 
the literature does not consider fully other spatial and temporal scales) (p.11). 
 
Third, much of the literature refers to elected local government with revenue-raising 
powers. Application to a national health service which is appointed and receives its 
revenue from central grants is problematic. As Klein (2001: 106) puts it, ‘everybody 
paid verbal homage to the principle of decentralisation, but how was this going to 
be achieved in a nationally-financed service?’ Applicability of such literature to the 
English health system is therefore limited.  
 
Fourth, the literature also fails to account for new political and organisational 
contexts. Emergent governance relations in new organisational settings provide a 
new context in which decentralisation is being played out. New forms of horizontal 
government (such as joined-up government and executive agencies at national 
level) and local partnerships (such as managed clinical networks) provide a radically 
different policy and organisation context from previous version of decentralisation.  
 
These four analytical problems are clearly evident in the way in which different 
disciplines and conceptual frameworks have sought to understand and explain 
decentralisation. However, they have been addressed in contrasting ways. First, the 
case of New Public Management (NPM), for example, illustrates the evolving 
interpretation of organisational and policy contexts. Decentralisation has, since the 
1980s, formed a key strand of NPM and its variants.  For example, in a publication 
by the World Bank (which has heavily promoted decentralisation), Preker and 
Harding (2003) argue that  
 
“Organisational reforms in hospitals include those which move “public hospitals 
out of the core public bureaucracies and transform them into more independent 
[ie. autonomous] entities responsible for performance, keeping ownership in the 
public sector” (p.6) 
 
These reforms have also involved the separation of strategic and operational 
functions (akin to `steering’ and `rowing’). Whilst similar to separation in other 
sectors and industries, the distinction by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) has been 
applied to executive agencies (Pollitt et al, 2004). Vrangbaek (2007) argues that 
the principles of `reinventing government’ (advocated by Osborne and Gaebler) 
promoted an entrepreneurialism with the aim of greater innovation, 
experimentation and responsiveness (p.56) but require the stimulation of 
appropriate incentives (p.67). 
 
The strategic / operation distinction has also coincided with novel applications (and 
combinations) of governance forms:  hierarchies, markets and networks. Exworthy 
et al (1999) noted the co-existence and interaction between these forms. 
Traditionally, hierarchy is associated with vertical (central-local) relations and 
networks with horizontal (local-local or central-central) relations. Attention has 
tended to focus on vertical relations with some seeing markets (privatization) as a 
form of decentralisation (Rondinelli, 1983). However, Vrangbaek’s (2007) analysis 
has also considered networks but he notes ambiguities found elsewhere and at 
other times in the analysis of decentralisation: 
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“The issue of network-based governance form is somewhat problematic for 
typologies of decentralisation.… Responsibility and accountability tend to be 
somewhat blurred in network structures… Networks may include central and 
decentralised public actors as well as private actors“ (p.50). 
 
Certain features of NPM reforms were also implemented at or around the same time 
of successive waves of decentralisation. These reforms included:  
• cadre of managers,  
• competition within market-style relations,  
• greater private sector involvement, and 
• strategies to respond to consumerist users. 
For decentralisation to be effective, it has relied on some/all of these features. For 
example, decentralisation – disaggregating former units into smaller ones – has 
been facilitated by the introduction of cadre of managers to run these `new’ units 
which are in competition with each other.  
 
Ferlie et al (1996) identified four types of NPM, one of which could be termed the 
“Decentralisation model.”  Ferlie and colleagues saw this form of NPM as part of the 
move towards post-Fordism which has entailed a “shift for flexibility and the 
unbundling of vertically integrated forms of organisation” (p.12). The 
`decentralisation’ model of NPM is characterised by: 
• Introduction of quasi-markets, 
• “Move from management by hierarchy to management by contract”, 
• “Split between a small strategic core and a large operational periphery”, 
• “Delayering and downsizing”, 
• “Split between public funding and independent sector provision”, 
• “Move from the command and control form of management... to new 
management styles”, and 
• “Attempt to move away from standardised forms of service to a service system 
characterised by more flexibility and variety” (Ferlie et al, 1996, p.13). 
 
Likewise, Mattei (2009) is careful to distinguish variants of NPM. She notes, 
however, that decentralisation reforms are distinct from those of quasi-markets: 
 
“The strand which deals with managerialism is concerned with hands-on 
management, autonomy, clear objectives and performance; it is different to the 
strand related to new institutional economics, which is based on competition, 
public choice and transaction costs analysis…” (p.65).  
 
It is such a context that decentralisation has been deployed to explain and justify 
such state restructuring and organisational change. 
Second, a well established discussion of decentralisation distinguishes between 
deconcentration, devolution, delegation and privatization (Rondinelli, 1983). 
Deconcentration transfers authority to different jurisdictional levels within the 
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central government. This is the case, for example, of the creation of local or 
regional offices of a central government ministry. Devolution is the transfer of 
authority from the central government to local structures within the public 
administration. This type of decentralisation includes the transfer of specific powers 
from central government to states, provinces or municipalities. Delegation is the 
transfer of government authority over specific tasks to semi-autonomous agencies 
(e.g. arm’s length bodies). Finally, privatisation, often understood as a sub-type of 
delegation, grants responsibilities and in some cases ownership to private 
organisations. 
 
While the Rondinelli’s framework is helpful in describing the institutional 
arrangements of decentralisation on the basis of the recipients of new powers and 
authority, its interpretative power is limited in several respects. First of all, it 
focuses on organisational recipients and therefore does not accommodate 
institutional arrangements that entail decentralising to individuals, being patients or 
professionals. Second, the classification overlooks the “what” (Mills, 1994) of 
decentralisation, does not explicitly address the role of the centre and the 
decentralisation/centralisation continuum. Furthermore, although some authors  
view the above categories as representing different degrees of administrative 
autonomy measurable through a set of indicators (e.g. Schneider, 2003), the 
framework does not clearly conceptualise nor operationalise the autonomy (space or 
freedom) available to local decision makers as a consequence of streams of 
decentralisation and centralization (Bossert, 1998). Therefore, the Rondinelli 
framework is not useful to assess the impact of decentralisation on local autonomy 
and ultimately on performance.  
 
Other frameworks have been developed that (in different guises) provide descriptive 
accounts of the institutional arrangements of decentralisation. (See, for example, 
Burns et al, 1994; Hambleton et al, 1996; Pollit et al, 1998). For example, Burns et 
al. (1994) argued that  
 
“It is helpful, in discussions about local government, to distinguish two types of 
decentralisation. On the one hand, it is used to refer to the physical dispersal of 
operations to local offices. In a second sense, it is used to refer to the 
delegation or devolution of a greater degree of decision making authority to 
lower levels of administration or government. In common usage, these 
meanings are sometimes combined.” (Burns, et al., 1994: 6) 
 
In contrast, Hambleton et al. (1996) identified four broad categories: 
 geography-based: physical dispersal 
 power-based: decision-making authority 
 managerial: improving the quality of services 
 political: enhancing local democracy. 
 
These themes are echoed in the work by Pollitt et al. (1998) who identify three 
categories with binary options: 
 politics (authority decentralised to elected representatives) – administration 
(authority decentralised to managers or appointed bodies) 
 competitive (competitive tendering; non-competitive) - agency given greater 
authority to manage its own budget 
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 internal (decentralisation within an organisation) – devolution (decentralisation to 
a separate, legally established organisation). 
 
The frameworks however suffer from similar weaknesses. Similarly to the 
Rondinelli’s framework they are concerned with describing the institutional 
framework of government or administrative systems and do not provide guidance in 
terms of interpreting and understanding the effects of decentralisation on autonomy 
and performance, inter alia. In addition, they do not capture the co-existence of 
decentralisation and centralisation and the place of the individual within the health 
care system as clinician, health care practitioner or patient.  
 
In summary, this decentralisation literature provides inadequate insight into the 
properties being decentralised, the organisational and spatial dimensions of such 
decentralisation (such as the extension of decentralisation to individuals, under the 
English `Patient Choice’ policy or vouchers for direct care payments) and changing 
role of the centre (such as the emergence / reconfiguration of multiple centres in 
the form of regulatory and inspection regimes). Overall, these multiple perspectives 
and paradigms (that have tended to dominate writing and commentaries on 
decentralisation) have often been conducted in parallel, rather than building on each 
other. Thus, relatively few attempts to operationalise  notions of local autonomy 
within the context of decentralisation have emerged. 
 
2.1.2. Towards a new framework of decentralisation 
As previously argued, traditional decentralisation frameworks miss some of the 
complex shifts of decentralisation and centralisation in contemporary UK health 
policy. We claim that the ‘Arrows Framework’ (Peckham et al 2005, 2008; See 
figure 2.1) helps to examine this complexity. We claim that our framework has four 
main advantages. First, it is linked to wider concepts (such as personalisation of 
public services and internationalisation). Second, it focuses on content of 
decentralisation (the 'what' issue).Third, it identifies the scope of decentralisation 
(from where to where?). Fourth, it allows some progress towards very crude 
measurement, but accepts that simple uni-dimensional measures cannot capture 
the essence of a complex and multi-dimensional concept. 
 
Figure 2.1. Arrows framework  
Examples  
of levels 
Activities 
 
Global 
 
Europe 
 
UK 
 
England 
 
Strategic 
Health 
Authority 
 
Primary 
Care 
Trust 
GP 
Practice 
/local 
Individual 
 
Input Payment by results 
 
Practice-based commissioning 
 
Professional regulations on employment 
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Process Patient choice 
Direct Payments 
 
Foundation Trusts 
 
National contracts for private providers 
 
  
Output GP Quality Framework 
 
Local targets 
 
Accountability and governance 
 
  
 
Figure 2.1 shows that decentralisation can be seen in terms of familiar concepts of 
inputs, process and outputs in an `I*P*O configuration’ (cf Hales 1999). Fiscal 
decentralisation relates to inputs such as the Government's claim that the NHS has 
been decentralised because PCTs spend a higher proportion of NHS money. Input 
decentralisation is the least radical. It gives more money, but may not devolve any 
power or increase autonomy. For example, if local bodies are constrained to spend 
their money in certain ways (earmarked or ring-fenced finance) or have to meet 
certain central targets (eg waiting lists) then local discretion, autonomy or ‘decision 
space’ is not increased.  
 
Process decentralisation relates to mechanisms. For example, patient choice and 
‘Direct Payments’ decentralise decisions about treatment to the individual. However, 
on the other hand, bodies such as the National Institute for Clinical Excellence and 
policies such as National Service Framework locate decisions at the national level.  
 
Outcome decentralisation relates to targets. Inspection and regulation by bodies 
such as the Healthcare Commission and Monitor and policies such as performance 
management (eg the 18 week target) stress national decision making. Very broadly, 
recent policies suggest input decentralisation, but a mix of process and outcome re-
centralisation (Peckham et al 2008).  
 
Another interpretation of the Arrows framework in terms of autonomy can be seen 
as the balance between vertical autonomy and horizontal autonomy. Whilst 
governments often like to stress their policies in terms of decentralisation, this is 
often only in terms of vertical autonomy (from the centre). It fails to account for 
horizontal autonomy (in terms of the latitude from / between other local 
organisations). Arguably it is both vertical and horizontal autonomy that is required 
to maximise the decision space / room for manoeuvre locally. In preparing for this 
study, the team heard of one NHS manager whose three star NHS Hospital Trust 
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had as much autonomy as the Department of Health could offer (at the time); 
vertical autonomy was maximised. However, the local decision space was small 
because the PCT (upon which the Hospital Trust relied for funding) operated a 
budget deficit. Hence, horizontal autonomy was limited. According to this NHS 
manager, the organisation’s autonomy (both vertical and horizontal) was deemed to 
be low.  
 
The Arrrows framework has resonance with the model proposed by Vrangbaek 
(2007). His model distinguishes between three activities (A-D-F):  
 Arranging, planning and facilitating,  
 Financing (revenue collection), and  
 Delivery (in terms of ownership, distribution of risk and profit) (p.55).  
These could be located along the central-local continuum, as shown by table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1.Governance structures: examples of institutional forms for 
different health service functions. 
 Responsibility for 
arranging, planning 
and facilitating 
Financing of heath 
services (revenue 
collection) 
Delivery: ownership, 
distribution of risk 
and profit 
Central 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local  
 National planning 
system 
 Formal national 
assignment of 
rights and 
obligations 
 Centralised 
agreements 
 Regional planning 
and networking 
 Local / municipal 
planning and 
networking 
 Market interaction 
 Individual choice of 
insurance or 
treatment facility 
 National taxation 
 Mandatory 
contribution to 
national sickness fund 
 Regional taxation 
 Mandatory 
contribution to 
regional sickness fund 
 Local / municipal 
taxation 
 Mandatory 
contribution to local 
sickness fund 
 Voluntary contribution 
to  sickness fund / 
insurance company 
 Out-of-pocket 
payment to providers 
 National health 
system 
 State ownership 
and control 
 Regional 
ownership and 
control 
 Local / 
municipal 
ownership and 
control 
 Private 
organizations 
having contracts 
with public 
authorities or 
sickness funds 
 Private 
independent 
service delivery 
Source: Vrangbaek, 2007, p.55 
 
Vrangbaek’s model makes a similar assumption to the Rondinelli model in that 
private sector involvement is considered a variant of decentralisation. It is also 
similar to the Arrows framework (Peckham et al, 2005) in that it seeks to address 
the “what” of decentralisation although it does not clearly distinguish between the 
“who” of decentralisation – who cedes power and who are the recipients. 
Significantly, Vrangbaek does note, like Peckham et al, that individuals might be 
such recipients.  
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In addition to indicating the ‘what’ of decentralizsation, the Arrows framework (with 
I-P-O) can indicate- at least heuristically- the degree of autonomy or ‘decision 
space’. While the conceptual volume of decision space is shown by I*P*O, it is not 
possible to calculate its precise volume as the ‘units’ of decentralisation are not 
clear,  and it is not clear whether the three dimensions should be equally weighted.  
In other words, the decision space is dependent on the constraints imposed by 
inputs, processes and outcomes, with the shape of the cube indicating the extent of 
constraint. For example, there is little constraint in the vertical dimension (input) in 
Figure 2.2. Financial resources are not a major issue, but the decision space is 
constrained by tight limits on process and outcome. Conversely, there is little 
constraint in the horizontal dimension (process) in Figure 2.2;.local health 
organizations are not constrained by process or how to achieve results, but there 
are tight limits on inputs and outcomes. 
 
Figure 2.2. Different Decision Spaces 
Fig. 2.2. Different decision spaces
combining Arrows Framework and Decision Space Framework
A. Cube dimensions:
• Input
• Process
• Outcome
B. Cube dimensions:
• Vertical (central‐local)
• Horizontal (local health 
economy)
Cube 1
Cube 2
1
 
Finally, most commentators (implicitly or explicitly) view decentralisation and 
decision space in vertical terms through a chain of command from the centre to the 
periphery. For example, the local government literature focuses on the degree of 
autonomy that local units have from the centre (eg Page 1991). However, according 
to Fleurke and Willemse (2004: 535), decentralisation or the distribution of 
responsibilities is organised not only vertically but also horizontally (Exworthy and 
Powell 2004; Pollitt 2005). In the ‘congested state’ (Skelcher 2000) or ‘governance’ 
(Rhodes 1997), local competitors or partners can constrain the room for 
manoeuvre. Organisations must increasingly compete for resources with those with 
whom they must also collaborate. For example, a Hospital Trust with a de facto local 
monopoly may be able to provide poor levels of service with little effective threat of 
exit, and so has high horizontal decision space.  A local health provider may not be 
able to provide a good integrated service because its social care partner is of low 
quality or has little real interest in partnership, and so has constrained decision 
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decision space. Hence, using figure 2.2 again, the dimensions of these cubes could 
also be seen in vertical and horizontal dimension; the former denoting central-local 
relations (the traditional configuration of decentralisation) and the latter denoting 
the horizontal relations with other organisations in the LHE. 
 
While decision making over the allocation of resources has been devolved to local 
commissioners (viz. PCTs and Practice Based Commissioners), their space for 
making decisions about the use of such inputs is constrained by local factors in 
terms of existing patterns of resource allocation, decisions by other local 
commissioners etc. Thus vertically, decisions have been decentralised but the room 
for manoeuvre is limited. Conversely local commissioners may not have much 
vertical autonomy about what they should do but local conditions mean they have 
more freedom to decide how they achieve this (Hoque et al, 2004). An example 
here might be the delivery of diabetic services where there are clear national 
guidelines and service frameworks but patterns of service delivery may vary 
considerably depending on a range of local circumstances and clinician interest. 
 
Putting these points together, it is not possible to regard autonomy or decision 
space in traditional one dimensional, vertical terms. Decentralisation needs to be 
viewed in three dimensions of inputs, process and outcomes, which combine to give 
different conceptual shapes and volumes of decision space. Furthermore, decision 
space can be constrained by horizontal as well as vertical relationships. It follows 
that individual periods and individual policies may contain a mix of centralisation 
and decentralisation, with different shapes and volumes of decision space cube. 
Frameworks for understanding decision space and autonomy are explored in the 
next section.  
 
 
2.2. Autonomy 
 
The long-standing interest in decentralisation within public sector reform and within 
academic communities has, in recent years, shifted towards policies and language 
that emphasise the development of autonomous organisations within the public 
sector. Autonomy, combined with some form of regulatory oversight, may enable 
governments to pursue many of the policy objectives attributed to decentralisation 
(such as efficiency) but represents a significant movement from the earlier 
approaches to public sector reform, inspired by neo-classical economics,   
 
 
2.2.1. What is Autonomy and how might it be conceptualised?  
 
The term autonomy has been widely used in organisational studies literature (eg. 
Andersen, 2000; Brooke, 1984). Often, it refers to autonomy from managerial 
oversight in the form of goal setting or supervision over operational decisions and 
therefore denotes greater discretion in common tasks and functions (McGrath, 
2001). Christensen (1999) defines autonomy as the formal exemption of an agency 
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manager from full supervision by a superior authority (possibly, political oversight in 
the form of a departmental minister). For example, Barber et al (2000) note the 
impact of reduced goal autonomy upon the (diminished) ability to specify the 
organisational objectives at the outset.  
 
(i) Organisational autonomy 
Discussions about autonomy emphasise the fact that the (English) health policy 
granting autonomy to PCTs and (some) Trusts has been highly specific in relation to 
organisational performance. First, the agents being granted autonomy are 
organisations rather than individuals such as managers or service users. (There are 
some recent developments in granting autonomy to individual service users in the 
form of direct payments although Patient Choice best illustrates this). Whilst it may 
appear problematic to grant autonomy to individual managers or clinicians in an 
NHS context, it is worth recalling two approaches where individual autonomy has 
been apparent. First, professional autonomy, which ascribes discretion to clinicians, 
can be defined as the entitlement to diagnose, treat and refer the clinician’s patient 
as s/he wishes within the limits of self-perceived competence and of the clinician’s 
perception of patient needs and available resources (Harrison, 1999, p.50). Harrison 
sees autonomy as pervasive through much of the history of the NHS though its 
dominance has come under greater attack in recent years. He argues autonomy is 
evident in three domains: official commitment to its preservation, in the formal 
organisation of the NHS and critically, in the practice of management. Second, that 
Enthoven (1985) originally proposed in his internal market model that contracts 
should be between the commissioner and individual hospital consultants. This did 
not come to fruition in the 1990s, but it would be feasible to introduce further 
decentralisation to sub-organisational levels. If one sees general practice as a sub-
organisational unit rather than an organization in its own right, it could be argued 
that PBC is one such form of further decentralisation.  Programme budgeting within 
PCTs might be another example; here, the proportion of the PCT budget which is 
spent on different areas of care is determined. It could follow that the authority and 
responsibility (hence, autonomy, according to Vancil (1979)) for such programme 
areas is allocated to dedicated managers. 
 
Given the high degree of inter-dependency between local NHS (and other) 
organizations, it might be possible to extend the notion of the decentralised unit of 
analysis to the LHE. Davies and Stamp (2001) from Addenbrookes Hospital had 
proposed the notion of an autonomous LHE in its proposal to create a `Foundation 
Economy’ based in the Cambridge area. Whilst the proposal was not accepted, it 
does indicate the potential for autonomy to be granted to different units. Indeed, 
the recent debate on system integration partly acknowledges this (Gleave, 2009). 
Granting autonomy to one organisation (and not another) in a highly inter-
dependent system might compromise its autonomy and/or negatively affect the 
non-autonomous organisations. On the one hand, it could be argued that the 
autonomous organisation `benefits’ directly as a result of the difference in local 
(organisational) autonomy; it enjoys greater decision-making freedom in the 
absence of competition from others. Autonomy thus becomes a zero sum game in 
which one agent’s loss of autonomy implies another’s freedom. On the other hand, 
it could also be argued that it cannot enjoy autonomy precisely because it is so 
reliant on the cooperation of others (for patient referrals funding, joint programmes 
in, say, service delivery or staffing). This is an argument about inter-dependence. 
The local context, it is thought, will determine the degree to which local inter-
dependencies shape the nature of autonomy (Exworthy, 1998). Some LHEs might 
be highly localised, with strong inter-dependencies and (as a result) contingent 
autonomy. Alternatively, other LHEs might be less localised, with weaker local ties.  
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In short, much will depend on how the LHE is defined, the extent of local (social and 
institutional) embeddedness including the degree of trust, reciprocity and mutuality 
between local organisations (see 1.4.).  Therefore, it might be disingenuous to 
assign autonomy to one organisation when it is reliant on others to achieve its 
performance.  
 
(ii) Conditional autonomy 
The second aspect of recent health policy in this area has been the emphasis on 
autonomy, conditional upon performance. Hence, decentralisation is not a `blanket’ 
approach, granting greater freedom in decision-making to all organisations; some 
public policy programmes have adopted this approach. However, as the 
performance culture in the public sector has taken hold (along the lines of the NPM 
(Ferlie et al, 2005)), autonomy (through decentralisation) has become much more 
contingent upon previous performance (according to national/central performance 
parameters). Thus, high performing organisations, the general policy approach 
posits, have demonstrated their ability to be responsible for their own governance 
and conduct, and are thus eligible to be granted more freedom in their decision-
making. Equally, low performing organisations cannot be trusted in the same way.  
If good performance is not random over time but tends to persist (Mannion et al, 
2005), then those organisations that exercise greater autonomy will be better 
performing organisations and so any simple comparisons between autonomous and 
non-autonomous hospitals will tend to favour the policy of autonomy (Anand, 
2009). 
 
This logic might be represented thus: performance (time period 2) is a function of 
the autonomy (enjoyed in time period 1) and the incentives available to the 
organisation.  
Pt2 = At1 * I 
Where P = performance, A= autonomy and I = incentives 
  
However, such logic begs the question: if autonomy is such a panacea of 
organizational sclerosis and rigidity, how can poorly performing organisations 
acquire sufficient `space’ to improve their performance? By definition, such 
organisations cannot improve because their autonomy its low. However, this 
assumption is based on particular notions of performance and autonomy which, will 
be shown later, require elaboration.  
 
(iii) Conceptual bases of autonomy 
Three broad sets of theories offer conceptual justification for autonomy to 
organisations. First, `political’ justifications for autonomy tend to orient around the 
key trade-off for political actors in institutional design which is the desire to steer 
local agents towards the production of politically desired outcomes whilst, at the 
same time, withdrawing from responsibility (particularly blame) for operational 
issues which they cannot control in much detail. This steering / rowing distinction is 
the hallmark of Osbourne and Gaebler’s (1992) thesis. This may be a tacit 
recognition that the centre never did or could `command and control’ but rather 
‘exhorts and encourages’ (Mohan, 1995; Powell, 1998). From a political perspective, 
autonomy is often aimed at inputs and processes whilst offering the prospect of 
some outcome control. Moreover, decentralisation (linked to autonomy) offers the 
possibility of making more explicit tensions within policy: for example, it may enable 
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centralisation of credit and decentralisation of blame thereby diffusing blame of 
systemic issues - a policy of divided and rule. 
 
Some explicit accounts of local autonomy in the context of decentralisation come 
from the literature on local government. For example, Hudson (1993) discusses the 
“capacity for local action” which can be “operationalised by four roles local 
government can play. These roles range from facilitating or accommodating local 
economy… and stimulating it… to activating economic activities… and interventions 
in the local economy…” (quoted Fleurke and Willemse, 2004, p.535). The 
democratic / political mandate of local government inevitably shapes the nature of 
how decentralised powers are exercised which Cole and Boyne (1995) conclude can 
lead to fragmentation and concentration. Similarly, Fleurke and Willemse (2004) 
refer to the “policy space left to local government’s own discretion” (p.527).  In his 
book “Decentralisation: managerial ambiguity by design”, Vancil (1979) was 
concerned with what was being decentralised. His view was that `real’ 
decentralisation is marked by the degree of autonomy in organisations – the extent 
to which organisations have a high degree of authority over particular functions and 
activities with limited responsibility (or accountability) to others (see figure 2.3.).  
 
Figure 2.3. Vancil’s model of autonomy 
 
Fig. 2.3. Vancil’s model of autonomy
Vancil (1979)
Autonomy
Authority
Responsibility
 
 
 
Second, the `economics’ justifications for autonomy within the public sector 
comprise a relatively novel application of established principles. These economic 
theories focus on the rationality of actor behaviour and the efficiency of the 
resulting outcomes. The neo-classical theory of production and markets, for 
example, specifies conditions under which inputs are used and outputs produced in 
ways that are optimal with respect to preferences (x-efficiency) and it is assumed 
that government or other centralised interventions impose constraints which 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 47  
prevent agencies from achieving optimal outcomes. A second related and 
widespread application (Propper, 1995) is the theoretical approach of principal-
agent analysis. Here, the emphasis is on the reasons why bureaucrats might not 
conform to what citizens or politicians desire. This analysis has encouraged the 
development of proposals that often amount to the refinement of economic 
incentives through, inter alia, the introduction of performance related pay or the 
promotion of (market-based) competition.  
 
The theoretical tenets of this approach lie in the fiscal federalism literature, which 
has its roots in economics and in particular in Oates’s (1999) decentralisation 
theorem. It offers an account on the financial dimension of local autonomy. The 
main argument is that all public goods and services for which there are no 
economies of scale and no spillovers across jurisdictional boundaries should be 
provided and funded by the local level of government. The assertion is based on the 
assumption of highly mobile households who “vote with their feet” and local 
authorities that compete to attract them by making choices tailored to local tastes 
thus maximizing social welfare.   
 
This framework focuses on the outcomes of decentralisation in terms of social 
welfare and offers a conceptualisation of how local authorities use their autonomy 
and of local decision making dynamics (Bossert, 1998). However this 
conceptualisation is only a partial account of local autonomy. First, the framework 
limits its analysis to the fiscal dimension of decentralisation and therefore does not 
allow an analysis of the range of `choices’ available to local authorities as a 
consequence of streams of decentralisation and centralisation in different functions. 
This weakness limits its applicability to context such as the NHS where the fiscal 
dimension (at least in terms of revenues) is not the dominant aspect of 
decentralisation policies. Second, by assuming rationality of local actors, it neglects 
the effects of local contingencies and context on the exercise of autonomy. 
 
Drawing on Saltman and Bankauskaite (2006) and Verhoest et al (2004), four types 
of efficiency can be identified which can be conceptualised in terms of their impact 
upon different types of autonomy. 
 Service Provision:   providing the `right’ mix (quantity and quality) of health 
goods and services 
 Input Mix: using an economically appropriate mix of resource inputs to produce 
goods and services  
 Technical Efficiency:  using all resources without waste  
 Dynamic Efficiency: adopting new technologies 
Employing three basic categories of autonomy – political, managerial and fiscal – it 
is possible to hypothesise the intuitive impacts of autonomy, as one form of 
performance (table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2. Autonomy-Performance Matrix 
Type of 
efficiency 
Political autonomy Managerial 
autonomy 
Fiscal autonomy 
Service 
offering 
Possibly substantial 
impact 
Possibly minimal 
impact 
Impact likely to 
depend on political 
autonomy 
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Input mix Impact depends on 
incentives 
Possibly minimal 
impact 
Possibly substantial 
impact 
Technical 
efficiency 
Impact depends on 
incentives 
Possibly minimal 
impact 
Possibly substantial 
impact 
Dynamic 
efficiency 
Impact depends on 
incentives 
Possibly minimal 
impact 
Possibly substantial 
impact 
 
Tentative conclusions can be drawn from this table. Managerial autonomy is the 
least likely type to have significant impact on any of the efficiencies.  However, 
whereas political autonomy is most likely to impact on appropriate service provision, 
fiscal autonomy seems most scope for allowing the service offering and input mix to 
be determined by local level actors. 
 
The assumptions underpinning the exercise of autonomy in practice can also be 
found in neo-institutionalism including principal-agent theory (Anand, 2009) and in 
political science which draws on notions of autonomy in the analysis of local 
democracy (Stoker, 2006). This theoretical approach focuses on the principal-agent 
analysis in which there is an emphasis on the reasons why bureaucrats might not do 
exactly what citizens or politicians would wish (Propper, 1995). This analysis has 
encouraged the development of proposals that often amount to the sharpening of 
economic incentives, for example by the introduction of performance related pay or 
the promotion of inter-organisational competition. 
 
Third, the justification for autonomy also draws on organisational studies; the 
concept of autonomy is widely used in the study of public organisations. Verhoest et 
al (2004) note the problems of attribution and data quality in such research 
(p.102). They conclude that three studies of autonomy focus on legal aspects of 
autonomy, on organisational dimension and on managerial / economics aspects. 
Verhoest and colleagues devise a conceptual model of autonomy which 
distinguishes between (i) autonomy as the level of decision-making competencies, 
and (ii) autonomy as the exemption of constraints on the actual use of decision-
making competencies (see table 2.3.).  
 
Their first type of autonomy relates to the discretion which organisations have in 
determining what they believe to be important. In the classic hierarchical 
organisations, agents receive instructions from higher authorities but yet, will have 
some discretion in the ways in which they conduct and enact these roles and 
functions. Such discretion can be sub-divided into managerial autonomy and policy 
autonomy – the former concerns exemptions from rules and regulations whilst the 
latter refers to the decisions about how it can manage inputs and achieve outputs.  
 
The second type of autonomy relates to the influence that governments (as superior 
authority) have over local agents. Christensen (1999) considers such influences in 
terms of  
 Structural autonomy: “the extent to which agency is shielded from influence by 
the government through lines of hierarchy and accountability” (Verhoest et al, 
2004, p.105) 
 Financial autonomy: the reliance on government for funding 
 Legal autonomy: the legal status of an agency as a an independent body 
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 Interventional autonomy: “the extent to which the agency is free from ex post 
reporting requirements, evaluation and audit provisions with respect to decisions 
and their outcomes” (Verhoest et al, 2004, p.106). If an organisation knows that 
its performance will be tightly controlled `from above’ (including the threat of 
sanctions if it does not perform), then it is likely that its actual and perceived 
sense of autonomy will be much reduced. Likewise, Hoque et al (2004) note that 
the goals externally set by central government are sufficiently numerous that 
autonomy may have limited bite; thus, the interventional autonomy is highly 
circumscribed.  
 
Table 2.3. Taxonomy of autonomy 
Autonomy as... Type Definition 
Managerial 
autonomy 
“Ex ante control on inputs by rules and 
ex ante approval of decisions or 
involvement in 
decisions concerning management of 
financial, human and organisational 
resources.” 
Decision-making 
competencies 
Policy autonomy “Ex ante control on processes or 
performance control by specifying ex 
ante rules, standards and norms 
concerning (in order of high control to 
low control) (1) processes, (2) policy 
instruments and (quantity and quality) 
of outputs, (3) and objectives and 
effects.” 
Structural 
autonomy 
“Control by influencing the agencies’ 
decisions through hierarchical and 
accountability lines towards the agency 
head or through the supervisory board” 
Financial autonomy “Control by influencing the agencies’ 
decisions by reducing or increasing the 
level of budget granted to the agency” 
Legal autonomy “Control by changing the legal status of 
the agency” 
Exemptions on the 
constraints on the 
actual use of 
decision making 
competencies  
Interventional 
autonomy 
“Control by influencing the agencies’ 
decisions by the means of reporting 
requirements, evaluation and auditing 
provisions against externally set goals 
and norms and by (the threat of) 
sanctions or direct interventions” 
Source: Verhoest et al, 2004 
 
In a similar vein, Mattei (2009) seeks to understand the significance for “managerial 
autonomy” of “accountability regimes.” She concludes that three aspects help 
explain the pattern of differences in such regimes (p.54-55): bureaucratic capacity, 
specialization and administrative coordination (see table 2.4.) 
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Table 2.4. Framework of accountability regimes  
 Significance for managerial autonomy 
Bureaucratic capacity 
Large structural capacity eg. 
Hospital 
Strong capacity for autonomous planning, 
supporting managerial autonomy 
Small structural capacity eg. 
secondary school 
Fewer opportunities to initiate new strategies 
and to develop alternatives from central policy. 
Managers become agents of central control 
Specialisation 
High fragmentation of tasks Serious information deficit and conflicts over 
policy content. Demand for coordination 
pushes conflicts resolution higher up the 
hierarchy. 
Low decoupling and de-
specialisation 
Weaker demand for internally centralised 
controls and managerial coordination 
Administrative coordination 
Collegial Decision-making occurs via negotiation and 
bargaining 
Hierarchical Decision-making occurs through command and 
control. Truncation of consultative layers. 
Adapted from Mattei, 2009, pp.54-55 
 
Analysis by Verhoest et al (2004) aids understanding of why the formal delegation 
of autonomy may not necessarily be realised in practice. They do so with reference 
to organisational performance. For example, organisations with similar structural 
autonomy (as in the case of FTs, for example) may have different levels of financial 
or interventional autonomy, Clearly, ambiguities, tensions and conflicts can and do 
arise when there are discrepancies between these different types of autonomy. As 
Verhoest et al (2004) argue, 
 
“A lot of organisations report that they have high levels of policy autonomy 
but low levels of managerial autonomy“ (p.111). 
 
The work of Verhoest et al (2004) and Christensen (1999) provide a useful back-
drop for applying notions of autonomy to the health service contexts. The previous 
work by the authors of this study (Peckham et al, 2005; Davies et al, 2005) also 
helps this process of translation. The work of Bossert (1998) and Mattei (2009) are 
also helpful in this regard.  For example, Mattei (2009) distinguishes autonomy in 
terms of: 
 Inputs: hiring decisions, investments and sale of assets 
 Outputs: volume of services and mix of services provided 
 Outcomes: public health targets 
 Processes: strategic management, financial management, setting user charges, 
clinical management). 
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This distinction echoes the I-P-O configuration in the Arrows Framework (Peckham 
et al, 2005). In addressing the ‘what’ of decentralisation, the Arrows (I-P-O) 
framework (discussed earlier in this chapter) can indicate- at least heuristically- the 
degree of local autonomy or ‘decision space’. While the conceptual volume of 
(vertical) decision space (autonomy) is shown by I*P*O, it is not possible to 
calculate its precise volume as the ‘units’ of decentralisation are not clear,  and it is 
not clear whether the three dimensions should be equally weighted.   
 
In the context of health-care organizations, Bossert (1998) provides a model of 
autonomy in terms of decentralisation. His `Decision Space Framework’ is a means 
to conceptualise the way in which the processes of decentralisation contribute to its 
apparent objectives, through the expansion of choice and hence, autonomy. 
Bossert’s model seeks “to explain the interaction between national context and local 
context in shaping local decision making which, in turn, shapes the local 
(organisational) performance” (Exworthy and Frosini, 2008, p.206). It does so by 
distinguishing between three elements: 
 “the amount of choice that is transferred from central institutions to institutions 
at the periphery of health systems,  
 what choices local officials make with their increased discretion and  
 what effect these choices have on the performance of the health system” 
(Bossert, 1998, p.1513).  
 
Figure 2.4. Decision Space Framework 
 
Fig.2.4. Decision Space Framework
Bossert 1988
National government
Increased decision space Incentives Centralised directed change
Local choices  Local context
Innovation No change
Change in performance?
1
 
 
“Decentralisation inherently implies the expansion of choice at the local level” 
(Bossert, 1998, p.1518); this has particular applicability here in terms of autonomy. 
The (extent and type of) choices that are permitted by higher authorities (usually 
central government) through rules and regulations effectively determine the 
`decision space’ (or rules of the game) that is available to local organisations. 
Beside this formal local `room for manoeuvre’, there is also a de facto space that 
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arises from, for example, the “lack of enforcement of these formal definitions” 
(p.1518; see also Fleurke and Willemse, 2004, p.529).  Clearly, the boundary 
between formal and informal decision space may be subject to conflict and 
negotiation. For example, local organisations may challenge the decision space 
granted by central government. Bossert (1998) applies the decision space across 
functional areas (such as finance or human resources) and (for simplicity) defines 
the decision space in each of these areas in terms of narrow, moderate or wide. The 
functional areas listed are those in which decisions are likely to affect the 
performance of the health system (loosely defined) in terms of  objectives such as 
equity and efficiency. Arguably, Bossert’s framework “conceptualises local autonomy 
mainly in the context of vertical decentralisation” (Exworthy and Frosini, 2008, 
p.205); it does not address the local governance or organisational inter-
dependencies, other than through the influence of “local context.” 
 
Incentives are included in Bossert’s framework as a mechanism which falls outside 
the formal decision space. Comprising individual and institutional rewards and 
sanctions, these incentives might include the conditional nature of inter-
governmental transfers (such as contingency funds) as well as “wide decision space 
itself” (p.1523) (such as professional autonomy). Sanctions might include 
governmental interventions. In short, the type and level of incentives affects the 
degree to which they contribute to shaping local decision making. 
 
 
2.2.2. How is autonomy meant to work in practice? 
 
This next part of this chapter discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the 
relationship between autonomy and performance. The relationships are underpinned 
by a set of assumptions and comprise incentives which reward or penalise local 
agents in pursuit of that particular objective. The following dimensions of 
performance are considered: technical efficiency, allocative efficiency and 
responsiveness, equity, accountability, and innovation.  
  
(i)Technical efficiency 
One of the assumptions is that autonomy leads to greater technical efficiency. 
Technical efficiency has been defined in various ways. For example, technical or 
productive efficiency is defined as the production of goods and services using the 
lower-cost combination of inputs (Hurley et al, 1995: 4). Kleinman et al (2002) 
state that technical efficiency refers to: 
 
“…maximising outputs (ideally outcomes) per input. Improving technical 
efficiency is about reducing waste, duplication and poor management so as 
to maximise the productive potential of a given range of inputs.” (p.17) 
 
Several rationales underline the relationship between autonomy and technical 
efficiency. Theoretically, the allocation of decision-making authority shapes 
constraints, demands and opportunities for “particular forms of behaviour” (Hales, 
1999, p. 839). In the classical bureaucratic hierarchical command and control 
arrangements, an actor receives instructions about what he/she is supposed to do 
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or has to ask for permission and approval before making decisions. This system 
serves the purpose of channeling the behaviour of the local manager towards 
desired actions or impeding undesired ones (Hales 1999; Thompson, 1993; 
Verhoest, et al,  2004). The allocation of decision-making authority to local 
managers changes these constraints and demands, creating a more “permissive” 
environment (Hales, 1999) in which local managers are free to experiment and 
innovate. In this new environment, decisions can be made quickly because local 
managers do not need authorisation or approval and the organisation is thus likely 
to be more adaptable and responsive (Child, 1977; Mintzberg, 1979; Vancil, 1979). 
Also, the removal of constraints and demands releases resources previously devoted 
to complying with central directions. Thus, autonomy implies less waste and a more 
efficient use of resources. Note that autonomy cannot guarantee efficiency gains. 
Decentralisation can also be inefficient as local (autonomous) organisations may not 
enjoy economies of scale and duplicate functions (that had been previously been 
conducted centrally).  
 
Furthermore, the allocation of decision-making authority defines whether there is a 
mismatch between information and decision rights. In a classical bureaucratic 
hierarchical system, those who make decisions are likely to be far removed from 
critical information. The implication is that information has to travel up through the 
layers of the hierarchy to reach those who make decisions. Yet, those who make 
decisions would be unlikely to have all the relevant local information. Conversely, 
the allocation of decision rights to local managers places decision-making authority 
where the information necessary to make decisions resides (Mintzberg, 1979). As a 
result, information processing requirements in the face of an organization’s limited 
information processing capacity are reduced (Galbraith, 1973; Scott, 2003). Since it 
does not require information to travel through limited processing channels 
(Galbraith, 1973; 1977), autonomy helps reduce the strain on organisational 
information processing capacity, thus increasing the efficiency of decision-making 
processes. Moreover, allowing decisions to be made by those who have information 
may facilitate the incorporation of local knowledge and experience in the decision-
making process, thus favouring decisions that are more effective and responsive to 
local circumstances (Child, 1977; Vancil, 1979).  
 
Finally, autonomy is viewed as a powerful motivator (Hales, 1999; Mintzberg, 
1979). Therefore, local managers are likely to have improved morale and be more 
satisfied about their jobs (Child, 1977; Vancil, 1979; McKnight et al. 2001). As a 
result local managers may have a greater commitment to the decisions they make 
and have greater determination to see them through (Hales, 1999). This would 
include pride, sense of ownership and a stronger local affiliation to individuals (eg. 
managers) and the organisation. 
 
(ii)Responsiveness and allocative efficiency 
Responsiveness has been identified as a key outcome indicator for health care 
systems by the World Health Organization (De Silva, 2000; Gostin et al., 2003). 
This focuses on the extent to which health care systems meet the needs of those 
receiving health care. There are eight dimensions to the WHO’s conceptualisation of 
responsiveness. The following dimensions are of interest here: 
• autonomy to participate in health-related decisions, 
• prompt attention, 
• clarity of communications to patients, 
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• access to social support networks and family and community involvement, and 
• choice of health care provider. 
 
Responsiveness also suggests, however, that resources are allocated in accordance 
with the need. In economic terms, efficient allocation of health care is when the 
health care system is producing exactly the quantity and type of health care that 
society wants – in this sense being most responsive to the distribution of needs.  
 
Responsiveness to local needs and priorities is a key consequence attributed to 
greater local room for manoeuvre. The main assumptions behind this claim is that 
greater local autonomy means that (a) decisions are made by those closer to and 
with a greater understanding of  local needs, and (b) there is greater flexibility to 
adapt to these local needs and preferences and greater innovation. Therefore 
decisions are more likely to reflect local needs and priorities. However, as with 
efficiency, local autonomy does not guarantee that local agents will be more 
responsive. By virtue of their reduced structural distance between decision-makers 
and users, it is more likely that they will respond to local needs and preferences. 
However, if responsiveness is the objective, then the incentives for 
unresponsiveness need to be more explicit. Hence, users’ decisions to exit the 
service, voice their concerns or remain loyal (Hisrchmann, 1970) must have real 
consequences for organisations, if responsiveness is to be realised. Local autonomy 
would enable to do so.  
 
(iii) Equity 
Improved equity is often presented as a positive outcome of decentralisation. The 
notion of equity is important in discussion of autonomy because it relates to the 
degree to which local agents are willing and able to exercise their newly acquired 
discretion to respond to local needs, and in doing so, introduce variations in the 
nature and type of services delivered locally. This is especially pertinent given the 
traditional centralised nature of the NHS and the overt `national’ dimension of 
British health-care.  
 
There are two basic assumptions concerning the impact of decentralisation upon 
equity but which contradict each other: one suggests that decentralisation improves 
equity, the other the converse. The first argument claims that decentralisation 
reduces equity (and/or increases inequality) by enabling greater variations / 
differences in access, provision or use (e.g. Kleinman et al. 2002, p.28; López-
Casasnovas, 2001, p.18; Rubio and Smith, 2004, p.4; Levaggi and Smith, 2004, 
p.6). This argument is probably the more common thesis for decentralisation. This 
argument relies on local agents exercising their autonomy to vary from 
national/central norms and practices. This therefore assumes that there is a 
minimal central coordinating function.  
 
The second argument claims that decentralisation increases equity (and reduces 
inequality) by giving local organisations the autonomy to respond more sensitively 
to the needs of previously marginalised groups (e.g. Bossert, 1998). As Levaggi and 
Smith, 2004) argue: 
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“Local governments may be better placed than national governments to 
ensure that resources are allocated equitably within their borders” (p.5). 
 
Decentralisation might also achieve:  
 
“Greater equity through distribution of resources towards traditionally 
marginal regions and groups.” (Bossert and Beauvais, 2002, p.14) 
 
To arbitrate on which argument can be sustained, one needs to recognise two 
caveats. First, there are multiple definitions of equity (used in policy documents) 
(Powell and Exworthy, 2003). The second concerns horizontal and vertical equity. 
Horizontal equity aims ‘to treat like cases alike’ (e.g. equal access for those in equal 
need) and vertical equity aims to treat ‘different individuals differently’ (e.g. 
allocating more resources to particular areas or groups; Powell and Exworthy, 2003, 
p.59).Third, much the debate hinges on where the goal of equity is pursued – at 
national or local levels. The impact of decentralisation upon equity depends on 
where equity is sought. It might deteriorate equity at the inter-group/area level but 
improve it at the intra-group/area level (Peckham et al, 2005). Fourth, the ability to 
exercise the autonomy generated by decentralisation may not enacted. Local agents 
may be socialised into centralised norms of behaviour, be inclined to conform to 
national equity principles and/or be risk-averse. 
 
Overall, Bossert’s (2000) conclusion that ‘decentralisation improves some equity 
measures but worsens others’ is commonly cited. Likewise, Janovsky (1997) found 
‘no clear evidence’ that decentralisation has increased equity. These conclusions 
hamper definitive conclusions about the equity consequences of decentralisation 
(Bossert and Beauvais, 2002, p.26). 
 
(iv) Accountability: 
Mattei (2009) argues that the NPM reforms which placed a central emphasis on 
“autonomisation” (p.35) also entailed a change in the political accountability of 
public services. She argues that this shift in accountability is highly patterned 
between sectors (say, health and education) and between countries. Traditional 
forms of public accountability had rested upon notions of elected representatives 
and/or a hierarchical line of (managerial) authority from the periphery to the centre. 
However, NPM reforms have tilted the balance of power away from such forms of 
accountability to a new regime in which local agents have greater autonomy (in 
certain domains) (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000).  
 
Yet, new forms of centralisation are apparent which seems to replace one form of 
accountability for another. The rise of performance management has been a central 
plank of the NPM and transforms the role of the centre. Indeed, new organisations 
have been created to `regulate the new relationships between the centre and the 
locality. In health-care, these include the Care Quality Commission (formerly, 
Healthcare Commission and prior to that, the Commission for Health Improvement 
and Audit) and the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). 
These new central institutions have mostly focused on the control of performance 
(through the definition of what `counts’ as good/poor performance and the ability to 
institute corrective action, should it be needed). Significantly, the re-centralisation 
of power to the centre can, it might be argued, re-locate power away from elected 
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representatives to a managerial notion of performance, enforced by a regulatory 
regime and informed by expertise (in the form of research evidence). In order for 
health policy based around performance and autonomy to be effective, it might 
require the combination of local managerial ability and willingness together with 
“institutionalised bureaucratic systems” and incentives (Mattei, 2009, p.53). In 
short, decentralisation cannot work effectively without (some degree of) 
centralisation. In the absence of the former, decentralisation can become a mode of 
control by the centre – a system of `divide and rule’ among disconnected local 
agents. 
 
The re-emphasis on centralisation is perhaps even more subtle than the re-
formation of central institutions. The decentralisation of authority and responsibility 
to disaggregated units, as part of the NPM programme, has, to a larger degree, 
fragmented the coordination and collaboration that previously existed between local 
organisations. Hence, the `re-discovery’ of the need for partnership, joined-up 
working, inter-agency cooperation and networks has occurred at around the same 
time that NPM reforms have taken effect. Whilst the ostensible aim of such local 
partnership working might be to improve “responsiveness” to service users and 
their needs, it does not necessarily follow that autonomy (acquired through 
decentralisation) would automatically generate such public responsiveness. Indeed, 
stronger partnerships could form a stronger institutional alliance to the detriment of 
service users. For example, the potential for `surveillance’ of individuals would be 
enhanced by such partnership. However, the reformed regime may not grant 
service users with sufficient `resources’ (eg. information) to hold autonomous 
agencies to account. Alternatively, autonomy could be used purely for 
organisational interests such as to maximise revenue, to protect their interests or to 
gain strategic advantage. To illustrate these points, Mannion et al (2007) found that 
chief executives of NHS organisations which were eligible for `earned autonomy’ did 
not seek autonomy necessarily for improving responsiveness to patients or the 
public. Rather, they sought much greater separation from the centre (in the form of 
performance monitoring and management) but also better access to policy-making 
machinery (presumably to influence it). There was some evidence that `earned 
autonomy’ would enable these chief executives to retain surplus to be reinvested for 
service developments. One opportunity of earned autonomy had been to `take over’ 
failing / poorly performing Trusts. This opportunity has become a possibility in 2009 
with the East of England SHA allowing the take over of the Bedfordshire  and Luton 
Health and Social Care Partnership Trust 
(http://www.hsj.co.uk/comment/leader/takeover-is-a-test-run-for-nervous-
bidders/5002017.article; 28 May 2009) and with the announcement that the “Top 
primary care trusts will be able to take over poor performing PCTs as franchises” 
(http://www.hsj.co.uk/news/primary-care/commissioning/best-primary-care-trusts-
to-get-franchise-on-rest/5002615.article; 11 June 2009) (see chapter 6). However, 
Mannion et al (2007) note that this aspect of autonomy has not previously been 
highly valued by managers.  
 
Furthermore, greater autonomy can lead to exactly the types of decisions which 
might not be tolerated by the centre. Allowing for the potential for difference (under 
claims of `responding to local need’ or `allowing managers to manage’) creates the 
possibility that these variations may run counter to the ethos of the wider 
institution. For example, whilst the “post-code lottery” may be seen as an unfair 
approach to determining priorities in the NHS, it can also be seen a a logical 
outcome of a system where decisions are taken locally, to reflect local needs and 
preferences. Such discretion in local decision-making is, however, becoming 
increasingly circumscribed by national guidelines based on (apparently) sound 
evidence.  For example, FTs have a list of `regulated services’ which it must provide 
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to NHS patients. Other limits of FT autonomy include a cap on the income from 
private patients, borrowing limits (security can only be given over unregulated 
assets), and close financial scrutiny (Allen et al, 2009).  Moreover,  managers may 
not wish to exercise their autonomy for various reasons including a lack of capability 
or capacity (to run their own affairs), a fear of the negative impacts upon partner 
agents/agencies, or an unwillingness to take the risks associated with greater 
autonomy (Hales, 1999; Exworthy et al, 2008). Hence, autonomy may assuage 
critics of unresponsive, bureaucratic organisations but it may (on its own) do little 
to enhance organizational accountability (Peters, 1992). Emergent evidence from 
Foundation Trusts seems to support this thesis. Aspects of public involvement, for 
example, have not been at the forefront of FT activity whilst most attention has 
been devoted by FTs’ governance of financial and organisational matters (House of 
Commons, 2008)  
 
(v) Innovation 
Both decentralisation and innovation defy easy definition, being complex concepts 
with multiple categorisations (Hartley, 2008). Mattei (2009) argues that autonomy 
is an essential component of innovation which has the potential to improve the 
performance of health-care organisations. Indeed, this notion has much support in 
the academic literature.  Decentralisation, it is claimed, creates incentives for 
innovation and experimentation (Hales, 1999; Levaggi and Smith, 2004, p.5, p.10; 
Malcolm et al, 1994; Oates, 1972). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) describe colourfully 
this opportunity for innovation:  
 
“Innovation happens because good ideas bubble up from employees, who 
actually do the work and deal with the customers” (p.253).  
 
However, the evidence in support of the connection between decentralisation and 
innovation is somewhat weak (Levaggi and Smith, 2004; Oates, 1999). Indeed, 
innovation, stimulated by decentralisation, might have adverse effects, as 
discovered by Moran (1994). Across the USA, UK, Scandinavia and Germany, 
institutional structures which encouraged innovation also generated health-care cost 
inflation. Moreover, as a publicly-funded health system, it might be seen as 
important to enable the lessons of innovation from (semi-)autonomous agencies to 
be shared with other publicly-funded organisations. This places a key role for the 
centre in fostering widespread adoption of innovation; indeed, Walker (2004) 
argues that many innovations are centrally-driven. This might also contradict a 
version of autonomy in which the benefits of autonomy accrue solely to the 
autonomous organisation; otherwise, there is a strong incentive to free-ride by 
poorly performing organisations. 
 
Innovation is often sought to pursue a strategic advantage over competitors. 
However, organisations should be able to reap the rewards for such innovation if 
this aspect of autonomy is to be realised. (Equally, the logic follows that 
organisations which are not innovative should suffer the disadvantage). The case of 
recruitment and retention of staff is one example of such how autonomy may affect 
innovation. Staff turnover can also hamper efforts to introduce and sustain 
innovation as it disrupts patterns of social and organisational knowledge. Recent re-
organisations in the English NHS have affected organisational memory. This 
problem is especially prevalent when “up to half of senior executives are likely to 
spend less than two years in the same post” 
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(http://www.hsj.co.uk/news/workforce/startling-senior-executive-turnover-stifles-
nhs-innovation/5002834.article; 18 June 2009).  
 
One way in which the notions of autonomy and innovations may be conceptualised 
is through Pettigrew and colleagues (1996) notion of `receptive context.’ 
Innovations, it is claimed, cannot prosper unless there is a conducive environment. 
Context, Pettigrew et al argue, refers to both the inner and outer context which 
concerns the internal organisational systems and the external environment. In this 
sense, innovation can be seen as an incentive by which autonomy can be translated 
into improved performance  Walker and Damanpour (2008) claim that “the adoption 
of innovation is intended to contribute to the organisation’s effectiveness 
[performance] by changing the adopting organisation so that it can respond to new 
conditions in its external environment” (p.220).  
 
 
 
(v)The role of context 
The discussion of autonomy and its relationships with performance so far views 
decision space mainly in vertical terms – the relationship between the centre and 
the locality. Though this dimension undoubtedly remains crucial, other scholars 
argue that decentralisation also needs to be viewed horizontally. As Fleurke and 
Willemse (2004) state 
 
“…decentralisation or the distribution of responsibilities is organized not only 
vertically but also horizontally” (p.535)  
 
Putting these points together, it is not possible to regard autonomy or decision 
space in the traditional one dimensional,  vertical terms. In terms of decision space, 
this is a function of the amount of autonomy allowed vertically. However, whatever 
the amount of vertical autonomy available, organisations are embedded in a local 
context where other organisations operate and are therefore faced with inter-
organisational complexity (Exworthy and Frosini, 2008). The implication of this is 
that the characteristics of the  local environment is likely to shape both the 
incentives an organisation faces and its effective room for manoeuvre, in turn 
influencing the outcomes of decentralisation. In other words, the ability and 
willingness to exercise autonomy and act upon incentives must take account of the 
local context and the degree of inter-dependencies in the locality. Ability to exercise 
autonomy may be derived from formal granting of this freedom but it may equally 
be derived from informal sources relating to trust. `Lighter touch’ performance 
management of a provider by an SHA exemplifies this. An unwillingness to exercise 
autonomy might be indicative of senior officials’  
“view of risk (aversion to it) given their greater degree of financial exposure, 
the uncertainty associated with the new policy environment (including on-
going features of centralisation) and the impact that their decisions might 
have upon other local organisations” (Exworthy et al, 2008). 
 
In the context of decentralised health-care, Atkinson et al (2000) explicitly discuss 
the horizontal dimension of local autonomy in accounting for the “different spaces 
for autonomy” (p.626) in Brazil and the ability of local groups and individuals to 
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exercise their `voice’ in health planning and policy. In the context of health-care in 
Brazil, they argue that increased autonomy over decision-making plus participation 
from the local population will generate greater responsiveness to local needs, 
accountability and ultimately quality of care and social development.  
 
In addition, the authors recognise that the local context, in terms of “social 
organisation and political culture” (p.626) influences the actual space available 
locally and the processes through which this space influences responsiveness, 
accountability and quality of care. In accounting for the “different spaces for 
autonomy” (p.626) in Brazil, Atkinson et al (2000) found three different aspects of 
local context that affect autonomy: sources of income, local government decisions, 
and capacity for information to inform planning. The processes through which 
autonomy works are in turn  shaped by “personal and institutional influences”, viz. 
management style, personalised leadership, individual and collective behaviour 
patterns, degrees of personal involvement, and commitment and continuity.` 
 
The horizontal dimension in analysis of decentralisation is further reinforced by two 
distinct perspectives: (a) governance and networks, and (b) inter-organisational 
dependencies. Both have implications for local autonomy and decision space. The 
governance literature refers the dynamic interaction between and co-existence of 
collaboration and competition (Exworthy et al, 1999; Newman, 2001; Rhodes, 
1997). For example, to achieve their objectives, organisations must increasingly 
collaborate with other agencies, over whom they have no direct or immediate 
authority. Yet, at the same time, they must also compete with these other agencies 
for resources (eg. financial resources from government and human resources from 
the labour market).  
 
The inter-organisational literature emphasises the influencing effects of (other) local 
organisations upon one organisation’s autonomy. The main tenet of this literature is 
that organisations are embedded in systems of inter-dependencies that are 
generated by an organisation’s need to achieve its objectives and survive (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Thomson, 1967). These inter-dependencies vary in nature and 
intensity, including institutional linkages, financial flows, patient flows, and 
collaborative and cooperative initiatives   (Oliver, 1991; Goes and Ho Park, 1997) 
and may be more or less intense, temporary or longstanding. Inevitably, to a 
greater or less extent, an organisation’s autonomy is affected by these 
dependencies (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Milward and Provan, 1988). 
 
Notwithstanding the inquiry into the interaction between human agency and wider 
structural forces, there is a growing literature on the role that context plays in 
shaping local decisions. For example, Pawson and Tilley (1997) identify outcomes 
(eg. performance) as the interaction between context (organisational and spatial) 
and mechanisms (such as decisions or policies). The configuration of context, 
mechanisms and outcomes are dynamic, interactive and specific. By contrast, 
Pettigrew et al (1992) describe the interaction between context, content and 
process. They distinguish between inner (local) and outer (national, structural) 
context. In terms of local autonomy, the decision space afforded vertically by 
government and horizontally by local organisations shapes both the context within 
which local agents make decisions and the content/mechanisms which are 
implemented (ie. the properties being decentralised or centralised). The resulting 
performance of local organisations can be seen as a function of both the formal 
metrics (eg. performance indicators) and the informal aspects (such as reputation). 
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In summary, decentralisation viewed in this way reinforces its conception as a 
process, not simply as a product. The processes of vertical and horizontal 
decentralisation and other local context dimensions define the “room to manoeuvre” 
available to local managers  
 
The factors that comprise this local dimension of autonomy include the spatial and 
organisational characteristics of the LHE, financial status, embeddedness of social 
and institutional relationships, organizational capacity and centralised legacy 
(Exworthy and Frosini, 2008). 
 Spatial and organisational characteristics of the LHE: The geographical context of 
organisations will shape their willingness and ability to exercise autonomy. For 
example, the 152 PCTs cover very different geographical areas. Some will cover 
urban areas with multiple local NHS and independent providers, often with more 
deprived populations. 
 Financial status: The financial performance of local organisations, in a centrally-
funded system with strong political involvement, might affect the decision space 
enjoyed by these organisations.  Also, local organisations will very in terms of 
their dependency on others for funding (through commissioning). Exworthy and 
Frosini identified “in one LHE in southern England (fiscal year 2005–2006)” that 
“one hospital provider received 38% of its revenues from the local PCT whereas 
the other two providers received over 80%” (p.209).  
 Embeddedness of social and institutional relationships: Networks of individuals 
and organisations build up in LHEs over time to such an extent that they 
accumulate a high level of tacit knowledge that supports their decision-making, 
especially in areas which lack full or detailed information (Exworthy, 1998). Such 
networks can build trust, reciprocity and mutuality which may prevent departures 
from the status quo. Thus, despite autonomy, individuals and organisations may 
be unwilling to exercise such autonomy.  
 Organisational capacity: Decentralisation creates a flatter organisational 
hierarchy with fewer tiers. As the centre `loses’ control (in some respects), it 
must reform itself by changing its systems of processes of control. Equally, the 
newly autonomous local organisations must develop the skills and competencies 
to exercise new decision-making powers. Often, these are lacking. 
Decentralisation could replicate small scale management arrangements in each 
autonomous unit, with a loss of overall coordination and higher transaction costs.  
 Centralised legacy: Though many claim that decentralisation frees local 
managers from central control, many such managers remain beholden to the 
centre, either because they have become inured to centralisation, are risk-averse 
(in a new autonomous climate) and/or anticipate on-going centralisation (despite 
ostensible decentralisation). They may also reject the entrepreneurial spirit of 
decentralisation (not least because it has been closely associated with 
marketisation and other NPM principles). Local managers may thus feel that they 
are a bastion of bureaucratic rule and consistency in an increasingly variegated 
and diverse system. Such ideas have close conceptual and practical connections 
with convergence theories, path dependency and coercive isomorphism (Greener, 
2002). 
 
 
2.2.3 Autonomy and performance 
 
Much of the literature that focuses on autonomy or decentralisation has 
demonstrated that there are a number of dimensions on which autonomy can be 
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measured and these generate different kinds (and levels) of autonomy  Some of the 
literature has deployed taxonomies of autonomy and/or decentralisation to illustrate 
this. These dimensions can interact in ways that give rise to a complexity that defies 
simple descriptive conclusions about the extent of autonomy or degree of 
decentralisation. Additionally, some of the literature has sought to determine the 
outcomes (and their determinants) of decentralisation and autonomy. The next 
section to this chapter explores the `performance’ dimension in detail.  
 
The alignment of autonomy with performance is significant because it is founded on 
an apparently unambiguous definition and measurement of performance. The 
development of earned (conditional) autonomy and Foundation Trust status in the 
NHS are variants of the traditional justifications of decentralisation generally and 
autonomy specifically. The policy initially began (DH, 2000) in terms of earned 
autonomy for 3 star Trusts but since June 2004, has expanded into Foundation 
Trust policy. In time, this is expected to cover all NHS Trusts. As of June 2009, 121 
Trusts had acquired FT status, over 50% of all NHS Trusts. Acute Trust account for 
52 of the 120 FTs and the SHA with the most FTs is the North-West (24) whilst 
South-East Coast only has 6 FTs. (http://www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/).  
 
By offering NHS Trusts that perform “well” the opportunity to become more 
autonomous, central government (in theory) allows `room’ for growth as 
autonomous Trusts are allowed to expand their activities more freely. In practice, a 
regulatory regime (in the form of Monitor and Competition Panel) has been 
introduced which effectively limits this scenario. Equally important, the finance and 
organisational relationships within the LHE might inhibit such entrepreneurialism. 
The `autonomy’ policy also comprises an inherent selection bias; high performing 
Trusts have tended to be more likely to apply for FT status (not least because prior 
performance was one of the selection criteria). This bias complicates comparisons 
between FTs and non-FTs.  This issue is very similar to the 1990s policy of Self-
Governing Trusts and GP-fund holding according to which better performing group 
practices were in effect selected to be fund-holders thereby encouraging a 
conclusion that funding-holding was itself desirable (Anand, 2009). There may also 
be a political benefit in that the earning of autonomy could place more responsibility 
for autonomous status on Trusts themselves, thereby giving rise to fewer objections 
from the service itself; blame is thus effectively decentralised to autonomous 
agents. However, if all Trusts become FT, the concern with performance still 
remains (see above) unless the government is satisfied that overall performance is 
above a threshold/minimum.  
 
 
2.3. Performance 
 
This section considers the significance of performance in managing the relationships 
within LHEs. It outlines the way in which notions of performance have become 
central to the management of the NHS, locally and nationally. It presents a 
distinction between formal and informal influences upon performance. The 
conceptual analysis provides a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which 
local agents understand and act upon information relating to the performance of 
their and other organisations. These issues are explored in relation to empirical 
evidence in chapter 4.  
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2.3.1. Decentralisation and performance 
Bankauskaite and Saltman (2007) argue that “the evidence regarding the ability of 
decentralisation to achieve its objectives is complex and ambiguous” (p.15). The 
`performance’ of decentralisation is not straightforward, not least because 
decentralisation itself is a complex concept, and is heavily influenced by contextual 
factors.  
 
Peckham et al (2005) examined decentralisation in terms of its performance of the 
following nine dimensions: outcomes, process, humanity, equity, staff morale and 
satisfaction, allocative efficiency (responsiveness), adherence (to guidelines), 
technical (productive) efficiency, and accountability. The assumptions underpinning 
the association between each measure and decentralisation, the theoretical 
propositions and the quality of evidence is enumerated in table 2.5. 
 
 
Table 2.5. Decentralisation and performance in health services: 
assumptions, theoretical propositions and quality of evidence 
Assumptions Theoretical 
propositions 
Quality of 
evidence 
Performance 
measures 
I P O I P O I P O 
Outcome 
measures 
+ - +    + + + 
Process 
measures 
+ + + ?  ? / + ? 
Staff morale + + + ?   / ? - 
Humanity ? + ? / / / ? ? - 
Equity -/+ -/+ -/+    + + + 
Alloc. efficiency + + +    ? ? ++ 
Tech.efficiency + + +    ++ + + 
Adherence - - - ? ?  ? ? + 
Accountability + + +    ? / ++ 
I/P/O: Input / Process/ Outcome 
Assumptions: +, Improved organisational performance; −, worsened 
organisational performance; ?, unclear. 
Theoretical propositions: , Support the assumptions in previous column; ?, no 
clear link between theory and assumption; /, no theoretical proposition. 
Quality of evidence: Evidence: ++, strong; +, moderately strong; −, moderately 
weak; ?, mixed quality; /, insufficient. 
Source: Peckham et al, 2005, p.78  
 
Vrangbaek (2007) presents “performance-related arguments for decentralisation” 
(p.64). He divides these into (dis-)advantages of centralisation and decentralisation 
(p.68) and input / throughput / output (p.64) (tables 2.6. and 2.7.). 
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Table 2.6. Performance of centralisation and decentralisation compared 
Centralisation 
advantages 
 Provides clear steering signals 
 Facilitate standardisation of process and products 
 Improves predictability in organisational practice 
Decentralisation 
disadvantages 
 
 Risk of sub-optimality as decision entities focus on their own 
performance 
 Lack of coordinated steering impulses 
 Inappropriate diversity in practice and standards 
 Reduce comparability and predictability at system level 
Source: Vrangbaek (2007) 
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Table 2.7. Performance-related arguments for decentralisation 
Clear link between decision-makers and user Input-related  
Differentiated services 
Efficiency: coordination problems occur with increasing 
size; facilitates use of knowledge and experience of local 
staff; improves flexibility; motivate employees  
Throughput-related / 
process-related 
Experimentation 
Output-related Empowerment: counter-balance to central power and 
decision-making 
Source: Vrangbaek (2007) 
  
In this section, the notion of `performance’ is not used at a macro level in terms of 
the effectiveness of decentralisation. Rather, the notion is considered problematic in 
itself. The focus is on the ways in which the performance of (semi-)autonomous 
organisations is managed and affected by incentives.  
 
 
2.3.2. The centrality of performance in public management 
 
It has become axiomatic that new public management (NPM) introduced new 
notions of performance which elevated the concept of efficiency to a pre-eminent 
position. Talbot (2005) argues that the “performance tide” is intimately linked with 
the trends of NPM in the latter half of the 20th century. Exworthy and Halford (1999) 
describe the aspects of NPM reforms which related to new parameters of 
performance:  
 
“Significant changes have included the imposition of new arrangements of 
financial accountability and the measurement of effectiveness (Exworthy and 
Halford, 1999, p.3). 
 
The evolution of NPM has, according to some commentators, evolved into a post-
bureaucratic position whereby new forms of control are exercised (Hoggett, 1996). 
Such control has, it is claimed, been marked by more remote / distal agents, 
greater use of IT (transmitting the performance information) and the inculcation of 
behaviour and norms (by local staff) which effectively provide self-enforcement 
(Newman, 2005). Performance measurement and management can also be seen in 
terms of the wider group of strategies used by government to improve services. 
These include the use of competition, citizen / user engagement and organisational 
development (Hartley and Skelcher, 2008, p.12). Of these, only organisational 
development may be seen as internal, the others being external (Hodgson et al, 
2007) 
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Notions of performance have been seen as critical to the NPM emphasis on 
improvement. NPM was accorded a revolutionary zeal by many politicians, policy-
makers and some practitioners in being able to transform public services through a 
greater focus on managing performance. The professionalisation of many public 
services inevitably posed a challenge to the introduction of the NPM performance 
regime (Exworthy, 1994). Traditionally, professionals (individually and collectively) 
had been responsible for setting standards of acceptable performance, monitoring 
those standards and taking (remedial) action, where necessary. On all three counts, 
though to varying degrees, NPM challenged professions in managing `their’ 
performance. For example, by changing notions of what performance meant, public 
managers were also able to challenge professions. That said, professions have 
sought to re-present their practice in the light of public research evidence, largely 
as a counter-balance to managerial notions (Exworthy et al, 2003).  
 
The NPM focus on performance in the last 20 (or so) years has involved the creation 
of new organisations and new processes (such as OFSTED in schools, QAA in Higher 
Education and Healthcare Commission (now Care Quality Commission) in health)  
(Hodgson et al, 2007). As a result of these, new institutions and processes, a series 
of “adaptive expectations” have been generated. For example, notions of `quality’ 
in general practice have become re-defined in terms of the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF). Whilst it could be argued that such performance systems open 
the possibility of `gaming’ (deliberate manipulation of data for ulterior purposes), it 
might equally be claimed that this behaviour illustrates the importance which 
practitioners place on such systems (Wilson et al, 2006). 
 
Despite the on-going focus on performance as a tool of service improvement and 
managerial control, there have been significant shifts in the role that performance 
has played in most public services and notably health-care (Harrison, 2008):  
 Formative to summative: Initially many performance schemes (such as medical 
audit) were developmental and educational. Such schemes have been more 
summative in becoming regulatory and managerial. The shift has thus been from 
`teacher to cop.’ Allied to this shift, the focus has moved from voluntary to 
compulsory schemes which have become more judgemental. This shift has been 
manifest since around 2000 when, for example, the star ratings were introduced.   
 Managerial motivation: There has been a shift from intrinsic motivation to 
extrinsic motivation whereby the value of performance has ostensibly been for 
improving services. However, more recently, the extrinsic focus introduces more 
(possibly, nefarious) motives related to competition and income generation, for 
example. 
 Extensiveness: Whereas performance measures were initially confined to 
administrative and organisational measures, there has been a growing reach of 
performance into more clinical domains. This has been most apparent with the 
introduction of the QOF in 2004 and more recently, by the publication of 
mortality data on the Healthcare Commission website 
(http://2008ratings.cqc.org.uk/findcareservices/informationabouthealthcareservi
ces/overallperformance.cfm) and NHS Choices 
(http://www.nhs.uk/Pages/HomePage.aspx). Similarly, in education, Wilson et al 
(2006) identify three types of performance measures: (i) level (the traditional 
“raw” data of output scores), (ii) changes (improvements of successive cohorts”) 
and (iii) gains (“measure of progress in one cohort”). The third of these has 
measured “context value added.” Alongside this development, there as been a 
shift from organisational to individual level data. Significantly, much of these 
data is no longer anonymised, but named. This extensiveness has been 
accompanied by greater ability to compare organisations.  
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 Plurality: Professional groups have largely lost the ability to retain control of their 
performance data not simply to managerial and regulatory groups but to the 
wider world in terms of patents and the media. Much of this plurality has been 
aided by Freedom of Information.  
 
In defining the scope of “performance”, it is worth noting that attention has also 
been given to “conformance” – changes in performance against pre-defined 
standards. (Conformance might also refer to expectations and norms). Whilst this 
approach may have some appeal, it overlooks whether the standard itself is 
appropriate, whether current performance levels can be sustained and neglects the 
role of systemic / environmental factors (Hartley and Skelcher, 2008, p.10). 
Freeman and Peck (2007) identify tensions between, on the one hand, conformance 
(“careful stewardship of resources”) and performance (“strategic value through risk 
taking”), and on the other hand, between monitoring and control (vertical) and 
developing partnerships (horizontal)(p.911).  
 
 
2.3.3. A history of performance in the NHS  
 
The Labour government’s use of both performance measurement and performance 
management have now become a ubiquitous feature of the NHS (Greener, 2008a; 
Johnson, 2006). However, the idea of ‘performance’ has a much longer history and 
needs to be set in the context of understanding relationships between professional 
groups in healthcare and the state, as well as in terms of the changing role of 
administrators and managers in healthcare. 
 
● The creation and establishment of the NHS 
At the creation of the NHS, performance was not a concept that was considered as 
being of particular importance. Policy-makers, health-care professionals and health-
care administrators were far more concerned with getting the newly created NHS to 
work than to deal with the finer points of how well it was being run (Honigsbaum, 
1989). Klein’s analysis of the relationship between the state and the medical 
profession is of particular importance in understanding how the health-care system 
worked at this time. Klein (1990) uses the metaphor of the ‘double bed’ to show the 
mutual dependence of the state on the medical profession, which it required to run 
the health service operationally, and of the medical profession on the state, which 
had become with the creation of the NHS the de facto monopoly employer of the 
medical profession in the UK. This relationship came with a ‘concordat’, that the 
state would effectively leave the doctors to run health services as they saw fit, in 
return for accepting that the state be left to set the overall budget for the service. 
This does not mean that the relationship between the medical profession and the 
government of the day was a harmonious one (see for example, Ross, 1952), but it 
does capture the flavour of the prevailing dynamic of the NHS at the time of its 
creation.  
 
The mutually dependent relationship between the state and the medical profession 
meant that the state effectively decentralised the running of health-care to the 
doctors left to run health services in their own specific organisation. Present day 
accounts of the history of health services (Ruggie, 1996; Secretary of State for 
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Health, 1997, 2000) have sometimes suggested that the NHS represented a 
‘command and control’ system at its founding, but this view is entirely mistaken. 
Central policy-makers took responsibility for the results of the NHS – hence Bevan’s 
aphorism about every dropped bedpan in the NHS ringing in the corridors of 
Whitehall – but they had very little idea what was going on in the hundreds of 
health-care organisations that represented the NHS, and very little practical means 
of control over them. The early years of the NHS were largely a case of the DH 
attempting to govern (by exhortation) via the use of circulars sent to health-care 
organisations, with very little idea of whether its requests were being carried out or 
not (Klein, 2006). 
 
Within a decade of the creation of the NHS, the Conservatives had instigated an 
inquiry into the costs of health-care, prompted by the difficulties the NHS had 
encountered in remaining within budget in its early years. The resulting report of 
the Guillebaud inquiry (Ministry of Health, 1956) absolved the NHS of being 
profligate, but did make observations about the lack of information the government 
appeared to be receiving about the everyday activities of the NHS. It suggested that 
the Department needed to employ specialist health economists to begin to collect 
and analyse information, a recommendation that was acted upon, but still with 
remarkably little effect. 
 
By the end of the 1950s, with the Conservatives still in power, Enoch Powell became 
Minister of Health. Powell’s tenure is best remembered for his Hospital Plan (Minister 
of Health, 1962), but Powell also wrote a book about his experiences as health 
minister where he expressed considerable frustration at the difficulties of attempting 
to find out what was actually going on in the NHS: 
 
“The attempts to find satisfactory measurements of yardsticks of 
performance have been persistently baffled. Enormous effect has been 
lavished during the twenty years of the National Health Service on the 
collection of statistics of hospital activity, and on the search among them for 
the means making valid comparisons, within the service itself and between 
the service and other systems. It is a search I myself engaged in with the 
freshness of hopefulness of inexperience only to be driven into recognising 
reluctantly that the search itself was inherently futile. The most carefully 
constructed parallels between one hospital and or hospital group and another 
dissolved on closer examination into a baffling complex of dissimilarities. 
Every attempt to apply a common standard had the effect of disclosing a 
deeper level of individual differences and incommensurables.” (Powell, 1966, 
p.52-3) 
 
Powell’s frustration was not simply a function of his individual experience as 
Minister, but also represented the orthodoxy in terms of the way that academics 
considered public organisations at that time (Dunsire, 1999). Public organisations 
were regarded as having outputs that were too difficult to measure to make any 
attempt worthwhile. Was the output of the NHS to be measured in terms of how 
many patients it treated, how long its waiting list was, or how healthy the 
population of the UK appeared to be? Given the inherent difficulties in measuring 
health-care organisations, performance measurement was regarded as being a task 
that required the careful tacit judgement of doctors rather than the use of hard 
(quantifiable, comparable) performance measures (Carter, Klein & Day, 1992). The 
lack of easy performance measures also tended to reinforce the organisational logic 
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that the state leave the doctors to run health services, despite increasing concerns 
in the 1960s about the sums being spent on health-care, especially as the medical 
profession became more militant in demanding increased pay awards (Rivett, 
1998). 
 
●  NHS reform 
The first organisational reform of the NHS took place in 1974 after over a decade of 
debate as to how health services could be better organised (Greener, 2008). It was 
important in the story of performance because of its attempt to begin to introduce 
performance measures into health-care. In the wake of the reforms, steering groups 
were set up to examine how health-care information might be better managed and 
statistics generated from it. The ‘Korner group’, named after its chair Edith Korner, 
reported in 1982 (Steering Group on Health Services Information (Korner Report), 
1982). The resulting performance indicators were introduced through the 1980s, 
and were picked up as a potentially important area of the future by prescient 
commentators. Pollitt (1985) noted that the measures had the potential to 
challenge clinical practice even though little impact had been made so far, and 
Bloomfield (1991; Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992) examined how coding systems had 
the potential to become sites of conflict between managers and clinicians over 
definitions of care, but also noted that the introduction of the performance 
indicators, in themselves, appeared to have been accepted by clinicians. This meant 
that doctors appeared to accept the legitimacy of performance indicators, and even 
that they might be co-opted to improve clinical practice. This appeared to represent 
a potentially centralising inroad into the very localised approach to clinical practice 
that had previously dominated through the possibility of greater monitoring and 
evaluation of NHS information. 
 
As the 1980s wore on, the ‘Griffiths’ NHS reforms (Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1983) came into effect, directly challenging the right of doctors to run 
their local health organisations by upgrading the formerly administrative roles in the 
NHS to those of managers. The Griffiths’ report suggested that health-care 
managers had to become accountable for the running of health services as Griffiths 
claimed he could presently find no-one `in charge.’ The new managers were 
analysed as terms of being corporate ‘rationalisers’ (Alford, 1972, 1975), 
challenging doctors, and with the new performance indicators as a means by which 
they might hold doctors to account (Gabe, Kelleher & Williams, 1994). As such, the 
combination of Griffiths and performance indicators gave an appearance of the 
potential of greater centralisation and control as the DH would be able to not only 
access more information about the NHS’s activities, particular seeking outliers in the 
indicators, but also be able to hold managers accountable for these differences. At 
the same time, however, the logic of the Griffiths reforms was very much 
decentralising – of making local managers accountable to local people and arguing 
that the Department should have much more of a general overseeing role than 
getting involved in the day-to-day operations of health-care. Perhaps it was this 
tension that meant that, by the end of the decade, the reforms appeared not to 
have led to a transformation in the way the health service operated (Harrison, 
1988). By the end of the decade, the NHS internal market was retrospectively 
explained by its creators as being a series of reforms not primarily about markets, 
but about giving NHS managers greater legitimacy in their challenge to the medical 
profession (Ham, 2000).  
 
The 1980s were also the decade in which information technology became more 
widespread, so creating the possibility for information to be gathered in a more 
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systematic and widespread manner than before. Whereas, in the 1960s, it was 
impossible to gather and analyse the vast amount of information health services 
produce, the availability of cheap personal computers made both feasible. The NHS 
was very slow at working out the potential of information technology (Scrivens, 
1985), but as personal computers became more widespread by the end of the 
1980s, the role of Director of Information was created in many hospitals, and, 
alongside the need to gather increasing amounts of information for the contracting 
process in the internal market, it became more and more possible to assemble 
comparative performance information about health services. 
 
In the 1990s, however, data from performance indicator were perhaps more 
significant outside of health-care organisations than in them. After the uproar over 
the NHS internal market, health-care went through something of a becalming 
(Wainwright, 1998) with the effects of the market becoming tempered by the 
Conservative government becoming concerned not to antagonise the still respected 
and vocal doctors further (Ham, 2000). What the government did do, however, is 
attempt to move performance measures into a more consumerist mode by 
publishing them in leaflets that were available to the public (such as the Patients’ 
Charter) (NHS Executive, 1994). However, the incentives on poorly performing 
health organisations as a result of their publication were often weak, with stories 
often being run in local newspapers as results appeared, but with little sanction for 
poorly performing health organisations as a result. 
 
In short, performance management techniques increased through the latter periods 
of the NHS (in common with wider NPM trends). “Performance targets and the 
linking of such targets to the resources allocated by Treasury to government 
departments” had become common by the time a Labour government was elected 
in 1997 (Wilson et al, 2006, p.154; see also Hartley and Skelcher, 2008). 
 
●  Labour government and performance 
Labour were elected in 1997 with a promise to reduce NHS waiting lists by 100,000 
as one of their pledges designed to restore trust between the public and politicians 
(Labour Party, 1997). Their first policy document was designed to increase quality 
in the NHS through a more partnership-driven approach, with claims that the 
market of their predecessors had been divisive and expensive (Secretary of State 
for Health, 1997). There appeared therefore to be no particular emphasis on 
centralising health services, and a rhetoric suggesting that it was the front-line staff 
of the NHS that knew how to run health services best.  
 
By 2000, and with the government apparently frustrated with a lack of progress 
towards the waiting list target and with health reform more generally (Giddens, 
2002), a very different focus on policy appeared (Exworthy and Greener, 2008). 
The publication of the NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 2000) instigated 
performance management in UK health-care for the first time. Performance was not 
simply being measured now, but actively managed. The Performance Assessment 
Framework was originally designed around a traffic light system (red, amber, 
green), with poor performers to be publicly sanctioned, but also potentially facing 
their management teams being removed. High performing organisations, in 
contrast, were promised a lighter touch inspection regime and access to additional 
funds. By the time the first round of performance league tables were published a 
year later (Department of Health, 2001), the measurement system had changed to 
one of ‘star ratings’, and resulted in considerable media discussion and debate. 
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Either way, performance management was being used in a way that centralised 
policy, putting in place standards with which local managers and clinicians now had 
to conform (Baggott, 2004). 
 
In terms of star ratings, Mannion et al (2005) noted the “general view” that the 
ratings did not represent a “rounded or balanced” picture of an organisation’s 
activities (p.18). This was despite the inclusion of a variety of dimensions such as 
government targets, clinical focus, and patient focus. This was explained by the 
partial information used to construct such measures. The ratings did have some 
value to local managers in the efforts to introduce organisational change. However, 
much of the attention devoted to them concerned their “mechanical application” 
(p.20) and/or  
 
“unintended and dysfunctional consequences, including tunnel vision and a 
distortion of clinical priorities, bullying and intimidation, erosion of public 
trust and reduced staff morale, and ghettoisation.” (Mannion et al, 2005, 
p.18) 
 
The new performance measures achieved wider publicity not only because of the 
government’s determination to make them meaningful, and potentially to remove 
managers in ‘failing’ organisations, but also because they were now widely available 
not only through the government’s web-site, but also with widely-read websites 
such as the BBC picking them up and making them extensively available to their 
readers.  As such, the broader use of information technology increased external 
scrutiny for the NHS as well as making it possible to produce performance league 
tables. Health managers found they had less space to make local decisions than 
before, that they were ‘free to do as they were told’ (Hoque et al, 2004). 
 
The more focused approach to performance management in the NHS was a 
manifestation of the government’s concern with ensuring ‘delivery’ – that is, the 
implementation of policy ‘on the ground’. A ‘delivery unit’ was set up by the Prime 
Minister and it was made clear, not only in health-care but also in other areas such 
as education, that the targets put in place were not simply going to be sources of 
information as they were in the 1990s, but were meant to be a means of leveraging 
improvement (Barber, 2007).  
 
The new focus on delivery was not without its critics. Performance management was 
viewed by many commentators as leading to a focus on targets rather than care 
(Smith, 2005), and with claims that the government was ‘target mad’ (Economist, 
2000) and to extensive ‘gaming’ in which managers tried to find ways of working 
within the performance management system rather than trying to drive 
improvement (Hood, 2006). Large scale surveys were drawn up to attempt to 
assess whether particular organisational cultures appeared to achieve better 
performance than others (Mannion et al, 2004; Scott et al, 2003). The performance 
management system was presented by policy-makers in subsequent years as 
becoming more ‘light touch’ (Timmins, 2002), but this shift did not appear 
particularly apparent to managers within the NHS itself (Greener, 2005). 
 
Further criticisms led to further changes to the performance management system, 
but not before it had been extended to cover not only hospitals, but also PCTs. Star 
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ratings were abolished to be replaced by a rating system that ranked a range of 
performance factors including new areas such as ‘use of resources’, and with many 
organisations that were previously highly-ranked in the star-rating system finding 
themselves appearing as poorly performing in the new assessment. This rather 
confusing tendency created doubt that the rating systems were consistently or 
reliably capturing the performance of health organisations. To create greater 
independence and trustworthiness for the rating systems their control passed from 
the DH to the Healthcare Commission, before that organisation was itself re-named 
to include its new social responsibilities. PCT mergers and the renaming of 
organisations overseeing performance management made it difficult for anyone but 
the most careful researcher to track the progress of particular trusts over time. 
 
Also significant was that, as the 2000s went on, Labour became increasingly more 
serious about re-inventing a marketplace for health-care. Unlike the Conservative 
internal market of the 1990s, prices were not a factor in competition as care carried 
a set price or tariff. Instead, patients (as patient choice became a key policy) were 
meant to choose between potential providers of care on the basis of their quality, 
with performance indicators providing an important basis for assessing their quality 
(see Easington Primary Care Trust, 2006). Performance data, as well as being used 
by policy-makers, and later care regulators, to make decisions about the quality of 
NHS managers, were also becoming a market signal by which patients were meant 
to decide between potential providers of care. Such performance data have enabled 
specific rewards (and penalties) to be linked to organisations. In health-care, the 
high performing Trust gain ‘earned autonomy’ (notably through FT status) and in 
education, schools that perform well attract more students and hence more 
resources (Wilson et al, 2006). If this logic is followed through, it would have 
profoundly decentralising tendencies within health-care as the allocation of local 
resources would be made on an individual level. However, it remains extremely 
unlikely that this will be the case given the considerable difficulties attached to the 
patient choice policy (Clarke et al, 2007; Greener and Mannion, 2009). 
 
● Assessment 
As such, the history of performance in the NHS represents a move from being 
largely ignored at its creation because of political considerations, to being a central 
part of the organisation of the NHS under Labour. Along with this change, there 
have been remarkable shifts in the relationships between doctors, the government 
and health-care administrators and managers. At the creation of the NHS, 
performance was absent in the rhetoric of health-care, and largely decided by 
groups of local doctors – an extremely decentralised system of delivering care. This 
was the ‘double bed’ relationship suggested by Klein. By the 1980s, managers were 
being introduced to challenge the doctors’ authority, and by the 2000s, performance 
management systems put in place that challenged clinicians in providing 
comparative information about the activities of health organisations. The possibility 
of centralising health-care on this basis, however, did not arrive until the 2000s 
when a fully-fledged performance management system was introduced which 
demanded health-care managers improve their organisations or face potentially 
losing their jobs. This shift was aided significantly by the widespread use of 
information technology (Greener and Powell, 2008).There was a move from the 
relatively informal use of performance indicators in the 1980s and 1990s, to 
performance management in the 2000s as the indicators were used to judge the 
success (or otherwise) of health organisations. However, even in a performance-led 
NHS, it would be problematic to rely solely on a formal system of performance 
measurement (Goddard et al, 1999). 
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The effects of the NHS performance culture can be seen at two levels. At a micro 
level, there is considerable evidence that the use of performance indicators in this 
way has led to managers attempting to ‘game’ systems rather than necessarily 
improve health organisations, and a concern that target focus has led to clinical 
priorities getting subsumed in the need to meet particular indicators (see next 
section). At a macro level, the UK’s system centralised government (despite political 
devolution) shapes the use and impact of performance management regimes, either 
for the acquisition of resources and/or to gain reputation and influence (Hartley and 
Skelcher, 2008, p.18). Moreover, it is debatable whether the emphasis on 
performance especially in the latter years of the NHS has yielded the outcomes 
which its supporters claim. For example, Hartley and Skelcher (2008) suggest that  
 
“There may be a danger that performance targets emphasise conformance to 
standards at the expense of organisational learning, thereby reducing the 
capacity of organisations to address future challenges or to innovate” (p.19).  
 
This is further underlined by the dubiety of many performance measures. If, as 
Greener (2003) argues, it is difficult (if not impossible) to reach a consensus about 
a definition, the centralising effects of recent performance management regimes 
pose serious questions about veracity, validity and value of such measures.  
 
 
2.3.4. Performance measurement: assumptions and 
consequences 
 
The `model’ by which performance measurement is supposed to improve the 
organisational and individual effectiveness relies on a number of assumptions. 
 
 Perfect information: Information about the performance of a particular unit of 
analysis (service or individual) is supposed to be freely available, in a format that 
can be readily digested. The form of dissemination (increasingly, the internet) of 
such data is not assumed to be significant; simply its production and 
dissemination is sufficient. Moreover, it is supposed to capture the entirety of the 
measured unit in a way that aids the `user’ of the information to make informed 
decisions.   
 
 Rational producers: The individual and organisations whose `performance’ is 
being measured are assumed to act as rational actors. Evidence of `poor’ 
performance is supposed to stimulate them, as trustworthy professionals, to take 
action to improve. Whilst intrinsic motivation is often seen as emblematic of 
clinicians, their motivation is increasingly shaped by external incentives. When 
the organisation (school, hospital) is the unit of analysis, managers are supposed 
to be able to act upon performance date to the benefit of the organisation. It also 
assumed that the performance which is being measured is discrete and able to 
be defined (making units of `work’ measurable). Harrison (2008) refers to the 
`abstract reductionism.’   
 
 Rational users: Those for whom performance information is intended, it is 
assumed, face rational choices in receiving, understanding and using the 
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information. The multiplicity of users is acknowledged; users include the general 
public (citizenry), clients (such as patients), regulators, politicians, and the 
hierarchical tiers of authority (including civil servants and managers).  
 
 Implementation impediments: It is assumed that no barriers exist to 
implementation of initiatives designed to improve performance, including flows of 
information and organisational change. Individuals, it is assumed, would not face 
organisational or systemic barriers to improve their own performance. 
Decentralisation complicates this as it introduces more inter-relationships and 
often separates control (hierarchically and spatially) from operational agents. 
 
Clearly, the perfect expression of the model can never be realised (Anand, 1988). 
That said, it is useful to identify how a/any performance measurement system is 
`supposed’ to work (in theory). Its use in practice is fraught, as discussed next.   
 
The factors modifying the ideal type of performance measurement’ can be grouped 
in the following ways: 
 
● Performance in the public sector 
Public sector organisations face similar contextual imperatives in terms of 
measuring and managing performance. First, the public sector comprises multiple 
stakeholders.  Discussion of the `rational users’ (above) is effectively redundant as 
performance measures vary in their importance, relevance and attention of any 
stakeholder (Dixit, 2000). Since public services are indeed “services, (rather than 
products), there is an inevitable impact upon performance measurement since the 
outcome of these services is effectively the interaction (dynamic) between the user 
and the public sector worker (Stewart and Walsh, 1994). There is an inherent 
unpredictability since two apparently identical users may perceive and receive 
different quality of services, the measurement of which would thus be further 
complicated.  
 
Second, the public sector operates in areas of market failure. Traditional market 
mechanisms are not feasible or appropriate for most public sector organisations. 
Hence, the role of exit, voice and loyalty (Hirschmann, 1970) does not readily apply 
in the same ways as commercial organisations. Moreover, these organisations do 
not `choose’ their markets. 
 
Third, given these multiple audiences, public sector agencies will have to meet the 
competing and often contradictory goals of these multiple audiences. Moreover, 
these goals may be vague and/or difficult to define in ways which facilitate 
measurement and management. In such cases when values conflict between 
stakeholders, Stewart and Walsh (1994) argue, the measurement and assessment 
of performance are “necessarily a matter of judgement” (p.45).  
 
Fourth, Wilson et al (2006) note the intrinsic motivation of many public sector 
workers, many of whom are professionally trained which tends to suggest greater 
intrinsic motivation. This has implications for the ways in which they respond to the 
incentives associated with performance measurement regimes/systems (Behn, 
2003). If the activity is the reward itself (the notion of `doing good’, vocational 
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work etc), then extrinsic motivation is unlikely to be effective; it may even have a 
negative impact (Frey, 2000). Any performance management system will comprise 
both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives (Wilson et al, 2006, p.168) 
 
● Limits to performance measurement 
The limits can be summarised into technical and normative issues. First, Freeman 
(2006) notes the technical difficulties in performance measures: imprecision,  data 
availability and reliability, data validity and indicators robustness. As such, it is 
unlikely that “full satisfactory” performance measures will ever be found (Stewart 
and Walsh, 1994). Greener (2003) identified:  
 
“…an even more important fallacy. That fallacy is the assumption that we can 
work out, and measure, exactly what we mean by performance in the NHS” 
(p.243). 
 
Wilson et al (2006) note the complexity of most public services and the 
consequential problems in measuring their performance. They argue that no single 
performance measure would be sufficient to capture the multiple functions and 
tasks, some of which are ineffable (Exworthy et al, 2003). As a result, publishing 
multiple measures seeks to overcome this dilemma. However, they note a “trade off 
between comprehensiveness and transparency” (p.156). 
 
Secondly, performance measures denote claims to objectivity. This authenticity is 
supposed to engender trust in such measurement but this may be displaced (Davies 
and Lampel, 1998). The existence of performance measures does not remove the 
“need for trust but relocates it from the internal control systems of professional to 
audit systems” (Freeman, 2006, p.311). Tsoukas (1997) also notes that the 
continual refinement of performance measures leads to the creation of in-groups 
and out-groups; the former implying knowledge and ability to interpret the 
measures, the latter implying ignorance. As such, performance measures can never 
be fully transparent. Indeed, efforts to `improve’ the measures are doomed and 
lead to further erosion of trust. 
 
Third, performance measures may not necessarily achieve the desired or anticipated 
results or outcomes. In other words, the value of performance as a measure of 
public service improvement may be over-stated. Hartley and Skelcher (2008) 
conclude that the  
 
“UK central government emphasis on public management has not resulted in 
the scope, scale or sustainability of change that had been anticipated by 
policy-makers. In particular, there may be a danger that performance 
targets emphasise conformance to standards at the expense of 
organisational learning, thereby reducing the capacity of organisations to 
address future challenges or to innovate” (p.19). 
 
This implementation gap between expectations and experience of performance 
measures might point to the rhetorical importance of notions of performance as well 
as organisational barriers which might hamper their use in practice.  
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● Unintended consequences of performance measurement 
Whether as a macro or micro scale, the impact of performance measures appears to 
be rather inconclusive. For example, it is significant that there appears to be no 
direct link between the type of governance structure (basically, hierarchy, market 
and network) and organisational performance (Allen, 2006; also Braithwaite et al 
2005). At a more micro-level analysis, Scott et al (2003) argue that their review of 
evidence does not provide “clear answers” as to whether there is a link between 
organisational culture and performance. At either level, the focus on performance 
measurement is likely to generate unintended consequences. Moreover, it is 
inevitable that systems and processes (introduced to measure performance) will 
continue to pose performance as a “problem” (Harrison, 2008). Performance is thus 
perpetuated and reproduced as a legitimate focus for managers and other actors. 
Rather than addressing systemic concerns, performance measures focus on 
disaggregated units of analysis (the school, the hospital etc). This regime both 
implies and guarantees that “poor” performance will always be found. A normal 
distribution curve of `measured’ performance will highlight some “high” performers 
and some “poor” performers; indeed, the performance of half of all 
schools/hospitals is below average.  
 
In a seminal paper, Smith (1995) identified the unintended consequences of 
publishing performance data (such as in school, hospitals or local government) 
(p.314).  First, there is an “emphasis on the phenomena quantified in the 
measurement scheme” to the detriment of areas/aspects not measured. Second, 
objectives and strategies are pursued which enhance the measured but do little to 
address wider objectives (even those of the organisation). Possibly, as a result, 
short-term objectives tend to dominate. Third, there is the potential to deliberately 
manipulate the performance data and to adjust behaviour (of those being measured 
or those responsible for delivering organisational performance). Such manipulation 
might be for “strategic advantage” or for more prosaic purposes. The potential for 
such `gaming’ may arise from “the imperfect picture of a complex process” (Wilson 
et al, 2006, p.154). Fourth, it is feasible that “misleading inferences” could be 
drawn from “raw performance data.” However, data adjustment (for example, in 
terms of social deprivation or “value added”) might lead to claims of manipulation. 
Fifth, Smith (1995) notes that  organisational inertia might result from an overly 
“rigid performance evaluation” in which analysis creates paralysis. 
 
Talbot (2005) draws similar conclusions. He notes that, despite a series of 
arguments advancing notions of `performance’, there are a series of counter-
arguments. These highlight the deficiencies of performance measurement  
1. Incompleteness: information is only ever able to glean a partial picture of public 
activities, leading to distortion and bias 
2. Over-complexity: in seeking completeness (see 1), performance systems often 
result in information over-load 
3. High transaction costs: Such costs refer not simply to data collection but also to 
the time spent on anticipating and responding to them by those whose 
performance is being measured. 
4. Attribution difficulties: It is commonly difficult to attribute variations in inputs or 
outputs to outcome. Causation is often implied from correlation or association 
5. Imbalances between quantity and quality: Performance measures are usually 
quantitative (given the need for comparisons) but this can lead to claims that 
what is measured becomes important, because it is being measured. 
6. Manipulation and deception: Some performance measures can, Talbot claims, 
encourage a “culture of cynicism and amoral behaviour” (p.504).  
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7. Distorted behaviours and unintended consequences:  Given ever stronger 
incentives to comply with the performance regime, the “narrow” focus on 
outputs for one organisation can be sought to detriment of wider objectives or 
concerns. 
8. Cyclical incompatibility: Sustaining improved performance over a period of time 
may not be achieved through a short-term focus, responding to the political and 
organisational dynamics. Hartley and Skelcher (2008) note the “limited shelf-
life” of some improvement strategies proposed by government (p.12). 
9. Measurement degradation; Talbot notes the effectiveness of performance 
measurement declines over time, thereby undermining the “long-term stability 
in performance measurement which is important for public 
accountability”(p.504) 
10. Tension between politics and rationality: Public sector is fraught with “instability 
incrementalism and muddling through, messy compromises and value 
judgements which fatally undermine all attempts at rational decision making” 
(p.504).  
 
Stewart and Walsh (1994) conclude, like others, that an ideal measure of 
performance is unachievable. Thus, they argue, “There is a need to recognise the 
imperfections and limitations of measures, and to use them as a means of 
supporting politically informed judgement” (p.45) 
 
 
2.3.5. Perspectives on performance 
Theoretical perspectives on performance have proliferated in recent years as the 
significance of performance has become more critical to public sector organisations. 
There are multiple notions of performance. For example, Skelcher (2008) suggest 
three conceptions of performance. 
 
Table 2.8. Concepts and definition 
Concepts Definition 
Organisational 
performance 
Substantive outputs and outcomes of a public 
organisation 
Democratic performance Extent to which a public organisation is able to 
demonstrate mechanisms for legitimacy, consent and 
accountability 
System performance Extent to which a system of public organisations is 
integrated 
Source: Skelcher, 2008, p.29 
 
A second approach is offered by Talbot (2005) who presented “emerging arguments 
for performance” (p.496-501). These were “performance” as: accountability, as 
user choice, as customer service, as efficiency, as results, effectiveness and `what 
works’, as resource allocation, and as creating public value.  
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Clearly, such multiple interpretations of performance offer a conundrum for its 
analysis; it would be virtually impossible to offer a comprehensive synthesis of 
them. No review of this myriad of perspectives can do justice to the breadth or 
depth; rather, an analysis of performance is feasible in relation to key dimensions 
pertinent to decentralisation, autonomy and local health economies. Such 
dimensions thus include governmentality, the role of incentives in improving 
performance and accounting logic. 
 
● Governmentality 
Governmentality has not commonly been associated with notions of autonomy and 
performance. However, it does potentially offer some intriguing insights which are 
sketched in this section. The notions that comprise `governmentality’ refer to a 
sweep of changes to governance relations within and between organisations. 
Commonly, these changes have been summarised in notable phrases such as 
`steering at a distance’, `external gaze’ and `remote surveillance’. However, they 
also denote a broader shift in inter/intra-organisational relations, which have been 
described by Reed (1999), Courpasson (2000) (among others) and adapted from 
the work of Foucault. In particular, governmentality refers to new and emerging 
modes of institutional control (as traditional forms have waned). In turn, disciplinary 
institutions, practices, discourses and knowledge bases have emerged within a new 
social order (Flynn, 2004; Freeman, 2006).  
 
Governmentality also encompasses changes in power relations associated with 
expertise and knowledge. Governmentality theories interpret the rise of invisible 
and often opaque apparatus of elite professionals that create what Stehr (1994) 
termed a `technical state.’ Power, for Foucault, was a diffuse property, produced 
and reproduced in everyday practice and techniques, not simply through observable 
use of authority. The rise of evidence-based medicine and the ways in which this 
evidence has been used by commissioners (in particular) illustrates the advent of 
this new discourse which has made alternative perspectives difficult to establish and 
challenge. Appeals to `evidence’ thus become superior to other competing claims. 
 
For the focus here on autonomy and performance, governmentality is also 
associated with changes in the normative behaviour of individuals who have become 
self-regulating. Rather than introducing coercive change, governmentality shifts 
norms and customs such that individuals become obedient and compliant. 
Individuals thus become the object and subject of performance control. 
Performance measurement makes the individual (clinician, teacher, etc) the object 
of inquiry and also subject to the exigencies of such a regime (Miller, 1992). The 
impacts of such control also entail:  
i. Continuous, remote observation, the effects of which are continuous even 
though such surveillance may (or may not) be continuous  
ii. Spatial separation of the observer and observed, aided increasingly by 
information technology which allows data collection, interpretation and 
comparison. No longer need the supervisor be in close proximity to the 
supervisee. As a result, local knowledge might be de-valued. 
iii. Segregation of those observed is enabled not only by remote surveillance 
(which implies that alternative meanings and resistance can be easily thwarted; 
but see (v) below). Further, surveillance facilitates performance categories such 
as those requiring `remedial’ action (so-called `poor’ performers) or `high’ 
performers (eligible for initiatives such as earned autonomy).  
iv. Hierarchical ranking in the form of comparative `league tables’, based on 
categories of measured `performance.’ (The consequence is that ineffable 
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practice is unmeasured). This ranking is aided by the use of standardised units 
of performance and again aided by the collection and analysis of large volumes 
of data by IT. Such ranking privileges one form of performance assessment 
above others.  
v. A process of normalisation whereby the customary norms of behaviour and 
what counts as `good’ or `poor’ performance are internalised within individuals 
and within professions. 
 
According to the `governmentality’ thesis, performance management (such as audit 
or accreditation) shifts attention from first order control (control of professional 
activity) to second order control (control of systems supervising / overseeing the 
quality of services). Reed (1999) thus refers to the `conduct of conduct’ – affecting 
how individuals behave and act. This echoes Power’s (1997) reference to `control of 
control.’ Hence, whilst some see the self-surveillance of governmentality as 
replacing programmes such as (clinical) audit (Flynn, 2004), it might also be seen 
as duplicative of it. Audit (and related) activities (such as hospital morbidity and 
mortality meetings) are largely organised and run by clinicians (usually doctors) 
which may be becoming oriented around  reformed notions of performance – what 
counts as good / poor performance, whose notions of performance are ascendant. 
 
A widely applied concept associated with governmentality is that of panoptic control. 
Drawing on Bentham’s notion of the panopticon, the notion of control is extended to 
various techniques of surveillance with the aim of creating obedient individuals in a 
reformed social system. The notion of panopticon includes physical systems as well 
as discourses and practices (which underpin Foucault’s notion of power). 
Specifically, panoptic control entails micro-control of fragmented subjects whose 
resistance (to control) is quelled. As such, Reed (1999) sees a critical shift from the 
`cage’ (prison-like structures) to the `gaze’, implying more remote surveillance and 
less tied to structural apparatus. However, whilst he notes this development, he is 
cautious as to whether a significant degree of change has taken place.  
 
A related concept associated with governmentality is `soft bureaucracy’ 
(Courpasson, 2000; Flynn, 2004). It also focuses on managerial systems within 
organisations which combine decentralisation (flexibility) and centralisation 
(control). This concept has been most widely applied in cases where managers have 
sought to `manage’ professionals; the former seeking to exert control whilst the 
latter seek to retain flexibility (their autonomy). Managers’ adopt “soft practices” 
within an existing framework of hierarchical control. Control is applied but in subtle 
ways which do not involve coercion and may not be readily evident. For example, 
managers may co-opt senior professionals into the management of clinical 
colleagues but using standard management techniques. Senior professional 
involvement creates a legitimacy of such practices, among colleagues. Goddard and 
Mannion (2006) note the complexity of performance measurement in the NHS and 
the consequent reliance on the “myriad of informal networks and “soft-intelligence” 
channels of communication, formal accountability arrangements [which] will always 
be supplemented by “softer” processes of control.” It can also be hypothesised that 
soft bureaucracy can be applied to managerial systems between organisations. 
 
Whilst the notions of governmentality have an intuitive appeal, it is far from certain 
that they have been widely or deeply implemented or adopted in health-care 
settings (clinically or organisationally). At both the level of discourse and practice, 
notions of govermentality suffer from conceptual and practical shortcomings.   
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Whilst challenges to clinical (especially medicine) professions have been many and 
manifest in recent years, it is far from clear that their power has been seriously 
eroded. Indeed, their power may not have been eroded but rather re-constituted in 
different forms. For example, the re-articulation of what counts as good/poor 
performance has been done so within the rubric of evidence-based medicine (EBM), 
a development largely owned by the profession. EBM has perhaps, however, 
instigated a re-ordering of the profession, internally. Freidson (1994) suggests a re-
stratification between the rank-and-file professionals, the knowledge elite (such as 
researchers generating the evidence base) and the administrative elite (such as 
medical directors). It is far from clear that the evidence generated is being used 
systematically to exert greater control over all professionals. Some have become 
more subject to surveillance, such as GPs under the QOF (Doran et al, 2006; 
Downing et al, 2007). Most recently, there have been signs that surveillance – the 
gaze - is increasing through the transparency offered by the publication of mortality 
(and other) data on the internet. Emerging evidence suggests that such disclosure 
is not widely used by the public, managers or others and that clinicians resist such 
disclosure, claiming it fails to capture an authentic picture of their activity (Exworthy 
et al, 2003; Smith et al, 2009).  
   
However, it is notable that senior managers in health-care organisations have been 
increasingly subject to the performance culture. Given their hierarchical position, it 
may be more difficult for them to offer overt resistance to the performance culture. 
However, the parameters by which (local) performance is measured and managed 
may be poorly transmitted through hierarchical / supervisory arrangements to an 
apparently omnipotent observer. Performance also remains highly contingent upon 
local (social and institutional) relationships (Fleurke and Willemse, 2004). This local 
contingency is examined later in this chapter.  
 
In summary, governmentality does provide a broad perspective on performance 
which is useful in the context of decentralisation, autonomy and inter-organisational 
relationships.  
 
● The role of incentives in improving performance 
Incentives are important concepts in relation to performance because they comprise 
the mechanisms by which performance is supposed to be improved. They rely 
heavily on adjusting the behaviour and motivation of individuals within 
organisations (Greener, 2003). Any performance indicator is socially constructed 
and should not be seen as a “neutral or objective measure” (p.242). As such, they 
seek to foster specific behaviour, often at the expense of others.  
 
The mechanisms of change / improvement comprise a set of incentives which might 
reward “good” performance and penalise “poor” performance. These mechanisms 
and incentives consist of a series of assumptions bout human motivation and 
behaviour (Le Grand, 2003; Davies et al, 2005).  Le Grand’s (2003) work on the 
motivation and agency in public services focuses on the tensions between two types 
of behaviour, principally between knightly and knavish behaviour. Essentially, this is 
a distinction between altruistic and self-interested behaviour, 
encouraged/discouraged by incentives; knights represent the former, whilst knaves 
represent the latter. (He also discusses whether citizens/users should be 
disempowered `pawns’ or `queens’ able to choose between competing providers). 
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For the purposes of the analysis here, it is instructive to note that Le Grand also 
considered the role of performance measures in the shift towards market-based 
public services. As such, performance information was a vital ingredient to affect 
the motivation and behaviour of producers and consumers. He concluded that NHS 
incentives should be sufficiently robust to invoke both knightly and knavish 
behaviour (rather than one or the other). Wilson et al (2006) regard the need to 
align these approaches within providers incentives in order to reconcile the 
objectives of users and government as (potentially opposing) stakeholders (p.154).   
 
The ways in which autonomy motivates individuals and their organisations clearly 
falls within the remit of this study. Le Grand et al (1998) found that the incentives 
in the 1990s internal market were probably insufficient to generate significant 
improvement across the NHS. In short, the incentives were too weak to alter 
motivation and behaviour. By contrast, Goddard and Mannion (2006) found that 
autonomy was valued by NHS and that, in itself, it was a sufficient incentive to 
improve performance (see also Hoque et al, 2004).  Whilst such autonomy may be 
granted from `above’ (hierarchically), it may also be seen as instrumental in 
fostering a particular organisational culture (Scott et al, 2003) 
 
Boyne (2003) concludes the variables most likely to affect performance are 
resources, regulation, market structure, organisation and management. This 
structural conclusion places little overt emphasis on incentives, other than the way 
in which regulation or market operates will, in consequence, shape the incentives 
for local agents.  Kaiser Permanente (2008) offer a different set of criteria for health 
system performance: governance, strong physician leadership, organisational 
culture, clear/shared aims, accountability and transparency, patient centredness, 
and team-work. The Kaiser criteria require some `translation’ to a UK context but 
do address health systems (which might be akin to LHEs). 
 
English health policy comprises a set of incentives which may complement or 
contradict each other. Ideally, incentives should be aligned but public policy 
inevitably involves trade-offs and compromises. For example, Wilson et al (2006) 
conclude that any performance management regime must strike “a balance between 
measured and unmeasured performance, between extrinsic and intrinsic reward” 
(p.168).  Among many other impacts, it is possible to hypothesise the intuitive 
impacts upon the autonomy of organisation in a LHE; see table 2.9.  
 
Table 2.9. Health policy: incentives and hypothesised autonomy 
`Policy’ Incentive (based on 
hierarchy, market, 
network) 
Potential impact on 
autonomy of LHE 
organisations 
Payment by Results ↑ competition ↑ autonomy  
Patient Choice ↑ competition ↑ autonomy 
Practice Based 
Commissioning 
↑ competition ↑ autonomy 
National Service 
Frameworks 
↑ hierarchical control ↓ autonomy 
Market stimulation 
(WCC) 
↑ competition ↑ autonomy 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 81  
Clinical networks ↑ coordination ↓ autonomy 
Performance 
management 
↑ hierarchical control ↓ autonomy 
 
In addition, Freeman (2006) presents a conceptual framework which seeks to 
identify the locus of performance control (also see Exworthy et al, 2003) (see 
fig.2.4.). It consists of two dimensions: location of control and nature of resultant 
action. The former lies on a spectrum from internal to external whilst the latter lies 
between formative and summative. In recent years, the locus has moved from 
internal to external and from formative to summative, though each performance 
regime has a specific configuration of these dimensions.  
 
Figure 2.4. Control locations and resultant action matrix 
 
Fig. 2.4. Control locations and resultant 
action matrix. Freeman (2006, p.303)
Internal
External
Summative Formative
Controlled by organisation
& used formatively for
development
Controlled by external agency
& used formatively for
development
Controlled by external 
agency & used for 
sanction & blame
Controlled by organisation
& used for sanction 
& blame
 
 
 
● Accounting logic:  
Ferlie and Geraghty (2005) distinguish between two types of NPM – hard and soft. 
The latter draws on the principles and practice of the “Human Resource school of 
private sector management” which place an accent on “user orientation, quality 
improvement, organizational and individual development and learning” (p.431). The 
former is associated with the accounting logic. 
 
The group of perspectives that address the social construction of accounting 
systems are relevant here as they challenge the notion that performance measures, 
as key elements in the accounting logic, are neutral and objective. Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2002) argue that accounting measures create an “aura of factual 
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representation, promoting a general perception that such measures generate 
neutral objective, independent and fair information” (p.102). This “aura” relies on 
standardisation to produce comparable units of assessment through quantification. 
This reductionism is aided by techniques and technologies such as Health-care 
Resource Groups (HRGs).  
 
In some ways, the accounting logic has strong connections with governmentality in 
the sense that logic makes visible aspects of local performance to central agents 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2002). By implication, it also makes invisible those 
aspects which are not included in such logic because they are ineffable or non-
standard. Similarly, the logic provides the mechanism by which local agents become 
the subject and object of surveillance. Individuals can become the object of 
performance assessments and subject to its exigencies; they thus become 
calculating selves (Miller, 1992). 
 
Many see this accounting logic (especially as it applies to performance 
management) as being a crucial element in hierarchical control. It would be hard to 
see, by contrast, how such logic would be consistent with network forms of 
governance. Yet, governance forms (principally, market, hierarchies and networks) 
compete and co-exist (Exworthy et al, 1999; Rhodes, 1997). Hence, whilst 
accounting logic is an essential component of the market and facilitates hierarchy, 
the individualisation of accounting logics might corrode collaboration and cohesion.  
 
● Public choice and other theories  
A number of other theories might shed light on the nature and scope of 
performance. These are largely oriented around disciplinary perspectives.  
 
Rather than one specific theoretical construct, the disciplinary approach taken by 
Public Choice and Institutional Economics are, according to Talbot (2005) “strong 
candidates” for the analysis of performance (p.509).  Public choice theories posit 
that competition and market-style relations are critical to improving performance. 
Hence, monopolies, producer capture and lack of user choice are seen as inimical to 
competition. Policies that remedy such deficits include greater reliance on contracts 
and better user information (about performance). Indeed, information becomes vital 
in managing the contracts and enabling users to make more informed decisions. 
However, such a perspective overlooks the relational dimensions of markets (Flynn 
et al, 1996) which entail notions of mutuality, reputation and legacy effects of 
previous transactions (Greener, 2008). Neo-institutional theories might also be 
expected to offer perspectives on performance but relatively little has been written 
(Talbot, 2005).  
 
Fordist and post-Fordist theories might also be expected to offer some insightful 
critiques on performance. Fordist theories place emphasis on the routinised, 
standardised nature of the production process and the outputs. Post-Fordist theories 
stress the socially-constructed nature and contested of such processes and outputs. 
It could be argued that current performance management systems are Fordist in 
character, seeking to measure performance in a standardised and comparative 
format, irrespective of local contextual factors. Talbot (2005) argues that 
performance management is redolent of the Taylorist approaches of Fordism that 
then the cultural management of the `excellence’ school (Peters and Waterman, 
1982). By contrast, post-Fordist approaches might highlight the ways in which 
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notions of performance and even the specific measures are socially constructed and 
subjective.  
 
The next section draws on different aspects of these theories to present a heuristic 
device for considering the inter-relationship between different domains– formal and 
informal performance.  
 
2.3.6. Formal and informal performance explained 
 
Conceptually, notions of performance can be divided into formal and informal. The 
former refers to official and (apparently) objective accounts and measures of 
organisational / individual activities whilst the latter refers to subjective 
perspectives on such activities (which might include `soft’ information such as 
reputation or credibility, for example). The division between the two categories is 
not fixed or permanent but contextual and contingent. Both categories address the 
structure, process and outcome of organisational activities. For example, processual 
aspects of performance might include both the measurement mechanisms of formal 
performance metrics as well as the ways in soft information is produced and 
disseminated. This reflects a similar distinction between governance type I and type 
II (Marks and Hoogh, 2005). Without privileging one form of performance over 
another, it is important to recognise the interaction and reaction between the two in 
making assessments about the ways in which performance is conceived, 
constructed and reproduced in local and national health systems. Performance can 
thus be seen as a disputed term which is socially constructed and contested by 
different stakeholders. Given the volume which have been written on `formal’ 
performance, the emphasis in this paper is towards `informal’ performance. 
 
● Formal performance: 
Most research attention has been paid to aspects of performance which may be 
described as `formal’ or `hard’ information. `Formal performance’ relies on the 
assumption that such information is an objective account of an organisation’s 
activities and presumes a degree of precision in measurement mechanisms and 
measures. Such performance systems are largely based on quantitative measures. 
Indeed, Goddard et al (1999) argue that  
 
“the success of formal performance measurement systems depends in part 
on the degree to which they can capture adequately relevant information 
within a quantitative framework” (p.119). 
 
Formal performance measures have been widely adopted in all areas of public 
services as a result of advances in information technology coupled with the adoption 
of the tenets of new public management (NPM) (Ferlie et al, 2005; Hartley et al, 
2008). Together, such performance information is used to make comparisons 
between units (such as rankings (such as stars) or league tables) with a view to (a) 
improving the organisation’s performance and/or (b) managing contracts between 
such units (agent) and a purchaser/commissioner (principal) in a quasi-competitive 
market. Much of the effort by public managers and researchers has been to find 
ways of improving the reliability and validity of formal performance systems and 
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measures, often without questioning the assumptions upon which those systems 
and measures are founded (Mannion et al, 2007). 
 
However, formal performance suffers from a number of drawbacks. Formal 
approaches to performance (especially quantitative ones) cannot measure what (all) 
multiple stakeholders consider important about a particular service. Goddard et al 
(1999) highlight this point thus: 
 
“The ability of Trusts to deliver on their contracts was seen by both regional 
offices and health authorities as a hard measure of performance, but again, 
the fulfilment of these targets does not appear to signal ‘good’ performance 
to the external organisations” (p.127). 
 
Moreover, any performance system cannot capture all the information (in 
meaningful and practical ways) which might be considered relevant to an 
organisation and its stakeholders (Sheaff et al, 2004). Whilst offering apparent 
precision, formal metrics are founded on a series of subjective judgements about 
which organisational activities should be measured, what standards should be 
adopted, what actions might follow `poor’ or `good’ performance. Street (2000) 
argued that the performance system (used to measure efficiency) was as significant 
as the performance of the organisation (hospital) itself. As a result, he concluded 
that  
 
“no significance can be attached to the differences observed among trusts” 
(p.50). 
 
Finally, there is a danger that formal metrics can displace trust by claiming to offer 
a credible account whilst inevitably overlooking some (`unmeasured’ or ineffable) 
aspects (Davies and Lampel, 1998; Exworthy et al, 2003; Power, 1997). The danger 
is that unmeasured aspects of performance become relegated or neglected by 
providers since there is no incentive to address them (Sheaff et al, 2004).  
 
Despite its shortcomings, formal performance has been the dominant mode by 
which organisations have been assessed in the last 20 years. Given the ability to 
align incentives to formal performance (in the form of government targets), there 
has been some evidence to suggest that formal metrics have improved performance 
(Gravelle et al, 2003). However, some side-effects have also become apparent 
(Greener, 2003; Propper et al, 2007). Sheaff et al (2004) identify ten such negative 
consequences in health-care settings:  
 
1. “Tunnel vision, i.e. concentration on areas that are included in the outcome 
scheme to the exclusion of other important areas. 
2. Sub-optimisation, i.e. managers (and clinicians) pursue their own narrow 
objectives at the expensive of strategic co-ordination. 
3. Myopia, i.e. concentration on short-term to the exclusion of long-term issues 
which may not show up in (clinical) outcome indicators for some time. 
4. Convergence, i.e. having a stronger preference not to be exposed as an outlier in 
an indicator scheme than to be outstanding. 
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5. Ossification, i.e. organisational paralysis due to an excessively rigid system of 
measurement and the disinclination to experiment with new and innovative 
methods. 
6. Gaming, i.e. altering behaviour so as to obtain strategic advantage. 
7. Misrepresentation, including creative accounting and fraud. 
8. Complacency, i.e. lack of ambition for improvement brought about by an 
adequate comparative performance. 
9. Misinterpretation, i.e. incorrect inferences about performance brought about by 
the difficulty of accounting for the full range of potential influences on a 
performance measurement. 
10. Ghettoisation, i.e. polarisation in provision and quality of provider staff 
exacerbated by a poor performance ranking” (p.66-67). 
 
Also, its value in improving performance has been questioned (Hartley et al, 2008). 
Some claim that formal performance approaches have been most widely applied in 
identifying `poor’ performing organisations rather than stimulating further 
improvements; hence Goddard and Mannion (2006) conclude that formal (`hard’) 
performance information is most commonly used as a `safety net’, as a way of 
identifying `poor’ performers (see below). 
 
● Informal performance: 
The notion of informal performance rests on the assumption that the ways in which 
performance is conceived, constructed and managed are founded on a series of 
subjective judgements, mainly by senior individuals responsible for managing 
organisations (directly or through contracts). Such judgements might, for example, 
relate to perceptions of trust, reputation, credibility and competence. Commonly, 
such aspects of performance include the professional norms, and conventions, 
habits and informal codes of conduct. They are particularly apparent in terms used 
by senior individuals to describe others; these include `a safe pair of hands’ or `we 
need to keep en eye on them.’ This informal performance might also be evidenced 
in “clashes and where people do not keep their side of the ‘bargain’ are labelled as 
‘problem’ Trusts” (Goddard et al, 1999). Atkinson (2000) described these factors as 
the “informal influences on local health system performance” (p.117). In short, 
informal performance data can generate a “picture of what is ‘really’ happening 
within Trusts” though dangers of bias are present (Goddard et al, 1999). 
 
Informal performance draws attention to relationships and networks to transmit 
information. This `informal’ dimension presumes that notions of performance are 
inevitably contested and thereby might reveal the lack of consensus among 
stakeholders about the quality or effectiveness of activities of individuals or 
organisations, and also the remedies to ameliorate (supposedly) `poor’ 
performance. It is thus a social constructionist approach to understanding and 
explaining performance (Talbot, 2005, p.510). Using notions of informal 
performance, better understandings might offer explanations as to why similar 
formal performance metrics and even similar organisational contexts might still elicit 
different accounts or perspectives (according to stakeholders) on such 
`performance’ (Braithwaite et al, 2005).   
 
Notions of informal performance may also play a part in explaining the intersection 
and interplay between markets, hierarchies and networks. In each of these 
coordinating mechanisms or governance modes (Exworthy et al, 1999), the 
mechanisms which allow each to operate may be classified thus 
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 Markets ~ Price 
 Hierarchy ~ Authority 
 Network ~ Trust 
To some extent, notions of informal performance help explain the `mix’ between 
each of these co-existent modes (Rhodes, 1997). This interplay between price, 
authority and trust may be especially significant in (sub-)systems (or local health 
economies) which exhibit few options for `exit’ but rather involve greater emphasis 
on `voice’ and/or `loyalty’ (Hirschmann, 1970). 
 
Recognition of the role of informal influence on performance points towards a 
greater understanding of the wider context within which organisations operate. 
Here, particular attention is paid to the LHE. This accords with neo-institutional 
theories which see institutions as integral within societal networks and therefore a 
determinant of the organisational, structure, process and outcome/performance 
(Sheaff et al, 2004, p.67). Such information enriches any assessment of 
organisations; indeed, Goddard et al (1999) argue that it is important that the 
formal performance does not suppress informal performance data. 
 
The ways and extent to which informal influences have influenced the (formal) 
performance of organisations has been assessed through analysed of concepts such 
as trust (Zaheer et al, 1998; Dyer and Chu, 2003) and dramaturgy (Freeman and 
Peck, 2007), and the interplay between `hard’ and `soft’ information (Goddard et 
al, 1999). Together, these two themes offer contrasting perspectives on the 
informal aspects of performance.  
 
Trust: Trust is a notoriously slippery concept to define and operationalise. However, 
one definition refers to confidence between agencies; trust is  
 
“one party's confidence that the other party in the exchange relationship will 
not exploit its vulnerabilities” (Dyer and Chu, 2003, p.58; see also 
Gambetta, 2000; Zaheer et al, 1998). 
 
Some assume that trust can help improve organisational efficiency by eliminating 
(or at least, minimising) the need for formal, extensive contracts. Health-care is a 
sector which fulfils Williamson’s (1975) criteria for a weak applicability of markets: 
bounded rationality, asset specificity and opportunism. Bounded rationality posits 
that it is difficult / impossible to specify or anticipate every eventuality in a contract, 
not least because many of the outcomes of interventions can never be fully known – 
the indeterminacy of health care (Klein, 2000).  
Similarly, trust helps to ensure that agents do not take “excessive advantage” of 
another even when the opportunity is available (Mayer et al, 1995); this again may 
be likely in health-care when complete monitoring of a contract is almost 
impossible. In such cases, it is logical to rely on `soft’ information (such as trust or 
reputation) to complete the picture about an organisation’s performance. In doing 
so, trust may help to reduce or minimise transaction costs (which are often high 
when contracts are written, implemented and enforced).  
 
Dyer and Chu (2003) conclude that, in their study of private sector companies, trust 
was linked to lower transaction costs and, in turn, lower transaction costs were 
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associated with `better’ performance (primarily financial). They also found that 
trust was most valuable when it was not based on contractual mechanisms but 
reinforced reciprocity and mutuality between agencies. These conclusions advanced 
by Zaheer et al (1998) take this argument a little further by surmising that  
“The basis for performance enhancement does not appear to be based on 
efficiencies gained from eased negotiation processes. Rather, we speculate 
that the enhancement of transaction value (Zajac and Olsen 1993)—such as 
cooperation in the exploration of new information and coordination 
technologies, new market opportunities, and product and process 
innovation—may account for the link between inter-organizational trust and 
exchange performance” (p.67) 
Hence, here, trust is seen as instrumental to improved “transaction value” rather 
than being an end on itself (cf. Boyne, 2003).  
 
Vakkuri and Meklin (2006) recognise the ambiguity in performance management 
which, they claim, gives rise to a search for more sophisticated measurement 
systems. It follows that this search will be fruitless as important aspects remain 
unmeasured or fail to capture its full impact. As a result, trust in the measurement 
system might decline. 
 
Dramaturgy: A hitherto neglected aspect of (informal) performance has been the 
notion of performance as drama – the symbolic and ritualistic aspects of giving a 
performance in an organisational setting. Rather than `performance’ being 
something that is measured, the notion of dramaturgy presents `performance’ as a 
dramatic composition and representation of the organisation. This might include 
approaches such as the enactment of impression management. Performance can 
thus be defined as 
`The deliberate, self-conscious `doing’ of highly symbolic actions in public’ 
(Bell, 1997, p.160). 
 
Dramaturgy may help, for example, to understand and explain the processes 
whereby agents 
 “Create and maintain identities as charismatic leaders” (Gardner and Avolio, 
1998, p.32); 
 Manipulate organisational symbols in order to build narratives about the 
organisation (Ritto and Silver, 1986); 
 Deploy ritual in meetings to create and maintain a sense of organisational 
identity (Peck et al, 2004) 
 
Dramaturgical analyses tend to examine organisational `outputs’ such as board 
meetings or public documents in order to search for meaning. Gardner and Avolio 
(1998) identify framing, scripting, staging and performing as ways of explaining 
“the situated interaction itself constructs new knowledge/understandings/ power 
relationships” (Freeman and Peck, 2007). Such step-wise analysis aids identification 
of the ways in which ritual and ceremony are deployed. For example, Freeman and 
Peck (2007) claim that meetings have dual purposes; firstly, instrumental, palpable 
and explicit and secondly, social, symbolic and implicit. Dramaturgy focuses 
especially on the latter. So, the purposes of a PCT board meeting might comprise 
both the formal action of holding the PCT to account and also the building of 
solidarity and cohesion within the senior management. This latter claim can be 
supported by the fact that often, board meetings do not make decisions but overtly 
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or covertly, seek ratification of decisions already made. Meetings thus become the 
venue for rites of affirmation or initiation. Freeman and Peck (2007) offer another 
example: participatory governance practices. They examine the “setting(s) in which 
deliberation takes place and the norms expressed during the process.”  
 
● Interplay between hard and soft information:  
Given the significance of formal performance and the mediating role of informal 
performance, it is important to examine the interplay between them. Indeed, the 
interplay is implicitly recognised by the way in which, for example, the Healthcare 
Commission’s annual check is summarised in its two headline measures (clinical 
quality and use of resources). Beneath these headlines lie a series of narrative 
accounts which rely heavily on subjective assessments. This has overtones of the 
inspection system (OFSTED) in English schools which also comprise (quantitative) 
summary measures and a narrative (http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/Ofsted-
home/Forms-and-guidance/Browse-all-by/Education-and-skills/Schools/How-we-
inspect/School-self-evaluation). Indeed, Schools are now required to complete a 
self-evaluation form to self-diagnose their `own’ performance. 
 
Huang and Provan (2007) discuss the interplay between what might be termed 
formal and informal performance. They argue that the balance between past 
performance (formal) and perceptions (informal).is “fragile” and “uncertain”, 
especially when organisations have contradictory objectives and measurement is 
problematic. If the “social outcomes” of this interplay are valued by the organisation 
and its stakeholders, then, Huang and Provan argue, legitimacy will be enhanced.  
 
Often, there appear to be shortcomings of formal performance systems in that they 
fail to convince local agents. This can breed further doubts about the value of 
initiatives such as `earned autonomy’ (Goddard and Mannion, 2006). A reliance on 
both formal and informal approaches might thus appear a sensible strategy. 
However, this can also risk the erosion of incentives for formal performance 
measures, especially if a degree of autonomy is already available to organisations 
(often through informal approaches) 
 
Goddard et al (1999) identify three ways in which “hard” and “soft” information on 
performance is employed.  (Here, hard and soft equates well with formal and 
informal measures). First, soft information can be seen as a substitute for hard 
information.  
“Hard data are not available on all of the areas which are seen as important 
factors in forming a judgement on Trust performance” (Goddard et al, 1999, 
p.126). 
No performance system would ever be able to comprise sufficient information to 
capture all aspects of performance which might be of interest. Soft information, it is 
claimed, might replace such hard information in offering a summation of 
performance. Indeed, before the relatively recent introduction of formal 
performance metrics, it is arguable that only soft information existed. Alternatively, 
formal/hard performance information may not be in a format that is desired; for 
example, the unit of analysis if often the organisation (rather than divisions within it 
or individuals). Hence, as Talbot (2005) asks, ”Where does performance take place 
– with programs, organisations or people?” (p.493)  
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Second, soft information can be seen as a complement to the deficiencies of hard 
information. Alone, the latter can be misleading or inadequate to enable others 
(such as a PCT) to judge the performance of another (such as a provider). 
Combined, hard and soft information can complement each other, offering a more 
rounded picture of an organisation’s activities. Goddard et al (1999) suggest that 
neither approach was able to determine what is “really” happening:  
“Health authority staff also indicated that whilst the hard indicators provide 
an overview of Trust performance, they need to supplement this with softer 
information in order to get a fuller picture of what is ‘really’ happening within 
Trusts” (p.125). 
 
Third, hard information may act as a safety net, providing a degree of re-assurance 
most especially in cases of `poor’ performance. As such, hard information can be 
seen as a “screening device” which helps identify `poor’ performance (see also 
Greener, 2003).  
 
In judging the balance between formal and informal performance (and the interplay 
between them), it should be noted that other factors might also determine 
organisational performance. For example, Appleby and Mulligan (2000) estimate 
that over 40% of health performance in a given area might be explained by socio-
economic factors which lie beyond managerial or organizational control.  
“New strategic health authorities should have a coordinating role for 
performance measurement, and still collect hard data about performance in 
health-care organisations, but also recognise the need to use soft 
information and not forget the socioeconomic context within which health 
organisations are working.” (Greener, 2003, p.247) 
 
In summary, performance management regimes have acquired a growing scope and 
remit within the NHS. However, this focus on formal aspects has not excluded 
informal aspects; indeed, both seem to have been incorporated, relying on each 
other to provide both important insights into organisational activities and as levers 
for service improvement (especially among poorly performing organisations). 
Indeed, neither formal nor informal performance measures can fully capture the 
entirety of the organisation’s activity. In order to strike a judicious balance, central 
and local agents must exercise politically-informed judgement (Stewart and Walsh, 
1994).  
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3 Methods. 
This chapter describes the research design and the methodology that has been 
adopted in this study, based on the original aim and objectives. It considers the 
methodological challenges and problems which were encountered during this study.  
 
3.1. Aims and objectives 
 
The original aim of this study was to investigate the inter-relationship between 
decentralisation and performance in LHEs. Five objectives flowed from this aim: 
 
a. To examine the impact of decentralisation upon performance through analysis of 
selected `tracers’ (as examples of current priorities) in local health economy 
(LHE) case-studies; 
b. To describe the local interaction of governance mechanisms;  
c. To evaluate the degree of autonomy available to local health-care organisations; 
d. To assess the (financial and non-financial) incentives associated with different 
policy initiatives; 
e. To provide lessons for policy-makers and managers at all levels in implementing 
decentralisation, managing the implications of autonomy and incentives, and 
addressing performance management through incentives. 
 
3.2. Overall methodology 
 
3.2.1. Comparative case-studies 
In order to achieve the aims and objectives of the study, the plan of investigation 
was to adopt a longitudinal, comparative case-study methodology of LHEs in 
England. To capture the nature of change and interaction within LHEs as complex 
adaptive systems, it was felt that a primarily qualitative study would be appropriate. 
With this in mind, the LHE would be considered as the case-study and the unit of 
analysis. Comparative case-studies were thought to reveal the apparent differences 
in motives, patterns and outputs/outcomes. However, case-studies are open 
systems which complicate data collection. This methodology has become widely 
applied in policy and organisational studies in recent years (for example, Buchanan 
et al, 2007; Greenaway et al, 2007).  
 
3.2.2. Rationale for case-study selection 
The purpose of the research project was to investigate the inter-relationship 
between decentralisation, governance mechanisms (hierarchy, market and 
networks), incentives and performance in LHEs in England. In particular the 
research sought to understand the pathways that link the above factors to 
performance as well as the conditions for their optimal balance.  
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On the basis of the stated objectives, the research adopted a comparative case 
study design and identified the LHE as its unit of analysis. A Local Health Economy 
is commonly defined as a community of local (NHS and non-NHS) organisations that 
offer health care and other welfare-based services. Furthermore, to provide greater 
focus, the study identified specific policy priorities or areas of service (tracers). 
These tracers were relevant to all local communities in England and had been used 
to variously capture the local interaction of market forces, incentives, autonomy, 
decentralisation and inter-organisational relationships and also to improve 
understanding about their impact on performance. In order to gain an in-depth 
portrayal of these dynamics, more than one tracer was selected. This approach 
allowed comparisons within tracers (across LHEs) as well as across tracers (within a 
LHE). The intention had been to provide depth and breadth to these issues, 
 
 
3.2.3. Case study selection criteria 
A main design issue was the selection of the case studies, which involved the choice 
of LHEs. Secondarily, the selection also involved the choice of tracers. Case study 
selection required a number of methodological choices in terms of the logic of 
selection, the criteria for selection, and the number of cases.  These are examined 
in turn. 
 
Drawing on Yin’s (2002, p.47) concepts and rationale for the selection of case 
studies, the research used a replication logic according to which contrasting LHEs 
(and tracers) are selected for analysis.  This theoretical replication approach was 
based on the development of a conceptual model that draws on Pawson and Tilley’s 
(1997) work. Pawson and Tilley, in the context of programme evaluation, argue that 
the mechanisms (M) through which a programme is expected to function are 
shaped by the context (C) in which the programme is implemented. The interaction 
between context and mechanism generated outcomes (O). Therefore, a “realistic 
evaluation” of the programme should be guided by the development of a theory 
that links contextual characteristics, mechanisms and outcomes, which are called 
“context/mechanisms/outcomes configurations.” The configuration of the C-M-O 
was essential to discern effectiveness and evaluate programme impact. The 
identification of the relevant contextual factors and their linkages to mechanism and 
outcomes can be based on academic theory and previous research as well as on 
practical/folk theory.  
 
In the context of this study, adopting Pawson and Tilley’s framework implied that 
LHEs should be selected on the basis that they vary in terms of their local 
contextual frames. Context is assumed to shape local dynamics in terms of 
functioning of market, hierarchy, networks and incentives (the mechanisms) and  in 
turn organizational and LHE outcomes.  This also reflected the national policies that 
are being implemented (by and large) across all NHS organizations; hence, 
`mechanisms’ can be seen as a constant between LHEs, whereas `context’ varies 
between them. 
 
However,  following the same logic, tracers could  be selected that present different 
characteristics in terms of degree of autonomy,  degree of competition, requirement 
for inter-organisational collaboration, because of their nature (Propper and 
Soderlund, 1998; Thomson, 1967), and of a differential national context (e.g. NSF, 
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NICE guidelines etc.). Consequently, the study design aimed to provide in depth 
understanding of differential local dynamics and their effects as they are shaped by 
contextual characteristics. 
 
The team developed a general model of alternative “context / mechanisms / 
outcomes” configurations. Various streams of literature have provided a theoretical 
basis for identification of relevant contextual criteria, their linkages with 
mechanisms and the linkages of the latter with outcomes. This model could then be 
applied to specific tracers to hypothesise how local dynamics for the tracers change 
depending on the contextual frame (the LHE).  
 
Two clarifications are, however, necessary. First, for the sake of clarity and 
simplicity, the conceptual model has been developed as linear relationships, where 
for each contextual characteristic, corresponding mechanisms and potential 
outcomes are hypothesised. However it is evident that complex causal pathways 
(which are made up of multiple influences) are likely to be a more accurate 
representation of local dynamics. It was hoped that empirical analysis would help 
identify some of these complex interactions and their implications for the LHE. 
Second, the model set out to conceptualise outcomes both in terms of behaviours 
and performance. However, behavioural changes have proved more immediate to 
trace than performance changes and are therefore the main focus of the conceptual 
model. 
 
Tracers were selected to achieve variation in terms of the degree of command and 
control exercised from the centre through NSFs, NICE guidelines and programmes 
and guidelines for change, the degree of competition to which the tracer is subject, 
the requirement of inter-organisational collaboration, and the extent to which the 
tracer is subject to national programmes such as patient choice, and PBR. As 
previously mentioned, hypotheses on the behavioural and performance 
consequences of these mechanisms are based on a number of theories and 
literature strands including public choice and principal agent theory, public policy 
implementation theory, decentralisation literature, inter-organisational relations 
literature and institutional theory. For example, the incentive effects of competition 
in terms of innovation and change are strongly advocated by public choice theory 
(see for example Tullock et al, 2002). By the same token, the decentralisation 
literature argues that autonomy increases flexibility in designing services and 
releases managerial entrepreneurship, thereby facilitating innovation and ultimately 
performance improvement (as discussed in the literature review by Davies et al, 
2005; Peckham et al, 2005; Peckham et al, 2008). Alternative paths to outcomes 
are proposed by other scholars. For example, in the context of educational reforms, 
evidence has shown that schools respond to increased competition by engaging in 
symbolic change (Lubienski, 2005) rather than changing processes.   
 
In order to determine the LHE selection, a number of contextual criteria were 
identified for their relevance on influencing mechanisms and outcomes. These 
criteria included:  
 
1. location: regional spread across England, 
2. level of PCT funding: above and below parity, 
3. comparative performance of the LHE (individual and collectively), according to 
formal performance metrics (such as the former star ratings), and 
4. presence of Foundation Trusts.  
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The framework traced the linkages of these contextual factors to mechanisms and 
outcomes drawing on the cited theories, as well as practical theories.  For example, 
geographical location was considered as a proxy of the number and types of local 
service providers. The number and type of providers shape at least two 
mechanisms. First, they shape the characteristic of the local market in terms of 
degree of competition and contestability actually operating in the market. Therefore, 
for tracers subject to competition (e.g. elective procedures), it was expected that 
different behavioural outcomes would be evident in different LHEs. Second, the 
number and types of providers shape the degree of inter-organisational complexity. 
For services where inter-dependences are strong (such as urgent care), inter-
organisational complexity influences coordination of these inter-dependencies and 
collaboration. (Coordination is expected to be facilitated when inter-organisational 
complexity is lower). Moreover, inter-organisational complexity impacts the ability 
of an organisation to act autonomously within the LHE (Bossert, 1998; Fleurke and 
Willemse, 2004). 
 
A final design issue refers to the choice of the number of LHEs and tracers. This 
choice entails a trade-off between breadth and depth. More LHEs would allow 
greater breadth in terms of contextual factors and would strengthen theoretical 
replication. However, having an in depth understanding of a LHE dynamics is 
fundamental to the research objectives. This requires having more than one tracer, 
and the inclusion of as many organisations as possible that are relevant to the 
tracers.  
 
In order to anticipate the type of data that might be gleaned from fieldwork in case-
studies and to acclimatise the researchers to the a priori themes, a hypothetical 
case-study was constructed (Appendix 1). It was developed, using extracts from 
quotes of NHS managers, clinicians and policy-makers. Whilst not designed as a 
comprehensive exercise (data was only gathered for 3 months in 2006), it did prove 
helpful in appreciating the saliency of different policy and practice issues. 
 
As a consequence, a study of several LHEs would have been extremely complex and 
resource-consuming. Given these considerations the research team decided to have 
two LHEs and three tracers. This decision was vindicated by subsequent logistical 
difficulties that were to arise in securing access to and ethical approval from the 
potential case-study sites. 
 
3.2.4. LHE selection 
The research team conducted a process of LHE selection. For practical reasons, the 
team narrowed the selection to 8 candidate areas. It also decided to exclude London 
on the basis of features which would made LHE boundary issues more problematic. 
As such, London was considered an outlier. To initially identify candidate LHEs in the 
8 areas, PCTs and their main providers were listed. Preliminary data collection was 
undertaken for each of these candidate LHEs. This classification was based on 
currently existing PCTs, as of summer 2006. However, PCTs underwent re-
organisation in October 2006. Thus, it was important to take into account the then-
imminent reconfiguration of PCTs by considering likely re-configured PCT and 
eventually, by grouping merged `old’ PCTs under the `new’ PCT. This provided a 
picture of the comparative characteristics of the PCTs that were supposed to merge 
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in October 2006. Candidate LHEs were profiled using different data sources.  Office 
of National Statistics Bands classification and rural/urban classification provide the 
source against which candidate PCTs have been profiled in terms of location. Other 
data included formal performance ratings of the PCT and main Providers (according 
to the Healthcare Commission), main providers’ FT status, funding level of the PCT 
(above / below parity) and coterminosity with Local Authorities. Table 3.1 provides 
the profile of LHEs against these criteria. 
 
Table 3.1. Candidate case-study LHEs 
Candidate LHE  Performance 
(2006-07) 
PCT & main `local’ 
provider*  
Geography 
DH categories 
Complexity 
 
A PCT: (i) Fair (ii) Fair 
Provider: (i) 
Excellent (ii) Fair 
“Regional centre” Low 
B PCT: (i) Fair (ii) 
Weak 
Provider: (i) Good 
(ii) Weak 
“City with industry” Low 
C PCT: (i) Fair (ii) Fair 
Provider: (i) 
Excellent (ii) 
Excellent  
 
“Prospering towns” 
 
High 
D PCT: (i) Fair (ii) Fair  
Provider: (i) Fair (ii) 
Fair  
“Prospering towns” High 
E PCT: (i) Weak (ii) 
Fair 
Provider (i) Excellent 
(ii) Good 
“City with industry” 
& “Prospering towns 
Mixed 
F PCT: (i) Good (ii) 
Good 
Provider: (i) Good 
(ii) Weak  
 
“City with industry” 
& “Prospering 
towns” 
Mixed 
G PCT: (i) Fair (ii) Fair  
Provider: (i) Fair (ii) 
Weak 
 
“Prospering towns” 
 
High 
H PCT: (i) Weak (ii)  
Provider (i) Excellent 
“Mining and 
manufacturing” 
Low 
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(ii) Excellent  
I PCT:  (i) Weak (ii) 
Weak  
Provider: (i) Fair (ii) 
Fair 
 
“Prospering south 
England” 
High 
J PCT: (i) Weak (ii) 
Fair 
Provider: (i) Good 
(ii) Fair 
 
“Prospering towns” 
& “Regional 
centres” 
High 
*Comparative performance is based on the assessment of how the performance of 
the old PCTs (pre-2006) comprising the new PCT (post-2006) compared with the 
performance of their main providers 
Healthcare Commission annual health check scores relating to (i) Quality of services 
and (ii) Use of resources 
 
The team decided that characteristics of location would be the initial criteria of 
selection.  There would then be a consideration of the other criteria as well as of 
knowledge that the team has developed through preliminary documentary analysis, 
collection of current information (e.g. from Health Service Journal, the Guardian 
etc.) and preliminary informative interviews with key stakeholders in the system 
(e.g. managers from NHS organizations, and individuals from key entities such as, 
DH, Healthcare Commission and NHS Confederation). Overall, case selection was 
based on an informed judgement taking a number of factors into account. 
 
A total of three case-studies was originally thought to represent sufficient breadth of 
LHEs.  On advice of the Advisory Group, two were selected to ensure sufficient 
depth rather than breadth. The two case-studies represented contrasting LHEs in 
terms of performance, geographical location and LHE complexity:  
 Performance: as no single measure of LHE performance exists, it was necessary 
to judge overall performance. Using the former star ratings, the two LHE case-
study exhibited the performance dimensions (table 3.2. and 3.3). 
 Geographical location: the LHEs comprised a major urban area and a semi-
urban/semi-rural area. Also, the LHEs were located in the north and the south of 
England.  
 Complexity: one LHE was a `closed’, highly dependent LHE (involving few NHS 
organizations) whilst the other was an `open’, highly inter-dependent LHE 
(involving multiple NHS organisations. 
The two LHEs were termed Northern and Southern to preserve their anonymity. (A 
detailed case-study profile of the two LHEs is presented in Appendix 2)  
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Table 3.2. Northern LHE performance 
HC Annual health check Organisation Year Star ratings 
Clinical 
quality 
Use of resources 
2005-06 - n/a n/a 
2006-07 - Weak Weak 
“Northern” PCT 
2007-08 - Fair Fair 
2003-04 3* - - 
2004-05 3* - - 
2005-06 - Good Excellent 
2006-07 - Good Excellent 
“Northern” 
Hospital 1  
2007-08 - Excellent Excellent 
2003-04 3* - - 
2004-05 3* - - 
2005-06 - Good Fair 
2006-07 - Excellent Excellent 
“Northern” 
Hospital 2  
2007-08 - Excellent Excellent 
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Table 3.3. Southern LHE performance. 
HC Annual health check Organisation Year Star rating 
Clinical 
quality 
Use of resources 
2005-06 - N/a N/a 
2006-07 - Weak Weak 
“Southern” PCT 
2007-08 - Fair Fair 
2003-04 2* - - 
2004-05 3* - - 
2005-06 - Good Weak 
2006-07 - Fair Weak 
“Southern” 
Hospital 1 
2007-08 - Good Fair 
2003-04 3* - - 
2004-05 3* - - 
2005-06 - Good Excellent 
2006-07 - Excellent Excellent 
“Southern” 
Hospital 2) 
2007-08 - Excellent Excellent 
2003-04 0 - - 
2004-05 2* - - 
2005-06 - Good Weak 
2006-07 - Fair Fair 
“Southern” 
Hospital 3 
2007-08 - Excellent Good 
2003-04 0 - - 
2004-05 0 - - 
2005-06 - Weak Weak 
2006-07 - Weak Weak 
“Southern” 
Hospital 4  
2007-08 - Fair Fair 
2003-04 2* - - 
2004-05 1* - - 
2005-06 - Fair Fair 
2006-07 - Good Weak 
“Southern” 
Hospital 5  
2007-08 - Good Fair 
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The case-study profiles (appendix 1) also illustrate the contrasting nature of the two 
LHE case-studies in terms of the financial flows between the PCT and local 
providers. In the Northern LHE, the 4 former PCTs spent between 95% and 97.4% 
of their (hospital and community health services) budget with providers located 
within their boundaries. Similarly, in the Southern LHE, two Trusts received as much 
as 93% of their budget from the local former PCTs. 
 
3.2.5. Tracer selection 
To direct the attention of inquiry within each case-study, it was thought that a focus 
on selected tracers would be appropriate. To ensure some consistency across LHE 
case-study sites, the tracers needed to be national priorities. These tracers were 
selected to illustrate the potential and the pitfalls of local governance mechanisms 
and the decision space which may enable/constrain, say, commissioning or service 
developments. The criteria for such tracers include:  
1. Governance regime (the mix of market, hierarchy and network); for example, 
market concentration indices may be applicable in day case surgery whereas 
forms of hierarchical control will influence organisations’ financial balance; 
2. Number and type of local organisations involved (for example, Chronic Disease 
Management may involve more organisations than others, posing problems of 
coordination; similarly, others (such as day case surgery) will have a stronger 
presence of private health-care providers);  
3. Tracer type (for example, some tracers focus on organisational processes, some 
on service delivery and others on social determinants of health);  
4. Autonomy (for example, some tracers (such as Coronary Heart Disease) are 
more centrally prescribed than others (say, tackling health inequalities) because 
of central policy guidelines and framework and/or clinical effectiveness 
evidence). 
The purpose of the tracer was to provide insight into these themes, rather than a 
specific focus on the services themselves. The tracers were also useful in applying 
the components of the Arrows Framework (Peckham et al, 2005): inputs, process 
and outcomes.  
 
The candidate tracers originally included  
1. Emergency admissions,  
2. Tackling health inequalities,  
3. Chronic disease management,  
4. Coronary heart disease (CHD),  
5. Day case surgery and  
6. Financial balance.   
 
On the advice of NCC-SDO and the project’s Advisory Group and in the light of 
current English health policy, three tracers were selected across all case-studies 
(appendix 3). Three tracers across three case-studies were thought to be a 
manageable workload given the size and scope of the proposed project. These were 
urgent care, elderly care and orthopaedics. The rationale for each tracer is 
summarized in tables 3.4 to 3.6. 
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Table 3.4. Urgent care tracer 
Control from the 
centre/autonomy 
 
 Identified as a national priority in the NHS Plan 2000.  
 Autonomy over outcomes is limited by specific targets 
incorporated in the performance management 
framework. Both NHS Trusts and PCTs are evaluated 
on Urgent Care related targets 
 There are no NSF frameworks specific to urgent care. 
However several NSFs influence the way patients 
should be treated during their journey through the 
urgent care system (ambulance, A&E) 
 Autonomy over processes is greater but within the 
framework of a 10 year national strategy and several 
guidelines and national-led improvement  
programmes 
Degree of competition 
 
By nature, urgent care is not subject to competition 
Service 
Interdependencies 
Urgent care entails a great deal of interdependencies 
among different actors of a local urgent care system. 
Interdependencies require collaboration and coordination 
between them and flexibility in the utilization of staff. 
PCTs are likely to serve as the leading organisation in the 
re-design of urgent care pathways to assure a smooth 
and seamless journey of the patient from first contact 
with until exit of the system. 
Influence of national 
policies 
 Patient choice not likely to influence urgent care 
 PBC - limited 
 PBR – limited 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 100  
 
Table 3.5. Elderly care tracer 
Control from the 
centre/autonomy 
 
 Became a national priority in the  NHS Plan 2000 
 Autonomy over outcomes: a specific National Service 
Framework has been produced in 2001 and recently 
reviewed. The NSF sets the targets for elderly care 
inside and outside the hospital setting 
 Autonomy over processes: moderate 
Degree of competition 
 
The degree of competition depends on the aspect of 
elderly care that is looked at. For example, orthopaedic 
and cataract procedures are likely to be elective. 
Conversely emergency admissions for elderly patients 
are not subject to competition 
Service 
Interdependencies 
Elderly care entails a great deal of organisational inter-
dependencies. It involves both health-care providers and 
social care providers. It also cuts across the other two 
tracers as both urgent care and orthopaedics are two 
services frequently utilized by elderly. Achieving the 
targets set out by the NSF requires joint working and 
collaboration, which involves PCTs, NHS providers and 
Local Authorities, as well as the Independent Sector 
Influence of national 
policies 
 Patient choice is likely to be relevant for those 
procedures that are elective, not on urgent care 
procedures. However given the characteristics of the 
population, the exercise of choice by elderly patients 
may be even more limited than for other categories 
of individuals 
 PBR also is likely to influence where elective 
procedures are involved 
 
Table 3.6. Orthopaedics tracer 
Control from the 
centre/autonomy 
 
Targets have been set out for orthopaedics to tackle 
waiting times for elective procedures. However there has 
been a great deal of freedom left on the processes of 
service redesign 
Degree of competition 
 
Procedures tend to be elective, therefore this tracer is 
subject to competition and contestability 
Service 
Interdependencies 
Service redesign in orthopaedics is likely to be mostly a 
provider’s internal issue without involving complex inter-
dependencies with other actors. However, inter-
dependencies may arise with rehabilitative care and 
home support once an individual has been discharged.  
Also it is likely that providers search for collaboration 
with other local providers as a strategy to service 
redesign. 
Influence of national 
policies 
Waiting time targets and Patient Choice are likely to 
affect orthopaedics significantly given the traditional 
waiting times for such services. As a consequence, 
policies such as PBR and PBC will also impact upon 
Orthopaedics. 
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3.3. Methods in detail 
 
The study comprised mixed methods, with particular emphasis on qualitative 
components. The methodology was sequential and cumulative in that later stages 
were dependent on previous ones to inform the questions and topics to be 
addressed. In practice, this proved much more complicated than we had imagined 
because of the complex nature of the LHEs and organisational restructuring in our 
selected case-study sites. These specific factors are addressed in the sub-sections 
that follow and later in section 3.4.   
 
3.3.1. Secondary data 
● National perspective: 
As this NCC-SDO funded project had followed two previous NCC-SDO funded 
literature review (conducted by some of this research team, led by Stephen 
Peckham and Celia Davies), it was felt that a detailed review of evidence would be 
unnecessary. However, the previous studies had not examined decentralisation in 
terms of the impacts upon organisational performance, and of the ways in which 
organizational autonomy was shaped by local and national incentives. Given this 
gap in knowledge, it seemed sensible to undertake a national review of LHEs. 
 
A review of routinely collected data, independent reports and research evidence was 
undertaken which identified broad patterns of organisational performance across 
England. Data included independent reports such as Leatherman and Sutherland 
(2005) and the Healthcare Commission’s annual health checks. These broad 
patterns were analysed by location, organisational size and type. In particular, the 
patterns also helped to identify case-studies. These data and advice from NCC-SDO 
and Advisory Group members helped to determine the final selection of case-
studies.  
 
● Mapping the LHE 
A detailed assessment of each (potential) LHE was made using local performance 
data (mainly financial and activity data), reports (such as NHS Local Development 
Plans (LDPs) and those from the District Auditor and Healthcare Commission). The 
start of the project (2006) acted as a baseline year but such evidence was gathered 
continually during the study. This mapping exercise helped keep an on-going 
appraisal of the (inner) contextual factors and the extent of local (LHE and 
organisational) autonomy. Other local data collected included:  
 Recent or planned changes to service provision: eg. commissioning 
confederations (as conducted in Manchester, Merseyside, Cheshire), vertical 
acute/PCT mergers (as in IOW, Cheshire, Winchester), PCT devolution contract 
administration and management, or PCT divestment of provision function 
(dependent on current DH review of PCTs). 
 Structure and pattern of local authority commissioning and provision (eg. 
unitary versus two-tier structure; extent of private sector involvement); 
 Emerging local effects of policies such payment-by-results; patient choice 
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 Evidence from patient / public surveys (eg. local results drawn from national 
studies). 
Data from previous years were also collected which helped to identify evolving 
patterns and to provide a more informed baseline (for subsequent analysis in this 
study) up to the start of the 2006-2007 NHS planning cycle (year 1).  
 
3.3.2. “Policy ethnography” in LHEs 
In-depth case-studies of local decision-making have been termed “policy 
ethnography”, signifying the ethnographic approach in policy and organizational 
settings (Flynn et al, 1996; Griffiths and Hughes, 2000; Oborn et al, 2009). The aim 
of such ethnography is to glean the repeated action, interaction and reaction of 
different stakeholders to an on-going / unfolding series of events and decisions. It is 
the continual nature of such relationships which poses challenges for the researcher 
but also makes such inquiry so insightful. It is thus not simply a matter of 
discerning individuals’ motives and behaviour but the interactivity between 
individuals. Such interaction might be apparent during formal settings (such as 
meetings) but equally, during chance encounters on corridors, over lunch or coffee. 
In effect, the policy ethnography is the organisational equivalent of Whyte’s (1943) 
“street corner society.” The researcher needs to “hang around” (proverbially) in 
formal and informal settings. This proved very difficult to achieve in the number of 
organisations involved over the extended period of fieldwork. 
 
Given the constraints within which most funded research operates, a genuine policy 
ethnography is highly challenging. For example, dividing time between two (or 
more) case-studies inevitably dilutes the ability of the researcher to glean 
information. The presence of the researcher might inhibit the conversations of 
stakeholders, thereby imparting a bias. Moreover, it is impossible to be everywhere 
to capture all interactions between multiple stakeholders. A judicious choice needs 
to be made in terms of coverage and depth; coverage ensures all relevant arenas of 
interaction are included whilst depth provides sufficient knowledge of the repeated 
interaction in these settings.   
 
The policy ethnography that was adopted for this study was circumscribed in the 
following ways. First, two case-study LHEs were selected, comprising a total of 10 
(NHS) organisations. Given this number, it was not feasible to explore every 
organization within the two LHEs. The local authority was included. However, 
despite their role in Practice-Based Commissioning, GP practices were not included. 
Second, the initial idea of tracking the Local Development Plan (LDP) was not 
feasible, not least because of the PCT reconfiguration in 2006. During the first and 
second years of the study, PCTs were almost entirely engaged with reconfiguration 
linked to systems and processes.  
 
● In-depth interviews  
Semi-structured interviews generate detailed information directly from informants. 
These interviews were held at two levels: national and local.  
 
National level interviews were held with two DH civil servants and two 
representatives from national organisations. Though the focus of the study was on 
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decentralisation in LHEs, evidence from the preceding literature review (Peckham et 
al, 2005) and others (eg. Saltman et al, 2007) demonstrate the significance of the 
centre in determining the parameters of decentralisation, notably in terms of the 
strategic objectives of the system and its performance measures. Such perspectives 
offer a counterpoint to local level views. It was, therefore, appropriate to interview 
individuals with a national overview. Interviews addressed the logic, implementation 
and consequences of decentralisation policies (including PBR, PBC, FT). In addition, 
individual discussions were held with Advisory Group members who were unable to 
attend meetings. Such discussion tended to provide a more in-depth insight into 
current policy tensions and challenges than Advisory Group meetings (where 
discussions were more wide ranging). Health policy analysis through interviews at 
this level tend to be less common, partly due to difficulties in accessing this group 
of civil servants and policy-makers (see Greer and Jarman, 2007), hence the value 
of these interviews in informing the overall study. 
 
Interviews at the local level were conducted in two rounds in the two case-study 
LHEs. An initial interview sample was drawn up by virtue of individuals’ 
organisational position (for example, chief executive or medical director), their role 
in the LHE (eg. PCT Director of Commissioning) or in one of the tracers (eg. clinical 
director for A and E). Additional individuals were identified from analysis of 
secondary sources (such as annual reports and strategy plans) or word of mouth. 
Their organisatons included the PCT, local acute Trusts, the SHA and the local 
authority. Moreover, it was important to interview more than one individual from 
each organisation (wherever possible). This was to ensure triangulation between 
and within organisations and professional groups (primarily clinicians and 
managers). Finally, it was also important to conduct repeat interviews so as to 
gauge the extent of change over time. The longitudinal perspective was important 
because of the dynamic nature of LHE and organisational change could not easily be 
captured in a single data collection. All interviews were recorded (with permission, 
for transcription and analytical purposes) and were conducted in accordance with 
the approval from the Research Ethics Committee. 
 
A total of 52 interviews were conducted in phase 1 and phase 2 in both case-studies 
(appendix 4 and 5).  The number of interviewees in the second round was lower 
than the first because the content and number of phase 2 interviews were largely 
dictated by the findings of the first round. It was concluded that repeat interviews 
were not required from each participant in phase 1. Whilst 34 interviews were 
conducted in phase 1, 18 were undertaken in phase 2. The volume of data was 
weighted towards one case-study for two reasons. First, the Southern case-study 
was more complex in terms of the number of organisations. Second, access to the 
Northern case-study had proved especially problematic (see 3.4.2.). Difficulties of 
access there curtailed the number of interviews that could be undertaken especially 
with one organization. As numbers are not meaningful in qualitative studies (for 
generalisability or power calculations), it was possible to vary the number of 
interviews in both case-studies and in both phases whilst being confident with the 
quality of the data. For example, in both phases, there was a reasonable confidence 
that saturation (of interview topic and respondent coverage) had been reached, 
largely due to other data sources.  
 
Interview topics in both phases included the effects of governance mechanisms, 
local contextual influences, perceived organisational/LHE autonomy, incentives, and 
sources/reasons for organisational/LHE performance, especially relating to the 
tracer examples (appendix 6). Additional topics included the role of commissioning 
in the LHE, development of LHE-wide objectives, performance  management by the 
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SHA and clinician involvement. The repeat interviews were informed by the first 
round of data collection (including the interview, documentation and observation of 
meetings). Interviews were conducted by four members of the research team. 
 
● Observation 
Observation of formal and informal settings is an essential component of policy 
ethnography. The interactions over time across a community of organisations (the 
LHE) shape the character of local networks and inter-dependencies and denote the 
decision space within which local actors operate. This is especially significant in 
describing and explaining the ways in which local actors negotiate vertical 
imperatives from the centre and horizontal pressures from within the LHE.  
 
Observation of 14 meetings was undertaken across the two LHEs. These meetings 
consisted mainly of board meetings (open to the public) but also of `private’ 
strategy and executive meetings. Both public and private observations corroborated 
data from other sources, especially interviews. Informants were, for example, 
observed in meetings and their comments could therefore be contrasted with 
interview accounts. Detailed field notes taken from each observation were compiled 
and contrasted with formal records (such as the agenda, minutes and papers for 
discussion) and communications (phone conversations and emails). 
 
The observations were undertaken by four team members, fostering triangulation 
between case-studies (including individual organisations) and between researchers. 
These data were forthcoming from the participating Trusts.  
 
● Documentary analysis 
An extensive array of documentation was collated from the two LHE case-studies 
and from national sources. Documents such as annual reports, strategy plans, 
board meeting minutes and public consultation documents were gathered on the 
basis that they informed the a priori and emerging themes of the study. Hence, for 
example, papers concerning reconfiguration across the LHE were specifically sought. 
The information gathered in these documents helped to corroborate the interview 
and observational fieldwork. Such triangulation is common in case-study 
methodologies (Abbott et al, 2004; Elston and Fulop, 2002). 
 
Due to problems of access (see below) in one organization (a Foundation Trust), a 
request under the Freedom of Information Act was submitted. The request was to 
see the minutes of the Board of Directors, which are normally private.  
 
3.3.3. Analysis 
Comparative case-study analysis seeks to identify and explain patterns across and 
within organizations and case-study LHEs. Analysis sought to achieve insights in 
four areas: 
1. The  interaction of (different) governance regimes, autonomy and incentives 
(implicit within national policies and local inter-organisational relationships) in 
forming / shaping performance across the LHE 
2. The patterns of performance by organisation and by LHE 
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3. The relative influence of vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal (networks and 
market) factors in determining the local decision space (room for manoeuvre) 
4. The impact of decisions (including non-decisions) over time. 
 
Given the longitudinal nature of the study (including observations), it was possible 
to begin analysis at an early stage (soon after data collection began in 2006) in 
order to inform subsequent phases. The iterative process of analysis involved all 
members of the team through periodic team meetings and more frequently, among 
the researchers. The members of the Advisory Group also received and commented 
on interim findings. 
 
Interview transcripts and observational field-notes were analysed by at least two 
researchers and their content was organised into a priori and emergent themes. 
Differences in interpretation were discussed among the researchers and later at 
team meetings. This process helped to identify a common thematic approach.  
 
NVivo software (version 7.0) was used to interrogate these qualitative data. This 
structured / hierarchical coding framework allowed comparisons to be drawn 
between and within the key parameters 
 LHE (north and south), 
 Purchaser (PCT) and providers (eg. acute Trust), 
 Organisation (such as Foundation Trust / non-FT, `poorly’ performing Trust), and 
 Professional (eg. clinician and manager). 
The complexity of multiple interviewers and multiple data sites (organisations and 
LHEs) were made easier by use of NVivo.  
 
Secondary data (such as documentary reports and quantitative evidence) was 
analysed through the identification of patterns and trends, consistent with the a 
priori and emergent themes from the qualitative data.  
 
As a way of offering feedback to those who had given their time in the first phase of 
data collection and so as to corroborate our emergent findings, an interim feedback 
was sent to all participants in the summer of 2008. This one page report 
summarised two primary areas of findings: autonomy and organizational 
relationship (see Appendix 7). The interim feedback summary generated relatively 
little response from study participants. However, the Health Select Committee did 
request written and oral evidence from the research team in 2008 (Exworthy et al, 
2008). 
 
3.3.4. Advisory Group 
The Advisory Group was formed to advise the project team on current policy 
developments and emerging findings. The Group was chaired by a former civil 
servant and professor at Warwick University. The group comprised 10 individuals, 
with a mix of academics and policy-makers (appendix 8).  
 
The Advisory group met on 3 occasions. Attendance was generally good. However, 
on occasion, participants withdrew from a meeting, usually at short notice, making 
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discussions somewhat truncated. Given their stated on-going interest in the project, 
the researchers arranged meetings with non-attenders to seek their advice and 
comment. This proved especially useful as it allowed more in-depth discussion 
(though at the expense of interaction within other Advisory Group members).  
 
3.4. Issues and challenges 
 
As in any other major study, numerous challenges were encountered in the 
execution of the research proposal. These fall into three broad categories. 
 
3.4.1. Revisions to the methodology 
The original research proposal was written before a major structural change in the 
NHS had taken place (October 2006, with the reduction on the number of PCTs) and 
with a certain level of knowledge about LHEs. The re-organisation and a greater 
appreciation of the dynamics of LHEs demanded certain revisions to the proposed 
methodology. 
 
● Survey data  
Having identified the candidate case-study LHEs and secured access, the first part 
of the case-study fieldwork was to conduct a self-administered questionnaire. Using 
an electronic survey facility (Survey Monkey: http://www.surveymonkey.com/), the 
survey was to be sent to:  
a. SHA (n=1): CEO, chair and directors (including finance, commissioning/planning 
and clinical (eg. DPH/medical director))   
b. PCT (n=2-3): CEO, chair and directors (including finance, 
commissioning/planning and clinical (eg. DPH)  
c. NHS providers (n=3-4 in each LHE): CEO, chair and directors (including finance, 
commissioning/planning and clinical (eg. medical director) 
d. Local authority (social services department)(n=2) and  
e. Independent sector (n=3).  
This sample of approx. 60 per LHE (total=180) was to be larger than the later 
interview sample. (It contrasts with a similar (postal) survey by Mannion et al 
(2007) who surveyed Chief Executives of all 173 NHS Trusts in England). 
Respondents were to be asked to identify the perceived degree of local autonomy, 
local service and policy dilemmas. A mix of open and closed questions would, it was 
thought, confirm the documentary assessment (identified earlier) and ascertain the 
current organisational issues to provide an up-to-date picture across the LHE. This 
would also provide a baseline for subsequent qualitative methods.  
 
However, the intention to conduct this survey questionnaire was hampered by the 
logistical and bureaucratic concerns. First, the logistical issues of operationalising 
the LHE soon became apparent. Whilst it was relatively easy to identify the key 
organizations and some individuals within them, it became less clear which 
individuals within were most suitable recipients of the questionnaire. This raised 
questions of comparability between organisations and LHEs. Second, at the time of 
questionnaire construction (summer 2006), PCTs across England were in a period of 
re-configuration. This created a `shadow’ effect of several months before and many 
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months after the formal reconfiguration which took place in October 2006. For 
example, at this time (summer 2006), in both LHE case-study sites, the PCT 
consisted only of a handful of executive officers (at senior or junior level). Former 
PCT managers had left or been re-located. There was little organizational memory 
and even less appetite to undertake a research study, let alone a questionnaire. 
(Further discussion of Access is presented below). 
 
As a result of these deliberations and other data (see 3.3.1), the aim of the survey 
– to glean an in-depth picture of LHE issues – was achieved through other means, 
primarily the collection of documentary evidence and discussions with LHE staff and 
relevant external individuals (such as the SHA and DH).  
 
 
● Case-studies and tracers  
It had originally been proposed to conduct three case-studies in contrasting LHEs. 
As initial exploration of the fieldwork was undertaken and taking advice from the 
Advisory Group (June 2006 meeting), it was decided to reduce the number to two. 
The complexity of the LHEs (the number of organisations and the inter-relationships 
between them) and conducting research in them (over two phases and across three 
tracers) within the available resources were critical factors in this decision. Dividing 
these resources (primarily researcher time) between three LHEs was thought to 
dilute the ability to conduct an effective policy ethnography. Two LHE case-studies 
would still provide sufficient depth within LHEs and also breadth across contrasting 
networks of organisations.  
 
The reduction of case-study numbers also allowed a more detailed ethnographic 
approach within the remaining two. For example, the original proposal had stated 
that the meetings to discuss the Local Development Plan (LDPs) would be observed. 
In fact, a wider range of meetings were observed, adding to the richness of data 
collected. 
 
The background analysis relating to the tracers, nationally and locally (appendix 3) 
shaped the thematic approach to data collection. However, it became apparent from 
initial fieldwork that it would be problematic to isolate individual tracers. Rather, the 
study took a wider approach but one informed by the tracers. For example, we 
conducted interviews with lead clinicians in the respective service areas but did not 
restrict the questions to the tracers alone.  
 
3.4.2. Access 
The research team was experienced in conducting applied research, in conjunction 
with NHS organisations. However, the project proved extremely challenging to 
secure access to NHS sites. This seemed to stem from a combination of three inter-
related factors. 
 
First, the start of the project (spring 2006) was in the shadow of the imminent re-
organisation of PCTs. As the PCT had been taken as the core of the LHE for the 
purposes of this study, it was essential that access to these organizations was 
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secured. Initial contact proved hard to establish as both sites only had a skeleton 
staff in the summer of 2006. For example, 
“The PCT only has “8 substantive people” in post, the last one joining on 1 
April. The CEO’s management team of 9 is still 2 short.” (From researcher 
field-notes of phone conversation with Northern PCT Chief Executive, 26 April 
2007). 
Despite an expressed interest in the project, senior managers had multiple and 
competing issues, not least to establish the infrastructure and effective governance 
of their organizations. The PCT Chief Executive in the Northern case-study was 
sympathetic to the project and said that “natural urge to snap hands off” that offer 
support (like this project) but feels he must resist (from researcher field-notes from 
phone conversation, 26 April 2007). However, given the process of PCT re-
organisation, the decisions following our initial requests in early 2007 was deferred 
until the autumn of 2007, as indicated in the following emails:  
 
“Have double checked again with [the Chief Executive] and he is not yet in a 
position for a meeting with you. Maybe give it a few months and contact us 
again to see if the situation has changed.  The organisation might be a little 
more structured then because as you know he has only been in post since 
Dec [2006] and his Directors are just taking up their posts.” (Email from 
Chief Executive’s secretary, 14 March 2007). 
 
“…the Senior Management Team [of the PCT] agreed that a 2 year research 
project looking at the PCT's success… would be valuable.  We would, 
therefore, wish to proceed on this basis… [but] particularly bearing in mind 
the need to minimise any PCT involvement before October [2007].” (Email 
from Chief Executive, 16 July 2007). 
 
Second, access proved not simply to be a one-off decision but an on-going 
negotiation between the team and the organisation but significantly, between local 
organisations the team. Seeking initial interest in the project from senior NHS 
managers prompted the response that their organisation would participate if others 
did so too. In many instances, this relied on securing the agreement of the PCT (see 
above). Having secured an agreement in principle, access was not always or 
necessarily secured from participants. Across the two LHE case-studies, three 
organisations (all providers) refused to participate.  One of these refusals was later 
to reverse its decision in phase 2 when interviews and observations were 
undertaken. Of those who did participate, most respondents were generally 
supportive of the project but some required persuasion to participate (eg. to be 
interviewed). Across the two LHE case-studies, only a couple refused to take part. 
Access was such a problem that, having sites to agree to a questionnaire survey as 
well as to two rounds of interviews, the former become unfeasible. A related 
dilemma here was how to approach access in relation to ethical approval; this is 
explored in more detail below. 
 
Third, the challenge of securing access from one provider, in particular, illustrated 
many of the wider issues for the research community in conducting such research. 
The initial approach to the Trust was through its Research Governance committee.  
This application (which was submitted in October 2006) was rejected in late 2006 
on grounds that it was not relevant to the Trust. The response in this rejection 
seemed to indicate a misunderstanding of the nature of the project. Therefore, one 
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of its Directors was approached (in November 2006) to seek the provider’s (a 
Foundation Trust) participation in the study. Although the Director was not 
supportive of the request, the PCT Chief Executive had suggested in discussions 
about the PCT’s participation (October 2006 – March 2007) that another Director at 
this provider Trust might be sympathetic. The second Director was contacted in May 
2007 and he indicated that  
“I have gained clearance with my colleague Directors subject to a discussion 
with [PCT Chief Executive]. I will arrange this as quickly as possible and get 
back to you.” (Email, 20 July 2007) 
Agreement to participate had already been secured from the PCT Chief Executive. 
This was indicated by the research team to the provider Director (in a phone 
conversation and email, 4 December 2007) and by the PCT Chief Executive (email, 
4 December 2007): 
“I have indicated that it [the project] should not interfere too much or be too 
onerous and the history to date is good on this.” (PCT Chief Executive  email 
to provider Director, 4 December 2007). 
(The reference of “history to date” refers to a previous research project led by the 
PI which had involved the Chief Executive when he occupied a different managerial 
position elsewhere. It had been fortuitous that the LHE was being chosen at around 
the same time that the new PCT Chief Executive was being appointed in 2006). The 
reactions to this email from the provider Director were positive: 
I will seek support from colleagues and assuming they are up for it I suggest 
we agree a start date and some sort of joint sponsorship. Will confirm later 
this month.” (Email from Director to PCT Chief Executive 14 January 2008). 
However, by early February 2008, the provider Director reported that the Trust was 
not sympathetic, not least because of wider policy developments. 
“We discussed the proposed project at some length at our Executive meeting 
last week and unfortunately the consensus view was that we could not 
support the project at the moment.  The Trust is managing a number of vital 
challenges over the next 6 months and the focus necessary to do justice to 
your research just would not be sufficient in terms of the availability of key 
staff to follow you methodology.  Also the work needed to pilot the project 
through the local ethics committee would be considerable taking into account 
the current long lead times for research projects of our own to be 
considered. Inherently the subject matter was of interest but there was an 
almost fatalistic view that no matter what the study revealed the headroom 
for local determination (despite what is said and published) will be small 
whilst ever the NHS is the subject of national direction through an executive 
that is essentially driven by Political preference.” (Provider Director email to 
Principal Investigator, 4 February 2008). 
(The reference to the `local ethics committee’ was slightly disingenuous because 
the research governance process had already been undertaken and, though the 
initial response was negative, the majority of paperwork was already in place. This 
workload would largely fall on the research team). The comments towards the end 
of the list email are highly significant since the provider – a Foundation Trust – did 
not enjoy sufficient “headroom”, free from “political preference.” The PCT Chief 
Executive’s reaction to this email was sought; he explained: 
“I don't think [Director] was ever keen and I know he was feeling pretty 
disgruntled on that day.” (PCT Chief Executive email to Principal 
Investigator, 15 February 2008)  
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The research team asked the Director to reconsider (now, with even more minimal 
Trust involvement, ie. a fewer number of interviews) and the subject was tabled at 
the Trust’s Executive meeting (25 June 2008). However, the Director explained: 
“unfortunately time ran out and I had to leave the meeting early” (email to Principal 
Investigator, 7 July 2008). With a month, the topic had been discussed but the 
outcome was negative. 
“We discussed again your request that we be involved in your research 
project together with [Northern] PCT.  However, having explained to my 
colleagues your revised proposal to limit the contact with this Trust, the 
prevailing view was we would still prefer not to participate in your project.  I 
am sorry that this is the outcome and I feel that further appeals would be 
fruitless. I wish you well with your project and hope that you can produce 
some useful work, albeit without the co-operation of this Trust” (Email to PI, 
29 July 2008 
Given the PCT’s support and the cost (primarily time) of pursuing a replacement 
case-study, it was decided to continue seeking access across this Northern LHE 
case-study. Though this Trust had decided not to cooperate in direct data collection, 
it was possible to observe some of their meetings, and collate documents. Given the 
limited access to some FT documents, it was decided to make a request for Board of 
Directors’ meeting minutes under the Freedom of Information Act. 
 
The implication of these specific factors was to increase the “transaction cost” of 
conducting the research. A tremendous amount of time throughout the life of the 
project was spent in simply securing the access of organizations. The research team 
kept on “Contact Diary” (kept on a password-protected internet file sharing website) 
to monitor the contact with case-study sites. This proved extremely helpful. It 
showed that, in the first 15 months of the study (to July 2007), 37 contacts and 
131 contacts (by phone, email or visit in person) were made with individuals in the 
Northern and Southern case-studies respectively. These contacts were simply to 
secure access and did not include arrangements to collect data (in terms of 
interview or observation, for example). 
 
Participation in this study was entirely voluntary. It is significant therefore that, 
despite stressing the funding of the research team came from the NHS, some 
organizations still refused to take part. In our correspondence with this Trust (and 
others), we had stressed the commitment of participating in the study, as follows: 
minimal organizational involvement (comprising 1 hour interviews with about 8-10 
Trust staff), unobtrusive observation of meetings, and access to relevant 
documentation. The organisational imperative to be involved in evaluations was 
overlaid too with an emphasis on accountability for public funds and on the need to 
share lessons and good practice across the NHS. The rights and responsibilities of 
developing an evidence-based approach to health services, their management and 
policy seemed to be weighted against the researchers. In sum, it was significant 
that the project, which was examining the impact of autonomy, was to encounter 
organisations’ autonomy in deciding not to participate.  
 
3.4.2. Ethics and research governance 
The research team sought ethical approval from London and Surrey Borders 
Research Ethics Committee (REC). Approval was secured following their meeting on 
12 July 2006. In the REC’s letter (13 July 2006) (appendix 9), it stated that 
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“You should arrange for the R&D Department at all relevant NHS care 
organisations to be notified that the research will be taking place, and 
provide a copy of the REC application, the protocol and this letter. All 
researchers and research collaborators who will be participating in the 
research at a NHS site must obtain final research governance approval 
before commencing any research procedures. ” 
Subsequently, the R&D department of each Trust in the two LHEs was approached. 
Most required the completion of local research governance approval but 
significantly, not all did.   
 
The “transaction costs” (preparation time and attendance at the REC meeting) was 
substantial, possibly amounting to 4-6 months (elapsed time). This heavy 
commitment for a study which was interviewing only senior managers and 
clinicians, and observing meetings (some of which were public anyway) seemed 
disproportionate to the ethical issues at stake.  
 
From the outset of the study in 2006, the bureaucratic issues concerned access and 
ethical approval were problematic. It had been debatable whether the LHE case-
study sites should be approached first (to garner their initial support) or whether 
ethical approval should be sought first (in order to ensure a smooth introduction 
once access had been agreed). The former option would involve an initial contact 
and agreement to participate in principle, then some period of time (probably 
months) to secure ethical approval from the Research Ethics Committee and local 
Research Governance approval. The latter option would, assuming a favourable REC 
approval, run the risk that access might later be denied and implying that research 
governance process had been pointless. In the end, initial soundings were sought 
from key parties ahead of the ethical approval and research governance processes.  
 
3.4.3. Limitations of the methodology adopted 
The study has been primarily qualitative in its methodology. Whilst this approach 
offers some strengths which have enabled rich data to be garnered, it also 
presented some limitations. Qualitative methods are limited in that interviews 
consider the perceptions of respondents and observations only reveal actions at that 
time. Reliance on these data can also introduce bias or be misleading. We sought to 
maximise triangulation (of the same participants in different settings) which would 
enable more robust interpretations to be drawn from these data. However, 
triangulation cannot be comprehensive in two case-studies, involving several 
organisations, over an extended period of time. It is impossible, for example, to 
capture the web of networks operating between organisations. We have thus sought 
to portray an authentic picture of the case-studies and believe that we have 
achieved this from feedback (in the second round interviews and other case-study 
contact).  
 
We did not consider quantitative methods to be useful in this study because they 
would be ill-suited to examining the actual effect of decentralisation on 
performance, not least because we have defined performance in a broader sense 
than simply official measured outcomes (some of which are outlined in the case-
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study profiles; see Appendix 2) or quantified responses from participants. These 
data would, for example, be unable, for example, to reveal how patterns of 
performance were achieved. We were thus not interested formal performance 
metrics per se but rather how ideas about performance were enact ed and 
managed. 
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4 Findings. 
The empirical findings are divided into two broad categories: autonomy and 
performance.  These two comprise the primary themes which framed the literature 
review and shaped the a priori and emergent themes revealed through fieldwork. 
NVivo coding did reveal a breadth to both these themes which tended to subsume 
other, seemingly less significant themes.  
 
4.1. Autonomy 
 
4.1.1. Views on autonomy 
This section of the chapter reports on respondents’ views on the benefits and value 
of autonomy.  This focus on benefits and value develops the earlier work by Russell 
Mannion et al (2007) on the perceived value of `earned autonomy.’ Given our focus 
on the intersection between vertical and horizontal pressures, a binary 
categorization of autonomy became readily apparent. Autonomy can thus be seen 
as both ‘freedom from’ (eg the centre or local inter-dependencies) and ‘freedom to’ 
(eg innovate, be responsive etc). This tension reflects a balance between 
constraining and liberating effects. These terms might appear pejorative and 
tendentious. A third benefit – autonomy as a ‘gold standard’ - was also identified. It 
refers to the notion that autonomy is valuable in itself, an organizing principle that 
is redolent of subsidiarity. The concepts have not been previously identified in the 
literature in this way. These three aspects will be discussed in turn, looking at both 
the views of respondents from the Foundation Trust (FT) in our case study and from 
organisations aspiring to become an FT or in inter-dependent relations with them. 
FTs played powerful roles in shaping the terms of the debate in both LHEs, despite 
their contrasting inter-dependencies. Nonetheless, FTs are the embodiment of 
English health policies designed to foster autonomy in the local NHS. It is, therefore, 
appropriate that attention is devoted to perceptions of them, both by those 
`possessing’ autonomy (as an FT) and those working in apparently non-
autonomous organizations.  
 
● Autonomy as “freedom from”: 
The benefits of autonomy in terms of “freedom from” emerged in the respondents’ 
narratives mainly in relation to the performance management approach of the 
Strategic Health Authority (SHA). For example, senior staff at a non-FT provider in 
the Southern case study felt that the space that had been created when 
performance management shifted from the SHA to the PCT had enabled them to 
improve their performance. Importantly there was a change in the ‘tone’ of 
performance management. In place of the ‘big stick’ approach the trust was able to 
develop collaborative relationships, with other organisations in the LHE, and with 
clinicians within the organisation. The shift in performance management “freed” the 
provider from the apparently constraining approach of the SHA towards a more 
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collaborative approach at the PCT level. The PCT also found this approach valuable 
as one of its senior managers explained: 
 
“I think the other positive thing is the work across [Southern LHE] with the …HR 
Directors because I think that because they see me as a colleague, I'm in a much 
better position to get them to work with me than the SHA I'm afraid because the 
SHA was always 'bad'… I do think that I've managed to build the relationships 
with my colleagues that are much more on a- 'you know, we need to help each 
other out, I really do need you to do this' and we understand each other…” (HR 
manager, Southern PCT) 
 
The view from providers on the Southern PCT’s efforts were appreciated 
 
“The PCT is working hard to develop a more substantial and structured 
relationship with the acute Trusts. I think it's paying dividends” (Manager, non-
FT provider, Southern LHE) 
 
FTs are not performance managed by the PCT or the SHA in the same way as before 
their autonomous status. However, a slightly more tempered view was given by 
senior staff at the Foundation Trust as to the benefits of autonomy in terms of 
freedom from SHA performance management.  
 
“The second thing, there were some short term gains to be coming out of 
financial trusts inasmuch as financial gains were really quite important but 
those have all been equalised down.  I think there is a small amount of 
freedom from local control, from SHA control, but it is not anywhere near what 
I had envisaged it should be, would be, and I don't think it's anywhere near 
what our counsel of governors believed it should be or would be …” 
(Senior manager, Foundation Trust, Southern LHE).  
 
The shift towards more local autonomy in terms of performance management was 
evident from the SHA perspective too. This was notable in the Northern LHE where 
the PCT and the Northern Hospital 1 were both highly regarded.  
 
“The main thing is we don't ask for anywhere near the same amount of 
information that we would of places that we're worried about. We tend to trust 
them [the organizations in the Northern LHE] when they're going to do 
something. If they say they're going to do something, we tend not to then check 
have they done it” (Director, SHA, Northern case-study). 
 
This view was corroborated by the Director Finance at the Northern PCT who 
complimented the SHA on its strategy of allowing more local autonomy: 
 
“So the SHA is naturally being rather hands-on to start with because we were 
one of their red-risk patches and we had to be seen to be delivering but now 
we've shown that we're into being able to deliver and we've come back to 
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financial balance. They've, in my book quite rightly, stepped back and we're not 
on the fortnightly monitoring, we're on much more light-touch review because 
we've gained their confidence, we know what we're doing and we are able 
perceive, so that's good.” 
 
However, there appeared to be a persistence of centralisation in relation to SHA-PCT 
relations, as indicated by the Chair of the Northern PCT 
“The PCT has not yet shaken off the old constraints of the SHA wanting to 
hammer us” (Field-notes, Northern PCT board meting, October 2007). 
 
The `Northern’ approach contrasts markedly with the `Southern’ approach to 
performance management by the SHA. The degree of autonomy ceded by the 
`Southern’ SHA appears more limited. 
 
“Now ideally, it would be preferable for Primary Care Trusts to performance 
manage all of their commissioned responsibilities but it just doesn't work so we 
separate mental health. The PCTs chair part two but we are always in attendance 
and we reserve the right to resume chairing if we don't think they're doing a 
good enough job of it.” (SHA Director, Southern case-study)   
 
A senior director of a provider, aspiring to become an FT, seemed to support the 
value of freedom from performance management by the `Southern’ SHA, as judged 
by this quote: 
 
“I would say we won't, in formal terms, be performance-managed by the 
SHA and that may make some things easier and simpler to achieve.” 
 
Similar views on autonomy emerged in a provider which was aspiring to become a 
Foundation Trust. Senior managers at this Trust viewed Foundation Trust status as 
liberating the Trust from much of existing external pressure (both vertically and 
horizontally). With FT status, more space for change could be created: 
 
“We feel that we've got to make that space, we don't actually feel that we have 
space at the moment as an organisation. We're still very pushed, very drained. 
At this meeting I had just before, I was talking about the fact that ward sisters 
are absolutely at their wits' end, you know. But we feel that one way out of this 
is to become a Foundation Trust” (Senior Manager, non-FT provider). 
 
These comments were echoed by another senior manager in a Trust hoping to 
become an FT in the near future.  
 
“We've got some quite ambitious capital plans which will require significant 
investment and we need to be a Foundation Trust in order to deliver on those 
and I think the reputational benefits both in terms of patient choice but also in 
terms of attracting the right workforce will be very, very helpful to us” (Chief 
Executive on an aspirant FT). 
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The lack of autonomy felt by poorly performing Trust was also notable. The 
Southern LHE comprised one Trust which, one respondent described as “we were 
the worst performing Trust as far as A&E was concerned in the country as well as 
having one of the largest deficits, this organisation for the last five years has not 
achieved any performance targets whatsoever.”  The national targets around certain 
clinical priorities were interpreted as a lack of autonomy, as manifest by one 
Director’s comments. 
 
Interviewer: did you feel along the way that there was any particular barriers? 
Director of Operations: “Um, pressure of time so there was a huge barrier. Well 
for example, in November last year, we received a David Nicholson [NHS Chief 
Executive] letter saying 'these are the top three things that you've got to hit, 
finance, improve quality of service and you’re A&E target and if you don't do it 
within 12 weeks then…' potentially, well, unsaid but potentially we're moved out 
and a new system moved in. I think there is that kind of still, one of the barriers 
is still a culture of blame that exists within the NHS, there is a big culture of 
national, Government policy that's introduced that goes bad because of bad 
management, not necessarily bad policy-making or planning at a Central level” 
 
This manager viewed the national targets and their incentives as negative in terms 
of the autonomy that it gave the Trust. Such minimal vertical autonomy did, in this 
manager’s view, hinder efforts to improve.  
 
“When you're on the receiving end, you certainly realise that quite a big barrier is 
the enormous amount of pressure, negative pressure, if you don't- if you don't 
achieve within a certain time scale. It is quite difficult to stand up and be counted 
and say, 'Either- either we just apply another Elastoplast to this wound or you 
give us the head space to apply the appropriate treatment so that we treat the 
underlying problem and we have sustainable change over a longer period of 
time.” (Director of Operations) 
 
However, in another Trust, previous poor performance had been improved. In the 
next quote, for example, a provider manager describes how the Trust was able to 
move from being one of the lowest performing trusts in the country in A&E to the 
highest.  
 
“The consultants were kind of regularly hauled in and just told to do better but 
just, you know. Calling people in and haranguing them about poor 
performance doesn't really achieve anything so what happened was that a 
very detailed piece of work to understand the medical pathway, what 
happened coming through A&E, how were they assessed, who assessed them, 
where were they admitted to?  (Senior manager, provider Trust, Southern 
LHE) 
 
The freedom from the centre was claimed, in some cases, to be illusory. FTs (in 
both case-studies) most clearly felt this since the expected freedom from the DH 
was not being realized. It was claimed that national policy was still being applied 
uniformly rather than recognizing local variations (including FTs), highlighting the 
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need for the centre to adjust its relationship with an increasingly variegated 
locality. This loss of “freedom from” precipitated a pessimism which was evident 
in one of the Northern FTs. (The reference to the NHS Council refers to the 
debate, at that time, about the possibility of an `independent NHS’ with its own 
constitution). 
 
“The headroom for local determination (despite what is said and published) will 
be small whilst ever the NHS is the subject of national direction through an 
executive that is essentially driven by political preference.  If the long awaited 
NHS Council free of party political interference is ever a substantive option then 
there may be a chance for local determination to flourish.”  (Email from Director, 
FT, Northern LHE, April 2008) 
A similar concern was expressed by the Chair of a Southern Trust who argued 
that:  
“The NHS has been centralised and prescriptive for 60 years. Can the NHS let 
go without imposing extra bureaucracy.  What does local mean? Is it the end 
of a national health service? Is there one now” (field-notes, Trust board 
meeting, July 2008; original emphasis).  
A non-executive director at the same meeting commented in a similar fashion:  
“We shouldn’t underestimate the challenge of moving from command and 
control to distributed leadership. Middle management will be confused - ‘What 
will be expected of me.’” (field-notes) 
 
● Autonomy as “freedom to”: 
Freedom from performance management was seen as a benefit in itself which 
amounted to a ‘control over one’s destiny.’ However, it was also seen as a derived 
benefit which enabled Trusts to develop their own strategies and provide more 
responsive services to patients. In this sense, autonomy also represented “freedom 
to” forge new ways of working.  
 
In the following account, for example, a senior manager from a non-FT illustrates 
how, in his view, an FT environment will be more conducive to the development of 
market expansion strategies. 
 
“What I want to get to personally in terms of my role is that we become more 
entrepreneurial, we have a much better sense of what patients and GPs think 
of us, and of our services, we use that feedback to improve and we actually go 
out there and actually promote our services externally so [another Trust] is 
just down the road, is a Foundation Trust but a specialist service but there are 
a number of services where they are looking to expand and grow their market 
share and that's what I want to, you know, our market share to increase 
because patients choose to come here and you don't need to be a Foundation 
Trust to do that but I think by being a Foundation Trust in a sense it will 
indicate that we're at that point where we can do more of that“ (Senior 
manager, non-FT) 
 
In a similar fashion, the financial freedoms derived from Foundation Trust status 
were valued so as to enable better patient care. A direct link was claimed between 
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financial freedom and improvements, not least staff morale, according to this FT 
manager.  
 
“I suppose we've had the income that the Trust have generated whether it be 
through surgery or emergency or whatever; we've seen massive investment in 
equipment and resources for things like theatre whereas before the Trust did 
its best in trying to supply us with additional bits of kit. We've been able to 
actually replace broken items, just basic instrumentation has been replaced; 
we've spent a lot of money on infrastructure and equipment and that's been 
noticed and really appreciated by the clinical staff and the nursing staff. So 
they've seen a real benefit.” (Business manager, Foundation Trust) 
 
However, the longitudinal nature of this study revealed how initial enthusiasms 
about FT freedoms (freedom to) were, in some cases, not being realized. The effect 
of enduring centralisation seemed to dominate (well-publicised) aspects of 
autonomy. Such effects were more insidious and were evident in FTs in both case-
studies. For example, in one FT, the Chief Executive had initially been optimistic 
about the FT’s freedom to (inter alia) improve infrastructure, to develop services 
and to improve staff morale.  
 
“Well we're on our own. So if we get it wrong, there's no one to bale us out. We 
have got a number of freedoms so you know, if we can make tariff work for us 
and provide services for low tariff we keep the difference and that generates our 
surplus and the more surplus we make, the more we can invest in the hospital 
for the future. So people here think they work hard to deliver an efficient service 
and a quality service to the local public, if we can, you know, generate a surplus, 
they can see some fruits for their hard work and we can say, yes, we're going to 
spend, I don't know, 5 million quid on reinvesting you know, money in the A&E 
infrastructure or building another operating theatre or whatever.” (Chief 
Executive, FT; phase 1 interview, October 2007) 
 
However, he had become rather more pessimistic in the second interview, citing the 
retention of powers by the DH.  
 
“It's the way the Department of Health and the NHS works so, you know, 
everyone kind of levels down to the lowest common denominator over time and 
you know, the NHS doesn't like winners and losers. It likes everyone to be 
neutral [laughs] and that's where you know, I think we're going to end…  at 
some point with you know, changes to the funding model and the new tariff 
coming out now. We'll see some of our surplus disappear along with other FTs.” 
(Chief Executive, FT; phase 2 interview, December 2008). 
  
● The gold standard 
For Trusts aspiring to become FTs, perhaps the main attraction was in being 
awarded a status which was seen as a `gold standard’ or ‘charter mark’. As one 
senior manager in a Trust aspiring to become an FT put it:  
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“There is that perception both within the wider NHS community and now from 
the patient perspective, that in order to be of the highest quality, you must be a 
Foundation Trust.” 
 
This comment implies an inevitability to health policy - that FT option is the only 
route to autonomy, among other objectives, and not valuable in and of itself. 
However, achieving the ‘gold standard’ was also seen as improving the internal 
image the Trust had of itself, which then  fostered staff motivation and recruitment,  
which in turn improved the quality of patient care:  
 
“Our clinicians are very keen for us to become a Foundation Trust. I think 
there's an element of kudos and status that comes along with the Foundation 
Trust. There's an element from workforce perspective that we've exceeded 
and particularly for an organisation like ours that has come from an incredibly 
low base and I don't mean that in terms of clinical delivery of care because I 
think our workforce provides very good care. They've just been told that 
they've been crap for a very long time so I think the aspiration to be a 
Foundation status sends a very clear message to the workforce that we feel 
that we're succeeding and I think when we get there, the workforce will feel 
that it's achieved a huge amount.  So there's a lot of- from a workforce point 
of view- issues around them wanting to prove a point that they provide good 
quality care and they want recognition for it” (Director of Finance, non-FT) 
 
The award of the FT `badge’ was seen as the primary benefit by the FTs in the case 
studies. Here, the impact upon staff pride and sense of ownership was stressed:  
 
“I think it enabled the continuation of a successful philosophy in the Trust to 
be demonstrated.  It's hard working in an acute Trust, it's hard working for 
the Government and you need something to puff your chest out so that you 
can try and be 3-star. You can try and win the charter mark in the old days.  I 
think you have to have something that can, if you're good enough to get 
there, demonstrate to your staff that you're different.” (Senior manger, 
Foundation Trust) 
 
4.1.2. How autonomy is shaped 
The empirical evidence underscores how both vertical (e.g. central policy) and 
horizontal (e.g. inter-organisational relationships) factors shape local decision space 
and organisational change. To some extent, the distinction “freedom from” and 
“freedom to” recognises the vertical / horizontal tension but this next section delves 
further into the impact of national policy upon local autonomy (vertical factors) and 
the impact of the LHE upon an organisation’s autonomy (horizontal factors). 
 
● Vertical factors– How autonomy is shaped by national policy mechanisms  
We found that, despite the rhetoric of decentralisation, national policy continues to 
influence local autonomy in several ways. Local autonomy should thus be seen as 
contingent upon the nature of the central policies.  
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First, national policy imperatives directly influenced local priorities and the focus of 
attention of local organisations. This direct mechanism of influence chiefly operates 
through targets and standards, as part of system management reforms. In the 
majority of the interviews across organisations, the main priorities were related to 
the achievement of targets, in particular financial balance, waiting times and 
infection rates.   This was also true for the Foundation Trust – for example, in our 
Northern case study. 
 
“I [have] just learned that there is an SHA instruction about to hit the PCTs 
and hence the Trust that, no matter the substance of the case or the 
background context, we are to be instructed to have more Matrons associated 
with infection control because that is what the DoH has told the SHA to do.  
This is an example of the antithesis of local determination even in an economy 
that comprises Foundation Trust providers and reasonably free-thinking PCTs” 
(Director, Foundation Trust, Northern case-study)  
 
It is significant that this Director also pointed to the importance of the (“free-
thinking”) PCT – an illustration of horizontal autonomy that will be explored later. 
In a similar vein, a PCT senior manager indicated: 
 
Interviewer:  Yes and how do you decide what to implement and what not to 
implement or what to prioritise? 
Respondent: “...the absolute priorities are the Healthcare Commission 
standards and the targets within those standards and the ...requirements that 
go alongside them and so on and so to try and make it clear what the 
priorities were we then sort of went through all the targets, especially the 
targets anyway. We've been having two or three of the targets that were at 
red or amber, the people who were leading on them coming to Exec team and 
us discussing and seeing how we could how we could improve on things” 
(Senior manager, PCT) 
Whilst recognising the role of central priorities, we observed some participants who 
expressed “the feeling that centrally defined policies and directions are detached 
from the local reality and that this creates tension for the organisation” (Field-notes, 
Trust board meeting, May 2007).  
 
In addition, around the time the second phase of fieldwork began, Lord Darzi’s 
review had been released and the World Class Commissioning document had been 
finalised. These two documents represented two examples of how (new) national 
policy was shaping the focus of attention locally, irrespective of the degree of local 
autonomy. However, there was a notable difference between the Northern and 
Southern case studies. In the Southern LHE case-study, the accounts suggested 
that these two documents were starting to channel attention and resources locally 
with a feeling that this would be, once again, generating a climate of uncertainty. 
 
In contrast, in the Northern case study, the Chief Executive of the PCT (who had 
actively participated in development work on world class commissioning) claimed 
that the PCT had been able to anticipate World Class Commissioning requirements 
quite proactively rather than simply being a recipient of an additional national 
programme. This view was reiterated and strengthened in our second phase of 
interviews.  
 
“It's [WCC] really just enabled us to carry on the way we're going, it hasn't really 
forced us to change our direction of travel, but it's obviously enabled us to focus 
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on one or two areas… it's reaffirmed if you like, confirmed where we thought we 
needed to work … There was the usual exercise of external validation but you 
know, ultimately it's not such a... different course, it's just confirmed we need to 
carry on the way we're going” (Chief Executive, Northern PCT; phase 2 interview, 
March 2009). 
 
As a fellow senior manager in the Northern PCT clarified, the high performing 
Northern PCT had the ability to align national and local policy, often in ways which 
implied that the latter was the driving force with the former precipitating on-going 
adjustments.  
 
“The five-year strategy, of course you need to refresh these things from time to 
time, as you'll know the NHS operating framework for this year said, 'Well Darzi 
will be out in June and the Darzi Report is going to say that every PCT... should 
have a strategy by the autumn but we've already got one. It's not entirely 
accidental because the boss is well connected and made sure he knew what was 
coming and did exactly what a Chief Exec should do, but essentially what, you 
know, what we will do is we'll refresh the strategy in the light of the Darzi 
Report” (Director, Northern PCT). 
 
An interesting aspect, and perhaps not surprising, that emerged from the 
narratives around national policy, was a concern about the extent to which local 
agents were able to game the national targets. For example, on the A&E targets, 
at least one manager suggested that this could be achieved by careful, but 
honest, work on the data. Another manager noted that the improving patient 
care was the underlying motivation of targets: 
 
Trust has good cancer performance and “whether you agree with the 2 
week target or not, it about standards of patient treatment.” (Field-notes, 
Trust executive meeting, September 2007). 
 
Associated with the direct influence of the national policy on local organisations’ 
autonomy was the perception of the distance between `directed change’ and the 
characteristics of the local context, which often resulted in the implementation of 
models of care inappropriate for the local population. 
 
“So that’s one of the problems with planning of emergency services. There’s 
this idea one size fits all and it really doesn’t, so there was never a huge 
primary care need in this department so that’s one of the reasons why the 
walk-in centre never ended up seeing the number of patients that they were 
originally designed to. But at the planning stage, my colleagues had to push 
the PCT to even look at a few of the A&E cuts but the planning stage when 
they were contemplating spending millions on this project. There was no audit 
done as to what actually was coming in here and what they might see.  They 
just assumed that there would be lots of patients they could see and there 
weren't and they employed nurses with a primary care background, not a 
minor injuries background and they've had to sort of try and get themselves 
up to speed dealing with the most minor of the minor injuries… you know, so 
they had the wrong skills for what they were need to do.” (A&E lead clinician, 
Southern case-study). 
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In the Northern case-study, one PCT Director commented on the inappropriateness 
of central policy approaches to managing the new version of LHE emerging from 
national policy: 
   
“World Class Commissioning I mean, you just know that the assurance 
framework is going to turn into, for us, what Monitor is for FTs and what they've 
also got no doubt about is that it will be done in a deeply unimaginative and 
heavy-handed manner by the Strategic Health Authority because actually what 
other role have they got other than performance-managing us.” 
 
There was also a perception among clinicians of how directed (central) change 
distorts clinical priorities and is often made at a level and by people who, it is 
claimed, have little sense of how things work in reality. Clinicians referred to central 
policies, especially waiting time targets, as influencing clinical practice in a way that 
is not guided by patient needs and with a weak clinical justification. 
 
“…the pressure on my operating list in two weeks' if there's a spare slot would 
be to get the person who has waited thirteen weeks in… and so to a degree, 
that was why targets were always not approved of, is that pressure would 
always be to just meet the target rather than determine the wait on clinical 
grounds. I mean that thirteen week patient, if they can wait thirteen weeks 
they can wait sixteen weeks, it's not going to kill them, yes it's a bore for 
anyone to have to wait that long but it's not going to adversely affect their 
outcome.”  (Consultant, Hospital). 
A second pathway through which national policy constrains local room for 
manoeuvre works through distracting from good patient care and crowding out of 
motivation. Interviewees highlighted how multiple and occasionally contradictory 
policies were being implemented simultaneously and delivered and disseminated in 
a non-user friendly way. They claimed that this led to a dilution of management 
energy and resources. As a result, efforts, energies and attention were focused on 
ticking boxes, leading to demoralisation and discouragement. For example, in the 
Southern case study, multiple and at times contradictory policies and a rapid pace 
of change resulted in a dilution of management energy and resources. This was 
expressed both by managers and clinicians. 
 
“I don't know what the master plan is but sometimes… I guess as with 
anything, people just add bits on and then work out that actually they don't fit 
together very well. It's no wonder that we confuse the population if you think 
about it; we've got so many initiatives running on so many things that we call 
terms that people don't even understand...” (Senior Manager). 
 
“Inundated with pieces of paper, guidelines, questionnaires, you know, can't 
remember all... frameworks, you know. Have you got posters up telling people 
what to do if they need alcohol rehabilitation, this kind of thing and it takes up 
vast amounts of my time, NICE guidelines on this that and the other. I really 
think they ought to do a NICE guidance on NICE guidance and actually there 
may be other areas of medicine where it's made a big difference from an A&E 
perspective. I can't think of a single piece of NICE guidance for example that 
really has improved patient care.  They produce these 50-page documents 
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that you know, waffle on for ages and you know, you want to just pick out the 
important facts. I do. So there's tons of that going on, box-ticking exercises 
and I don't think it translates into good patient care. (Consultant, Hospital).  
 
“I've just spent over a year and a half with a completely demoralised and 
extremely worried set of staff in there who don't know if they've got a job. To 
be honest, politically, no one in the Health Service wants to play politics and it 
looks like it's a whole political thing around here. The Trust that is the most 
overspent is not the Trust that's to be involved in the public consultation and 
so everybody thinks well `what's that about?’  And then someone twigs, it's in 
a Labour seat – oh fine – so, everybody loses faith somewhat in these 
scenarios. It's very difficult and everybody has felt very threatened and that's 
been very difficult and you cannot talk about change and you cannot talk 
about moving things forward with a set of people who are just worried about 
whether they've got a job or not, you can't go there, so that's difficult” 
(Manager , Hospital, Southern case-study). 
 
In addition to demoralisation, there were also concerns around the shifting agenda 
and decisions from government. For example, the Chair of a Trust (hoping to 
become an FT) spoke of the value of autonomy as a way of controlling their own 
`destiny’, a view which had been shaped by the Trust’s experience with another 
aspect of national policy – Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs). The 
ISTC policy had been given a great deal of emphasis locally and, although it was not 
implemented locally, its deliberations had created a planning blight for the Trust. 
 
“Becoming master of our own destiny actually that means the Department of 
Health can't impose things on us. One of the things that we did suffer from for 
many years, was we were going to have an ISTC. This wasn't our initiative, it 
was imposed on us, huge amounts of money spent on legal fees. It was all going 
to go ahead but it was stopped. It was orthopaedic work so it stopped us 
developing our orthopaedic service because we- because you know, we were 
going to lose all this work and the contract was signed with the supplier and then 
all went quiet for months and months and months and in the end the 
Department of Health quietly decided to drop it.” 
 
Furthermore, managers complained that as a result of national decisions they are 
often held responsible for things not entirely under their control, which is clearly 
detrimental to their autonomy - their `room for manoeuvre’ as this managers 
describes it.  
 
“I think sometimes the big decisions set the risk in the wrong place. I think 
the risk around eighteen weeks sits with the acute trust. If the PCT haven’t 
commissioned accordingly, you get anomalies down the line which then make 
you feel as though your room to manoeuvre is being completely kyboshed” 
(Senior Manager, Hospital) 
 
(The 18 week target should be shared across the patient journey, with responsibility 
divided between the Trust, GPs and PCT). However, this view was not shared by 
managers in the Northern case study, who offered a much more tempered account 
on responsibility over national targets. In particular, it appears that there was a 
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more shared ownership for the achievement of targets, such as A&E and waiting 
times, between the PCT, the main hospital provider and other partner organizations. 
This shared ownership appeared to have mitigated the issue of a divergence 
between responsibility and control over actions. This might reflect a perception that 
the target was instrumental to a wider objective, as one senior manager in the 
Northern PCT explained:  
 
“You obviously need to be seen quickly and safely but it's [targets] seen as a 
means to an end reducing of waiting times as opposed to the be all and end all 
and it- it's cost us a lot of money.” 
 
 
Another way in which national policy shapes local decision space is by 
setting/defining the parameters through which organisations evaluate and are 
evaluated by other organisations, which is embodied for example in a local highly 
structured approach to performance management. This theme is explored in detail 
in the next section of this chapter.  
 
“The formal structure is that we have a Monthly Performance Management 
cycle which has a part one performance management meeting which is the 
SHA Performance Managing Primary Care Trusts so it's just the SHA and the 
PCTs present.  Part two is the PCTs chairing the meeting, undertaking their 
responsibilities of performance management of the acute providers or the 
mental health providers. We separate the acute and mental health because 
otherwise what tended to happen was that mental health got about five 
minutes at the end of the agenda.”  (Director, SHA, Southern case-study).   
 
This contrasts with the approach of the SHA in the Northern case-study which 
had a more remote approach to local performance management 
 
“We think of it as a high-performing health economy that also has quite 
significant challenges and um, and I guess from our perspective, we tend to 
think that they're pretty good. If anybody's going to deal with some of the 
things they have to deal with, it will be them, um, and I think one of the 
things that probably really happened over the last couple of years has been, I 
think, seeing the PCT take on the mantle of kind of leading the NHS.” 
(Director, SHA, Northern case-study). 
 
However, interestingly, the data also indicated that formal metrics, although 
dominating local mindset, alone did not provide adequate information. Informal 
relations were crucial, especially when the FT is but one of several players, as in the 
Southern LHE case-study.  
 
 “In addition to that formal meeting structure, the Director has one-to-one 
meetings with all Chief Executives on a monthly cycle …then on a two-monthly 
basis, they meet our Chief Executive and on a quarterly basis our Chair and 
Chief Executive meet the Chair and Chief Executive of each organisation 
because we have responsibility for management of both the executive and the 
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non-executive function. So we have our Chair doing performance reviews with 
Chairs of PCTs and Trusts…. So that's the formal structure.  Informally, we 
have very regular contact through the weekly performance reports which 
come in, which would cover A&E performance, or some come in weekly, some 
are monthly, A&Es on a weekly basis, activity returns are on a weekly basis, 
breaches we pick up on a daily basis when they happen” (Director, SHA, 
Southern case-study). 
 
Two narratives of autonomy were often juxtaposed. The first suggested that local 
organisations’ autonomy continued to be jeopardised by considerable pressures 
from the centre and by the multiple and at times contradictory policies. For 
example, the annual plan (2008-2009) of a Northern hospital referred to: 
“The cumulative impact of the many current NHS policies and initiatives creates 
great risk and uncertainty for this and other Foundation Trusts. It is in this 
context that the Board will again commit itself to improving services, governance 
and links to the membership whilst making a step change in productivity and 
efficiency to maintain financial health and enable additional investment” 
(para.1.4). 
The second narrative centred on how national policy occasionally had facilitated 
local change. The mechanism through which national policy operates as a lever for 
change is the removal of constraints, especially in terms of resource allocation and 
competing arguments and interests on the necessity of change. In so doing, 
national policy actually created `room for manoeuvre’ within which it had been 
possible to instigate organisational and clinical change. For example, several 
interviews with clinicians and managers indicated how the A&E target was essential 
to marshal resources towards the restructuring of the A&E department and how the 
national collaborative further supported this change.   
 
“I really think that there’s been a lot of benefits from these targets; I don’t 
think we would have probably ever cracked the A&E problem if we hadn’t had 
the four-hour target around it” (Senior Manager, Hospital). 
 
Similarly, the NSF on Stroke was viewed as key to silence disagreements and focus 
resources on a service improvement which was needed “years ago”. 
 
“Well, a stroke (service) was easy to set up, relatively speaking because of the 
National Service Framework. We were required to do it. I wanted to set up a 
stroke unit years ago and nobody would have it, the hospital clinicians were 
against it, my colleagues in medicine, the GPs weren't. There was a debate in 
the postgraduate centre you know, are stroke units worthwhile… and I think it 
was unanimous that they were, so the general physician that spoke against 
them … [laughs] didn’t quite know what to say afterwards but I think he sort 
of half believed they were as well, so, the hospital, our colleagues were 
against it and the management and the PCT weren't interested because, like 
most new services and improvements cost money and, if it costs money, it 
can't be done” (Consultant, Hospital). 
 
In addition, it was found that local organisations used national policy as a lever to 
bring forward their agenda and implement change. The alignment of national 
policies and local priorities was a strategic decision to enhance the interest of key 
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local agents. For example, in the Southern case study, the PCT used national 
standards published by the Royal Colleges as the basis of their commissioning 
intentions (see 4.2.4).  However, in some cases, this alignment was as much 
coincidental as a strategic choice. On occasion, this prompted critical (and cynical) 
comments from others. 
 
 
 
● Horizontal factors – How autonomy is shaped by the local health economy 
 
In contrast to the influence of national policy on autonomy, the following section 
looks at how `room for manoeuvre’ is shaped by local context characteristics, 
including relational dynamics between organisations and professional groups, by 
attitudes towards autonomy, and by leadership and competence. 
 
Relational dynamics: 
LHEs are shaped and defined by organisational inter-dependencies which are 
generated by collegial relationships (eg between general practitioners and 
specialists) and organizational / institutional relationships (eg the purchasers and 
providers of health-care and between providers). The existence and continuous 
nature of such social and institutional relationships develops a deep knowledge of 
people and processes that are underpinned by informal aspects such as reputation, 
trust, and reciprocity. This embeddedness shapes how clinical and managerial staff 
in organisations make decisions and act / react to others. Thus, these relational 
dynamics are a key factor in understanding local organisation’s uptake of autonomy 
and the scope for organisational change. The data provide several interesting leads 
into the role of relationships. 
 
“I suppose in [the Northern] case is I think that really comes down to the way 
that personal relationships are managed between the Chair and the Chief 
Executive and um, the reputation of the Chief Executive at the PCT is such that 
the Chief Executive [at one of the Northern FTs], even if he wanted to, you 
know, I'm sure he wouldn't want to but kind of can't take him out,  you know. So 
there has to be a bit more respect there” (Director, SHA, Northern case-study). 
 
This perspective was corroborated by observations of the Northern PCT board 
meeting (October 2007). During the Chief Executive’s verbal report, he referred to 
the 18 week waiting limit and indicated that the orthopaedic waiting times in the 
local FT (Northern Hospital 1) was 20 weeks. This had prompted him to have “a 
number of conversations with the other local PCTs and  the chief executive of 
[Northern Hospital 1] about orthopaedics” (field-notes). The PCT chief executive 
also reported Similar conversations with the chief executives from the FT and local 
authority were also held regarding the `healthy’ financial position. 
 
One manager explained that the Southern PCT had sought to develop a LHE-wide 
strategy to foster the type of inter-organisational relationship which would facilitate 
subsequent organisational change.  
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“We'll also have the [Southern LHE]- Team [Southern LHE] - a Chief Execs 
meeting where we have the opportunity to reflect on some of the sort of higher 
level stuff as well but I think it's… the way in which we establish our own 
personal relationships is what will make [the LHE] work or not” (Senior manager, 
Southern PCT). 
 
This LHE-wide approach was also adopted in the Northern case-study where the PCT 
had made it central to its strategy. 
 
“We've got a document which I'm sure… proper document called the “[Northern 
LHE] Way” which- which we produced last summer in response to the national 
competition rules… We said, 'OK so where does this leave us in terms of…but also 
getting a bit of grit in the oyster?’  So we produced a document signed up by the 
providers. It's been through all their Boards and the consortia and local authority 
and other bits of the system to sort of say how we're going to navigate, how 
we're going to keep the system going, at the same time deliver change” 
(Director, Northern PCT). 
This local approach seemed to be mirrored in the Trusts, one of whose annual plan 
(2008-2009) stated that  
“The Trust Board of Directors is aware of the very challenging time which lies 
ahead in terms of new commissioning arrangements, developing market 
dynamics, the general economic environment, very challenging national 
targets and growing public and patient expectations. It is at all times mindful 
of its role in ensuring stability and excellence but is also very clear that it is 
part of an NHS system which needs to be equitable and facilitative as well as 
challenging” (para.1.3; emphasis added). 
 
Persistence of social relationships: 
Embeddedness can limit `room for manoeuvre’ in two ways. A first pathway 
highlighted by the findings of this study relates to the constraints that 
embeddedness poses in moving from the status quo, where this shift requires the 
alteration of established patterns and loyalties. We found that entrenched social and 
institutional relationships moderated the incentives set by national policies such as 
patient choice. As a result, embeddedness minimised the impact of central and local 
organisational changes. For example, patients and GPs appeared to be loyal to local 
providers and unwilling to receive treatment and move referrals away from their 
local hospital. Such patterns were evident in both our case studies and explain why 
national policies such as patient choice aimed at enhancing autonomy appear to 
have less local significance.  
 
“We will offer a patient five places to go and appointment times at those five 
places. That's what it says. It doesn't mean it's going to be within your 
county, or within you district, it's anywhere within the country. So all [the GP 
seeking to refer a patient]does is she logs out of the Choose & Book screen 
and writes me a letter and sends it in, so I mean, so that's all that's 
happening. There is no choice. Patients don't want choice, patients want to be 
treated in their local hospital” (Clinical director, Hospital). 
 
This comment about Patient Choice also highlights the implementation gap in the 
sense that local agents deal with the impracticality and shortcomings of centrally 
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developed policies. In the case of Patient Choice, the impracticalities related to the 
public’s tendency to prefer a local hospital and the shortcomings related to some of 
the IT problems. 
  
Similarly, the evidence indicates that PCTs are prompted not to change patterns of 
commissioning as they do not want to destabilize local providers. (Previous patterns 
of PCT expenditure are illustrated in the Case-study profiles; appendix 2).  In the 
Northern case study, for example, this collegiality is reflected in the PCT negotiating 
with the main local provider what was needed for the provider to maintain its 
current risk rating and refraining from moving activity elsewhere.  
 
[Northern FT] has an incentive to keep going. Monitor’s risk scoring rates [it] as 
“4.” [Chief Executive of Northern PCT] told [Northern FT] “tell us how much you 
need to score 4.” “There need to be some trust.” This helps to shift the agenda 
from finance to quality. (Field-notes, October 2007). 
 
Equally, in the Southern case study, where there is a multiplicity of providers, they 
appeared more willing to negotiate services rather than competing with one 
another, including the FT. This pattern was reinforced by the persistence of clinical 
networks that span organisational boundaries. Contrary to expectations, the clinical 
networks/collaborations have persisted even after one of the main local providers 
became a Foundation Trust. 
 
[Trust manager] said that he believed that “more and more that networking 
is the thing.  More consultants are visiting local hospitals” [A clinician] 
explained that [another local Trust] was “offering the hand of friendship to 
consultants”, to which the Trust manager said  “good God.” (Field-notes, 
Trust executive meeting, September 2007] 
 
However, there are signs that the stability of patterns may be altered over time. 
Our second round of interviews in the Northern case study at least, suggested that 
as the PCT has become a more mature and consolidated organisation, it might turn 
into looking outwards its LHE to commission services, including the private sector. 
However, the Chief Executive of the Northern PCT pointed out that market 
stimulation (one of the WCC criteria) should not simply be seen as an end in itself.  
 
Disruption of social relations: 
A second way in which embeddedness shaped room for manoeuvre and 
organisational change, is where relationships were disrupted, for example because 
of constant re-organisations, with new staff being appointed.  This was particularly 
evident in our Southern case study where ongoing reconfigurations and 
reorganisations disrupted relations and distracted staff from other imperatives. For 
example, a few months before the beginning of our fieldwork (October 2006), the 
PCT had undergone a major re-organisation with five former PCTs brought into one. 
This reorganisation was accompanied by a major LHE-wide reconfiguration 
programme and the proposal of a merger between two Trusts in the economy, 
which then was withdrawn few months into the process. (The financial aspects of 
this re-organisation are explored in the next section of this chapter). These multiple 
exercises, and changes in the direction of local policy without any particular 
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transparent reason, generated lots of uncertainty in the economy and led to 
tensions which ended up creating conflicts and lack of trust.  
  
“Well, it’s difficult because, you know, new people come and you end up with 
a different set of relationships. Sometimes that’s been helpful, sometimes it’s 
been less helpful but you know, it has caused some difficulties where you 
develop some strategic alliances and new people come in and want to change 
those alliances for all sorts of reasons. That can disrupt continuity” (Managers, 
Hospital, Southern case-study).  
 
“I think that situation often brings out the worst in people and sours 
relationships which then take a long time to recover. So I think it’s been very 
detrimental to the area and probably the reason why we’re now thinking about 
joining with [the other hospital] as opposed to- some might say the more 
logical thing is for us to join with [Southern] hospital first and then go east 
towards [another hospital] is that the relationships between us and [Southern] 
hospital have been soured by the whole process, so it wasn’t a particularly 
constructive or useful thing to go through” (Consultant, Hospital). 
 
“The premise was that this was a financial problem that the PCT had, now the 
other thing, and if you read the local papers, the trust the public have now is 
completely shot to bits because it would appear magically, the PCT have got 
money from somewhere!  Well how dare you threaten us all that time and 
then suddenly find the money!  How dare the NHS make £500,000 or 
whatever it made, half a million pounds nationally and we have just been to 
hell and back for a year and a half thinking, you know, everything was going 
to be ghastly. So I think there’s a great deal of mistrust out there as to what’s 
really going on.” (Manager, Hospital). 
 
The LHE-wide re-configuration did not take place as planned as it attracted a large 
amount of local criticism (from clinicians and the public) and was also overtaken by 
the Darzi `Next Stage Review’. However, social and institutional embeddedness had 
inevitably been disrupted by the merger of the former PCTs into one (in both case-
studies), and of the legacy effect of previous re-organisations.  In the Southern 
case-study, a new senior manager at the PCT observed the historical impression 
that had been left by previous attempts to re-organise services across the LHE  
 
“Although I'm obviously still relatively new to [the LHE], I think there has been a 
history of threatening one organisation or another for you know, I'm led to 
believe ten to fifteen years. So I think my diagnosis of some [of the LHE’s] 
problems is probably different from where other people have come from and I 
think the first thing really was to analyse just what is the problem to start off 
with rather than start it with a solution” (Senior manager, Southern PCT). 
 
In addition, in the Southern case study, differential levels of autonomy brought 
about by the phased-in introduction of Foundation status and PBR (only one 
provider was a Foundation Trust at the time of fieldwork) had also led to 
perceptions of an uneven `playing field’ locally and had exacerbated existing 
historical rivalries among providers. There were also perceptions by managers and 
clinicians in other non-FT providers of a favoured relationship between the 
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Foundation Trust and the PCT, whereby the FT was seen as having “the PCTs ear” in 
the major reconfiguration exercise the LHE was embarking at the beginning of 
fieldwork.  
 
“The [FT] contract is better than the standard FT contract that was around at the 
time. [The FT] had  become an FT and so they clearly were very successful at 
negotiating clauses into the contract that have been beneficial over and above 
what they would have had through the standard contract at the time” (Director, 
Southern PCT). 
 
 
Relationships as enhancing room for manoeuvre: 
There is also evidence of how embeddedness can actually enhance room for 
manoeuvre. Where relational dynamics are underpinned by shared understanding, 
reciprocal trust, and transparency, embeddedness can actually create autonomy - 
space for change. Under these conditions, role and background differences 
appeared to become less relevant. Actors were thus bound together in mutual 
endeavour and as a result, lengthy negotiations were avoided and change was 
facilitated, even in the absence of autonomy from the centre. As such, it may be 
possible to describe this situation as de facto horizontal autonomy in the absence of 
de jure vertical autonomy. Both the relationships between managers and between 
clinicians and managers appeared to be important in shaping the ability to 
implement local change (through horizontal autonomy), although sound 
relationships between clinicians and managers were certainly paramount in each 
organisation.  
 
Good relationships were particularly evident within organisations, both between 
managers in different hierarchical positions and between managers and clinicians. 
Middle managers felt positive about relationships where the top management was 
giving them freedom and trusting their competence and decisions. The autonomy 
that these middle managers enjoyed was especially noticeable in FTs, suggesting 
that decentralisation need not simply stop at the organisational level.  
 
Interviewer: …how's that developed in terms of the freedom that you're been 
given within the Trust?   
Respondent: The same as [business manager in another directorate]. We both 
report in to the Chief Exec…  He gives us a lot of freedom as well as, you know. 
If I said to him there was a problem and this was the solution, he'd say 'fine go 
ahead and do it.' So we're given a lot of autonomy to make those decisions and 
also as far as the investment and saying what services we need and what we 
need to develop, you know, he's very reliant upon you know, what we think” 
(Directorate business manager, Foundation Trust).  
 
The fostering of autonomy within the organisation also concerned another FT. In a 
discussion about organisational development, the minutes of the Board of Directors 
(November 2008) note that the following questions were posed by OD consultants: 
 “Do managers and leaders have sufficient time to think or are they weighed 
down by immediate operational pressures? 
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 We want leadership and culture which supports people in ‘doing the right thing 
for the patient’ whatever the implications. How do we develop the courage for 
this? 
 What about more delegation to create some space? Do things come ‘back to 
Trust Executive Group’ too easily, creating a bottleneck?” 
 
Clinical engagement appeared strong within the providers and was mostly grounded 
on clear communication and shared goals. Engagement was further reinforced 
where hybrid managers (especially medical and clinical directors in executive-style 
boards) were involved, as in those cases the relational dynamics were strengthened 
by a shared professional identity. For example, at one hospital executive board 
meeting (September 2007), the chief executive spoke of the centrality of clinical 
involvement in Trust decision-making. 
`The chief executive emphasised that “we can only spend the money once.” If 
money is spent but value for money is not secured, auditors can write off the 
difference. He stressed that “there is no GO button until you guys [clinicians] 
support it. But we [the Trust] need to decide what we want to see as an 
organisation and what the priorities are.’ (field-notes)  
 
There were several examples of how these healthy relationships were conducive to 
space for change. Good internal relationships were, it was claimed, at the base of 
one local provider in the Southern case study moving from being one of the worst 
performers in emergency care to being one of the best in the country. The process 
through which this happened was underpinned by transparency and communication 
within and outside the department. Similarly, another local hospital, which at the 
beginning of our fieldwork was recognised as the longstanding poorest performer in 
the LHE, managed to considerably turn around its performance by the time of our 
second phase of fieldwork 
 
“The pressure got to a point where we couldn't stave it [organisational change] 
off any further and we were given a very tight time scale to turn around our A&E 
performance…. So from January this year, for six months, I stopped all my 
clinical work and did full-time Medical Director role to implement what we called 
the new medical model care processes… I spent hours and hours and hours down 
in A&E pushing trolleys and talk. It was that sort of engagement and being on 
the ground and really supporting the whole process to get the new sort of model 
in place and along with me, the A&E lead who was at that time the Clinical 
Director for Medicine also took three months off clinical work to really get that 
embedded. So we started at the beginning of January and it was just 
horrendous. I mean I can remember two Monday nights being in A&E and 
thinking 'God, how are we ever going to do this?' it was just unbelievable, it was 
just chaos, complete chaos.” (Medical Director, Trust). 
 
Again, good relationships between the various stakeholders were grounded on 
shared goals and transparency, was one of the key drivers for this shift in 
performance.  
 
Functioning relationships were generally evident also between clinicians across 
organisations as “clinicians just get on with it”, perhaps not surprisingly given the 
shared goal of patient care and a shared professional identity.  However, these 
clinical relationships were threatened either in the presence of a particularly strong 
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willed consultant or when organisational identities were endangered and therefore 
became dominant compared to professional identities. This, for example, happened 
in the Southern case study at the beginning of our fieldwork when the LHE-wide 
plan for reconfiguration entailed the potential closure of one A&E department. 
Meanwhile, in the Northern case study, the presence of trust between the main 
players and transparency in the development of a LHE strategy has contributed to 
moving forward the LHE-wide plans. 
 
The Northern case-study was commended in the World Class Commissioning panel 
assessment (2008) because the PCT’s “Joint needs assessment and performance 
management arrangements with the local authority are strongly embedded” 
 
 
Attitudes towards autonomy: 
The evidence on respondents’ views of the benefits and value of autonomy suggests 
that overall autonomy is valued both per se and as a vehicle/means to change. 
However, the evidence from the FT in the Southern case study found managers to 
be rather risk averse and unwilling to take up the risks that would result from 
expanding existing services or venturing out into the development of new service 
initiatives. This aversion appeared to be the result of a greater degree of financial 
exposure and the uncertainties in the policy and local environment.  
 
“...no. I'd say we've been very conservative about being bold as yet, so most 
FTs you know, they've all got borrowing limits, we have and we can borrow 32 
million. But you know, no one's borrowed very much so far and I think you 
know, we're naturally cautious because everyone doesn't want to press the 
wrong kind of investment buttons” (Senior Manager, FT). 
This cautiousness was also mentioned in a meeting (September 2007). Likewise, in 
a meeting in an FT, a senior manager was concerned that financial autonomy meant 
little given the scale of expenditure that capital projects, for example, incurred. 
It’s a question of what we will do with the money [savings]. FTs want to spend it 
on capital projects – there is a need to save to invest. FTs do not get money to 
replace their asset base. [This FT] has £28million in the bank but that’s not much 
for a capital project” (field-notes). 
It also appeared that Monitor’s regime contributes to this cautiousness as Monitor’s 
degree of intervention was linked to the performance (especially financial) of the 
organization 
 
“The Monitor regime that we have to comply with is quite pernicious if 
performance isn't going well.  So you're in a- quite a high-risk business so I 
think as a consequence, people are a bit more reticent about whether you know, 
they should borrow 30 million and stick up you know, a XYZ facility.” (Senior 
manager, FT). 
  
However, there was a sense that things might change in the future as an 
organization becomes more mature and consolidated as an FT. In particular vertical 
integration into primary or community care was mentioned as one potential area of 
interest. 
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Some uncertainty about autonomy prevailed in Foundation Trusts. In a similar vein 
to the cautiousness (above), another FT wondered how to spend their retained 
savings. The minutes of the Board of Governors (January 2009) reveal the internal 
debate about how to recognise the “Trust’s success in the Healthcare Commission 
Ratings”: 
“The Chief Executive explained that a number of neighbouring organizations had 
given their staff either a cash bonus (£50) or vouchers to recognise their 
success in the Healthcare Commission Ratings. The Trust Executive Group had 
been giving some consideration on how best to do likewise within [the FT] and 
following discussions with staff and staff of neighbouring organisations, a 
decision had been taken not to go down the route of cash bonuses but to invest 
the money in improving patient care. Therefore, it had been decided to give 
each Matron / Departmental Manager an allocation of £5000 to spend on 
patients within their areas of responsibility before the end of this financial year. 
The Deputy Chief Nurse would hold the central budget of £200k” 
This dilemma contrasts with the Trust’s response to its award as the Large Trust of 
the Year 2008 by the Dr Foster Good Hospital Guide (minutes, Board of Director, 
November 2008). Press releases, congratulatory letters to staff and GPs, website 
redesign, banners in hospital entrances and redesigned hospital stationery aimed to 
disseminate the positive news. In addition, “further consideration was being given 
to how to recognise the staff’s contribution” (minutes). 
 
Leadership and competence: 
Leadership and competence within the organisation emerged as key components 
shaping room for manoeuvre and ability to change. The Southern and Northern 
PCTs represent two contrasting examples of these dynamics. Both case studies had 
undergone reconfiguration in October 2006, therefore starting from a potentially 
destabilising and challenging baseline. In both cases, reconfiguration meant staff 
turnaround and internal reorganisation. However, the two PCTs clearly took two 
different approaches. In the North, the PCT spent the first year after reconfiguration 
building up a new top management team and putting a new structure in place. The 
PCT also invested in building up relationships and partnerships, assessing and 
diagnosing problems in the LHE, and building up public consensus and engagement. 
An LHE-wide strategy was produced as a result of these processes, which was 
viewed as an “LHE strategy (not just a PCT one)” (field notes, meeting with Chief 
Executive, Northern PCT, October 2007). The implementation of this strategy over 
the subsequent year has been made possible by agreement of all the stakeholders 
and the competence and leadership the PCT had built during its first year of life as a 
reconfigured PCT.  
“At the end of '06/07, we were classified as a weak organisation in terms of 
our Healthcare Commission ratings… If you go on any of the websites they, 
you know, they usually come up with, 'but how was your organisation 
doing?'… Last October, for the year '07/08, we got Fair and Fair so a tangible 
impact that we're starting to use our money more wisely and put in systems 
in place to get better delivery” (Director, Northern PCT) 
Conversely, the Southern PCT launched a major LHE-wide reconfiguration 
programme immediately after reconfiguration. The PCT embarked in this 
programme before having replaced the necessary infrastructure and developed its 
leadership and competence. The common view emerging from the fieldwork was 
that there was no clear vision behind this programme 
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“…the [Southern] PCT weren't in a position to handle all this.  They were 
completely, you know, in a turmoil all of their own so I mean, we have some 
sympathy with them because they couldn’t sit down and get the pieces of work 
done and they still don’t know what an urgent care centre is” (Manager, Southern 
Hospital) 
“I think they're struggling to really work out what their remit is, and rather than 
being able to bed down as a new organisation in a sort of a constant situation, 
what you refer to is also an issue which is the political demands are changing so 
fast that the PCT isn't just able to actually sort itself out, set itself up. They're 
having to change before they've even recruited people.” (Manager, Southern 
Hospital) 
Equally, the lack of leadership within the PCT was regarded as a major constraint, 
an aspect that was also implicit in respondents’ referring to the PCT as “the PCT” or 
“They”, rarely to named individuals within the PCT.  
“So in relation to the PCT it is difficult, they have difficulties in knowing who's 
now in charge of which area, which director's responsible for this, who in the 
structure is this. So that's been very difficult because there five PCTs gone into 
one big one for [the LHE] and I suspect the [Southern PCT] one is one of the 
biggest PCTs in the country now” (Manager, Southern Hospital) 
Ultimately, the programme was not implement as planned with numerous changes 
in the direction of travel adopted in the year following its first launch and strong 
criticisms within the LHE. This contrasts with examples of strong leadership which 
enhanced an organisation’s autonomy. FTs clearly illustrated this but equally, poorer 
performing Trusts had, over the course of the fieldwork, begun to demonstrate this 
capability (albeit in different ways). Leadership in the latter case had often been 
associated with new senior management appointments and/or new roles of existing 
staff. Yet, this was not universal, according to our fieldwork. For example, observing 
a Trust board meeting (July 2008), one non-executive director argued that “We 
have to decide as a Trust that we are going to do it and not wait for someone to tell 
us we can do it.” In return, the Chair wondered whether the Trust had “the leaders 
[who are] going to be able to deliver Darzi [reforms]?” as, he argued, previously 
people were `told what to do.’ 
 
 
4.2. Performance 
 
Here, performance is viewed as a contested concept, with rival versions disputed by 
stakeholders. This contestation needs to be set against the general thrust of recent 
policy which has placed a heavy emphasis on (quantified) performance measures, 
associated with incentives (for `good’ and `poor’ performance); see chapter 2. This 
section of the chapter considers respondents’ views on this performance culture, 
and their perceptions of how good / poor performance is achieved (the causal 
pathways). It also examines the distinction between formal and informal 
performance, as contrasting (though not necessarily competing) ways of describing, 
explaining and acting upon organisational functions and activities.  
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4.2.1. The significance of “performance” in LHEs 
Respondents were commonly attuned to the needs of a `performance culture’ in 
which activity needed to be demonstrated (primarily) through quantitative data, 
notably for the purpose of accounting to higher authorities (such as the SHA). Few 
questioned the need or the value of such a performance culture; it was taken as a 
sine qua non of NHS organisations. Indeed, most sought ways in which it could be 
enhanced.  
 
Measured activity was central to securing revenue for services commissioned from 
the PCT and to meeting government targets. 
 
“Before PbR, clinical coding was kind of, you know, …if you were clinical 
coder you could be stuck in a broom cupboard somewhere you know, given a 
biscuit once… But then all of a sudden, you know… at the sort of outset of 
PbR, the Trust actually started to improve the clinical coding, improve the 
depth of clinical coding, then there’s a financial benefit” (Director, Southern 
PCT) 
 
“The message of the CEO is that the Trust has to deliver. Even though the 
targets of DH are demanding and probably unachievable (he was referring to 
infection control mainly), the Trust has to show that it is going in the right 
direction” (field-notes; Chief Executive, Trust board meeting, May 2007).   
 
The PCT Director of Commissioning reported that it is difficult to get data 
from [hospital X] in a form that the PCT can use. The main performance 
issue for the PCT is [hospital Y] A&E performance. (Field-notes; PCT Board 
meeting, June 2007). 
    
Interviewer: what areas would you say that this Trust is performing 
particularly well and what areas this Trust is not? 
Respondent: I think we're very high performers, I think that we achieve all 
of our targets so, all the waiting time targets, numbers on waiting lists, all 
those sort of you know, very numerical measurements, we are home and dry 
on constantly and I think there's a real culture here that people want to 
achieve those.  (Director of Nursing, Southern Hospital) 
 
Though the performance culture has been embedded within social and institutional 
practices, there was a widespread use of competing notions of performance across 
the two LHE case-studies. Often, formal performance metrics were cited and yet, at 
other times, it was respondents’ impressions of key organisational leaders or the 
collective impression of an organisation which predominated. This seems to denote 
a tacit recognition and understanding of the role of formal and informal performance 
measures and processes. It may also significantly point towards the interplay 
between them.  
 
However, a crucial omission in these notions of performance across LHEs was 
consideration of or accounts by the public and/or patients. There was little or no 
evidence in observations, interviews or documentation of such user-defined 
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performance measures. This perspective was not apparent in interviews but it did 
surface on rare occasions in observations of board or other meetings. Yet, even 
when public / patients’ views were recalled, it was done in a rather cursory and 
perfunctory manner.  
 
One Trust board meeting held a discussion about plans to become a FT. A 
manager said the Trust “needs to start working on a membership strategy. We 
are claiming a catchment of 450,000. We have to know what it is we want to say 
to people about what we are about and why people would want to become 
members.” (Field-notes from Board meeting, July 2008). 
 
In other meetings, anecdotes from Board members (for example about a 
neighbour’s experience of care at the Trust) were common. Public protests in or 
outside some board meetings were clearly indications that (some) people felt 
strongly about organisational and clinical issues under discussion. Also, the 
Southern PCT had undertaken a `public involvement’ exercise regarding a proposed 
reconfiguration in the LHE. The approach involved a bus touring local towns and 
villages, with information leaflets and staffed by PCT managers. 
 
“I think what happens is, whenever you try and engage with the public you get 
the sort of small core of people that actually probably recognise their faces 
anyway. So I think the idea of the bus going out was to try and get some people 
who happened to be walking by whereas the questions and answer sessions you 
do tend to get the people that you would normally be engaging with anyway” 
(Director, Southern PCT) 
 
Reference to the National Patient Survey results might have illustrated this 
perspective. Whilst these data are nationally aggregated, they might have prompted 
local debate and managerial attention. 
http://www.pickereurope.org/page.php?id=45). We found few examples of where 
these data were used; such as 
“The assessment of 2006 patient survey shows a number of positive 
achievements. Trust is on top 20% for not changing admission dates and top 
20% for ward quality (noise, sharing of sleeping area and bathroom). These 
are all huge improvements from past” (field-notes; Director of Nursing, Trust 
board meeting, May 2007) 
Generally, these findings imply a predominance of formal metrics over informal 
notions based on organisational networks.  
 
4.2.2. Causes and pathways to performance: 
Respondents offered multiple interpretations for the causes of `good’ and `poor’ 
performance: why such-and-such a Trust was performing the way it was, according 
to formal metrics or their own subjective assessment. This focus on causes and 
pathways has implications for the conceptualisation of the association between 
autonomy and performance. Their comments also included the barriers and 
opportunities which culminated in such levels of performance – perceived or 
otherwise.  
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Respondents questioned and offered interpretations for the apparently differing 
`performance’ of local organisations.  
 
“I suppose I was looking at the comparison between [three Southern 
hospitals], who aren’t a Foundation Trust who are serving broadly similar 
population and their kind of, you know, broadly similar hospitals. I mean 
there are features that are different, but their performance is completely 
different” (Director, Southern PCT)  
 
 
Interviewees were asked how their own organisations had reached a particular level 
of performance. Their answers were insightful, not least because it prompted 
individuals to reflect on how their own organisation (or others) had developed and 
might develop into the future. One of the case-study organisations had `improved’ 
the performance in their A&E department through a combination of analysis of 
formal performance metrics – “real analysis” – and challenging perceptions and 
attitudes – changing “hearts and minds.”  As a result, performance had “improved” 
and was gauged by a ranking position of “one of the top performing” departments in 
England. 
 
“That was certainly the case here four years ago when our A&E was not 
performing well and we were not performing well on the waiting lists… Now 
what's happened is, is you know, real analysis, real getting I think, the 
hearts and minds of the medical staff in A&E such that we are now- have 
become one of the top performing areas in the country. I think a methodical 
approach to waiting list management as well has made that improvement” 
(Director of Finance; emphasis added).  
A contrasting perspective from the same Trust was observed at a Board meeting 
(May 2007): “Not many areas have improved. The trust is in the bottom quartile 
nationally in areas. Every area comes down to communication. The question was 
‘how do we engage with every member of staff?’… The only attendee was a senior 
member of medical staff. He felt the trust could do more to ensure that staff 
represent the community it serves (in terms of ethnic make up of workforce, 
especially in senior posts). He also stated that the Board needed to ‘come out of the 
Ivory Tower to see the issues.” 
 
Another illustration of this understanding about pathways to performance might be 
apparent in one PCT, one of whose directors commented on a local provider’s 
strategies. He continued to offer further insight on the causes of performance in this 
provider Trust. 
 
“I think some of those things are as much about the providers that you’re 
working with and historical accidents as always as necessarily about the 
competencies or not of the commissioners.” (Director, PCT). 
 
In the case of the Southern PCT’s own performance, the financial situation was seen 
as the fundamental cause of its `performance.’ Indeed financial deficits were critical 
factors, a situation (it was claimed) directly affected by the financial competence of 
the providers from which it commissioned services. The centrality of financial 
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performance, it was claimed, hampered (PCT) efforts to rectify the financial 
imbalance.  
 
“[Southern Hospital] is a very efficient organisation and they are one or two 
steps ahead of the commissioners [the Southern PCT] all the time and so the 
PCT gets into deficit, once you get into that then you know, it’s a struggle to 
get out of it” (Director, Southern PCT; emphasis added). 
 
This comment reflects the often-cited power imbalance between PCT commissioners 
and providers (in terms of prestige, executive pay, influence etc). He added that 
provider strategies complicated the PCT’s ability to ensure financial balance.  
 
“I think there were benefits to the PCT by having a Trust that wasn’t 
particularly aggressively pursuing maximum income” (Director, Southern 
PCT). 
 
The logic of this statement is that the PCT can only remain solvent so long as the 
providers do not pursue self-interested strategies of revenue maximisation. This 
recognises a tacit recognition that the fortunes of the PCT and providers are bound 
together and it would seem to follow that a LHE-wide approach of shared objectives 
would be mutually beneficial. By contrast, in the second phase of the fieldwork 
(2008-2009) and in the light of World Class Commissioning (WCC) panel reviews 
(2009), both PCTs seemed to be taking more assertive action in their LHE. Both had 
`performed’ at or above their expectation in this WCC process (according to 
interviews conducted after the WCC panel had reported in January 2009). As such, 
it seemed as if their causes of their own performance lay increasingly within their 
own strategy and implementation.  
 
“I think we have got traction… contractors are our Foundation Trusts and our 
community services and the local authority and the SHA would say that 
[Northern] PCT is now in charge of the system and obviously the first thing is 
we've made sure that people know that we have the money and we're not 
going to hand over the cash without some return” (Chief Executive, Northern 
PCT; phase 2 interview). 
 
Equally, this Chief Executive also felt that the causes of provider performance were 
also increasingly within the PCT’s remit 
 
“We are moving the money around a little bit to incentivise and penalise 
where performances prove positive so you know, it's supported by some 
hard-edged, you know, shifting activity” (Northern PCT Chief executive; 
phase 2 interview). 
 
If this is the case (viz. that the PCTs’ fortunes were increasingly within their own 
hands), it might signal that autonomy (for the PCT at least) was connected with 
their (improved) performance. However, these comments need to be contrasted 
with the case-study of formal performance (see 4.2.4.).  
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4.2.3. Performance management 
The dominant form of managing the relationships between organisations was 
performance management primarily through the contracting / commissioning 
process. This was a layered process in which heath-care providers were accountable 
to the PCT and (for non-FTs) to the SHA. For some (and not necessarily those who 
were classed as `poor’ performers), this was seen as a heavy-handed process. The 
process might reflect a lag effect between formal performance metrics (inevitably 
retrospective) and SHA perceptions. However, it might also reflect a sense in which 
the Trusts felt that their performance had improved sufficiently to be given more 
autonomy from SHA performance management. For example, one Trust in the 
Southern case-study had scored “fair” (use of resources) and “good” (quality of 
services) on the Healthcare Commission’s annual health check (2007/08). A more 
reflective assessment of the SHA role was offered by another respondent from a 
local authority in the Southern case-study: 
 
“They [SHA] basically play the role of life that has to be for central 
Government in the local area. A lot of people don’t know what they do 
except represent the DoH values at a regional level.  They ensure that 
targets set by Government are being reached or have an understanding of 
why they are not being reached and what the recovery strategy is. So you 
see their role more as, I shouldn’t probably use this word really but not 
passive but not as like steering role into the [local health] economy.”  
 
Even in the case of high performing organisations, PCTs often felt unable to exercise 
control through commissioning. For example, in the Northern case-study, the 
discussion at the Northern PCT board meeting (October 2007) focused on available 
penalties for high infection rates at an FT. One non-executive director asked if there 
was a financial penalty. The PCT director of strategy said that there was no penalty, 
other than “asking them to comply with the infection control team.” The non-
executive director observed that “Non-financial penalties are “embedded in NHS 
thinking” (filed-notes).  (The 2008-2009 model contract for PCT did allow some 
penalty for breaches of 18 week waiting times but unilateral contract variations 
were not permissible before then). 
 
In contrast to this regulatory (policing) role, others saw performance management 
as much more developmental. This approach involved an evolution of a relationship 
between commissioner and provider, which had been “messy” but was becoming 
more “standardised.” 
 
“We’ll pick up individual performance issues with the Trusts.  It’s been 
messy, the kind of PCT-to-organisation detailed meetings that we have in 
different ways, they’re now coming into a sort of fairly standardised 
approach.” (Director, Southern PCT). 
 
Clearly, there was a strong link between the performance management approach 
and the formal metrics (previously, star ratings and more recently, the annual 
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health check and key government targets). This reflects the primacy of formal 
performance (see next section) and is evident from the comments of a senior PCT 
manager: 
 
“We left some of the qualitative aspects of it [performance management] to 
continue the way they have been before. So we’ve been trying to move 
again, towards a sort of standard approach which we’re now building in so in 
terms of having a standard, kind of routine, monthly process that you would 
be able to read across from one Trust to another so that my team you know, 
have one set of reports that look the same although we tell them different 
things.” (Director, Southern PCT).  
These approaches are being increasingly tested in the PbR regime whereby Trusts 
will be paid for activity. FTs, in particular, saw PbR as a route to increasing revenue 
but were aware of PCT constraints. This was evident, for example, in the Annual 
Plan of one FT (2008-2009) which stated that  
“Elective activity in 2007/08 was close to the Trust plan overall, with significant 
over performance on new outpatient attendances. Referrals were 4% higher than 
in 2006/07, and consequently there was significant over performance in all 
categories compared to commissioner contract targets.” 
 
 
4.2.4. Formal performance 
 
As noted above, formal metrics dominate the performance management system. 
The annual health check by the Healthcare Commission, government targets 
relating to national priorities (such as 18 week waiting, 4 hour wait in A&E, infection 
control and financial balance) were the principle metrics by which such formal 
performance was calculated in the LHEs.  
 
The `performance’ tables (see appendix 2) provide a summary of some formal 
performance metrics of the NHS organisations in the two case-studies. Whilst, in 
general, some managers may not agree with the impression that such (formal) 
metrics provide (Mannion et al, 2005), they serve to illustrate the diversity of 
`performance’ within the two LHE case-studies.  
 
In both LHEs, the (formal) performance of individual organisations appears 
relatively consistent over time. However, over the three years in question, Southern 
Hospital 3 has managed to record all four possible scores on the Healthcare 
Commission’s annual health check. In general, the direction has been an 
improvement of scores / ratings. Those who had reached the highest ratings had 
largely managed to maintain their position. Equally, `poor’ performers still tended 
to remain weak or fair. Although the two LHEs represent a small sample, this 
picture of two LHEs largely corresponds with a national picture gleaned by Mannion 
et al (2005).  
 
One aspect of the reliance on formal performance was the need to record activity 
and financial data, in relation to government and local targets. Without such data, 
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organisations would be unable to confirm or deny the formal performance metrics. 
This was, for example, manifest in the move to FT status that many Trusts sought. 
Trusts needed to ascertain a baseline for their activity and financial performance but 
this was not a straightforward exercise, as one director of a provider Trust noted: 
 
“None of us can even really begin to get our head round the concept of what 
the baseline truly is but for sure the baseline for the amount of work that we 
need to do, in elective work and outpatient work, not emergency work, is 
significantly less than what we've been doing and tremendously less than 
what we're doing for this last push to eighteen weeks [the government’s 
waiting target].” (Director, non-FT) 
 
A second aspect concerned the performance against targets that were set. Trusts 
needed to “perform” across a whole range of measures. However, target setting did 
not always appear to take local organisational factors into account (see Mannion et 
al, 2005). For example:   
 
“We don't achieve our MRSA target and probably never will. Our target was 
set… the year that we had an abnormally low number of MRSA, …we 
probably never will achieve it which is very sad because we do work very 
hard towards it.” (Director, provider, Southern LHE) 
 
Targets did catch the attention of managers in the ways in which their 
organisational performance was managed (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Propper et al, 
2007). This underlines the centrality of formal performance measures, set by 
central government, and the incentives that they comprised. Effectively, this 
`crowded out’ other measures of performance and unmeasured aspects as well as 
promoting a `tick box’ mentality in service improvement (McGivern and Ferlie, 
2007). That said, the `performance’ tables in appendix 2 reveal a general upward 
trend on formal (measured) performance. What the tables do not reveal, however, 
is the unintended consequences and distorted behaviours that resulted.  
 
“The four hour wait target [for A&E] is such a big one, and it's just 
constantly there, I mean, the SHA can't talk to us about anything else really, 
and it's a bit like our Chief Exec says, you know, unless you can tick off 
those targets you can't get on with other things” (Director, Southern PCT). 
  
Targets were the shared responsibility across the LHE, so for example, the 18 week 
target had to be divided between GPs/PCT and providers. Yet, the PCT (claimed that 
it) did not have the authority of that Trust whose performance was considered poor. 
The incentives associated with national policies had some leverage but so did other 
`softer’ techniques and tactics. 
 
“Here’s something that’s about how you collectively deliver the bottom line, 
deliver the targets, because some of the measures of performance of the 
PCT are completely reliant on what’s happening within [Southern Hospital] - 
so for example, [Southern Hospital’s] A&E performance.” (Director, Southern 
PCT) 
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In one Trust in the Southern LHE, discussion at a Board meeting focused on Trust 
performance against national targets.  
 
“The Trust is also doing well against most national targets…. Some problems 
and confusions are created by the way targets are measured and set. For 
example waiting time targets generate confusion as to where the 
responsibility of the Trust starts, “where the clock starts ticking” (versus PCT 
and other providers)”. (Field-notes of Board meeting, May 2007) 
 
Clearly, determining when the “clock starts ticking” can create the possibility for 
conflict, gaming and other opportunistic behaviour (Mannion et al, 2005). 
 
In addition, the use of formal performance metrics to determine the `actual’ 
performance of Trusts was problematic for PCTs. It was often claimed that it was 
hard to discern pre-existing `high’ performers as opposed to those who were 
`adding value.’  The example of Foundation Trusts was illustrative here.  
 
“It’s an association which is a function of the fact that Trusts that we’d had 
in Foundation Trusts were bloody good Trusts. They were well-managed and 
efficient units.” (Director, Southern PCT). 
 
Generally, despite their previous high performance, FTs had been willing to use only 
some of their `freedoms’ despite their apparent ability to do (Exworthy et al, 2008). 
Such high performance did not always match individuals’ perception of them. For 
example, 
 
“[I know] a [nursing] sister at [a nearby FT] which is quite interesting and it 
is quite interesting… [she] and I talk quite regularly, and they have similar 
problems to what we do… They're in the better position that they are a 
Foundation Trust and… well they seem to have more money than we do” 
(Clinical lead, Southern PCT) 
 
The chief executive of the FT in the Southern case-study was worried about the 
weak incentive that FTs, especially in terms of retained savings. He spoke at one 
Trust Executive meeting (September 2007):  
“Number one is not a good position to be in! FTs have about £1billion in the bank 
accounts. Gordon Brown might take back that money as a `windfall tax.’ [the 
chief executive] and other Ft chief executives recently had dinner with the DH 
policy adviser and tried to persuade him that nothing will come if this idea” (field-
notes). 
 
●  Financial deficit and accounting: a case-study from the Southern LHE 
Financial assessments were a central component of formal metric approach, not 
least of the need to maintain financial balance. The case-study fieldwork took place 
during a change in financial fortunes, nationally. At the outset of fieldwork, the NHS 
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was reporting large deficits - £512 million, according to the BBC 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/5055602.stm), more than double the previous 
year. In the Southern LHE, the Audit Commission (January 2006) was reporting an 
estimated deficit in 2005-2006 on £75 million in the (former) SHA area. Nationally 
and locally, the size of deficits prompted severe managerial action.  
 
The financial strategies had apparently brought the NHS back into balance by 2008. 
In August 2008, the Department of Health was predicting that the NHS would report 
a surplus of £1.75 billion (equivalent to 2% of the entire NHS budget) for 2008-
2009.  (http://www.nelm.nhs.uk/en/NeLM-Area/News/2008---August/28/NHS-
finance-report-at-quarter-1-2008-2009/). 
  
The Southern LHE offers a compelling case-study of how the centrality of formal 
(here, financial) performance prompted organisational initiatives to remedy an 
apparent PCT deficit. In a short space of time (less than 1 year), this local deficit 
was seen to be much less than first thought, which bred a high degree of 
resentment and cynicism across clinicians and managers in the LHE  
 
Having merged several PCTs into one in October 2006, a financial deficit of 
approximately £120 million in the Southern LHE was revealed. Such a scale 
(approx. 10% of the PCT annual turnover of £1.3 billion) necessitated, the PCT 
argued, wholesale re-configuration. This was approached through an organisational 
restructuring which focused on seven clinical areas including A&E and maternity 
services.  
 
An early proposal was the closure of an entire Trust, as one manager revealed: 
 
“There was some work done around the future financial viability of this… 
health system and a conclusion was reached that the only solution was a 
whole site closure of one of the Trusts in [the LHE]” (Director). 
 
By March 2007, the proposal had been to replace the current three district general 
hospitals with two ‘hot’ sites (with major A&E departments) and one ‘cold site’ (with 
an urgent care centre) (Jones et al, 2008). A key management strategy for 
implementing the reconfiguration was to involve local doctors in order that they 
could ‘sell’ the model of provision to the wider public. This strategy focused mainly 
on medical and clinical directors.  
 
The three affected hospitals ‘signed off’ the document drafted by management 
consultants. However, interviews with those who had attended the planning 
meeting highlighted dissatisfaction with the process and with the final document 
which, they claimed, did not reflect the discussion. Comments from two consultants 
(at different hospitals) reveal the reaction of clinicians generally. 
 
“We were all very, very cross about that because… it was only a short 
workshop, when you think of the scale of what's discussed, to achieve some 
sort of meaningful outcome after two half days is pretty ambitious. It was one 
afternoon and the next morning and the session was supposedly fairly broad 
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discussion without any specifics and then in the next, we focussed on what 
would happen if you reduced sites or services at sites.  But, the participants 
from here felt that our input was effectively ignored and certainly, we said 
quite a lot things and almost none of it was recorded. You felt that whoever 
wrote it had decided it all beforehand and the consultation was not really 
intended to accurately reflect what the consultants felt.” (Hospital consultant). 
 
“Closing a hospital in this kind of area is not going to be easy and I mean, that's 
why they tried to sort of shift it towards us clinicians… So trying to make it look 
like the clinicians were suggesting it which was quite a crafty move and caused a 
lot of resentment. A lot of my colleagues were saying 'no, no don't take part in 
the process because otherwise you'll be blamed when it happens’” (Hospital 
consultant). 
 
However, the proposal that was advanced by the PCT comprised a wider re-
organisation of existing services. The PCT Director of Finance presented the financial 
case for reconfiguration at a PCT Board meeting (June 2007).The Director explained 
that incorrect assumptions had meant that the PCT’s projected deficit of £118 
million was revised to a likely surplus of £20 million. During this PCT Board meeting, 
the rationale for LHE re-configuration seemed to shift away from financial pressures 
to an emphasis on evidence-based standards and national guidelines (field-notes). 
Indeed, in referring to the plans for re-configuration, the PCT Chair claimed that: 
‘this is what the doctors have told us we have to do’ (field-notes). 
 
A clinical director of an `affected’ provider Trust confirmed this and discussed its 
implications: 
 
“At the initial spending review and can't remember which accountant's firm it 
was that did it, it said it was going to be this 120 million deficit and the only 
way they felt that they could recoup that was by shutting the acute services 
at one hospital. We went through lots of scenarios looking at the best clinical 
scenario and what the financial implications of that would be so us staying as 
an acute hospital, [….] being downgraded or [Southern Hosptial] being 
downgraded and that was going to be closing ICUs, closing A&E departments 
at one hospital so that there would be more an elective centre which makes 
more money than it costs sort of thing. So that's where it was up until 
reasonably recently…” (Clincial Director).  
 
However, the scale of the financial deficit was hotly disputed, not least because of 
the changing assessments over the course of several months.  
 
“…basically I think for a variety of reasons including the fact that the 
providers and the PCT have managed to turn round a number of financial 
issues and problems.  The picture changed significantly so it went from one 
really where finances were the main motivation for making the… change [ie 
the re-configuration], and alongside that we wanted to make clinical best 
practice changes as well to one where it completely flipped so that it was 
almost entirely about clinical best practice, Royal College guidelines etc. etc. 
That was quite a rocky road because obviously you know, it was almost like 
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going from one end of the scale to the other end of the scale…” (Director, 
Southern PCT). 
 
Many questioned the assumptions upon which such financial calculations could 
change so radically and so quickly. Brokering of financial deficit (traditionally 
undertaken by the SHA, on behalf of the DH) was viewed as manipulation of figures, 
rather than pointing to fundamental organisational concerns. The dramatic and 
significant shifts in accounting assumptions and conclusions raised doubts about the 
entire process, as the quotes (below) illustrate. Two are from `affected’ provider 
Trusts and the other from a local authority. 
 
“Then they got a different accounting firm to look at the books and he said 
'ooh actually, you won't have any deficit at all, you're all fine!' So it's a 
complete and utter mess. We all felt very pissed off and used really by the 
whole thing, because we'd gone through this huge exercise and we've given 
up a lot of time and effort to go through all this and then find that actually 
we're scrapping all the ideas we came up with” (Clinical director, FT hospital) 
 
“…then suddenly [the] PCT announced that they had re-audited their figures 
and that was no longer the case. So they weren't going to lose all this 
money, therefore all the pressure to shut an A&E and shut a hospital have 
gone” (Clincial Director, non-FT hospital)  
 
Respondent: Well I’ll give you one example. [Southern Hospital] - largest 
deficit in the whole of the country, all of a sudden, ah! 43 million [pounds] 
comes flying out of the ether – 
Interviewer: How do you think that …. 
Respondent:  I have no idea, conjuring trick?  [pause, laughs] It was a 
decision I would think that this was taken definitely at DoH level to ensure 
that vast amounts of money which had been spent on very expensive 
consultants did not blow up in the Governments face.”  (Local authority 
officer, Southern LHE). 
 
However, tacit knowledge supplemented this perceived weaknesses in formal 
performance data), as will be shown later in this chapter in discussion of `informal 
performance.’ 
 
The financial situation also prompted widespread public concern 
 
“In parallel with that, clearly we had an awful lot of publicity going on 'Save' 
you know, '[Southern Hospital]’ and the like with banners because they'd 
picked up on the earlier message and we weren't, for a number of months, 
in a position really to share anything else with them because it was still very 
much under discussion…” (Director, Southern PCT) 
 
This public interest and engagement was later promoted by the Southern PCT as a 
positive benefit of this process.  
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“We've learnt a lot from the… exercise. I suppose some of the really good 
learning lessons and some of our strengths now as a result of that has been 
our patient and public engagement around the changes.” (Chief Executive, 
Southern PCT). 
 
As a footnote to this case-study, the `Southern’ PCT Director of Finance reported to 
the PCT Board meeting (July 2008) that the PCT deficit was £1.6 million in the first 
quarter 2008-2009. The scale of this deficit largely depended on Trust activity as 
there was an overspending of £6 million in acute commissioning (mainly due to 
waiting time target) (field-notes). By 2009, the financial position was more delicate, 
as reported by the Director of Finance to the PCT: 
 
“The forecast outturn position for the year remains a surplus of £200k after 
the return of the PCT’s contingency from the SHA, full use of the PCT’s 
contingency reserve and the delay in discretionary spending. The forecast 
out-turn continues to be extremely finely balanced with no scope for further 
movements over the last month of the financial year” (Finance report, 
Executive summary, Southern PCT Board meeting, April 2009). 
 
 
●  Formal performance as a safety net 
Goddard et al (1999) note that formal performance information is often used as a 
`safety net.’ They argued that the `safety net’ was mostly applied in cases of poor 
performance, rather than being used to stimulate further improved performance of 
already `high’ performing organisations. In this study, PCT commissioners and 
other managers also tended to rely on formal performance metrics, possibly 
because the saliency of `failing’ organisations has been consistently high across the 
NHS – poor performance initiated external interventions and observation in the form 
of media interest, `turnaround teams’,  highly structured performance reporting 
etc.. One Chief Executive described one local `poorly’ performing Trust thus:  
 
“They have some very interesting challenges and I think they've had just 
about everybody in to assist them, so far and I think there's something 
about it's not one- what that work is showing it's quite a systematic change 
that needs to take place around.” 
 
Formal performance metrics thus provided reassurance for commissioners and other 
stakeholders. However, often, such formal performance also set (or limited) the 
terms of debate between the poorly performing organisations and those who 
oversaw its performance management. Negotiations only seemed to take place 
about managing the quantitative measures such that they were above the `safety 
net’ (for example, having met a particular target) and no longer attracted such 
negative attention.  
 
This study thus confirms this `safety net’ approach. However, the qualitative data 
that were gathered in this study, demonstrated a more subtle picture. According to 
one SHA Director, `poorly’ performing organisations had (already) prompted a 
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significant amount of managerial activity including secondments, SHA interventions 
and challenge as well as traditional performance management. Indeed, given the 
social and institutional embeddedness of both LHEs, many of the problems of poor 
performance had been known for some time, irrespective of recent or the latest 
performance metrics. Hence, a reliance on formal performance data alone for poorly 
performing organisations was less relevant. Information relating to informal 
performance was used in conjunction with the formal performance metrics (see 
below). 
 
Furthermore, the `safety net’ role of formal performance applied poorly to `high 
performing’ organisations such as Foundation Trusts. It did not seem to offer the 
stimulus for such organisations to improve further. Clearly, `high’ performing Trusts 
faced different challenges, often linked to the risk posed by greater autonomy and 
especially Foundation Trust status.  The incentive to maintain their `high’ 
performance was especially relevant in terms of retaining FT status. Two 
illustrations from the same FT bear out this point. In January 2009, the minutes 
from the Board of Directors meeting recorded that  
“If the Trust was to retain its HCC [Healthcare Commission] score of 
“Excellent/Excellent”. it would need to achieve 98.23% for the next 10 weeks to 
achieve 98.01% for the year overall. It was hoped that the recent pressures on 
the department would ease over the coming weeks. Elective surgery had also 
been cancelled during January which would affect the 18 week position. 
Therefore, it was essential to carry out as much elective work as possible during 
February and March. It was noted that the PCT had served a Performance Notice 
on the Trust concerning the 98% target. This was routine procedure 
The on-going concern with hard performance measure was also evident in the Board 
of Directors meeting of this FT (March 2009). The minutes note that the Chief 
Executive:  
“explained that the Trust had now failed to achieve the [emergency services 
target] target for two quarters in a row and, if it was to fail for a third quarter, 
[the FT] would automatically receive an Amber rating which would be extremely 
serious for the Trust. However, he emphasised that this did not mean that the 
Trust could not be “excellent” for quality of services next year.” 
Yet, the Chief Executive of the `Northern’ PCT (which had `performed’ well in the 
World Class Commissioning panel assessment (2009)) spoke of the continued focus 
on meeting “hard targets.” For him, these targets were not so much a safety net as 
a baseline which prompted further improvements. 
 
“For me, it's about being very clear about what our vision is and our strategy 
– [getting] everyone to galvanise and to deliver what we want in our 
strategy so it's about dialogue and it's about vision and it's about 
performance management and hard targets” 
 
This PCT Chief Executive claimed that the WCC had proved positive because 
 
“We were reassured by the process because it confirmed where we thought we 
were.” 
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Nonetheless, for such high’ performing organisations generally, it was unclear 
whether formal performance metrics alone achieved this. Formal performance 
metrics were increasingly less relevant despite their fundamental importance (linked 
to incentives to comply). They had become the minimum standards that were 
largely taken for granted. 
 
The Chief Executive reported that the Trust has good cancer performance 
but “whether you agree with the 2 week target or not, it about standards of 
patient treatment.” (Field-notes of Trust Executive meeting, September 
2007) 
 
The Chief Executive of the Northern PCT illustrated the declining relevance of the 
safety net function of formal performance metrics by recalling an anecdote. 
 
“Eighteen weeks [target] has been there for ages but it hasn't driven… I had 
somebody come from the hospital, she's a director of a very large [Trust] 
that I know and she spent the day with me, she said, 'I've been with you all 
day including executive team meeting and a meeting with the commissions, 
through our PEC', she said, 'not one person has mentioned eighteen weeks 
all day', I said, 'Yes that's right, it's not- it just happens' …and we expect the 
Provider to … it's not a big issue for us, what drives us is tackling health and 
inequality and driving up the standard of care“ 
 
The `safety net’ role of formal performance had other limitations. Reliance of formal 
performance metrics was only sufficient if supported by an appropriate set of 
incentives.  Hence, if a Trust was “under-performing”, what options were available 
to the PCT? This question became the topic of one (Northern) PCT Board meeting 
(October 2007) in relation to the MRSA targets of one local Trust. The conversation 
developed as follows: 
 
Board member: “It’s always disappointing to see [Northern Hospital, an FT] 
being too high. Is there any financial penalty?” 
PCT Director #1: “No. PCT can ask them to comply fully with the infection 
control team.” 
Board member: “Non-financial penalties are “embedded in NHS thinking.” 
PCT Director #1: “That’s not entirely true. The “new model contract” [with 
effect from 2008-2009] allows some penalty in terms of 18 week. Before 
then, a variation of contract cannot be unilaterally implemented. “  
PCT Director #2: “MRSA is a very tight target that has been benchmarked 
nationally.”  
PCT Director #1: “18 weeks will be the total wait time by 2008. But 
[Northern] SHA is the worst SHA area. So there is high anxiety as [the 
Northern LHE] is one of the worst in the SHA. The PCT can’t sort this out on 
its own. It’s reliant on its providers.” (Field-notes). 
 
Another perspective on the role of formal performance and the `safety net’ function 
relates to time, both in terms of the periodic performance assessment and the 
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legacy / template of former performance regimes (Pollitt, 2008). Performance 
targets are often defined in temporal dimensions: 18 week target for elective 
admissions, 4 hour A&E target, health inequalities target (of life expectancy and 
infant mortality) by 2010, for example. A PCT would receive weekly updates on its 
performance against the 18 week target but would only receive an annual report on 
its progress in addressing life expectancy. Clearly, the volume of performance data 
for the former tends to imply a greater priority than the latter. The temporal 
dimension of formal performance metrics (`hard targets’) was illustrated during one 
PCT Board meeting. 
 
The main performance issue for the PCT was [Southern Hospital] A&E 
performance. The Trust has extended the walk-in opening hours. They are 
putting greater and more senior resources into issue. The PCT Chief 
Executive and Director are getting daily text message updates.” (Field-notes, 
Southern PCT Board meeting, June 2007). 
 
The immediacy of A&E (as a service and a target) is illustrated in contrast to the 
target for tackling health inequalities which operates over a much longer timescale. 
 
“Where the data comes in, so say A&E on Mondays mornings we can see the 
data for the previous week. For life expectancy, we see it a year after- a 
year later we see the life expectancy changes and we only get it once a year 
so it's not that we don't, you know, we- we care about both - but actually 
one, the amount of attention you can give it just by fact that the data isn't 
there and it doesn't move quickly in a way that A&E moves on an hourly 
basis” (Director, Northern SHA; emphasis added). 
 
Nonetheless, in both cases cited by this respondent, performance data were 
retrospective. By contrast, one SHA director suggested that one of their primary 
roles was to provide “time and cover” for poor performers. The health system - 
centrally and locally - tended to exert pressure to improve performance but, this 
director noted, time might be needed to introduce and sustain new processes and 
practices. Hence, the SHA was able to provide ”cover” (de facto autonomy) for 
Trusts to develop improvement strategies. In this sense, autonomy might be seen 
as a route to improved performance but this autonomy was granted by the SHA. On 
the other hand, good / high performers required less time by the SHA in terms of 
checking. In one SHA area, 80% of senior management time was spent, according 
to one Director, on three “poorly” performing PCTs. 
 
 
4.2.5. Informal performance 
 
Notions of informal performance were commonly used by interview respondents and 
employed in meetings which were observed. Notions such as trust, reputation and 
credibility were often deployed but were not always explicit. The information 
gleaned from the deployment of such `informal’ notions generated vital intelligence 
in managing relations between organisations, especially between the PCT and its 
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provider(s). For example, a Director of one Trust in the Southern LHE identified 
that:  
 
“There are old prejudices from when we were a non performing trust that we 
need to turn around” (Field-notes, Trust board meeting, July 2008). 
 
The role of informal performance is, according to Goddard and Mannion (2006) 
twofold; first, to act as a complement to formal (hard) performance information and 
second, to act as a substitute for it. We apply this typology to the case-studies.  
 
 
● Informal performance as a complement 
Some respondents contrasted their formal and informal aspects of performance in 
complementary ways. In particular, aspects of performance which were not easily 
measurable or were ineffable, were described in “softer” or “touchy-feely” terms. By 
contrast, formal performance aspects were deemed more precise, hard and 
sometimes `real’. Respondents offered a clearer association between cause and 
effect in terms of formal performance; hence, there were more “black and white” 
measurable issues. In the quote below, it is interesting that the Trust Director does 
not seek to evaluate one form of performance over another but recognises that both 
offer important insights into the overall performance – recognising the 
complementarity of performance information. Yet, despite a claim to be a “very 
high” performing organisation, this respondent was able to identify shortcomings in 
performance. 
  
“I think we're very high performers. I think that we achieve all of our targets so, 
all the waiting time targets, numbers on waiting lists, all those sort of you know, 
very numerical measurements, we are home and dry on constantly… The area 
that I think we are very weak on is a softer area which is actually involving 
patients listening to patients …but on the black and white measurables I think 
we're strong.  On the softer, more touchy-feeling stuff, we're not particularly 
good, so staff morale we're not particularly good so the more soft stuff we're 
poor, the hard stuff we're good.” (Director, Southern Hospital). 
 
The internal/external perspective was also offered by a Non-Executive Director of a 
Northern Hospital: 
“His impression was that the organisation had made significant achievements 
since 2004 and was viewed much better as an organisation from the inside 
rather than the outside. He felt staff morale was high” (Minutes of Board of 
Directors meeting, November 2008). 
 
Complementary aspects of informal performance were also manifest in other 
regards. For example, the `official‘ performance management process (which might 
be considered a formal aspect of performance) was increasingly seen as limited in 
offering insights into provider performance.  
“Creating performance management frameworks and control mechanisms is 
not sufficient if the organisation does not respond” (field-notes, Southern 
Hospital board meeting, April 2007).  
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Official meetings to discuss performance were often seen in ritualistic ways or were 
part of the dramaturgy of performance (where individuals might orchestrate events 
or use the forum for `playing games’). Other processes had been instituted to 
complement the official/formal approaches. In particular, this involved developing a 
corporate / cross-organisation approach. 
 
“That’s called a Part One Review, performance review monthly with the 
[Strategic] Health Authority where they look at us and also our kind of 
management of this system and then we have another one which the acute 
Trusts with the exception of [Southern Hospital A, an FT], come to and 
that’s, to my feeling, that’s never been a particularly helpful or effective 
meeting generally speaking, Chief Exec from the [Southern Hospital B] says 
something stupid and everyone jumps on him and then we all go home and 
sort of talk about [Southern Hospital C] and how difficult things are there. 
But we’re beginning to move away from that and what [Chief Executive of 
the Southern PCT] has done is set up a- I’m not sure what he’s calling it but 
that’s on a monthly basis where he’s going to sit down with the Chief Execs 
from across [the LHE], and not just the acutes, so mental health will be 
there and also …from the local authority will be there and our own provider 
side as well so a sort of much more Health and Social Care Community 
...officers meeting. He hasn’t yet but we’ll build in some elements of 
performance management into that.”  (Director, Southern PCT). 
 
This complementary role of formal and informal performance was also manifested in 
the strategic development of PCTs. Following their re-organisation in 2006, PCTs 
initially focused on establishing the organisational infrastructure for commissioning 
all services and providing community-based services. In the phase two interview 
with the Chief Executive of the Northern PCT, he noted a shift in the implementation 
of the PCT strategy over time, from a formal approach to an informal one. 
 
“I think in those three years [coinciding with the life of the PCT and the 
period of fieldwork] it was `sort out the money and get our house in order’ 
…putting new things in place, structures and processes as you say, and then 
year three was starting to see the returns on our efforts and I think we're 
starting to generate a whole stock of stories, narratives and evidence of 
where we have an impact on patients and the public and commissioners will 
see a difference. I guess the big question for PCTs and you will have a view – 
that’s the effort of two to three year's of investment.” 
 
A second example is the tacit knowledge (based on experience) which was seen as 
vital. In both case-studies, the Chief Executives of the two PCTs were new 
appointments (since or as a result of the October 2006 reorganisation).  Some 
provider Chief Executives had been in post a while but, in the Southern LHE case-
study, all but one provider had appointed new Chief Executives in the two years 
prior to the start of our fieldwork. In some cases, this provided the opportunity for a 
strategic re-design of the PCT’s approach or in other cases, it stifled development 
since other infrastructural and relational issues had yet to be resolved. 
 
“I think they [PCT] were very slow to start and I'm not quite sure why they 
were so slow.  I think part of the reason was that when [the Chief Executive] 
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was appointed, he took the view that the […] former PCTs coming together 
into one new one was such a confusion, such a mess, that he didn't quite 
know who he wanted or what he wanted or how.  So they took a long time 
getting their structures in place. I think the board was slow to get together so 
they were much slower in appointing their new Executive Directors and getting 
their new structures in place than the other PCTs from [the region]” (Director, 
SHA). 
We also recorded the `reverse’ perspective (of the SHA by the Trusts). For 
example, we noted the observation that  
“the role of the SHA is fundamental in facilitating collaboration and setting the 
expectations. The old [metropolitan] SHA had created a quite adversarial 
relationship. The new one, instead has created a culture of transparency which 
has help to move things forward. The same cannot be said of the [regional] 
SHA.” (field-notes, Trust board meeting, April 2007) 
Informal performance was evident in external perceptions of other Trusts. For 
example, at one Trust board meeting (April 2007), it was noted that the local FT 
“presents a contrasting example. The Trust is a mature organisation which has self-
awareness and control internally” (field-notes). 
 
● Informal performance as a substitute: 
Informal performance as a substitute was evident at all levels – inside the 
organisation, between organisations and across the LHE. Firstly, within the 
organisation, one Trust provider manager used an `informal’ approach as part of 
their management `style.’ 
  
“It's about communication regularly on a regular basis and obviously 
monitoring is through the data you get and discussing 'this looks like this is 
happening, what's happening here?' It is about constant regular 
communication and my door is actually never shut. It is always open 
because what you pick up out and about and around, the sort of  intelligence 
that you work to is probably the best thing that you can do by being out and 
about picking up on the issues and you'll trip over something and someone 
will say 'well you know, I can't actually do that because this, this and this.' 
And…there's no point being very important if you can't sort things out, so I 
use my importance to sort out lots of things often and to be the place where 
people can escalate” (Medical manager) 
 
Secondly, between organisations, the management of inter-organisational 
relationships (even for FTs) was an important role for managers and clinicians. In 
some cases, this was to remedy apparent misconceptions or to ensure harmonious 
working relationships, say, with the PCT. In the case of the former, the following 
quote illustrates how GPs were led to believe rather outlandish claims. These 
examples are hopefully hyberbolic but may have been fostered by previous 
attitudes and approaches by this FT or FTs in general. 
“So we're building up liaison with GPs more now, you know, we're trying go 
out and see them, we're trying to build up relationships and trying to dispel 
some of the myths that are you know, 'we've been told that you're all, you 
know, operating on dead people, you know, admitting people unnecessarily, 
charging your private patients to us.’” (Director, FT). 
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Such negative perceptions were reinforced by comments of senior managers at a 
Trust meeting (September 2007). The Director of Human Resources said that there 
was a “common theme from GPs that [the Trust] is ripping them off in terms of 
coding. The Medical Director argued that “We need to keep in with GPs. One 
meeting he attended led to a row between GPs and the PCT” and a consultant 
claimed that the “PCT is painting us as a pariah.” To these comments, the chief 
executive replied 
“There seems to be a `ring of hatred” around [the Trust] but some respect 
that, organisationally, we deliver good quality services. It seems that the NHS 
doesn’t like success” 
 
An example of the latter relates to the mutual inter-dependence evident in the 
Northern case-study. The Chief Executive of the PCT spoke of the “trust” that he 
had in Chief Executive of a local FT, a trust which the PCT manager recognised as 
essential in developing a strategy in a mutually dependent LHE. The SHA confirmed 
the high degree of respect that the PCT and FT held for each other; they thus 
avoided exploiting the opportunism that might be feasible.  
 
Thirdly, across the LHE, inter-organisational relationships impacted upon others. 
Perceptions about services and organisational decisions were often formed in the 
absence of formal performance (usually because it would be impossible to capture 
such data or do so in a timely manner). 
  
The PCT chair explained that there is a “perception of poor mental health 
services” in [the LHE] and that the PCT is going to “take money away from 
services” (Field-notes, Northern PCT Board meeting, October 2007) 
 
In a different way, though at the same meeting, the Director of Public Health 
pointed out a common view across many patients and the public at large. The 
solutions, according to the DPH, was to hold “conversations” with the public. 
 
“The public don’t appreciate the organisational differences between the PCT 
and providers. How do we cope with that? We need to have a realistic 
conversation with the public.” (Field-notes, Northern PCT Board meeting, 
October 2007) 
 
In another example, performance management by the SHA or PCT affected 
perceptions and shaped attitudes. An interview with a Northern SHA director 
revealed how informal performance operates in the performance management of 
the PCT. The director explained that, whilst the SHA offered challenge and support 
to the PCT, it also adjusted its approach according to the “performance” of the PCT 
and LHE. In the case-study, the PCT was perceived as a high performer and so the 
SHA could “trust” the PCT and hence, needed to “check” less. Specifically, the time 
that senior SHA management would spend per PCT indicated the perceived level of 
“trust.” However, the SHA director believed that granting autonomy did not 
generate improved performance per se.  
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The opposite end of the performance management regime presents different 
insights. For example, a discussion on infection control was held at a Trust Board 
meeting (field-notes, July 2008). It was reported that  
 
“The SHA are still on our back and they are ringing us up once a week to see 
what has happened in the last week.”  
 
In a similar vein, one Board member commented that “the visibility of Matron is 
improving patient perceptions of how well the hospital is being run.” 
 
Whilst informal performance was often seen as a substitute for formal performance, 
there were differing levels of the former. It was thus not always evident that 
managers could access, use or interpret the information about informal performance 
emanating from providers. This differential became especially critical when a PCT 
was commissioning services from several different Trusts, with contrasting levels of 
formal performance. It is instructive to note the “longer conversation” in terms of 
relationships as well as the commissioner’s response to levels of performance - a 
wealth of “informal knowledge” in situation where there had been a history of “poor” 
performance and “informal networking” creating a collegial approach. However, it 
was the Trust which had performed moderately well that had been a “closed book” 
to the PCT. 
  
“Again we’d have to have a longer conversation perhaps about kind of, 
relationships and perceptions between PCTs and Trusts from both aspects.  
We’ve got a wealth of informal knowledge about [Southern Hospital X] 
because there are a number of people in the team who’ve been there before 
and the nature of [Southern Hospital X] is it’s been very open to it because 
they’ve been so desperate for help.  [Southern Hospital Y] is much more of a 
closed book to us. There are people that have come into different roles in the 
PCT who may have known something about it but it always feels quite 
antagonistic that relationship and the GPs are pretty disenfranchised lot as 
well. So there’s not a lot that has a kind of root of understanding and 
influencing this... isn’t there either. [Southern Hospital Z] was a fairly sort of 
collegiate comfortable sort of relationship and there’s a fair amount of sort 
of, traffic, you know, informal networking stuff through that, for a lot of 
people in the PCT or- there are in the Exec Team of the legacy PCTs” 
(Director, Southern PCT). 
 
(Note the organisations in this and subsequent quotes have been given additional 
anonymity). Commonly, informal performance was used as a substitute for formal 
performance when the latter was deemed inadequate, inappropriate or insufficient. 
Despite the volume of formal performance data, its inadequacy in managing 
relationships within the LHE was widely acknowledged. In its place, an array of 
informal performance `mechanisms’ was deployed. When asked how the 
competencies of WCC, one PCT Chief Executive explained 
 
“It's a whole range of things that I think are in lots of ways tied up to be 
World Class Commission… It starts off with 'Well, do we know what's going 
on?'  you know, 'Can we get to the bottom of the activity flows and what 
patients are saying about their experience, is there enough information out 
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there that can give us an evidence-based decision making' and the answer is 
`we're getting there’ and some things are very good, some things are 
woefully inadequate in telling us about what's actually happening and why 
and what the patients are saying about it.” 
 
The WCC panel (2009) assessed this PCT’s strategy positively: “The PCT has built 
strong foundations, which have already made an impact in both developing the 
strategic vision for the health of the [LHE] population, and in ensuring a robust grip 
on financial performance.” 
 
In a different way, an example from the Northern LHE illustrates the importance of 
securing effective / productive informal performance `mechanisms’ in support of 
wider organisational and policy goals. At a PCT Board meeting (October 2007), the 
Chair of the Professional Executive explained the relations between the PEC and the 
PBC `clusters.’ 
 
There is some leading edge work but others are looking for lessons to 
improve themselves. PEC “feels healthy.” We are getting a good relationship 
between the PEC and the (practice-based commissioning) consortia. The two 
balance each other quite well to deliver on action to reduce health 
inequalities across the city. (Field-notes) 
 
A different example from the Southern LHE seemed to highlight a similar use of 
informal performance. At a Trust Board meeting, there was a debate about the 
options facing in the Trust in the light of LHE discussions about possible merger with 
a neighbouring Trust.  
 
The Chairman reported that the Trust had considered several alternatives 
and had discarded the hypothesis of becoming an FT or merging with 
[Southern Hospital L], because of “cultural” divergences. They had have 
considered [neighbouring hospital M] but it is an aspirant FT. [Southern 
Hospital N] turns out as the best option (though it was already an FT) 
because there is a “strong cultural compatibility.” It would be the merger of 
two “high performing” trusts, which would allow financial stability and more 
investments. The PCT and SHA agree. From a clinical viewpoint, this would 
allow the Trust to have safe and high quality services in accordance with 
Royal College guidelines. Furthermore, there would be opportunity for 
vertical integration in the community. Also as [Southern Hospital N] is an FT, 
there is the opportunity to learn from their experience on how to best 
engage with the community. (Field-notes, September 2007) 
 
 
4.2.6. The interplay between formal and informal performance 
 
Rather than viewing informal performance as complementary to formal 
performance, it is also possible to view the two in conjunction with each other, as 
they facilitated the interplay between different mechanisms and notions of 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 156  
performance. This interplay was played out in various settings and in different 
arenas. Three are prominent: (i) defining the LHE, (ii) the inter-twining of formal 
and informal performance, and (iii) the mismatch between formal and informal 
performance. 
 
● Defining the LHE? 
As noted earlier in chapter 1, the definition of the LHE is not an objective matter. At 
a fundamental level, decisions about which organisations comprised the LHE (or 
system) seemed, on occasion, quite subjective. In some cases, the decision was to 
include them within LHE decisions whilst in others, to exclude them, and others still 
to include and then exclude them.  
 
Throughout the field-work, there were frequent debates about the size and scope of 
the LHEs, especially in the Southern case-study. In June 2007, the PCT Chief 
Executive gave a verbal report to the PCT Board meeting.  
 
The Chief Executive had attended the Board meeting at [Southern Hospital 
R]. It is now considered to be a [neighbouring SHA] trust even though [one 
half of the Trust] is in [the Southern LHE]. London is bringing out guidance 
to accelerate to the standard on consultant cover at [Southern Hospital R] 
(field-notes) 
 
Similarly, in July 2008, the Chief Executive gave his verbal report in which he 
mentioned again the responsibility for the border Trust (mentioned in June 2007) 
being shared with a neighbouring PCT in a different SHA area. In addition, he 
referred to the re-naming of the PCT. 
 
“[Southern] PCT will become NHS [Southern]. The DH recognises the 
separation between provision and commissioning and becoming NHS 
[Southern] is the expected step to take. Concerns were raised of the costs 
that changing name will generate and of the implications on reputation when 
[Southern] PCT is withdrawing services because of financial issues. (Field-
notes of Southern PCT Board meeting, July 2008) 
 
●  Formal and informal performance inter-twined: 
Quite often, it was difficult to distinguish notions of performance between formal 
and informal aspects. Rather, they seemed to be so inter-twined as to become 
inter-twined with each other.  
 
Respondents’ discussed the mechanisms and techniques available to them to 
improve `performance’ ranged across formal and informal aspects. It seemed that 
managers (as opposed to clinicians) valued their ability to deploy a judicious blend 
of formal and informal notions, as demonstrated by this manager: 
 
“So you've got a whole range of tools in the tool-bag [to improve 
performance] starting with soft stuff, ending up with quite hard stuff and we 
spend a lot of time thinking about... whether we're going to use a hammer 
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or we're going to use a nut, …to crack a nut, we're going to use a scalpel, 
we're going to use a load of hammers. That is the nature of our business, 
trying to keep all that going over a sustainable period where ultimately you 
want a sustainable system is what the [name of the PCT’s strategy] is trying 
to describe even though it may be a bit tricky along the way.” (Manager, 
Northern PCT) 
 
The blend of “soft and hard stuff” to implement the PCT strategy seemed to vary 
over time according to local contingencies, that could not necessarily be determined 
centrally. This careful use of “hard and soft stuff” might be easier in a more “closed” 
LHE where social and institutional relationships are more embedded. For example, 
at the Southern PCT board meeting (June 207), the PCT Chair described his recent 
meeting with the Health Overview and Scrutiny Committee. They were, he said, ‘not 
quite on the same wave length’. There was a lot of information that, although 
available in the public domain, the committee expected to have shared with them 
more formally. They want to hear from us about performance across [the LHE], not 
just the PCT. The Chair added “let’s hope we quickly get onto the right wave 
length.” (field-notes). 
 
This inter-dependence also became obvious in observations of meetings. For 
example, at a Trust Executive meeting (Southern Hospital, September 2007), a 
discussion was held about the Trust’s performance and the associated financial 
implications. One consultant claimed that “there is a fear that the PCT is stealing 
our money”, to which a Trust Director replied that “there is agreement that [Trust’s] 
coding is generally accurate and where it is not, there is no financial gain.” The 
consultant has presented performance in an informal perspective and yet the reply 
has been within a formal perspective. A similar illustration also came from 
observation at a Trust Board meeting. A Board member asked: “How do you think 
we [the Trust] are perceived?” A clinical director replied that: “We need to go out 
and tell people what we are going to do.” This prompted the Trust’s medical director 
to comment that “We had a 24% increase in new medical referrals so somebody 
knows we are here.” 
 
The inter-dependence of formal and informal performance was especially evident in 
`performance management.’ As this function seeks to capture all aspects of 
performance, it is perhaps unsurprising that respondents drew on both types of 
performance notions. Comments by the WCC assessment of PCTs illustrate the 
inter-dependence in performance management; for example, in the Northern PCT, 
the 2008 assessment panel concluded that: 
“The PCT has built strong foundations, which have already made an impact in 
both developing the strategic vision for the health of the [Northern] population, 
and in ensuring a robust grip on financial performance.” 
 
●  Mismatch between formal and informal performance 
Much of the time, there appeared to be a reasonable consistency between formal 
and informal notions of performance across the two LHEs. However, on occasion, a 
mismatch was evident. The mismatch became apparent when informal performance 
notions tended to be more responsive to events than formal performance metrics 
(which are inevitably retrospective; see above). That said, reputations and goodwill 
(key aspects of an informal performance perspective) might, arguably, take a longer 
time to develop and, equally, be lost in a short time too. For example, it might be 
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expected that newly appointed and newly formed organisations might rely more 
heavily on formal performance (and vice versa). Since “up to half of senior 
executives are likely to spend less than two years in the same post” 
(http://www.hsj.co.uk/news/workforce/startling-senior-executive-turnover-stifles-
nhs-innovation/5002834.article; 18 June 2009), there might also be a mismatch in 
terms of their ability to “deliver performance improvements” in, say, less than 1½ -
2 years. The legacy of former informal performance notions might thus be expected 
to provide a basis for current assessment of individuals and organisations. As such, 
informal performance seemed to be less volatile or fluid than formal performance. 
This accords with findings that many formal performance metrics are liable to 
significant changes through small variations. 
  
One newly appointed Chief Executive spoke about his focus on the formal 
performance of the organisation and the LHE:  
 
“I just encourage people to look at, if you like, what we do know as facts, that 
our audited accounts, our projections were assessed independently.” (Southern 
LHE) 
 
By contrast, a long-serving senior manager seemed to emphasise more informal 
performance aspects of his job. His length of service seemed to offer some 
advantages though later in the interview he also noted some disadvantages. 
 
“I think longevity gives you an opportunity to have or build up a successful 
team, it gives you the opportunity of having a degree of credibility you know, 
the organisation is successful and you- you know a lot more about the 
organisation because you are the organisational memory” 
 
In the case of a third organisation which had a tradition of `poor’ (formal and 
informal) performance, a new Chief Executive had been appointed shortly before 
fieldwork began. One senior manager at this Trust noted that 
 
He has a reputation for strong leadership and presence on the ‘shop floor’. 
He has imposed a culture of ‘non-tolerance of non-delivery.’  (Field-notes, 
April 2007) 
 
It is important to note that the previous poor performance had precipitated the 
appointment of this new Chief Executive. As hypothesised above, new senior 
managers thus tend to rely on formal performance at the outset and might focus on 
the aspects of performance that had prompted their demise of their predecessor in 
the first place. 
 
Respondents spoke about the `organisational’ correspondence between formal and 
informal performance. One senior manager noted that the public may rely more 
heavily on personal experience (informal performance) than national measures 
(formal performance). Yet, he also felt that Foundation Trust status does carry 
recognition of high performance amongst the public. 
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“I'm not sure whether the health-care standards are that understood by the 
wider public. I think certainly the old star system was and I think the label of 
Foundation Trust is. But you know quite a lot of it is probably more to do 
with what people's own experience is. I live within 10 miles of the hospital, I 
mean, there's hardly anything you'd go to where somebody doesn't say 'Ah 
well, you know, I was admitted to the hospital, I had a great experience of 
going to A&E there' or 'I know so-and-so and-' or 'my elderly mother went 
in' or whatever.” (Director of Finance, Southern LHE). 
 
He later than explained that reputation of clinicians does become associated with 
the Trust as a whole. 
 
Public perceptions might become increasingly significant in a era of “Patient Choice.” 
This policy imperative did not feature very strongly in either LHE case-study. 
However, it provided a rhetorical back-drop to some discussions. For example, at 
the Board meeting of one Trust which regularly performed `poorly’ according to 
formal metrics and was widely perceived to be in `difficulty, it was reported that:  
 
The Trust Board wants to be ‘a trust of choice’ and are primarily concerned 
with meeting performance indicators that are published and are of most 
concern to patients and most likely to influence commissioners. (Field-notes, 
Trust board meeting, May 2007). 
 
This was also illustrated in documentary evidence. One example is the mismatch 
between `improving results” and the public’s “poor” perception of services. 
 
“Members commended the [Southern LHE] Trusts on their improving results 
with the Healthcare Commission, however, concerns were raised that patient and 
user surveys were poor. Members were informed that this was an area that the 
Trust was looking at improving.” (Southern LHE, Health Overview and Scrutiny 
Committee minutes, January 2009, p.4). 
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5 Discussion and interpretation. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter revisits the conceptual frameworks (introduced in chapter 2) in the 
light of the empirical evidence gathered through fieldwork (whose findings are 
outlined in chapter 4). This is done through three primary themes: decentralisation, 
autonomy and performance. It is also important to consider the contribution that 
this study makes to extant knowledge about such themes in terms of the original 
aims and objectives.  
 
Aim:  
 To investigate the inter-relationship between decentralisation, governance, 
incentives and performance in LHEs.  
 
Objectives: 
f. To examine the impact of decentralisation upon performance; 
g. To describe the local interaction of governance mechanisms;  
h. To evaluate the degree of autonomy (`decision space’) available to local health-
care organisations; 
i. To assess the incentives associated with different policy initiatives; 
j. To provide lessons for policy-makers and managers at all levels  
 
5.2 Decentralisation revisited 
 
Decentralisation has long been analysed in a variety of academic disciplines. It has 
also been popular among policy-makers and politicians for (apparently) resolving 
organisational and structural failings. Nonetheless, its appeal has waxed and waned 
in response to shortcomings of the previous `regime.’ It is fair to say that over the 
last 10-20 years, decentralisation has been in the ascendancy among 
Western/OECD-type countries. Developments towards centralisation have, however, 
also been apparent during this time, underlining the dual / oscillating process of 
reform that is inherent within central-local relations. 
 
Although previous `rounds’ of decentralisation / centralisation have been well 
covered in various academic literatures (Peckham et al, 2005; Saltman et al, 2007), 
there has been a need to examine this latest version for two principal reasons. First, 
extant knowledge about decentralisation has been unable to account for recent 
policy and organisational developments. Governance reforms (such as the rise of 
network-based organisations and quasi-markets) have fundamentally altered the 
landscape in which health policy reforms now take place (Davies et al, 2005). Yet, 
decentralisation models and frameworks have been unable to accommodate such 
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reforms, not least because they were constructed beforehand.  Secondly, extant 
knowledge has also been limited in being able to differentiate both what is being 
decentralised and which agents are involved – the `what and who/where’ questions 
of decentralisation.  
 
A previous study (written by some of the authors of this report; Peckham et al, 
2005) sought to advance extant knowledge by proposing the Arrows framework 
which clarified the `what and who’ questions. The traditional model of 
decentralisation had usually located the continuum from central to local. The Arrows 
framework extended both ends such that international / supra-national 
organisations and the individual (patient / practitioner) were now included within 
this `new’ framework. It also sought to distinguish more clearly between what 
properties / domains were being decentralised. Primarily for analytical clarity, the 
Arrows framework distinguished between inputs, process and outputs/outcomes 
(I*P*O). This distinction helped demonstrate the ambiguity inherent in 
decentralisation (Vancil, 1979) because it allowed for the possibility that 
decentralisation and centralisation might take place at the same time. Hence, 
control over inputs (I) and process (P) may be decentralised whilst control over 
outputs/outcomes (O) may be centralised. Moreover, an organisation (at one level 
within the central-local continuum) may experience the loss of power (upwards 
and/or downwards) and power by-passing them (say, from central authority to a 
more local agency). All three possibilities make decentralisation highly problematic 
as a strategy for evaluation and assessment.  
 
However, this Arrows framework, though an `improvement’ on previous models, 
remained focused on the vertical dimension. As we had noted earlier, frameworks 
had not adapted to the changing governance landscape. Hence, it was important to 
recognise the networks and dependencies within which organisations (newly in 
receipt of decentralised powers) operated. Inter-organisational dependencies and 
relationships, it was hypothesised, were crucial to the ways in which decentralised 
powers might be exercised and ultimately, to the performance of the initiative itself 
and also the organisations. These dependencies and relationships were situated 
within the LHE which was thought to shape and be shaped by decentralisation (see 
below). Though a nebulous concept, the LHE was thought to be the context in which 
the vertical dimension would intersect with the horizontal dimension. This 
contextual dimension helped to explain (in two ways) why decentralisation might 
have differential effects. Firstly, national policy (vertical dimension) has increasingly 
sought to differentiate local organisations (most clearly related to performance; 
note, star ratings, earned autonomy and Foundation Trusts). This can be seen as a 
`divide-and-rule’ strategy, evident in many versions of decentralisation. The sub-
national interpretation of national policy might also have had an effect; note, for 
example, the variation in Foundation Trusts by SHA (http://www.monitor-
nhsft.gov.uk/) or geographical variations in the uptake of Patient Choice. Secondly, 
given the uniformity of many (though clearly not all) national policies, local context 
(horizontal dimension) has an explanatory contribution.   
 
In short, the evolution of decentralisation frameworks can be seen as the 
development of multi-dimensional perspectives. The first, and traditional, approach 
was oriented around the central-local axis. The second involved the extension of the 
central-local continuum from supra-national to individual. The third involved the 
expansion from a purely vertical analysis to one which also included a horizontal 
(local) dimension. We might also add a fourth development – time – involving the 
oscillation (ebb and flow, wax and wane) of decentralisation and centralisation. By 
virtue of the length of this study (3 years) and the methodology adopted (including 
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repeat interviews and extended observation), this study has been able to 
incorporate a temporal dimension. However, it may be arguable that a longer time 
frame (such as a decade) is required to appreciate the wider ramifications of 
decentralisation. 
 
In terms of the conceptual contributions relating to decentralisation, this study has 
shown the value of the new multi-dimensional perspective even though the study 
did not extend its inquiry to individuals or to supra-national organisations. (This 
latter point was beyond the scope and remit of the study). Attention remained 
focused at the organisational level, not simply in terms of atomistic agencies but 
rather in terms of the inter-relationships between them, each of which were 
implicated in and affected by decentralisation in differing ways. All were affected by 
the implementation of national policies (such as Patient Choice), but some became 
FTs and others were subject to greater scrutiny and control (due to previous “poor” 
performance). Yet, how did these vertical imperatives have horizontal ramifications 
within the LHE? 
 
It was found that several national policies had little impact upon local inter-
organisational dynamics. Structurally and financially oriented policies (such as FTs 
and PBR) seemed to gain greater traction locally than others (eg. PBC). This may 
have been partly due to the focus of the study on structural and financial concerns 
(among others) but PCT budget devolution did not seem to figure prominently in 
accounts about new decentralised powers. Yet, this specific policy (a form of `input 
decentralisation’, in the Arrows framework) had been prominently advanced as one 
of the key ways in which PCTs were able to be free from government and be free to 
respond to local concerns/needs. However, it may also reflect the relatively slow / 
problematic implementation of other policies such as Patient Choice and PBC 
(Fotaki, 2007). The Audit Commission (2008) confirms this impression: 
“The incentives and infrastructure to support practice-based commissioning 
are not currently sufficient to engage most GPs in commissioning” (p.4). In 
short, these policies were the `dogs that did not bark in the night.’ 
 
We found that central control had either been retained (ie. not decentralised) or re-
centralised almost wholly within the `output/outcome’ domain (in the Arrows 
framework) (or interventional autonomy, according to Verhoest et al (2004)). This 
was closely related to the performance culture which placed heavy emphasis on a 
centralised approach to measuring and managing performance. Such 
`centralisation’ was apparent in terms of targets (relating to A&E 4 hour target, 18 
week elective surgery target and financial balance etc.). Whilst there has been 
much comment on the deficiencies of the performance culture generally and the 
targets specifically (eg. Bevan and Hood, 2006), we found that the `centralisation 
of outputs’ was largely accepted by respondents in all agencies in both case-studies. 
Clearly, some questioned their value and accuracy but in general, they were mostly 
accepted as a `fact-of-life.’  It might have been expected that such centralisation 
would have been more strongly resisted. However, much time and effort was 
expended in dealing with the data and their implications. This might lead to the 
conclusion that, whilst input and process decentralisation offered local organisations 
some new powers, attention was dominated by `output centralisation.’ It might also 
be argued that all local organisations were (for the most part) equally affected by 
this `output centralisation’ even though it had been policy sought to differentiate 
local organisations through input and process decentralisation.   
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The permission to apply for and the granting of FT status was a notable example 
whereby differential patterns did emerge in the `Inputs’ and `Outputs’ of 
decentralisation. This was noticeably apparent in the Southern case-study. Here, 
there was a distinction between FTs and non-FTs, and in particular aspirant FTs. The 
aspirant FTs perceived an uneven `playing field’ in competing with the FT in terms 
of the alleged preferential financial regime. The transitional PBR applied to FTs did 
indeed offer them a financial advantage over non-FTs. However, some aspirant FTs 
went further to claim that their applications were held back in order that the LHE 
might be better established given recent reconfigurations (such as the PCT). This 
differential decentralisation was not simply a variant of conditional decentralisation 
associated with `earned autonomy’, an approach linking decentralisation and 
performance. Rather, differential decentralisation sought to exploit an apparently 
uniform policy (the possibility of FTs status) into a deliberate market-shaping 
strategy. This is where evidence from a wider range of case-studies would be 
especially illuminating. 
 
We found degrees of ambiguity as some powers were devolved to sub-
organisational levels (eg. to individual patients through Patient Choice, and to 
practices through PBC). Some powers (mostly relating to outputs) were also 
centralised but many of these were not contested because it was possible to deploy 
them beneficially. For example, NSFs and clinical evidence were used to justify local 
(often controversial) decisions.  
 
An alternative reading of the findings gleaned from this study can be cast in terms 
of legitimacy (Vrangbaek, 2007). It can be argued that decentralisation (and 
equally, centralisation) is not so much an initiative to improve the performance of 
local (and possibly, central) organisations, though this may be a beneficial by-
product. Rather, decentralisation is a strategy design to restore legitimacy in central 
and local organisations. Vrangbaek identified three types of legitimacy: input, 
process and output – categories which offer a close correspondence to the Arrows 
framework and enable a deeper analysis. Decentralisation may thus be as much 
about the search for new forms of legitimacy in re-structured public services as 
specific performance objectives.  
 
`Input legitimacy’ refers to the ability of the public to influence decision-making; 
decentralisation is often presented as a chance to reduce the structural distance 
between decision-makers and citizens. We found little evidence that input legitimacy 
had been enhanced by decentralisation. The Southern PCT had claimed that its 
approach had enhanced public involvement. Under competency 3 of World Class 
Commissioning (“Proactively build continuous and meaningful engagement with the 
public and patients to shape services and improve health”), the PCT had assessed 
its `influence on local health opinions and aspirations’ at level 3 but the WCC panel 
rated this level 1. Likewise, the PCT rated `public and patient engagement’ at level 
3 but the WCC panel at level 2. This evidence supports a wider pattern, reported by 
the Health Service Journal (4 June 2009; http://www.hsj.co.uk/5002146.article). 
The FTs in the study claimed that more needed to be done to engage better with 
the public and patients, a conclusion also reached by the Health Select Committee 
report on Foundation Trusts (2008). One FT in the Northern LHE has begun to use 
the Picker Institute `Frequent Feedback’ service (from 2009 for 3 years) 
(http://www.pickereurope.org/frequentfeedback). 
  
`Process legitimacy’ offers the prospect of greater control, trust accountability and 
transparency. This is thought to be achieved by decentralisation creating smaller, 
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leaner organisations which are better able to respond to local needs. We found 
limited evidence of this, especially among those organisations with greater 
autonomy (such as FTs). However, this moderately favourable conclusion is 
tempered by three factors. First, local needs are mediated through assessment by 
PCTs (ie. joint service needs assessment); responsiveness may thus be evidence in 
the light of Patient Choice. Second, although the Audit Commission (2008) noted 
some improvement in services delivered by to FTs, they concluded that “FT status 
does not yet seem to be empowering organisations to deliver innovative models of 
patient care” (p.4). Third, some signs of centralisation still persisted.  
 
`Output legitimacy’ concerns the acceptance of results by relevant actors. 
Decentralisation is thus a “way to shift attention... and signal responsiveness” 
(Vrangbaek, 2007, p.72). Whilst the focus in this form of legitimacy is on the 
performance of organisations, there was evidence in this study of `blame 
decentralisation’, the tendency to present a performance `failure’ as the 
responsibility of only that organisation, rather than analysing the systemic problems 
across the LHE or wider. This study began to demonstrate how improvement (and 
indeed, failures) in one organisation had consequential effects elsewhere in the LHE, 
underlining the need for further attention to local health systems. 
 
5.3 Autonomy  
 
5.3.1 Defining types of autonomy: 
The notion of `autonomy’ is foremost in analyses of decentralisation. By 
decentralising powers to lower / local levels, the autonomy of such local agencies / 
agents is supposedly augmented. This, of course assumes that all properties have 
been decentralised. Using the I*P*O properties of the Arrows framework, it can be 
argued that `full’ autonomy is only achieved if each of the I*P*O properties are 
decentralised to the same level. As, in many cases, this does not happen, it can be 
argued that there have been few instances of decentralisation in which autonomy 
has been fully or properly `enabled.’ This is especially pertinent in tax-funded 
health systems where centralisation denotes notions of political accountability.  
 
Verhoest et al (2004) have delineated two basic forms of autonomy (and sub-
types): (i) decision-making competencies (managerial and policy autonomy), and 
(ii) exemptions on the constraints on the actual use of decision making 
competencies (structural, financial, legal and interventional autonomy) (see table 
2.3.).  In addition, this study has sought to add another dimension to the useful 
framework by Verhoest et al. Previously, emphasis in decentralisation had been on 
vertical aspects of autonomy. Here, vertical autonomy created the opportunity for 
local implementation. It also conveyed a shift in the explicit norms and standards 
which were expected of organisations. However, the local `room for manoeuvre’ 
available to organizations (with newly-acquired vertical autonomy) might also play a 
part in how vertical autonomy was deployed. Horizontal autonomy thus implies 
opportunity for innovation and a political space (for argumentation and 
engagement). Innovation has been particularly stressed as part of the new 
structural options emerging from Lord Darzi’s Next Stage Review (NHS 
Confederation, 2009). 
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An equally useful framework is offered by Bossert (1998) whose decision space 
framework incorporates the horizontal dimensions, in explaining performance 
(figure 5.1.). 
 
Figure 5.1. Decision space framework: a revised version. 
National government
Increased decision space Incentives Centralised directed change
Local choices  
~ autonomyLocal context
Innovation No change
Change in performance?
Formal & informal
8
 
Note: The boxes with darker shading denote particular relevance to this study 
 
This model presents three possibilities for central government in terms of 
autonomy: increased decision space, the creation of incentives and centralized 
directed change. `Increased decision space’ might result from the relaxation of 
central controls (say, in terms of performance management) or devolution of 
previously centralised functions (such as budgetary decisions). PCT budget 
devolution might fall into this latter category. Equally, `centralised directed change’ 
has been apparent in recent re-organisations such as the creation of the NHS quasi-
market in the 1990s and the re-configuration of PCTs in October 2006. The 
framework implies (though does not make explicit) the possibility that national 
policy might also constrain decision space (say, through `national’ frameworks and 
targets). The third possibility – creation of incentives – is a more conditional 
approach than the other two as it influences local decisions through differing levels 
of rewards and sanctions, both financial and non-financial. Most national policies 
created incentives for local agents though often, these were contradictory or at 
least, not synchronous. For example, PBR created the incentive for Trusts to 
increase their activity, knowing that they would be paid for each item of activity. 
Yet, for PCTs, PBR could be a strategy to introduce demand management, 
restricting the rise in costs. Likewise, Patient Choice was a way in which PCTs might 
seek to exert leverage over Trusts but the latter could equally employ the localised 
nature of health-care to reinforce existing patterns of service delivery.  This study 
found examples of these tensions in both case-studies.  
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Arguably, the key component of the DSF is the local choices relating to the exercise 
of autonomy. This concerns the ways in which local decisions are made about how 
and where new areas of discretion might be deployed. This study was able to 
explore how individual organisations and the LHEs as a whole, made (or did not 
make) these local choices. Bossert argues that these local choices are influenced by 
the local context. We found the local context to be critical in explaining the ways in 
which autonomy was exercised (or not) locally. Here, context is taken to mean the 
LHE. In selecting a sample of two contrasting case-studies, we were able to observe 
marked differences in the ways in which autonomy was used and the ways in which 
other organisations responded to such autonomy. It is this latter point which 
distinguishes this study (from those which might focus more centrally on autonomy 
per se). Critical aspects of the LHE context included: 
 Spatial and organisational characteristics, 
 Financial status, 
 Embedded social and institutional relations, 
 Centralised legacy, and 
 Organisational capacity  
Such factors were hypothesised a priori (Exworthy and Frosini, 2008) and have 
been confirmed by empirical evidence. The study found examples of `innovation’ 
and `no change’ which were largely the interaction between vertical and horizontal 
factors. 
 
Recognising that autonomy can be viewed in both vertical and horizontal 
dimensions is a crucial component for understanding and explaining autonomy in 
LHEs.  Note, however, that autonomy, like power, is not necessarily a zero sum 
game, in which one agent’s `loss’ of autonomy automatically implies another’s 
`gain.’ Thus, the I*P*O configuration and the Verhoest taxonomy (chapter 2) help 
explain why autonomy may be seized by local agents in the hope of `breaking free’ 
from the centre, only to find their new powers are illusory (Hoque et al, 2004). 
Autonomy, in Verhoest’s terms, may be granted, for example, in a managerial or 
financial sense but not in a policy or interventional sense. The ambiguity of 
decentralisation (and autonomy) is, once again, apparent.  
 
Combining the horizontal and vertical, and distinguishing between types of 
autonomy, it is possible to construct a series of scenarios to illustrate the 
consequences for organisations and LHEs. Here, four scenarios are presented as a 
heuristic device to improve understanding. However, the content of these scenarios 
is based on the empirical data, gleaned from fieldwork in this study. They are 
composite pictures, rather than a portrayal of one LHE or organisation. The four 
quadrants of the figure below denote contrasting levels of autonomy: full, partial or 
absent. Whilst the consequences of full and absent autonomy may be relatively 
easy to decipher, it is not necessarily clear which state of autonomy might be 
preferable: (i) “maximal vertical and minimal horizontal” or (ii) “minimal vertical 
and maximal horizontal.” They each offer different advantages and disadvantages. 
However, this study has begun to reveal such consequences.  
 
It is apparent that horizontal autonomy exists through the inter-organisational and 
inter-personal relationships between managers and clinicians in LHEs. This might 
include the `loose rein’ of performance management by the SHA regarding a well-
performing (non-FT) Trust. Equally, it refers to the good working partnerships 
between a PCT and local Trusts. From this study, maximal horizontal autonomy 
(implied in option (ii) (above)) is a vital to a well-functioning LHE, though `process 
autonomy’ may still be problematic. By contrast, vertical autonomy certainly offers 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 167  
freedom from constraints that have traditionally been associated with the 
centralised policy-making and finance of the NHS. Structural autonomy has been 
most apparent in this vertical dimension whilst interventional autonomy has largely 
remained (or been reinforced). This conclusion is supported by Verhoest et al 
(2004) who argue that; 
 
“A public organisation with extensive decision making competencies could be 
less good than expected because the organisation faces constraints on the 
actual use of the competencies.... When organisations have high level of 
managerial autonomy but low levels of interventional autonomy, the 
organisation could be inhibited in the full use of the managerial autonomy 
due to the strong reporting, evaluation, audit and sanction provisions issued 
by the oversight authorities” (p.112). 
 
It does not follow, therefore, that full autonomy is necessarily a positive situation. It 
may be beneficial for the organisation (by fostering innovation, greater pride and 
sense of ownership) but have negative consequences for the LHE (if the 
organisation acts upon its freedom to accrue more activity at the expense of 
others). Much will depend on the specific configuration of the LHE in balancing the 
types of autonomy and, crucially, the motivation of the agents involved (see 
5.3.2.).  
 
 
Autonomy scenarios: 
hypothetical examples
Minimal Maximal
Minimal
Maximal
Scenario 2:
Problematic Trust
Scenario 1 
Foundation Trust
Scenario 3:
PCT in deficit
Scenario 4:
High performing PCT
HORIZONTAL AUTONOMY
VE
R
TI
C
AL
 A
U
TO
N
O
M
Y
Partial autonomy
Partial autonomyAbsentautonomy
Full autonomy
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Scenario 1: Foundation Trust
• Vertical autonomy from centre
– Autonomy re. input and process
– Little autonomy re. outputs
• Horizontal  autonomy limited 
– LHE in financial deficit
– High level of competition with other
Local provider  
• Autonomy cube:
– Tall and thin
 
Scenario 2: Problematic Trust
• Vertical autonomy from centre:
– Limited
– Close performance management
– Limited autonomy in I-P-O
• Horizontal autonomy:
– Little collaboration from local partners
– Some assistance through PCT assistance 
(eg. secondments) and informal support from 
other local Trusts
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Scenario 3: PCT in deficit
• Vertical autonomy from centre:
– Close scrutiny from DH
– Close performance management by SHA
– Some autonomy in `I’, little in `P’ and none in 
`O’
• Horizontal autonomy:
– Limited
– Few options to develop local strategy
 
 
 
Scenario 4: High performing PCT
• Vertical autonomy from centre
– Significant freedom from DH and SHA
– PCT well regarded
• Horizontal autonomy
– Senior PCT managers well
regarded
– Cooperative Trusts enable
Implementation of PCT strategy
 
 
 
The overall volume of the autonomy `cuboids’ in these scenarios is indicative of the 
organisation’s overall `decision space.’ Whilst it is difficult to create a single `cube’ 
for the LHE, the room for manoeuvre afforded by the LHE is incorporated within 
organisational cubes through the horizontal dimension. In addition, the `cubes’ 
need to be sub-divided into types of autonomy, discussed earlier in this section. 
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Autonomy can, in theory, also be withdrawn. Since autonomy was granted on the 
basis of (good) performance in previous periods, it could follow that failure to 
perform might also precipitate a loss or withdrawal of autonomy. This equates to 
`interventional autonomy’, as described by Verhoest et al (2004). Although the 
legislation enacting FTs was significant because it removed many of the former 
powers of the Secretary of State and introduced a new regulatory function 
(Monitor), it would be possible to envisage circumstances whereby (some or all of) 
the powers of FTs were withdrawn. Evidence of this re-centralisation might be 
emerging from the experience of events at the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust. Though 
an FT, clinical performance was apparently well below expectations at this Trust. 
The then Health Minister Ben Bradshaw has indicated that legislation might be 
amended to allow the de-authorisation of FTs (4 June 2009; 
http://www.hsj.co.uk/news/policy/government-may-take-further-powers-over-
foundation-trusts/5002370.article). In addition, the possibility (pressure) to `take-
over’ failing Trusts may become significant as about 20 Trusts are thought to be 
unable to become FT. Yet, earlier studies on earned autonomy’ found that this 
aspect of autonomy was not valued highly by managers (Mannion et al, 2007). 
Similar take-over plans are mooted for PCTs (11 June 2009; 
http://www.hsj.co.uk/news/primary-care/commissioning/best-primary-care-trusts-
to-get-franchise-on-rest/5002615.article). Given the number of FTs now exceed 120 
(http://www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/), it is unlikely that a major reversal of this 
policy would be feasible or desirable. Moreover, given their ability to generate 
surpluses, such financial abundance might be seen as a luxury in times of economic 
restraint. Once again, this possibility highlights the oscillation between centralisation 
and decentralisation. Yet, significantly, it further emphasises the differential impact 
as some organisations will maintain autonomy whilst others will lose (or be unable 
to gain) it by virtue of performance.  
 
5.3.2 Ability and willingness to exercise autonomy: 
The act of granting autonomy, it has been noted by several commentators, does not 
necessarily guarantee that it will be exercised. In short, there is a fundamental 
distinction between the ability to exercise autonomy and a willingness to do so. The 
technical possession of autonomy (through formal granting of FT status or 
budgetary devolution) does provide the opportunity for the benefits of 
decentralisation to be enjoyed. However, unless these new opportunities are 
exploited, the autonomy will remain illusory, a situation which may foster claims 
that this form of decentralisation is superficial and impotent. This can be accounted 
for in a parallel explanation to the Arrows framework. If it is assumed that 
autonomy is only realisable if each of the I*P*O properties is controlled by the same 
agent, then it follows that autonomy can not be fully enjoyed when the locus of 
control of any of these is not co-located with the others. Likewise, it could also be 
argued that it is not simply the technical possession of these properties at that level 
which realises autonomy but in addition, the willingness of agents to exercise them.  
 
In the light of the preceding text on vertical and horizontal autonomy, it is possible 
to map the salient differences between these approaches in terms of the ability and 
willingness to exercise autonomy. Table 5.1. shows that ability to exercise 
autonomy may be compromised by unwillingness to do so. Here, ability is taken to 
imply not just a technical / formal ability (derived from the receipt of formerly 
centralised powers) but the managerial / organisational capability. Hence, it is 
possible to envisage a trade-off between the granting of autonomy to an 
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organisation whilst there is a lack of managerial capacity to enact such autonomy. A 
similar pattern emerges from `willingness.’  
 
Table 5.1. A comparison between vertical and horizontal autonomy in 
terms of ability and willingness to exercise autonomy 
 (In)ability to exercise 
autonomy 
(Un)willingness to exercise 
autonomy 
Vertical 
autonomy 
 PCT budget devolved () 
 FT () 
 Savings required before capital 
investment in FTs (〤) 
 Low management capacity 
locally as talent is spread thinly 
(〤) 
 Inured to centralisation (〤) 
 Greater exposure to risk (〤) 
 PBR rewards more activity () 
Horizontal 
autonomy 
 Higher inter-dependency in 
LHE (〤) 
 Competitive environment () 
 
 Fear of destabilising LHE (〤) 
 Harm local relationships (〤) 
 Opportunity to develop new 
services / new markets via 
Patient Choice () 
() implies ability / willingness. (〤) implies inability / unwillingness. 
 
The contents of each of the cells in table 5.1. were, to a greater or lesser extent, 
found in this study. Certainly, there had been a heavy emphasis on the creating in 
the ability to exercise vertical autonomy (top left cell). In part because of Monitor’s 
authorisation process of FTs, there were few concerns about managerial capability 
in these organisations. However, by contrast, the WCC panels had identified 
managerial capability to be deficient, notably in the Southern PCT. The case-study 
organisations did welcome the policy emphasis on autonomy and saw that some 
(though certainly not all) policies were aligned (top right cell). However, certain 
factors made them less willing to exercise autonomy. The FTs were exposed to 
greater (financial and organisational) risk than before and this made them cautious 
in certain decision areas. The two PCTs seemed to demonstrate contrasting 
approaches, largely because of the nature of the LHE within which they were 
situated.  The Northern PCT has forged a strategy which potentially threatened the 
existing pattern of services, primarily delivered by an FT, its main provider. The 
Southern PCT was faced with a more challenging environment and, though it had 
tried to develop a similar health strategy, there were signs that the legacy of 
centralisation was still felt in some areas (such as challenging existing financial 
flows). That said, it may not be so much that PCTs were acting in the context of 
centralisation but rather the sense in which they (PCT managers) felt and acted as 
part of a wider institutional framework (namely, the NHS). Hence, there is 
significant value in exploring the role that senior leaders in the NHS play in 
organisational change; they have the `room for manoeuvre’ to interpret and adapt 
national policy in the light of the local context. Managers in both PCTs seemed to be 
very cognisant of their responsibility and accountability to the broader NHS as were 
some FT managers.  
 
Given the potential for positive and negative aspects in table 5.1., it is possible to 
draw up a set of types which see the intersection of ability and willingness to 
exercise autonomy; table 5.2. 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 172  
 
Table 5.2. Potential impacts of differences between ability and 
willingness to exercise autonomy 
Type Exercise of autonomy  Potential impact? 
I Able but unwilling Unused / under-used powers 
II Unable but willing Frustration; disempowerment  
III Unable and unwilling Acceptance of centralisation 
IV Able and willing Genuine local freedom 
 
Table 5.2 begs the question whether vertical autonomy is a necessary condition to 
facilitate horizontal autonomy, and hence release the full performance potential of 
local agencies. (Ability could be seen as the formal authorisation of autonomy 
whereas willingness could be the perceptions and motivations of such `freedom’). 
This study did not reach this conclusion. Given the degree of informal performance 
(that exists or existed), there was some horizontal autonomy already within the 
system. For sure, vertical autonomy did enhance and even build on extant 
autonomy. This occurred in catalytic effects whereby, for example, FTs were seen as 
doubly advantaged – already being high performing Trusts but being given 
additional, preferential freedoms by virtue of their status. This was referred to as an 
`uneven playing field’ by non-FTs.  The Audit Commission (2008) make a similar 
point in concluding that “Foundation Trusts are becoming even stronger 
organisations when compared with other acute trusts” (p.5). However, as noted 
earlier, FTs were selected specifically because they were “high” performing 
organisations; evidence from this study and the Audit Commission suggest 
potentially widening of performance between organisations. With reference to the 
above table, this study found a combination of all four types of ability/willingness. 
There was evidence that type IV (able and willing) was generating improvements in 
innovation and efficiency. In sum, neither is sufficient to enable full autonomy and 
neither prevents some degree of autonomy to be exercised.  
 
5.3.3 Freedom from and freedom to: 
The distinction between two types of freedom – from and to – offers a slightly 
different analysis of the preceding discussion and of the empirical evidence. 
`Freedom from’ equates with autonomy from the centre and is associated with the 
technical ability to exercise autonomy. Freedom refers to the apparent constraints 
of centralisation – stifling bureaucracy, rigidity and unresponsiveness to variations 
in local needs. Also, `freedom to’ equates with horizontal autonomy, implying the 
potential to be responsive and to innovate. Though it does not necessarily imply a 
willingness to exercise autonomy, the motivation to exploit `freedom to’ does 
include horizontal aspects of autonomy.  
 
However, this binary division of freedom (from/to) has an intuitive appeal but alone 
is unsatisfactory. First, the term `freedom’ is itself rather pejorative in that it 
implies the former regime was restrictive and oppressive. Whilst this may have been 
the case, it also overlooks the possibility that it may have had other advantages 
such as being more equitable, rational and efficient (in terms of scale economies). 
Equally, autonomous local agencies might be as unresponsive or lack capacity to 
innovate as the centre; decentralisation per se does not guarantee such outcomes. 
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Second, we need to understand that freedom (whether `from’ or `to’) carries 
responsibilities, whether exercised centrally or locally. Freedom is this viewed as 
instrumental to wider organisational / policy purposes; it is a means to an end. 
Third, as much of the preceding discussion has shown, we need to examine 
different types of freedom and autonomy. For sure, freedom `from’ and `to’ offer 
some further insight but possibly not as much as `ability’ and `willingness.’ Fourth, 
the binary distinction overlooks the possibility that freedom within a central 
framework may be possible through informal autonomy associated with local 
discretion.  
 
In this study, it was often not easy to distinguish between `freedom from’ the 
centre and `freedom to’ be responsive or to innovate. Whilst one agency might 
have greater freedom from the centre, this did not always translate into a freedom 
to be responsive, for example, because the other agencies with whom collaboration 
took place, did not always enjoy similar levels of freedom. The putative freedoms of 
FTs (from the centre) did not necessarily translate (yet) into responsive services. 
Freedom to innovate did, however, appear more promising. In other cases, differing 
levels of freedom (between agencies or between `from’ and `to’) did not appear to 
hamper collaborative efforts; this was apparent in shared services and clinical 
networks.  
 
It is notable that autonomy has been granted in the English NHS on the basis of 
(past) performance. Though consistent with the heavy emphasis of a performance 
culture, it has precluded other imperatives and reasons for autonomy. Two 
alternatives might be envisaged: subsidiarity and public involvement.  
 
First, subsidiarity involves the delegation of functions to smallest, lowest or least 
centralised competent authority. Significantly, this competent authority has, in 
some cases, become the individual patient, though it could equally apply to 
individual clinicians. Subsidiarity (especially to individual patient level) raises further 
questions about the complexities of information and knowledge asymmetries, 
increased transaction costs and the limits to assumed ‘competence’ of the individual 
patient (or inequalities between patients in this regard). By implication, more 
central levels of authority only have subsidiary roles where they cannot be 
performed at the local level. This is inevitably problematic in centrally-funded health 
systems and yet, the UK has devolved health as a competency to Wales and 
Scotland. 
 
Second, in line with a more democratic version of decentralisation, autonomy could 
be granted on the basis of greater public (and patient) involvement in decision-
making (Greener and Powell, 2008). Public involvement is facilitated by such 
reduced structural distance between those governing and those governed. This 
accords with one of decentralisation’s positive virtues which aids improved 
responsiveness to needs which were previously ignored or overlooked. In terms of 
current decentralisation strategies, this `democratic’ impulse might be evident in a 
range of recent initiatives such as `parent-run’ schools (and academies with private 
sector input) or vouchers for social care and potential initiatives such as elected 
police commissioners or local referenda. This could be accompanied by a greater 
emphasis on health service “rights” or “entitlements”, the logic of this shift being “to 
create public services that are accountable to the public rather than Whitehall” 
(Lucas and Taylor, 2009). Mandatory services (through entitlements) could be a 
form of centralisation, restricting local freedom but, if allied to a reformed 
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relationship with users and the public, it could represent (outcome) decentralisation 
beyond the organisation to individuals.  
 
These versions of local autonomy seem to go further than previous efforts to 
reinvigorate local government between the 1970s and 1990s. It was argued (by 
both ends of the political spectrum) that some local governments were “virtually 
powerless in the face of wider social and economic forces” (Burns et al, 1994, p.10). 
However, Burns and colleagues also noted that “different localities [here, we could 
substitute LHEs] have different degrees of local autonomy in responding to social 
and economic processes” (p.12). In noting that `context does matter’, they argue 
that “local governments can choose to ignore the space that may be available to 
them” (pp.11-12). Such local government decentralisation retained power over 
decision-making, consistent with Arnstein’s (1971) ladder of participation.  
 
5.3.4 Autonomy - conclusions 
By way of conclusion to this section on autonomy, we consider the extent to which 
agencies can ever be fully autonomous in a publicly-funded health system. Whilst 
the principles of strategic and operational separation (steering and rowing) may be 
desirable (even though they are predominant in virtually all organisations 
nowadays), this study has shown the importance of assessing the context within 
which the operational activities are conducted. The boundary between strategy and 
operation is invariably blurred in the public sector (Pollitt and Talbot, 2003), not 
least because of professional autonomy and discretion (Lipsky, 1980). The local 
context inevitably conjures up notions of inter-dependency which have shaped, to a 
considerable degree, the extent of horizontal autonomy. In some senses, vertical 
autonomy simply offers a formal supplement to some of the (semi-)autonomous 
activity that was taking place anyway at the local level. This is especially apt if the 
vertical autonomy is granted on the basis of `good’ / `high’ performance. That said, 
vertical autonomy may provide an additive or catalytic effect to horizontal autonomy 
whereby `high’ performing organisations are enabled to perform even better (than 
before, than counterparts). In the English NHS, the establishment of Monitor (FT 
regulator) has institutionalised, to a far greater extent than ever before, a 
commitment to decentralisation. Yet, as of June 2009, there are suggestions that 
“the Department of Health is moving to weaken the power of foundation trust 
regulator Monitor” (Health Service Journal, 2009, p.3; 
http://www.hsj.co.uk/comment/leader/limits-on-monitor-should-not-threaten-
foundation-trusts/5002903.article). 
 
Notwithstanding the potential that certain forms of autonomy (eg. interventional 
autonomy) may undermine or counteract other forms, the combination of vertical 
and horizontal autonomy across all types (I*P*O; managerial/policy, 
structural/financial/legal/interventional) offers the most extensive decision space to 
local agents. 
 
One way in which vertical and horizontal autonomy may be `reconciled’ is through 
the notion of `responsible autonomy’ (Fairtlough, 2005). As a variation of the 
market-hierarchy-network trilogy, Fairtlough offers “three ways of getting things 
done”: hierarchy, heterarchy and responsible autonomy.  The latter of these types 
implies much of the foregoing analysis of autonomy but specific reference is made 
to the autonomy within a wider framework of accountability. The analysis thus gives 
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greater acknowledgement to the role of the centre in retaining interventional 
autonomy, namely the centralization of outputs (O). As Fairtlough (2005) argues: 
 
“For autonomy to become responsible autonomy, the absence of external 
rule must not mean there is no accountability for the outcome of self-
organisation. With responsible autonomy, the ways in which outcomes are 
achieved are not externally controlled, but the outcomes are monitored and 
poor outcomes are sanctioned.” 
 
We might argue that the outcomes which are achieved may not be externally 
controlled (by the centre) but rather heavily influenced by local partners in the LHE. 
The monitoring and sanctioning of poor outcomes is consistent with the 
(centralised) performance culture of the NHS in recent years. In addition, the notion 
of heterarchy – with its stress on dispersed and multiple nodes of power – may also 
be equally valid in these circumstances.  
 
 
5.4 Performance 
 
Decentralisation has long been claimed as a solution to various organisational 
problems. The evidence that decentralisation is positively associated with improved 
performance is, however, rather equivocal (Peckham et al, 2005; Saltman et al, 
2007). There are indications that decentralisation is positively associated with intra-
area/group equity, innovation and allocative efficiency, among other performance 
criteria. However, whilst it not always or even often stated in policy 
pronouncements or academic assessments, the context into which decentralised 
powers are located appears to be crucial in determining the impact that such 
powers have upon organisational performance. One might also claim that autonomy 
(as a consequence of decentralisation) might have a similar impact though the 
evidence for such claim is decidedly weak at the moment (López-Casasnovas et al, 
2006). Moreover, both decentralisation and autonomy might, it could be argued, 
have objectives which go beyond improvement in organisational performance; these 
might include the search for greater legitimacy, for example (Saltman et al, 2007). 
Indeed, autonomy has been a primary focus of this study as illustrative of the 
decentralisation policies of recent years.  
 
Performance is often defined in rather reductionist terms (as simply, one particular 
performance criterion such as efficiency), neglecting: 
a. the wider socio-political climate and / or  
b. the local administrative / organisational context in which semi-autonomous 
agents (individuals and organisations) operate.  
This contextual dimension might help explain apparent paradoxes in practice when, 
for example, the effect of (apparently uniform) policies (such as FT) might vary 
between different localities.  For, as Verhoest et al (2004) argue, 
 
“The link between autonomy and performance may appear blurred or unclear 
in seemingly similar cases just because the focus of the analysis is only on 
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decision making competencies of the agency. Agencies with similar decision 
making competencies may have totally different financial or structural links 
with government which may affect the extent to which these agencies can 
actually decide freely within these competencies” (p.109). 
 
We would argue that it is not just “structural links with government” that might 
affect agencies’ room for manoeuvre but also local / horizontal links with other 
agencies in the LHE. For sure, “links with government” affect the decision space of 
agencies but it is the interaction between vertical relations and horizontal relations 
which effectively determine the autonomy of local agencies. Moreover, as we have 
sought to demonstrate in this project, the degree of autonomy over different 
aspects of these agencies’ activities are crucial to explaining patterns of ability and 
willingness to exercise such autonomy. Hence, we saw contrasting (rather than 
radically different) strategies by the FTs in both LHE case-studies. The catalytic 
effect between vertical and horizontal autonomy implies that autonomy is not a 
static property but ever-changing in the light of national and local decision-making 
in each of the facets of autonomy (however defined – whether Peckham et al 
(2005) or Verhoest et al (2004)). The two dimensions of autonomy are not 
necessarily co-dependent because,  as table 5.1 shows, it is feasible to have an 
ability to exercise autonomy without willingness (and vice versa).  
 
5.4.1 Revisiting the Decision Space Framework: 
The theoretical constructs that have been applied (and modified) in this study offer 
some insight into these catalytic effects, in terms of performance. Bossert’s 
`decision space framework’ posits performance as an outcome of the interaction 
between national policy, incentives, local choices and context. Such performance 
might include innovation and also `no change’ (or inertia). We can apply and 
interpret the framework to this empirical study in each of Bossert’s components. 
First, national policy has been relatively consistent in stressing conditional 
autonomy, `earned’ through `good’ performance. (It is, of course, debatable how 
far some organisations actually `earned’ this through their own efforts). Although it 
is questionable whether these policies are necessarily consistent or offer 
contradictory messages (note, for example PbR), recent policy statements such as 
Darzi’s (2008) Next Stage Review is replete with references to autonomy being the 
catalyst for improved performance; for example: 
 “We try to improve our practice but we need the freedom and opportunity to do 
so” (p.59) 
 “The freedom of NHS foundation trusts to innovate and invest in improved care 
for patients is valuable and essential” (p.61) 
It will be a strong test of this commitment to local autonomy as public spending 
tightens in the coming years. There may be a tendency to revert to greater 
centralisation, ensuring stronger control over key aspects of inputs, process and (as 
now) outcomes. FT surpluses might be seen, for example, as excessive given wider 
spending restraint. Mergers between smaller, possibly below-average performing 
Trusts might also be seen as attractive to policy-makers in search of savings.  
 
Second, the incentives in these national policies (focusing on autonomy) have been 
both financial and non-financial. Davies et al (2005) found that most attention has 
been devoted to financial incentives and called for a more finely-grained analysis. 
The rewards for autonomy have been greater (provider) revenue (financial) and the 
ability to shape ones own destiny, foster local pride and ownership (non-financial). 
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This study found that both these sets of rewards had strong-to-moderate effects in 
both LHE case-studies. By implication, the sanctions were largely the opposite of 
these – loss of revenue and financial penalties (financial) and loss of job (especially 
for chief executives and directors) and damaged reputations (non-financial).  
Moreover, we found that the incentives were less effective when: 
a. Autonomy of organisations was lower. With little decision space, organisations 
were less able to respond positively to the incentives. 
b. Complexity weakened the transmission of incentives. The effectiveness of 
incentives was diminished when there was organisational complexity which 
meant that the incentives were poorly transmitted through the LHE. 
 
However, the balance between rewards (positive) and sanctions (negative) is a 
matter of interpretation. The King’s Fund (2008), for example, concluded that  
 
“Their [PCTs’] main incentives are negative ones: performance management 
from above allied to the ultimate threat of removal of their chairs or chief 
executives. That only encourages a risk-averse approach. They need other, 
more positive incentives….There need to be stronger incentives for PCT 
performance: for example, publication of performance against metrics that 
the PCT can influence” (pp.7 and 10). 
 
Based on our empirical study, we would not necessarily concur entirely with the 
King’s Fund conclusions although we recognise that the influence of performance 
management is pervasive. We found evidence that the incentives facing PCTs did 
indeed relate strongly to their (formal) performance but also a desire to become 
legitimate organisations in their LHE. In both LHEs the PCTs were striving to forge a 
health strategy which shifted the balance of power between the PCT and provider, 
and shifted care away from the hospital and `closer to home.’ Since PbR created an 
incentive for greater provider activity, we could agree with the King’s Fund that 
more positive incentives for PCTs are required. The King’s Fund outlines such 
possibilities:  
 “Performance-linked flexibility to manage surpluses and deficits over longer time 
scales, of up to five years, 
 Performance-linked access to innovation funds for new service development 
(formula-based to avoid bureaucratic application processes),  
 Performance-linked flexibility around existing staffing levels – do well and you 
can appoint more staff to do better” (p.10).  
The prospect of health policy which affords greater autonomy for `high-performing’ 
PCTs has been outlined in the summer of 2009 (Crump, 2009).  
 
The proposed freedoms for PCTs 
1. Lighter touch performance management  
2. Franchising (taking on some of the commissioning functions of poorer 
performing PCTs)  
3. Direct access to the DH to influence national policy  
4. Setting budgets across multiple years  
5. Being highlighted as a top PCT  
6. Preferential access to the innovation fund  
7. DH commitment to consider pay flexibilities 
 
Source: Crump, 2009 
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Though the notion of taking over a failing PCT may not be appealing to PCT 
managers, other aspects such performance management and budget flexibility may 
be welcomed.  The `freedoms’ (described in this study and outlined by the DH) are 
performance-based (derived from WCC assessments) and relate mainly to inputs 
and process. Whilst PCTs are rightly responsible for the spending of NHS money 
locally, there might be some potential to relax PCT performance management, 
consistent with World Class Commissioning and consistent with existing practice, in 
some areas. A major criticism of the 1990s internal market was that the incentives 
were not strong enough to elicit significant organisational change (Le Grand et al, 
1998). The reforms in recent years may suffer the same fate if, according to this 
study, the embedded social and institutional relations still heavily influence the 
horizontal autonomy of LHEs (Exworthy, 1998; Granovetter, 1992). This may 
compromise the incentives of the reforms which are associated with vertical 
autonomy. Furthermore, the “best” performing PCTs and Trusts could plateau in 
performance and become less innovative if their `autonomy’ was associated with a 
lack of new incentives to achieve continuous improvement beyond centrally-
determined targets.  
 
Third, Bossert’s framework hinges around the choices that local agents make. In 
reconciling the incentives associated with national policy and local context, 
performance outcomes are generated. As Bossert (1998) argues, “Decentralisation 
inherently implies the expansion of choice at the local level” (p.1518) but much 
rests on local agents’ willingness to make such choices. (They may, of course, make 
a non-decision by choosing not to choose). However, whilst the general tenor of 
health policy has been decentralist, increased choice for PCTs has not always been 
apparent, as table 5.3 shows.  (Further analyses could be applied to other local 
organisations). Indeed, it reinforces the Arrows framework which shows that, often, 
decentralisation by-passes particular organizations, adding to further ambiguity. 
Thus, choice (for organizations as much for patients) is highly structured and 
contextualized (Exworthy and Peckham, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 179  
 
Table 5.3. Assessment of decision space for PCTs 
Policy Degree of 
choice 
Argument 
Patient Choice Less choice Power is ceded to patients. PCTs are required to 
provide conditions (e.g. capacity) for such choice 
to be exercised 
Foundation Trusts Less choice At least in theory, power is ceded to providers 
and PCTs are required to implement contracts 
with them 
Practice-based 
commissioning 
Less choice Power is ceded to family doctors’ groups rather 
than the PCT 
Payment by 
Results 
Mixed PCT has a mechanism to control costs (if they 
improve commissioning capacity and demand 
management strategies). However, providers 
have incentives to increase activity level, 
particularly critical with respect to FTs 
Budget 
devolution 
More choice At least in theory, PCTs have greater freedom to 
allocate resources based on local priorities and 
needs 
Regulation 
regime by 
Healthcare 
Commission 
Less choice Former bureaucratic hierarchies are replaced with 
surveillance and control strategies of inspection 
regimes 
National Service 
Frameworks 
Less choice PCTs are more or less constrained to follow 
national ‘guidance’, as deviating from them would 
need to be justified more robustly 
Source: Exworthy and Frosini, 2008, p.208 
 
Fourth, choices thus interact with the local context in ways that focus on ability / 
willingness and freedom from / to (see earlier in this chapter). Exworthy and Frosini 
(2008) conclude that:  
 
“Whatever level/amount of decision space vertically available to local 
organisations, the process of horizontal decentralisation implies that the 
exercise of choice by managers in such organisations is shaped by and 
interdependent with other actors in the locality” (p.206). 
 
This is echoed by Fleurke and Willemse (2004) who argue that “…decentralisation or 
the distribution of responsibilities is organized not only vertically but also 
horizontally” (p. 535). In order to understand better the vertical / horizontal 
interaction, it is useful to draw on the notion of `realistic evaluation’ which posits a 
pivotal role for `context’ in mediating mechanisms (M) and outcomes (O)(Pawson 
and Tilley, 1997; Pettigrew et al, 1992; Greenhalgh et al, 2009). Often this is 
summarised as C+M=O, generating C-M-O configurations. Here, adapting Bossert’s 
model, we can observe the relationship as “I+C+A=P” (where I=incentives, 
A=autonomy, C=context, P= performance). Rather than the relationship being 
additive, we see it as a configuration in which the constituents are interactive and 
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co-dependent. Hence, in understanding the relationship between autonomy and 
performance, we need to understand the “ICAP” configurations in each locality 
(here, LHE). 
 
Fifth, Bossert identified two performance outcomes – innovation and no change – in 
the decision space framework. Here, we may interpret `innovation’ not simply as 
new service developments but also strategies to `defend’ an organisation’s 
autonomous position and/or implement an entrepreneurial strategy within the LHE. 
Equally, `no change’ may imply an active decision not to change (a freedom not to 
choose). Though recognising the value of this binary approach (change / no 
change), this study offers a finer distinction in terms of performance outcomes, 
relating to formal and informal performance (see next section). For example, this 
study helps explain why there may be differences between the de jure formal 
performance (as measured by `official’ metrics) and the de facto informal 
performance (as manifest in reputation and perceptions). Clearly, the LHE shapes 
the receptivity of the local context for innovation, mediating between vertical and 
horizontal imperatives and between formal and informal performance.  
 
In addition, the decision space framework poses the possibility that national policy 
creates greater decision space (say, through greater budget devolution to PCTs) 
and/or centralised directed change (say, through PCT mergers). The former directly 
increases decision space but this approach has been less in favour in recent years, 
as policy has tended to work through incentive mechanisms. The latter illustrates 
coercive, directed change, and has remained as an option in the policy `toolkit.’ 
Again, it illustrates the tension between decentralisation (here, autonomy) and 
centralisation, as both have usually been implemented at the same time. 
 
This study has sought to emphasise the interactivity between policy, incentives, 
autonomy, context and performance. In the light of the empirical evidence and 
preceding analysis, we are able to offer a revised version of Bossert’s `decision 
space framework’, drawing on the conceptual analysis in Exworthy and Frosini 
(2008). Bossert identified a causal pathway from incentives, local choices to 
performance. The framework that we present (figure 5.2.) suggests a more co-
dependent / co-constitutive process between autonomy, context and performance; 
hence, the causal pathway is not linear.  Rather, performance shapes and is shaped 
by autonomy. We suggest that incentives have a direct relationship on autonomy. 
In this relationship, autonomy would expand and contract as incentives increase 
and decrease. 
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Figure 5.2. Performance, autonomy and incentives in LHEs 
Performance, autonomy and incentives 
in local health economies
INCENTIVES
LOCAL CONTEXT
PERFORMANCE
mainly formal
National policy
Willingness and ability
to act upon incentives
Eg. loyalty to local providers 
& structure of local health economy
Informal performance
Eg. efficiency, equity, 
quality, responsiveness
Provisional 
arrow direction, ie
cause & effect 5
AUTONOMY
“Freedom from” 
and “freedom to”
I*P*O
 
 
5.4.2 Formal and informal performance: 
The focus on different aspects of performance has enabled a more critical 
perspective, one which offers insights into the ways in which `formal’ performance 
interacts with `informal’ performance. Traditionally, health policy towards 
performance improvement has focused almost exclusively on formal performance – 
improving the metrics, meeting targets, keeping financial balance etc. This study 
has demonstrated how notions of informal performance are co-constructed with 
approaches to formal performance. The example of the financial deficits in the 
Southern LHE illustrated this well.   
 
The study found the categorisation by Goddard et al (1999) to be useful. Formal 
performance still had a key role in acting as a safety net, most notably for `poor’ 
performers. Yet, the incentives of such an approach to high performers seemed to 
be quite weak. Recent debate about further `freedoms’ to high performing Trusts 
and PCTs illustrates the weakness of formal performance as a single strategy. In 
addition, informal performance offered both substitute and complimentary effects. 
These informal notions were widely deployed to explain patterns of performance 
when formal notions were deficient.  These notions were found to shape the culture 
of the LHE and the character of inter-organisational relationships. These affected 
how organisations made decisions and reacted upon one another. These notions 
were drawn from the embedded relations within the LHE and enhanced the 
knowledge derived from formal performance notions, effectively influencing the local 
`room for manoeuvre’ (autonomy).  
 
The notion of performativity – performance as a dramatic gesture – has not been 
explored in detail in this study. It represents a strand of inquiry which future 
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research should examine. The field of the `anthropology of policy’ (such as the work 
of Shore and Wright (1997)) provides a useful entry into these debates. Such 
inquiry could examine: 
 The ways in which performance is portrayed to various audiences including the 
public. This might include content analysis of Trust websites; 
 The deployment of performance narratives in board meetings and other `public’ 
settings; 
 The construction of debates justifying `poor’ or `good’ performance. 
 
 
5.5.Concluding words 
 
The shortcomings of extant evidence have been identified. Existing frameworks and 
models of decentralisation autonomy and performance has traditionally provided 
some value in descriptions and explanations in health policy and elsewhere. 
However, to date, they have not been integrated into a coherent framework. This 
study has sought to remedy the individual deficiencies of such models by 
undertaking detailed fieldwork in LHEs.  
 
It has been noteworthy that, to date, English health policy has sought to 
decentralise power to an organisational tier (such as Self-Governing Trusts in the 
1990s and Foundation Trusts in this decade). Moreover, most research in health 
policy and management (and health services research) has tended to focus 
exclusively on individual organisations. Little attention has been paid to inter-
organisational relationships that are prevalent in the new governance regimes. The 
increasing inter-dependence of organisations in (a) public sector settings and (b) 
health-care settings demand a re-appraisal of our understandings of such inter-
organisational relationships. The reforms of the public sector have had the effect of 
creating a tension between competition and collaboration. Public service 
organisations must both collaborate and compete with other agencies.  Health-care 
is increasingly organised around patient pathways and clinical guidelines which cut 
across traditional organisational boundaries. This is most clearly manifest in 
(managed) clinical networks (Ferlie et al, 2009). This project has provided an 
antidote to the prevailing policy and research paradigm by examining LHEs.  
 
The contribution of empirical evidence has been made through a longitudinal, 
comparative case-study method. Using interviews from a range of managerial and 
clinical staff at middle and senior levels from across two LHEs, it has been possible 
to trace the actions, reactions and interactions of key stakeholders implementing 
national policies and taking local decisions. The focus of attention has focused on 
autonomy and performance and on the incentives which pertain to both. We have 
been fortunate to undertake such fieldwork over an extended period of time. Not 
only does this allow a focus on the `reaction’ and `interaction’, but also to monitor 
the influence over external policy imperatives (here, government policy) upon LHEs.   
 
 
The key models and frameworks we have sought to test and refine have included: 
 Arrows Framework, 
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 Decision Space Framework, 
 Autonomy (`freedom from’ and `freedom to’), and 
 Formal and informal performance. 
 
The Arrows Framework has had limited value in analysis of autonomy and 
performance in LHEs because its primary analytical contribution is on the vertical 
axis. Its structure does not permit an assessment of horizontal (inter-dependent) 
relationships. However, it has been useful in separating the properties of 
decentralisation into inputs, process and outcomes. In the light of autonomy to FTs, 
it is also able to capture the emergence of multiple centres, viz. the way in which 
Monitor has provided a counter-balance to the DH at the centre (see chapter 2).  
 
The Decision Space Framework introduces the association between autonomy 
(choice) and performance, between central policy and local decision-making, both 
through the mediation of incentives. This study modifies the Decision Space 
Framework, through expanded and more nuanced notions of autonomy and 
performance. For example, the Framework says little about how local choice is 
exercised and what forms of performance might be generated.  
 
Notions of autonomy have been explored through the framework offered by 
Verhoest et al (2004) and by the distinction between `freedom from’ and `freedom 
to.’ The former has been useful in distinguishing between different types of 
autonomy (firstly, managerial and policy, and secondly, structural, financial, legal 
and interventional). However, the distinction between the ability and willingness to 
exercise autonomy has been particularly powerful in accounting for the tension 
between formal acquisition of autonomy and its practical expression as an agent of 
responsiveness, innovation etc. It also underlines the contextual nature within 
which autonomy can be exercised, structured in terms of the constraints and 
opportunities presented in/by the LHE. 
 
The assumption that performance is contested has also been helpful as it leads to a 
recognition that the formal metrics of performance measurement and assessment 
only offer a partial analysis of the ways in which agents understand and act upon 
organisational activities. The attention of formal performance has tended to eclipse 
other forms and notions of performance. Here, informal performance is examined as 
it offers a contrasting and more rounded perspective than one based solely on 
formal metrics. The notion of `dramatic performance’ might equally be addressed. 
These conclusions provide the link to the next chapter where the implications of this 
study are examined for policy-makers and research agendas. 
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6 Conclusions.  
 
6.1. Summary of key conceptual and empirical 
contributions of this report 
 
This report is an in-depth examination of the ways in which decentralisation in the 
English health system is being interpreted and implemented. It has sought to 
describe and explain the relationship between autonomy and performance, 
mediated by incentives, in two LHEs. It has drawn on a variety of theoretical models 
and frameworks to provide the conceptual context within which the empirical 
findings can be presented and interpreted.  
 
Decentralisation remains a focal theme within international health policy and is still 
highly salient within England. However, given the evolution of governance of public 
services and the observed limitations of most conceptual frameworks, the need to 
revisit and update theoretical and empirical knowledge relating to decentralisation 
has become pressing. To date, analysis of decentralisation has predominantly 
focused on vertical (central – local) relations. Debates have become entangled in 
definitions of decentralisation and its measurement. This study has refined earlier 
conceptualisations of decentralisation, extending the vertical perspective and 
combining this with the horizontal perspective within LHEs. The conceptualisation 
has also distinguished more clearly what is being decentralised from where and to 
where.  
 
One of the recent developments which has prompted the renewed interest in and 
application of decentralisation has been the notion of health systems. Hence, the 
study took the LHE as its primary unit of analysis. Hitherto, the organisation (the 
hospital, the FT) or the individual (the clinician, the manager) has dominated 
analysis in health policy research (and other fields of inquiry). However, the LHE 
represents an important perspective since it addresses inter-organisational 
dimensions such as power, dependency, autonomy and relationships. The project 
has also sought to delineate differences and similarity in terms of: 
 Organisations (mainly PCTs, FTs and other Trusts), 
 Function (purchaser / commissioner and provider), and 
 Professional (clinical and managerial groups).  
 
A second recent development has been the use of autonomy as a lever for 
improvement in the quality of health services. Whilst decentralisation necessarily 
expands choice for local agents, the circumstances within which such autonomy is 
exercised, are invariably contingent upon local context. Using Bossert’s (1998) 
`decision space framework’, the study has provided a more finely grained analysis 
of the ways in which autonomy has been interpreted and deployed in LHEs. This has 
involved analysis of the catalytic effects of one organisation’s autonomy upon the 
rest of the LHE (including the PCT and providers). The empirical analysis has 
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focused attention on local agents’ views of autonomy (their perceptions of freedom 
from the centre and of freedom to innovate or be responsive to local needs) and 
their resulting behaviour. We were also able to examine how autonomy was shaped 
by vertical and horizontal factors (such as relational dynamics, persistent social 
relationships, disrupted social relationships and local leadership).  
 
The third development concerns performance. Whilst the `performance culture’ has 
become ever more prevalent recently, it has been given greater weight by its 
association with autonomy. Claims for autonomy have not been universally applied; 
rather, there has been a form of decentralisation contingent upon certain levels of 
performance. Such an association has implications for those with autonomy and 
those who aspire to it. Interest in this study has, therefore, focused on respondents’ 
views on the causes and pathways to performance. However, we have considered 
performance to be a contested concept. Clearly, there are many views on what 
constitutes effective or successful performance which may have a direct bearing on 
how organisations are measured and managed, especially by external agencies. 
Here, the distinction between formal and informal performance is relevant. Across 
both LHEs, formal performance was relevant to `safety net’ functions, ensuring that 
performance did not drop below a minimum threshold. Informal performance, by 
contrast, acted as a substitute or complement to formal performance.  
 
The issues of autonomy and performance have been mediated by incentives which 
are both implicit and explicit, financial and non-financial, rewards and sanctions. 
The overlapping and often contradictory incentives are, however, “frequently 
implicated in the success, or otherwise, of reforms” (Davies et al, 2005, p.21). The 
broad association can be sustained in this study but it is difficult to make clear 
association and pathways between incentives and improved performance. Hence, 
analysis of how incentives shaped autonomy and performance has been particularly 
instructive. However, the effect of single incentives has been difficult to disentangle 
from the `noise’ of multiple national and local policy imperatives, each with their 
own set of incentives. The study found that some incentives had substitution effects 
whereby attention was diverted to some areas (such as FT, PbR, and targets for 
A&E and waiting times) to the neglect of others (such as Patient Choice and patient 
involvement). The study also found that the consequences of responding to 
incentives rippled throughout the LHE. Adopting the LHE as the unit of analysis 
showed the inter-dependent effects of health reforms; for example, a PCT’s or an 
FT’s decisions had consequences for others, sometimes in negative ways. Promoting 
collective responses (in the form of LHE-wide health strategies) recognised this 
inter-dependency but also emphasised entrenched local interests. Equally, the lack 
of autonomy (or the threat of loss of it) also blunted the incentive regime. In short, 
the benefit of intrinsic and non-financial rewards was often eroded at the expense of 
extrinsic, financial sanctions. Viewing such incentive effects across LHEs helped to 
understand better the role of agency within LHEs. 
 
● Decentralisation, autonomy and performance: a programme theory? 
So, what does interpretation of our findings say about `what works for whom, 
where and in what context’? Building on the work of Pawson (for example, Pawson, 
2002; Pawson et al, 2005), it is possible to devise some tentative `programme 
theories’ which could be empirically tested in subsequent research (see below). 
Programme theories and theory-based evaluations are increasingly widespread in 
health and social research as ways to generate empirically-based recommendations 
for policy and practice. In particular, they can help to identify the linkages in the 
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“causal chain” which require “repair” and to offer a contingent assessment, 
qualifying outcomes measures (Dahler-Larsen, 2005, p.629).  
 
Walshe (2007) argues for the need to “unpick the complex relationship between 
context, content, application and outcomes” (p.58). Here, we might assume that 
each of these is highly variable (table 6.1.). First, `context’ varies between LHEs, as 
the contrasting complexity of the two case-studies demonstrated. The LHE was 
established as the primary focus of this study which generated an inherent 
variability according to spatial, institutional and social characteristics. It appeared as 
if these starting points had a significant bearing upon the findings. Second, the 
`content’ of (national) policy might be assumed to show little variation but a 
performance-based approach to autonomy (ie. FTs), for example, belies the notion 
of uniformity; national policy was thus mediated by the local context (Pawson et al, 
2005). Third, attention in this study has addressed the local `application’ of national 
policy (Exworthy et al, 2002). Factors such as the behaviour of individuals in each 
LHE, their tacit knowledge, their reputation and local organisational politics have 
been powerful in explaining differences between the two LHEs. The active 
involvement of key individuals (with varying levels of power), we found, had a 
significant bearing on the application of policy. Fourth, the multiple `outcomes’ were 
diffuse and less measurable than other results of policy interventions, largely 
because they are contested (often between formal and informal performance). The 
outcomes also have a synergistic effect so autonomy and performance are co-
dependent (see figure 5.2.): the willingness to exercise autonomy, for example, was 
shaped by an organisation’s previous (formal and informal) performance and also 
by the anticipated impact on the LHE.  
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Table 6.1. Summary of LHE differences in response to policy according 
to context, content, application and outcome 
 Southern LHE Northern LHE 
Context Complex and `open’ LHE; multiple 
providers; only 1 FT provider; 
mixed organisational performance 
 
Highly inter-dependent but largely 
`closed’ LHE; only FT providers 
National: broadly decentralist, including autonomy conditional upon 
performance, increasingly strong central incentives (such as national 
targets) but weak incentives for responsiveness and innovation. 
 
Content 
Local: PCT financial deficit; plans 
for reconfiguration; some market 
competition attempted 
 
Local: LHE-wide strategy with wide 
ownership; some market 
competition attempted 
Applicatio
n 
Weak PCT (eg. capability) though 
improving situation; variable 
organisational responses to policy 
content; inter-organisational 
tensions; limited PBC development 
 
Collaborative approach underlined 
by PCT with strong leadership; 
strong reputation of local 
organisations; PBC clusters 
developed 
Outcome Moderate but variable 
performance, as PCT faces 
transition issues. Stalled re-
configuration.  
 
Strong, sustained performance 
across the LHE. Some progress 
towards service re-configuration.  
 
Understandings and explanations of the inter-relationship between autonomy and 
performance must be situated within LHEs which intersect vertical (national policy) 
and horizontal (local inter-dependencies) dimensions. Hence, there is an inherent 
limitation as to how generalisable these findings can be to any other LHE. By 
definition, any LHE is a highly complex open system which offers a unique 
configuration of factors.  However, empirical generalisability was not the purpose of 
the study. By drawing on conceptual frameworks, the study can, however, offer 
theoretical generalisability, defined as “the ability to transfer theories from the 
research setting and bring them to bear in often quite different combinations of 
context, content and application” (Walshe, 2007, p.58). The study did, for example, 
demonstrate the ways the actions, reactions and interactions within LHEs were 
nested within a hierarchy of  (national) infrastructure, local institutional 
configuration, inter-personal relationships and individual behaviour  (Pawson et al, 
2005, p.23).  
 
It is, nonetheless, challenging to provide a generalisable theory based on the 
empirical evidence presented in this study. Whilst programme theories offer some 
insight into what works, for whom and in what circumstances, the complexity that 
arises from examining the content and application of multiple national policies and 
from assessing multiple outcomes is a weakness. Policy interventions comprise an 
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assumed theory (of underlying assumptions) but rarely do they address the 
synergistic effects with other policies (vertically) and with inter-organisational 
relationships (horizontally). For example, national targets, the presence of FTs (and 
their regulatory regime) and the implementation of PbR (among many other 
policies) interacted in the two LHEs such that performance (shaped by formal and 
informal notions) dominated inter-organisational relationships. These findings echo 
the conclusions of the Health Select Committee report on patient safety (2009), the 
chair of which is reported as saying: “Government policy has often given the 
impression that there are other priorities for hospitals, such as hitting targets, 
reaching financial balance and maintaining foundation status, which seem to have 
become more important than maintaining safety."  
 
Disentangling the multiple underlying assumptions and tracing their application over 
time in LHEs has been challenging. For example, in spite of the emphasis on 
partnership working with local government and the voluntary sector to deliver 
improved public health, it has only been feasible to study NHS parts of the LHE. 
However, the focus on the LHE – as context – does provide the arena within which 
policy content, its applications and outcomes are articulated and displayed (table 
6.1.). Yet, the LHE is not passive; it is malleable to organisational politics, local 
leadership as well as shifting definitions about its very nature. Such a shifting arena 
of change complicates the analysis further; context shapes and is shaped by 
autonomy, performance and policy.  
 
There is also a need to appreciate the limits of such analysis. Pawson et al (2005) 
suggest that such programme theories are akin to the highway in that the latter 
does not instruct the driver but gives indications to survive the journey (p.33). 
Here, we suggest that this study’s assessment is a brief insight into an on-going 
story in both LHEs; we have only taken glimpses at a random point in time. Hence a 
longer time frame can help fill in gaps in knowledge though inevitably this extended 
perspective can lose sight of the finer detail available through our methods. It 
seems likely that the three year period of this study was an appropriate 
compromise.  
 
 
6.2. Implications of research for policy and practice 
 
Since the research brief and the research questions were informed by practical 
concerns of health policy-makers and NHS managers, it is appropriate that the 
concluding chapter of this report considered the implications of this extensive study 
for health policy and practice in England. Before policy themes are addressed, it is 
important to note that assessments of decentralisation are problematic “cover the 
full range of possible judgements” (Saltman et al, 2007, p.9). The implications, 
therefore, for policy and practice will depend, to a large degree, on the perception 
of existing systemic shortcomings and the starting point of analysis. Framing policy 
`problems’ as public services which are (apparently) unresponsive to local needs, 
fail to innovate, suffer from a lack of meaningful competition and lack appropriate 
incentives to improve, can lead to a conclusion in which decentralisation is the 
answer. Bearing these points in minds, Saltman and Vrangbaek’s (2007) 
interpretation of evidence provides useful pointers for policy and practice (see table 
6.2.). 
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Table 6.2. Summation of evidence in terms of claims made for decentralisation 
Claim:  
Decentralisation
… 
Evidence: Decentralisation... 
Is a panacea “is not a magic bullet, capable of solving all… dilemmas” 
Implies a uniform 
model 
Has “not set model, no perfect or permanent solution.” 
Instead, “there are multiple models of decentralisation, 
each developed to fit the particular context”  
Requires a universal 
approach 
Is “neither unitary nor consistent” across health systems. 
Decisions about mix of decentralisation and centralisation 
are critical 
Is a static concept Is “not a static organizational attribute” but reflects 
oscillation between decentralisation and centralisation 
Is straightforward 
to implement 
Is “labour-intensive…, hard to introduce, hard to maintain 
and requires continual adjustment if it is to be successfully 
maintained over time” 
Is a superior 
mechanism for 
delivery 
 May affect legitimacy of local organisations if 
decentralisation “impedes the delivery of those services” 
Improves outcomes “Few, if any, links between decentralisation and the 
evidence for specific policy outcomes” 
Adapted from Saltman and Vrangbaek, 2007, p.79 
 
They conclude that decentralisation is based upon the values, objectives and 
preferences of the decision-makers, which will necessarily be context-dependent 
(p.80). This study concurs with their conclusions. The key policy lessons may 
therefore be summarised as:  
1. Decentralisation is a means to an end which needs to be clearly defined; 
2. Decentralisation (and centralisation) can be applied in multiple ways and 
approaches - most commonly, to inputs, processes and outcomes; 
3. Decentralisation needs to be constantly adjusted according to on-going decisions 
about system and organisational performance; 
4. Decentralisation strategies must reflect the variety of contexts where they are 
implemented; 
5. Decentralisation underlines the need for more effective regulation to ensure 
system goals; 
6. Decentralisation cannot achieve specific outcomes always and everywhere, and 
so, policy compromises need to be made.   
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6.2.1. Autonomy  
FTs now cover more than 50% of hospital and community health service Trusts 
which changes the balance of power vis-a-vis the DH and the PCTs. With Monitor 
established as the FT regulator, the centre has become bifurcated, shifting the 
centre of gravity away from the DH alone (as recently discussed; for example,  
http://www.hsj.co.uk/comment/leader/limits-on-monitor-should-not-threaten-
foundation-trusts/5002903.article 18 June 2009).  Proposals that Monitor might 
extend its remit to cover `quality’ (as currently measured the Care Quality 
Commission) would exacerbate this. The Care Quality Commission (and to a lesser 
extent, the NICE) has also deflected attention away from the DH. As a result, the 
centre is no longer unitary. However, these `alternative’ centres related largely to 
`outcome decentralisation’, as in a modified version of the Arrows framework 
(figure 6.1. where the dotted lines represent new forms of 
decentralisation/centralisation). The centre(s) will need to adjust their relationships 
with an increasingly diverse locality (Exworthy et al, 2008). No longer can policy be 
applied uniformly.  
 
 
Fig.6.1. Arrows Framework 
with `multiple centres’, applied to FTs
Input
Process Outcome
DH Monitor
Centres
Organisation
Monitor DH CQC
NICE
 
 
Equally, the distinction between the rhetoric and reality of autonomy needs to be 
addressed by policy-makers (Hoque et al, 2004). No longer will it be possible to 
exhort most local organisations to deliver better services; incentives must be 
sufficient to drive such change. Whilst there is some evidence that the incentive 
regime of (performance-based) autonomy is driving change (eg. PbR), it remains in 
contradiction to other aspects of the policy reform programme (such as Patient 
Choice and integrated care)(Audit Commission, 2008). Greater autonomy for PCTs 
is currently proposed but it is unclear how far they can deviate from the (national) 
norm since local variations will become ever more evident. Above all, centralisation 
is possible (or even likely) if/when performance drops. This approach is in contrast 
to ‘failing schools’ which risk being handed over to private sector sponsors to run as 
relatively more autonomous `Academies.’ This may be because schools are less 
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politically sensitive than hospitals. This scenario may also become more apparent in 
an era of economic constraint on public services since (semi-) autonomous 
organisations are likely to challenge some long-established customs and norms of 
the NHS (such as equity of access). This potential re-centralisation would mirror the 
experience of other semi-autonomous agencies (such as Non-Departmental Public 
Bodies and `quangos’) where the boundary between politically-defined strategy and 
operational management has, notwithstanding regulatory regimes, become ever 
more blurred (Pollitt and Talbot, 2003). Finally, the proposed NHS Constitution 
(contained in the 2009 Health Bill) may formalise a centralised definition of 
entitlements to NHS services. This may centralise the control over what can 
delivered locally and implies that targets are re-branded as entitlements.  
 
The motivation of managers and clinicians in these autonomous organisations are 
shaped not only by national policy but also by the local context (including legacy 
effects and reputation within the LHE, inter alia). For example, the possibility that 
FT managers would wish to take over a `failing’ Trust (as in the 2009 case of the 
Bedfordshire and Luton Mental Health and Social Care Partnership Trust) may be 
over-optimistic. Mannion et al (2007) found little appetite for this opportunity 
among managers. Hence, their willingness to exercise autonomy may be a more 
significant explanatory factor than their technical ability to do so (Exworthy et al, 
2008). Though FT status is increasingly the norm in England, policy will need to 
address their attitudes and perceptions of autonomy if it is to be exercised in the 
way that the DH intends. 
 
Two further aspects are worth considering here. First, autonomy remains focused on 
the organisation (cf. LHE). The shift towards integrated care, for example, will 
increasingly challenge the tension between collaboration (relying on trust and 
goodwill) and competition (relying on autonomous agencies). These tensions will be 
played out most acutely in LHEs, with some areas becoming highly contentious. 
Complex, open LHEs may find this especially problematic (table 6.1). Autonomous 
organisations embody the policy focus on localisation which, in the current policy 
climate, suggests further devolution to PCTs (and emphasis on innovation), locally-
determined targets and a reduced role for SHAs. As PCTs devolve decision-making 
further to PBC and FTs become the norm, the PCT can take on some of the former 
SHA roles (such as performance management) 
 
Second, the growing emphasis on personalisation (and the even more recent 
developments on `entitlements’ to public services) underlines the shift of 
decentralisation beyond the organisation to the individual. Whether such 
personalised services can be maintained in an era of fiscal constraint remains to be 
seen but, together with Patient Choice and market stimulation, personalisation 
might put further strain on public services. Such policies rely on an element of spare 
capacity such that (autonomous) organisations can respond and attract more 
patients. Organisational slack is normally the first casualty of fiscal constraint, 
illustrated by recruitment freezes, high vacancy factors and reductions in training 
budgets.’ 
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6.2.2. Performance 
The performance culture in the NHS has become so pervasive that often its tenets 
are unquestioned. However, this study has sought to question the assumptions of 
(formal) performance metrics and to explore the informal aspects. There was clear 
and widespread use of informal performance notions which complement formal 
performance. Formal performance was seen as inadequate and/or unresponsive to 
manage performance across the LHE. New forms of formal performance (that move 
away from dysfunctional targets) will be required. The development of Patient 
Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) may be one such enhancement but its impact 
will inevitably be limited without informal performance measurement and 
management. Where formal performance is incomplete or inadequate, informal 
performance offered a complementary role. It, therefore, appears from this study as 
if NHS staff need to be more aware of the use and abuse of informal performance 
measurement, and how it can enhance their assessment and management 
functions.   
 
The interplay between formal and informal performance was found to be vital in 
both LHEs which involved, more or less, inter-dependent relationships. Such 
relationships were socially and institutionally embedded, meaning that relational 
aspects of commissioning (for example) may be as important as formal techniques. 
As yet, analysis of (formal and informal) performance across LHEs remains nascent. 
Harvey et al (2007) underline the need to move away from solely an organisational 
focus to one which recognises the inter-dependent relationships across LHEs: 
 
“An important question for them is whether the assessment of health care 
performance can be adequately undertaken solely with an organisational focus. 
Increasingly, patients will be cared for by competing ‘supply chains’ of providers, 
and it may be necessary for regulators to take a more ‘horizontal’ service view 
rather than a vertical institutional perspective in order to assess safety and 
quality” (p.21). 
 
Given the policy direction towards health system performance (DH, 2009), it is 
increasingly important to undertake analysis of formal and informal performance 
across LHEs. Performance is increasingly a shared concern and, in cases such as 
public health and waiting times, assigning responsibility across organisations has 
been challenging but constructive in fostering greater integration. Other 
performance measures do require inter-organisational collaboration either as a 
mandate (eg. joint targets and inspection across health and social services) or 
implicitly such as measuring PCTs on the performance of hospitals (A&E waiting 
time targets were constructed on this basis). Local performance frameworks that 
take account of local context and inter-organisational approaches to performance 
are, according to this study, worth further development. However, in doing so, 
questions are raised about giving autonomy to one organisation when others do not 
enjoy such freedom from the centre.  (`Freedom to’ may not always be apparent 
irrespective of whether autonomy is granted or not). As a result, sustaining 
autonomy over the long-term (as a stimulus to improved performance) and 
reconciling competing policies remain key issues for the DH to address in this 
regard.  There is a strong danger that centrally-determined standards and targets 
may ossify as an incentive and/or that the dysfunctional effects of targets remain 
potent barriers to local reform. This potential has been identified as the ‘dead hand’ 
of best practice (a situation which relates to coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983)).  
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 193  
 
Given the focus of this study – the intersection of vertical and horizontal dimensions 
- the performance of the LHE may be viewed as the result as a balance between 
`integration’ within the LHE and `domination’ by the centre. Integration would 
imply local, cooperative relationships whilst domination would imply little scope of 
local autonomy. Drawing on work of `cultures for performance’ by Mannion et al 
(2005), this balance can be portrayed as one of four potential `outcomes’: synergy, 
segregation, domination and breakdown (table 6.3.). According to this scenario, 
`breakdown’ in the LHE would occur when there is no integration between 
organisations within the LHE and the centre retains a dominant control. 
`Domination’ would occur when the centre allows little autonomy despite local 
integration within the LHE. `Segregation‘ would occur without integration in the LHE 
or domination by the centre. Such a situation would not necessarily imply local 
autonomy but rather a disjointed system that achieves the benefits of neither 
centralisation nor local collaboration. Finally, `synergy’ is seen as the result of 
integration within the LHE without the domination by the centre.  As this model is 
oriented around the LHE, it is weighted against the notion that strong central 
involvement in the LHE is a positive attribute.  
 
Table 6.3. Performance outcomes for LHE (as the unit of analysis) 
Integration within the LHE? Integration versus domination 
Yes No 
No Synergy Segregation Domination by 
the centre? 
Yes Domination Breakdown 
Adapted from Mannion et al (2005) p.33 
 
This table has some heuristic value but also some practical value in the sense that it 
raises questions as to whether local organisations are sufficiently integrated to 
accommodate central policy reforms and whether those reforms have sufficient 
incentives to achieve their objectives. If not, the `unifying narrative’ of reforms may 
mean little locally.  There may be a synergistic effect between `domination’ and 
`integration’ since, as we found in this study, the vertical context shapes and is 
shaped by horizontal contingencies.  
 
6.2.3. LHE 
Although this study has examined the interpretation and application of the notion of 
the LHE, what is its value for policy and practice? Is it just a useful general 
descriptive term that is used imprecisely to describe various sets of relationships? Is 
there any value in trying to be more precise about the term? If the main use is 
descriptive, does a precise definition or contribution to policy matter? At one level, 
the answer is negative except that it is widely used at all levels of the NHS.  
 
There appears to be a strong assumption in policy and practice that the LHE is 
tangible, underpinned by shared conceptions. The emphasis on `economy’ suggests 
that inter-organisational relationships within the NHS are primarily economic. The 
focus is thus on a set of economic relationships – ties of finance, performance, 
contract etc. This study has sought to demonstrate that additional social, political 
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and clinical connections overlie economic relationships. All these tend to be highly 
localised within the LHEs. Organisational relationships thus denote the extent of 
inter-organisational dependency.  
 
So, is it possible to develop a definition of the LHE or is it merely a portmanteau 
concept to be used with various meanings by policy makers? The definitive use of 
LHE may remain elusive and be of little use in health policy analysis. However, by 
exploring the nature of the LHE, a number of key features emerge. This process 
might help to understand better the different types of LHEs and to determine the 
strength of horizontal ties (cf. vertical). The continua would apply within LHEs.   
Such a process might be aided by a typology of LHEs (table 6.4.).  
 
Table 6.4. Typology of LHEs  
Features Continuum 
LHE  Open – Closed 
Inter-organisational relationships Collaborative – Competitive 
Inter-organisational dependency High – Low 
System complexity High – Low 
Embeddedness (institutional and social) Strong – Weak 
Power (organisations within the LHE) Strong – Weak 
Autonomy (organisational) Larger – Small 
Spatiality (geographical coverage) Large – Small 
Performance – formal High – Poor 
Performance – informal Strong – Weak 
Trust High – Low 
 
 
Without doubt, the LHE is a (localised) system but it is also a number of interlocking 
systems, the boundaries of which are defined by how people define the purpose of 
the systems. The LHE may thus be defined in terms of different services. For 
example, the three tracers in this study (urgent care, care of the elderly and 
orthopaedics) would each have different LHEs. LHEs for these and others would 
overlap and may not necessarily be connected by any formal institutional structure 
but have meaning for individuals and inter-personal relationships.  One approach to 
examining the LHE may be through the lens of governance. Rather than examining 
formal structures, attention would focus on the rules, activities and structures that 
define its `boundaries.’ In this way, analysis could help explain how autonomy is 
exercised or restrained and how central control is brought to bear within LHEs.  
 
A final consideration in the implications of the analysis for policy and practice is the 
role of LHE leadership. We noted that rapid turnover of senior managers was 
detrimental to building a strong `informal performance’ across the LHEs. It 
appeared significant that only the FT chief executives in the two LHEs had not 
moved position in the three years of fieldwork. Whilst the leadership in Northern 
LHE was noted inside and outside the LHE, it appeared remarkably absent in the 
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Southern LHE. Such leadership relates clearly to both transactional and (perhaps 
more importantly here) transformational qualities of leadership (Denis et al, 2005; 
Newman, 2005).  
 
Leadership needs to be considered in terms of autonomy and performance. Local 
leaders’ willingness and ability to exercise autonomy will be crucial to the impact of 
health reforms. Local leaders should therefore be `empowered’ if reform objectives 
are to be realised (Newman, 2005). Also, it may be that senior leaders in the LHE 
value informal performance; if so, how do they nurture and sustain their networks 
of informal relations and how do leaders reconcile differences between formal and 
informal performance? Yet, moreover, LHE leadership will also be required to drive 
locally-inspired and owned change through contested processes of re-configuration. 
For PCT leaders, this might be increasingly problematic given the growing presence 
of FTs. 
 
There is a danger, however, that discussions about the role of leadership in the 
context of decentralisation become self-reinforcing. As Newman (2005) states, the 
discourses of leadership are often portrayed as a series of binary divisions such as 
failing/successful organisations, forces of conservatism/proactive leadership 
(p.720). Decentralisation too is often portrayed as only beneficial and the antithesis 
of the current (centralised) regime. Leadership can thus help to magnify the 
diversity that is enabled by decentralisation.  
 
 
6.2.4. Political directions in 2009 
Over the past decade, there has been a general rhetorical consensus that 
decentralisation is a positive direction and greater autonomy a positive attribute for 
the NHS.  Despite this, there have also been significant features of centralisation.  
As a general election looms before May 2010, it is timely to review the political and 
policy directions related to decentralisation. Retrospective and prospective analysis 
is therefore opportune. 
 
Rawnsley (2009) identified five “phases” of the Labour government’s public policy 
which has striking applicability to ebb and flow of decentralisation and centralisation 
in health policy. The fifth phase, he argues, began in June 2009 with the proposal of 
public service “entitlements.”  
 
 Phase 1 (1997-2000; Blair): the objective was “to drive public services through 
centrally imposed diktat” 
 Phase 2 (2001-2005; Blair): recognition of the limitations of the “dirigiste 
approach” 
 Phase 3 (2005-2007; Blair): approach which aimed to make reform “self-
fuelling” (or self-sustaining) 
 Phase 4 (2007-2009; Brown: reform process stalled though rhetoric of choice 
and competition remained 
 Phase 5 (June 2009-onwards; Brown):  revival of citizen-led reforms; Brown’s 
“new concept is to make a big shift away from the Whitehall command and 
control” and “there weren't really any meaningful penalties for those who didn't 
hit the targets. Their latest answer is to give `entitlements’ to parents, pupils, 
patients... The idea is that this creates pressure to perform from the bottom up 
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rather than vainly trying to drive everything from the top down.” (see also 
House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2008) 
 
It is far too early to tell whether Rawnsley’s fifth phase is indeed a “big shift” but 
this study provides the apparatus by which such claims could be assessed. At a 
superficial level, the focus on the individual is the extension of a recent trend. 
Whether this shift can be institutionalised and whether it applies across input, 
process and outcome decentralisation will denote the degree of this “big shift.” With 
Rawnsley’s assessment in mind, it is worth highlighting salient sections from recent 
statements relating to political parties’ views on decentralisation (table 6.5.).  
 
Each of the three main parties in England is emphasising decentralisation and 
autonomy. A particular accent is placed in institutionalising autonomy in the form of 
entitlements (Labour) or a statutory framework (Conservative). This accords with 
the previously identified version of (process) decentralisation to the individual. As 
the Liberal Democrats suggest, there may be greater scope for considering the 
possibility of institutionalising democratic accountability, an issue also raised by Ben 
Bradshaw (former health minister) who claimed that: 
 
“PCTs that increasingly will be responsible for spending vast sums of money 
and commissioning services don't have any direct democratic accountability” 
(quote in Health Service Journal, 13 September 2007. 
http://www.hsj.co.uk/news/bradshaw.html). 
 
Accountability might take the form of petitions, directly elected boards, elected 
board members, wider application of FT-style governance arrangements. However, 
some may be wary of further re-organisations and others might suspect that these 
moves would only further marketisation in the NHS. Still further, others will be 
reminded of the public opposition to `re-configure’ services in Kidderminster (which 
led to the election of an independent MP in 2001) and Sussex (where plans were 
“suspended” in 2008; http://www.hsj.co.uk/west-sussex-puts-hospital-plan-on-ice-
after-backlash/1894010.article).  
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Table 6.5. Political indications of future health policy relating to 
decentralisation 
Political 
party 
Policy statements (2009) 
Existing targets would either be converted into minimum standards 
for services or “removed”, he [Burnham] said. “We have got to 
make sure that minimum standards are fairer and more focused on 
local context than the targets that preceded them.” He gave the 
example of the MRSA target, saying it was important that 
standards were high, but a national target was “no comfort” to 
patients in areas where their local hospital was not up to standard. 
(Evans, R. `Andy Burnham promises to overhaul NHS targets’ HSJ, 
11 June 2009 http://www.hsj.co.uk/news/policy/andy-burnham-
promises-to-overhaul-nhs-targets/5002708.article) 
Labour 
“We are committed to an enabling government that, wherever 
possible, wants national targets turned into individual entitlements 
in service delivery” (Foreword by Gordon Brown in HM Government, 
2009, p.8) 
In November 2007 we published our draft NHS Autonomy and 
Accountability Bill, which outlined a strong statutory framework to 
set the NHS free from constant political meddling. (Conservative 
Party (2008) Renewal: plan for a new NHS. p.16) 
“The government must… allow more decentralised, open systems 
where people and professionals, not politicians, take the lead on 
how our public services are run.” (ditto, p.20) 
Conservative 
“Mr Lansley also criticised the “command and control” structure 
that he said had led to leadership becoming confused with control. 
More power needed to rest with patients, he said, which would be 
helped by expanding practice based commissioning. (Santry, C. 
`Tories will increase NHS budget’  Andrew Lansley says.’ 
http://www.hsj.co.uk/news/finance/tories-will-increase-nhs-
budget-andrew-lansley-says/5002659.article 10 June 2009) 
Liberal 
Democrats 
Health spokesman Norman Lamb has called for further devolution 
and local accountability in the NHS. Speaking at the NHS 
Confederation conference today, Mr Lamb said: “There needs to be 
a fundamental change from the situation at the moment where the 
only person accountable is the secretary of state to a situation 
where there is local democratic accountability for the 
commissioners. (West, D. (2009) `Devolve NHS power, urges 
Norman Lamb.’ HSJ, 11 June 2009 
http://www.hsj.co.uk/news/policy/devolve-nhs-power-urges-
norman-lamb/5002720.article). 
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6.3. Further research 
 
Whilst three years of research has answered many questions, new and outstanding 
questions remain to be addressed. Indeed, one could argue that the institutional 
frameworks within which the research design was constructed, have altered so 
markedly, that the research may have little relevance. Whilst this may be so up to a 
point, the conceptual models provide an enduring framework within which on-going 
policy and structural modifications can be accommodated. This is a value of long-
term funding that research can (hopefully) move beyond the purely descriptive, 
evaluative approaches to offer some deeper, more meaningful interpretations of 
long-term trends and on-going developments. Such an approach ensures that 
programme theories are necessarily grounded in robust empirical findings. The 
recommendations for future research (6.3.2., 6.3.3. and 6.3.4.) are not placed in 
priority order as the topics they cover are sufficiently distinct as to be considered in 
their own right and/or in conjunction with findings from other studies. 
 
6.3.1. The conduct of research in the current NHS 
Future research needs to pay more attention to the context in which it is conducted. 
There are many concerns that the feasibility of conducting organisationally-based 
research has rarely been more difficult than now. This difficulty might stem from 
three sources. 
 
First, procedures for ethical approval and research governance are out of proportion 
to the risk of the research. Like many other studies funded by NCC-SDO, this 
project only involved managers and clinicians in interviews about organisational 
change, strategy and implementation.  
 
Second, whilst this study was bound to involve many organisations in two LHEs, 
access has proved more problematic than anticipated. Several organisations initially 
refused to participate.  This was despite assurances that participation would: 
 Comprise minimal active involvement (involving 6-10 one hour interviews), 
 Foster accountability (as it was funded by the NHS) 
 Provide lessons and good practice across the NHS, and  
 Be relevant (to current policy and organisational concerns).  
The reasons for such initial refusal relates to the third point: re-configuration. Many 
who declined cited poor timing due to re-configuration (especially in 2006/07). This 
reason was perplexing since the study sought to examine how LHEs navigated 
through re-configurations.  
 
The (ir)-relevance of research has often been cited and indeed the potential futility 
of research in an ever-changing organisational/policy environment is still present. 
Research often reports its findings after the `problem’ has apparently been solved 
and the topic becomes less relevant. Alternatively, research is used symbolically in 
decision-making, to justify a decision `already’ made. These dangers remain. This 
study encouraged a dialogue with participants and feedback results to various policy 
and academic audiences.  
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These concerns point towards the need for a new `contract’ between research 
communities and policy and practice.  Both parties have a role to play and so need 
to be aware of their responsibilities towards producing the evidence with the 
support of practitioners (on the one hand) and acting upon findings which are 
disseminated in a timely and appropriate manner (on the other).   
 
6.3.2. Autonomy: further research  
 
 Intra-organisational autonomy:  
1. Do autonomous organisations (such as FTs) delegate responsibility within 
their organisations to middle managers and clinicians?  
o 4.1.2. sub-section “Relationships as enhancing room for manoeuvre” 
2. How do middle managers and clinicians deal with their new ability and what 
is their willingness to do so?  
o 4.1.2. sub-section “Relationships as enhancing room for manoeuvre” 
3. Are there differences in the nature of autonomy between `freedom from’ and 
`freedom to’?  
o 4.1.1. sub-section on `freedom from’ and `freedom to’ 
4. How far does organisational autonomy limit the incentives for local 
collaboration? 
o 4.1.2. sub-section `Horizontal factors: how autonomy is shaped by 
the LHE’ 
 
 Ability and willingness to exercise autonomy:  
5. How does local autonomy vary between different types of LHE?  
o 4.1.2. sub-section `Horizontal factors: how autonomy is shaped by 
the LHE’ 
6. How does local autonomy vary in response to evolving national policy 
imperatives? 
o 4.1.2. sub-section `Vertical factors: how autonomy is shaped by 
national policy mechanisms 
7. What are the attitudes and perceptions of managers and clinicians who 
`enjoy’ autonomy, those who aspire it / are about to receive it, and those 
unlikely to get it (due to poor organisational performance)? 
o 4.1. Autonomy 
 
 New frontiers of autonomy:  
8. How do organisational actors respond to incentives which allow the franchise 
of poorly performing organisations? 
o 2.2.2. (iv) Accountability 
o 4.1.1. View on autonomy 
9. How do private sector providers view autonomy? 
o 4.1.2. Sub-section ``Horizontal factors: how autonomy is shaped by 
the LHE’ (including `Persistence of social relationships’) 
10. What lessons can be learned from other health systems in the UK and 
elsewhere about the use of autonomy to improve organisational and system 
performance? 
 
 Leadership and autonomy:  
11. What role do senior leaders play in organisational change?  
o 4.1.2. Sub-section ``Horizontal factors: how autonomy is shaped by 
the LHE’ (including `Leadership and competence’) 
o 4.2.5. Informal performance (`as complement’ and `as substitute’) 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 200  
12. How do senior leaders `adapt’ national policy to meet local exigencies? 
o 4.1.2. Sub-section ``Horizontal factors: how autonomy is shaped by 
the LHE’ (including `Relational dynamics’) 
 
6.3.3. Performance: further research  
 
 Formal performance: 
1. What are the unintended consequences for autonomy of the emphasis on 
formal performance? 
o 4.1. Autonomy 
o 4.2.4. Formal performance 
2. How can formal performance provide a sufficient incentive for high 
performing organisations to continue to improve? 
o 4.2.4. Formal performance 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance (sub-sections 
`inter-twined’ and `mismatch’) 
 
 Informal performance: 
3. What measures or markers of informal performance are most relevant to 
managing the LHE? 
o 4.2.5. Informal performance 
4. What factors affect the ways in which informal performance evolves over 
time? 
o 4.2.5. Informal performance 
5. How strong is informal performance across different managerial and clinical 
grades and how could it be `measured’? 
o 4.1.2. Sub-section ``Horizontal factors: how autonomy is shaped by the 
LHE’ (including `Leadership and competence’) 
o 4.2.5. Informal performance 
 
 Interplay between formal and informal performance:  
6. What are the effects of dissonance between formal and informal 
performance? (That is, how do local actors reconcile good formal performance 
with poor informal performance, and vice versa?). 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance (especially 
sub-section `mismatch’) 
7. How resistant is informal performance over time? (That is, in the face of 
contrary evidence, how strong is informal performance?) 
o 4.2.5. Informal performance 
8. In what ways do the public and patients reconcile formal and informal 
performance in making decisions about health-care? 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance (especially 
sub-sections `defining the LHE’ and `mismatch’) 
9. How can formal performance (via remote monitoring by DH, SHA) incorporate 
informal performance? 
o 4.2.5. Informal performance (especially sub-section `complement’) 
 
 Performativity and dramaturgy:  
10. What forms of performativity are evident in different settings (board 
meetings, public meetings, private meetings, interviews)? How are they 
constructed and displayed? 
o 2.3.6. Formal and informal performance explained (sub-section 
`Informal performance’) 
o 5.4.2. Formal and informal performance 
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11. How does the `ritualistic’ collection of performance data for the purposes of 
the centre affect local managers? 
o 2.3.6. Formal and informal performance explained (sub-section 
`Informal performance’) 
o 4.1.2. How autonomy is shaped (sub-section `Vertical factors: how 
autonomy is shaped by national policy mechanisms’) 
 
6.3.4. Systems, integration and collaboration: further research 
 
 System integration:  
1. What factors are most effective in managing different types of nested health 
systems? What is the respective role of infrastructure, institutions, inter-
personal relationships and individuals?  
o 1.4. Local health economy 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance (sub-
section `defining the LHE’) 
2. How do PCTs manage across an increasingly diverse range of local 
organisations? 
o 4.1.2. How autonomy is shaped (sub-section `Horizontal factors: how 
autonomy is shaped by the LHE’) 
 
 Collaboration: 
3. Under what conditions is collaboration a strategy that promotes autonomy 
and performance? 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance 
4. Are there aspects of health systems (eg. structures or processes) where 
collaboration is vital and aspects where it is not? 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance 
5. Can high performing, autonomous organisations ignore collaboration with 
other agencies? What effects does this have upon the system? 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance 
 
 System performance: 
6. In what ways does LHE performance differ from the sum of individual 
organisational performance? 
o 1.4. Local health economy 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance (sub-
section `defining the LHE’) 
7. How do regulators and performance managers (Monitor, SHAs, DH and CQC) 
facilitate improved performance and secure compliance? 
o 4.2.1. Significant of `performance in LHEs 
o 4.2.2. Causes and pathways to performance 
o 4.2.3. Performance management 
8. How can the regulatory regime foster improved performance?  
o 4.2.2. Causes and pathways to performance 
o 4.2.3. Performance management 
9. How do local performance managers (PCTs, SHA) manage system 
fragmentation? 
o 4.2.3. Performance management 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance (sub-
section `defining the LHE’) 
 
 LHE:  
10. How is the LHE defined and operationalised in policy and practice? 
o 1.4. Local health economy 
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o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance (sub-
section `defining the LHE’) 
11. Is there an optimal size and structure to LHEs (for the purposes of system 
management, among others)? 
o 1.4. Local health economy 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance (sub-
section `defining the LHE’) 
12. How is a new language and practice of health systems (involving 
organisational learning, knowledge sharing and long-term commitment) 
incorporated into a competitive environment of semi-autonomous 
organisations? 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance 
13. What role does leadership play in LHE / system integration? 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance 
14. How do PCTs legitimate themselves as leaders of the LHE in the facing of FT 
membership? Does place affiliation counteract membership of FTs? 
o 1.4. Local health economy 
o 4.1.2. Sub-section ``Horizontal factors: how autonomy is shaped by 
the LHE’ (including `Leadership and competence’) 
o 4.2.6. Interplay between formal and informal performance (sub-
section `defining the LHE’) 
 
 Legacy effect on health systems:  
15. How do LHEs / local health systems deal with different legacy effects (such as 
“years of heavy command, control and performance management from the 
centre.” (King’s Fund, 2008, p.3)? 
o 4.1.2. How autonomy is shaped (sub-section `Vertical factors – how 
autonomy is shaped by national policy mechanisms’) 
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Appendix 1. Hypothetical case-study 
 
To inform the selection of case-study LHEs and to draw on contemporary debates in 
health policy and practices, extracts from commentaries and articles in practitioner / 
trade journals (such as the Health Service Journal and British Medical Journal) and 
newspapers (such as the Guardian) were collated between April and June 2006. The 
extracts were grouped into the primary themes of the study. The questions and 
issues which were of relevance to the study are included (in italics) after some of 
the extracts. The hypothetical case-study was useful in anticipating the type of data 
that would be gleaned from fieldwork, anticipating the type of analysis that might 
be possible.  The extracts have been anonymised because some of them referred to 
case-studies that ere eventually chosen for further inquiry as part of the fieldwork 
 
 
a.Vertical autonomy: 
 “The government has put too many changes in place at the same time without 
considering the impact on services. Targets are set nationally, locally we try and 
meet these and then get the blame when the targets and funding don’t balance” 
(Chief Executive) 
How does the locality try to meet the targets? What is the impact on services? 
Why do targets and funding not balance? What are the conditions for balancing? 
 
 “There are certainly some trusts where the finances have been mismanaged but 
there are a significant number where the situation has been caused by structural 
changes” (Chief Executive) 
How are finances being mismanaged? What are the factors that generate 
mismanagement? How do structural changes affect Trusts that would otherwise 
be well managed? Why do some trusts thrive while others do not? 
 
 “An utter disgrace. Taking my own trust as a barometer, our financial difficulties 
are almost exclusively a function of things imposed upon us. We would not be in 
this position but for centrally-driven initiatives. (Chief Executive) 
What is it about centrally driven initiatives that cause problems? How would 
things be done differently? What factors other than central initiatives are 
responsible for the situation? 
 
 “The government has failed to examine their own part in the problem. We have 
undoubtedly been given a huge increase in revenue, but it has been more than 
swallowed up by too many ill though-out targets and changes” (CE) 
Why are targets ill thought out? Would better targets make a difference? 
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 “Sending in turnaround teams will not resolve the problem. If there is a hint that 
an external body is taking the lead, then it is less clear where accountability lies. 
There is a risk that over-reliance on external intervention dilutes board 
responsibility” (NHS finance director). 
 
 “Local managers need to have choice over what they can do” 
 
 “[XYZ] Hospital Trust had already asked for independent help and its finance 
director is not too proud to take advice along the way.” (Financial director) 
 
 “ We do not need turnaround teams. What we need is support for implementing 
the unpalatable” (CE) 
Why are turnaround teams not effective? What would be a valuable support?  
 
 
b. Capacity and skills 
 “The DoH underestimated the fact that a change in culture and behaviour takes a 
long time  in some organizations and the senior leadership is not sufficiently 
skilled. Some providers are slow to accept financial realities and most 
commissioners lack the capacity and skills to effectively manage demands” 
(Chief Executive) 
 
 
c.Horizontal autonomy and dependency 
 “A top performing Trust in [...], which has been balancing its books for years  is 
having to make savings to help out its neighbouring NHS services. The cuts will 
harm patient care at a time where services need more investment not less.” 
How can an organization balance its books and maintain the balance over time? 
What are the conditions for this? Who decides that the “sacrifice” has to be 
done? Does the type of organization influence the extent of sacrifice? 
 
 
d. Priority policy areas 
 “The economy has continued to struggle to meet and sustain delivery of 
emergency access targets (County, LDP) 
 
 “The narrow range covered by the targets within the proforma does not reflect 
the needs of children and priority service areas, particularly with the forthcoming 
NSF. There is a danger that the whole service area will be neglected as it is not 
high profile within the national targets. We will be re-focusing on the provision 
of community-based services to enable children with more complex needs to be 
supported at home.” (County, LDP) 
 
 “[ABC and DEF] PCTs  have yet to meet the two month GP urgent referral target 
for cancer care.” 
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e. Relationships between  PCT and NHS providers 
 “The role of the new PCT will be to become a commissioning organisation with 
the scale and greater capability to commission services that are affordable from 
the major providing organisations, in particular the [...] NHS Trust.”  
How will affordability will be achieved? Which are the major providing 
organizations? How can greater capability be reached? 
 
 
f. Relationships between PCT and private providers 
 “The policy that has introduced the private sector has destabilized the NHS” 
How has the private sector destabilised the NHS? 
 
 
g. Collaboration and partnership 
 “Hospitals will have to collaborate to ensure some services are provided in a 
locality. We need to combine the benefits of contestability with the need for 
integration in certain services” (Chief Executive, NHSTrust) 
How is partnership going to be created and managed? How will the independent 
sector be involved? How are trust and confidence created? Are there differences 
based on the constituent parts of the survey? 
 
 
h. Reconfiguration 
 “Many of the issues like clinical engagement, public involvement, health 
inequalities and partnership, all fit much better with smaller PCTs who are 
accountable to their communities” (Chair, PCT) 
 
 “Obviously if you’ve got fewer organisations you may be able to save money at 
PCT level, but then you’re devolving a lot of the activities and you’ve got to fund 
that. So whether overall you’re going to save money is at best questionable.”  
 
 In the [city] area, the local strategy devised by the PCTs together with the SHA 
had delivered service improvements. This strategy included merging the existing 
PCTs into three. However, the DoH’s requirement of creating a single [city-wide] 
PCT, against the wishes and strategy of the local health community, generates 
the risk of stopping the reform and shunt the road. 
 
 There are currently five PCTs in [county] with five Boards and Chairs. 
There is a shared management structure for two PCTs in the South and the 
North, resulting in three Chief Executives and management teams covering 
the five PCTs.  These 5 PCTs will be streamlined into 1 PCT from October 2006. 
 
 The [county] PCTs’ approach is to grow a new streamlined organisation 
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out of the current five PCTs . A single management team has already been set 
up in anticipation of one PCT for [county] which will ensure that services to 
patients are not disrupted during the transition period and that we lay the best 
foundations for a successful single PCT. The role of the new [county] PCT will be 
to support GPs as budgets are devolved to primary care practitioners and to 
become a commissioning organisation with the scale and greater capability to 
commission services that are affordable from the major providing organisations” 
How is capacity to manage the change created? How is scale going to make 
things better? How is the commissioning function going to be carried out? 
 
 
i.Financial balance 
 “We recognize that the financial position differs for individual NHS bodies, with 
some managing their finances well. We need to focus on what the good trusts 
are getting right, so that we can spread good practice across the whole area” 
(Chief Executive, SHA). 
 “Services have been the victim of weaknesses in financial management.” 
 
What are the elements of good management? What are the conditions for good 
management (why are some trusts able to be in balance while others are not?). 
How does this disparity affect the economy? (This is linked to the horizontal 
dimension of autonomy; from this excerpt emerges an attitude where disparity 
is good for learning; while, from the other cases, it seems to emerge that 
disparity is detrimental for the successful cases). How can good practice be 
spread? How can learning for organizational change be nurtured and fostered?  
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Appendix 2. Case-study profiles 
 
 
Given the guarantees of anonymity that the research team gave to the participants 
in both LHE case-studies, it is somewhat problematic to provide a profile of these 
case-studies in sufficient depth to enable an informed assessment. However, it is 
important to provide a degree of contextual information relating to the nature of 
each LHE so as to triangulate empirical data which is described elsewhere in the 
report. These profiles thus offer an abbreviated version which presents the key 
information.  
 
A similar pattern of description is presented in each case-study but differences are 
apparent in terms of the degree to which the data might reveal the identity and 
location of the LHE and its constituent organisations. The methodological 
justification for the inclusion of these case-study profiles is not to imply that they 
are generalisable or representative of other or any LHEs; rather, the conceptual and 
empirical themes (which are outlined in chapter 2 and form the basis of the case-
study profiles) are designed to be illustrative and heuristic. 
 
These themes include: 
1. Organisational configuration of the LHE 
2. Financial position and performance 
3. Organisational performance  
4. Organisational inter-dependence (based on financial flows between PCTs and 
principal providers) 
5. Organisational issues which were contemporary (during the fieldwork) and 
oriented around: 
6. Clinical tracers of urgent care, orthopaedics and care of the elderly, in order to 
illustrate: 
a. Service re-design  
b. Integration and collaboration 
c. Access to care 
 
 
Before details of the two case-studies are examined, it is worth setting them in a 
national context. Information from the Healthcare Commission achieves this (see 
figures 1 and 2). The case-studies comprise organisations which represent the 
range of performance evident across all PCTs; the case-studies comprised among 
the best and worst performing Trusts in England.  
 
Fig. 1.  Healthcare Commission (2008) Overall performance of primary care trusts 
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Fig. 2.  Healthcare Commission (2008) Overall performance of acute and specialist 
trusts 
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Case-study: Northern LHE 
 
●Organisational configuration 
The Northern LHE comprises three NHS provider-based organisations which are 
Foundation Trusts and one PCT (which was formed from the merger of four former 
PCTs in 2006). .  
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Table 1. NHS organisations in Northern LHE 
SHA 
 Formed July 2006 from the merger of 3 former SHAs 
Northern PCT 
 Formed in October 2006 from the merger of 4 PCTs 
 Catchment population >500,000 
 Coterminous with City Council 
Northern Hospital 1 
 Formed in April 2001 from the merger of 2 former Trusts 
 FT since 1 April 2004 
 Primary site with >1000 beds plus 4 other sites  
 12,000 staff 
 Annual turnover (2007/08) £ 673 million 
Northern Hospital 2 
 FT since 1 August 2006 
 Annual turnover (2007/08) £87 million 
 >150 beds 
 >1,500 staff 
Northern Trust 3 
 FT since 1 July 2008 
 570 beds 
 2,300 staff 
 Annual turnover (2007/08) £99 million 
 
 
● Financial position and performance 
The Northern LHE presents a positive trend in terms of financial position of its 
constituent NHS organisations. In both 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 each NHS 
organization in the Northern HE (pre-merger PCTs and NHS Trusts) ended the fiscal 
year with a surplus, although this represented a small percentage of overall 
organizational turnover across the LHE.  In 2005-2006, “Northern Hospital 1” had 
achieved financial balance for the fifth year in a row.  
 
Despite these successes financial pressures within the LHE have been increasing 
and in February 2006 the pre-merger PCTs appointed a turnaround team. The 
financial position of the new PCT in 2006/2007 highlighted some issues, although by 
December 2006 the forecast year end over spend had improved.  Commissioning 
expenditures had been an area of concern, due to an increase in activities at the 
“Northern Hospital 1” over the budget level. However, “the PCT remains in 
negotiation with [the Trust] with the objective of returning expenditure as close to 
plan as possible” (Finance Director’s Report, February 2007). A second reason for 
the forecast is a lower than planned income, which savings from the PCT turnaround 
plan should help to offset.   
 
A turnaround plan has been agreed with the SHA and the Department of Health with 
the aim to return the PCT to financial balance. Although to date there have been 
some progresses, “the PCT continues to face a significant challenge to deliver 
financial balance in 2006-2007”  (Finance Director’s Report, February 2007). 
 
According to the Audit Commission’s (2008) analysis, the Northern PCT’s total 
spending per head (unified, weighted; £ 2006/07) was marginally above the 
national average (median) of £1,336. However, its reference cost index 2006/07 
(inc MFF) was 86.9, significantly below the average (median) of 101.5. 
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One of the FTs in the Northern case-study recorded  an Income and Expenditure 
Account surplus for 2007/08 of £6.9million but its annual report (2007-2008) noted 
that this represented “just less than 1 per cent of turnover for the year, and 
equivalent to just 3.7 days’ worth of expenditure, the surplus can be reasonably 
described as modest and beneficial” (p.39).  
 
 
● Financial flows 
Table 2 and table 3 report on the relationships between the pre-merger PCTs and 
Acute Trusts based on financial flows in the Northern LHE. They also include NHS 
organizations outside the immediate boundaries of the LHE with which Northern 
NHS organizations have financial relationships. Table 2 shows that all NHS Trusts 
draw most of their activity from the LHE, especially Northern Hospital 1 and 
Northern Care Trust. Table 3 shows that most of the resources from pre-merger 
PCTs stayed within the LHE. The Northern LHE appears therefore as a `closed’ LHE. 
In addition, before PCT reconfiguration there was quite an asymmetry in terms of 
financial flows between each pre-merger PCT and local NHS providers, with the 
latter presenting a diversified portfolio of commissioners while the former almost 
exclusively depending on `Northern Hospital 1’ as single adult care provider.  
However reconfiguration is at least in terms of financial flows going to rebalance this 
dependency situation. 
 
Table 2. Northern LHE: Proportion of the (former) PCT contract expenditure to the 
Acute Trust  
 
Acute 
Trusts 
↓ 
PCT 
→ 
Ex-PCT 1  Ex-PCT 2  Ex-PCT 3  Ex=PCT 4  
“Northern” 
Hospital 1  
8.2% 7.1% 7.5% 8.0% 
“Northern” 
Hospital 2 
88.1% 86.9% 88.7% 86.8% 
“Northern” 
Trust 3 
1.1% 1.1% 0.8% 0.6% 
Total 97.4% 95.1% 97% 95.4% 
Note: PCT expenditure is disbursed to other providers 
In other words, each of the former PCTs in the LHE spent the vast majority (over 
95%) of their expenditure of hospital and community health services budget with 
thee providers within the Northern LHE 
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Table 3. Northern LHE: Proportion of the local NHS Trusts budget received from the 
former Northern LHE PCTs 
 
Acute 
Trusts 
↓ 
PCT 
→ 
Ex-PCT 1  Ex-PCT 2  Ex-PCT 3  Ex=PCT 4  Total 
“Northern” 
Hospital 1  
15.3% 11.3% 11.2% 19.7% 57.5% 
“Northern” 
Hospital 2 
18.1% 15.2% 14.5% 23.3% 71.1% 
“Northern” 
Trust 3 
30.6% 26.7% 17.9% 21.2% 96.4% 
 
In other words, the three providers within the LHE were differentially dependent 
upon the (former) PCTs of the Northern LHE for funding. Yet, for even `Northern 
Hospital 1’, it received over half its funding from the local PCTs. By contrast, 
`Northern Trust 3’ was almost totally reliant on these local PCTs.  
 
 
Table 4. Northern LHE Proportion of the NHS Trusts budget received from non-local 
PCTs 
 
Acute 
Trusts 
↓ 
PCT 
→ 
PCT [i]  PCT [ii]  PCT [iii]  PCT [iv] Total 
“Northern” 
Hospital 1  
7.0% 7.3% 3.4% - 17.7% 
“Northern” 
Hospital 2 
5.9% 5.6% 3.0% - 14.6% 
“Northern” 
Trust 3 
- - - 2.4% 0% 
Source for all three figures: DH Purchaser-provider matrix 
In other words, the local providers also received expenditure from non-local PCTs 
Apart from PCT [iv], these were neighbouring PCTs. For Northern Hospital 1 and 2, 
the expenditure amounted to around one sixth of their total budget. 
 
In summary, therefore, the observation that Northern LHE was a closed economy is 
validated by these figures on financial flows between the PCT(s) and local providers. 
This has implications for the ways in which inter-organisational relationships were 
conducted and, it is hypothesised, for the room for manoeuvre available to all 
organisations.  
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● Organisational performance 
In February 2006, at the outset of the project, the Northern PCT assessed the 
position of the LHE in terms of performance targets as follows: 
 
Table 5: Northern PCT self-assessment 
Areas on target to be 
achieved 
 
 Key waiting time targets 
 Health inequalities: cancer, heart disease, 
stroke 
 Older people’s mental health 
 Delayed transfers of care 
 Reducing emergency bed days 
 
Areas requiring support 
 Cancer waiting times 
 Infant mortality 
 A&E waiting times: “[Northern Hospital 1] 
performance has been fluctuating to below the 
target 98%” (Performance Report, 6 February 
2007) 
 
Areas not expected to 
achieve 
 
 Patient choice 
 Community equipment for long-term 
conditions (older people) 
 Community matrons 
 Financial balance) 
 
 
Subsequently, two sets of performance assessment have been made – World Class 
Commissioning applicable to the PCT and the Healthcare Commission annual health 
check (applicable to the PCT and NHS Trusts). The performance measured in these 
assessments are summarised below.  
 
 
● World Class Commissioning assessment: 
The WCC Panel (2008) declared that the Northern PCT was “an ambitious 
organisation with big plans” and concluded that  
 “The panel believes the scale of  risk and provider management that the PCT 
faces to deliver its strategy is significant” 
 “The panel recommend that the PCT give thought to: (a) how they work with 
their main providers to manage this transition” 
 “The PCT has a long history of joint needs assessment” 
 “The panel recognises the work to be done on building the PCT’s capabilities in 
order to execute its vision” 
 “The panel observed strong aligned leadership at the top” of the PCT 
 
In terms of the 10 WCC competencies in the PCT self-assessment and panel 
assessment, the PCT rated themselves at level 3 (out of 4, with 4 being the `best’) 
on 2 measures (“locally lead the NHS” and “work with community partners”), only 
one of which was confirmed by the WCC panel (the latter). All the other measures 
were rated level 2 except “stimulate market” which was rated by both at level 1.  
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However, the PCT did under-perform in terms of Patient Choice: 
“The PCT performs below national and SHA averages for offering and providing 
choice to patients (Patient Choice Survey). The strategic plan does not fully set 
out how the market can be developed to extend patient choice 
 
● Audit Commission (2008) 
In November 2008, the Audit Commission conducted an audit of the PCT’s “use of 
resources.” As part of this assessment, it reported on the 2007 survey of patient 
perceptions (p.11). It also reported that the PCT’s reference costs were 86.9 
compared to an average of 101.5 (median)(index 2006-2007 including MFF). 
 
Table 6: Northern PCT - selected performance 
 Northern PCT Average (median) 
Offered choice of provider 95.0% 93.4% 
Phone access 81.0% 84.5% 
Able to get appointment 
within 48 hours 
81.0% 84.3% 
Opening hours 83.6% 84.6% 
 
Whilst choice of provider is above the average, the other 3 measures (cited here) 
were below average. 
 
The findings from the Healthcare Commission’s Annual health check are reported in 
2.3.6. (see also 3.2.4. and 3.3.1). However, it is worth noting that the Healthcare 
Commission provides a more detailed analysis of each organisation’s performance 
according to the national performance targets. This offers a more detailed 
assessment of performance compared to the `headlines’ in the table above. 
 
Northern PCT: 
In the Healthcare Commission’s annual health check (2006/07), a total of 32 
indicators were used to measure performance of the organisation against the (new 
and existing) national targets. In 2006/2007, the Northern PCT “failed” on 8 
indicators: 
1. Commissioning of crisis resolution services 
2. PCT facilities in place to support choice 
3. PCT booking 
4. Teenage conception rates 
5. Community matrons and additional case managers 
6. Practice-based registers 
7. Community equipment delivery 
8. Four week smoking quitters  
 
By 2007/2008, the PCT “failed” on 7 indicators  
1. Access to a GP 
2. Commissioning of crisis resolution services 
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3. PCT facilities in place to support choice 
4. PCT booking 
5. Teenage conception rates 
6. Community matrons and additional case managers 
7. Four week smoking quitters 
Whilst the PCT was compliant in all but 5 of its core performance standards (and a 
further 4 has “insufficient assurance”) in 2006/2007, it was fully compliant in 
2007/2008. 
 
Northern Hospital 1: 
In 2006/2007, the Trust achieved all of its 24 (new and existing) performance 
targets though 3 of which were “not applicable” and they achieved 1 score as 
“satisfactory” and 1 “under-achieved” in that year. The following year (2007/2008), 
three targets were “under-achieved” (though they had been the previous year).  
One target was deemed “satisfactory” (the same score as the previous year). No 
target was deemed “not applicable” in 2007/2008. The Trust was compliant in all its 
core performance standards in 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 
 
Northern Hospital 2: 
In 2006/2007 and  2007/2008, the Trust achieved all (new and existing) national 
performance targets although 8 (of the 24) were applicable in neither year.  
 
Northern Care Trust: 
As of spring 2009, there are no `formal interventions’ in this Trust, according to 
Monitor. Its risk rating is level 3 which indicates “regulatory concerns in one or more 
components” but that a “serious breach is unlikely.” 
 
 
● Stated policy goals and approaches to key research themes (including tracer 
conditions  
 
Research themes 
This section cites extracts from local documentation in the Northern LHE which 
address initiatives that are related to the core themes of the study: central-local 
relationships, national policies and local relationships in general. They are cited here 
to illustrate the broader themes which are explored in further detail in the empirical 
fieldwork (see chapter 4) 
 
 a) Central-Local Relationships 
 
Quotes/Actions Organisation Source 
“we will focus on specific targets for reducing 
health inequalities which take account of 
national priorities and local needs” 
Ex-PCT 1 Delivery Plan 
2003-2006, p.9 
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b) National Policies 
 
Quotes/Actions Organisation Source 
“we aim to meet and exceed the 
standards of the NSFs and will 
implement NICE guidelines” 
Ex-PCT 1 Delivery Plan 2003-
2006: 9 
“Work is ongoing to reconcile and 
merge the different management 
systems that were in place in the 4 
former PCTs” 
Northern PCT 
(post-2006) 
Performance Report 
February 2007, p.3 
“PBC has given us an opportunity to 
work with our GPs and other NHS staff 
and give them greater say in how 
services can be delivered around the 
needs of the patients” 
“Our practices have formed into two 
groups led by GPs and practice 
managers” 
Ex-PCT 4 Annual Report 2005-06 
(pp a) 
“we are working with our colleagues 
across the four […] PCTs to develop an 
organizational framework for the 
future”  
Ex-PCT 4 Annual Report 2004-05 
(pp a) 
 
 
c) Local relationships 
 
Quotes/Actions Organisation Source 
“we will work with NHS trusts, Social services 
and other providers to deliver improvements to 
capacity and efficiency for emergency care, 
chronic disease and elective care” 
Ex-PCT 1 Delivery Plan 
2003-2006, 
p.10 
 
“We will develop with other NHS organizations 
in [the Northern LHE] and [Northern] City 
Council a three year financial plan for health 
and social care” 
Ex- PCT 1 Delivery Plan 
2003-2006, 
p.10 
 
“[Northern] Partnership arrangements are very 
strong” 
Ex- PCT 1 Delivery Plan 
2003-2006, 
p.15 
 
It is in the joint interest of the Trust and its 
commissioners to plan capacity for secondary 
care services as a collective effort. This will 
Northern 
Hospital 1 
Strategic plan 
2004-2009 
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provide advantages of simplifying the capacity 
modelling and liberating scarce management 
time for focus on the delivery of strategic 
changes (p. 15) 
“It is our intention to pursue greater 
collaboration in joint provision to maximise the 
collective capacity of all secondary care and give 
no threat to organisational integrity the 
inclusion of independent sector organizations” 
page 15 
Northern 
Hospital 1 
Strategic plan 
2004-2009 
“Since October 2005 the PCT has been working 
in partnership with Northern Hospital 1 to 
improve appropriate admissions to hospital. PCT 
nurses have been working in the hospital” 
Ex-PCT 4 and 
Northern 
Hospital 1 
Ex-PCT 4 
Annual Report 
2005-2006 
(pp a) 
“The four PCTs in [the LHE] have reciprocal 
working arrangements…[the PCT]set out a suite 
of service redesign initiatives alongside a 
neighbourhood approach to service planning” 
Ex-PCT 4 Annual Report 
2004-2005 
 
 
d) Local context: an illustration 
 
Area Characteristics Source 
Ex-PCT 1 ● Health: 
High level of premature death and illness 
● Socioeconomic situation 
Poverty and social exclusion (six of the 
seven wards are amongst the 10% most 
deprived areas in England) 
Poor environment 
● Social capital 
Strong communities, many voluntary and 
community organizations 
● Organisational ethos 
Flat, open and accessible organization 
Seeks out for participation of the public in 
decision making 
Delivery Plan 2003-2006 
Public health report 
2004-2005 
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e) Performance Management and Planning 
 
Organisatio
n 
Quotes/Actions Source 
Ex-PCT 1 “ We will continue to improve our internal 
performance management framework 
through which we monitor and review all 
aspects of our performance” 
Delivery Plan 2003-2006, 
p.10 
 
 
Tracers in the Northern LHE 
This section reports on issues that relate specifically to each tracer, including 
performance, organization of the service and local initiatives. These local initiatives 
have been categorised based on the themes of service redesign and access and 
integration. Where the documents reported a clear time range for the initiative, this 
is also reported together with the organization(s) involved and the documentary 
source. 
 
a) Urgent care 
● Performance against targets 
Organisation Target 
Northern Hospital 1 Performance fluctuating below target 98% A&E waiting 
times (as reported in the[Northern] PCT performance 
report 2006) 
Northern Hospital 1 In the A&E department survey high score in most areas 
with waiting times improved and high level of confidence 
in doctors and nurses (as reported in the 2004-2005 
annual report) 
Northern Hospital 1 2004-2005 A&E target achieved. in January 2004 the 
figure was less than 90% 
Ex-PCT 1 Since February 2005 the target of 98% of patients who 
attend A&E has been achieved 
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● Service re-design (A&E) and access to urgent care 
Action Status Organisatio
n 
Source 
 Clinical Unit for A&E department 
for patients needing non urgent 
tests 
 Medical Assessment Unit for Bed 
bureau patients 
Created Northern 
Hospital  1 
Annual 
report and 
accounts 
2005-2006 
“In A&E we have radically improved 
the services by ensuring 98% of our 
patients get the treatment they need 
and a hospital bed within four hours of 
their arrival…only two years ago 
patients often waited on trolleys for 
hours in the corridors of the A&E 
department” 
 Pit stop scheme introduced 
 Patent tracking system 
 Temporary clinical decision unit 
(not sure it is the same as the 
clinical unit mentioned above) 
 Work has involved the entire 
hospital: 
 A&E work with new specialist 
assessment areas to fast track 
patients to appropriate specialty 
 Imaging, lab and the hospital 
discharge Lounge supported A&E 
Improvements of emergency 
admissions and minor injuries unit at 
the [Northern] Hospital 
Changes 
implemented 
in 2004 
Northern 
Hospital 1 
Annual 
report 
2004-2005 
Resident Consultant Emergency 
Physician in the A&E 
 Northern 
Hospital 1 
Strategic 
Plan 2004-
2009 
 
 
● Integration 
Change Status Organisatio
n 
Source 
“Partnership between [Ex-PCT 4 
and Northern Hospital 1] to 
reduce number of patients using 
A&E as principal access to care” 
Implemented 
since 
October 
2005 
Ex-PCT 4 and 
Northern 
Hospital 1 
Ex-PCT 4 Annual report 
2005-2006 
 
b) Care of the elderly  
 
● Integration 
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In 2005, Northern LHE developed [Northern] Health Agreement 2005-2008 which 
consists of three areas among which older people. Below is a summary of the main 
aspects of the document: 
i) Vision:  The vision of the document is to ensure local older people 
independence and well being (reduction in unnecessary admissions and 
increase in the number of elderly able to live in their homes). This entails 
covering all the range of services older people need, beyond health and 
social care.  
ii) Goals: Provide a fully integrated and coordinated care for older people 
through innovative ways of working and partnership approach 
iii) Actions: 
 Development of a strategy for an ageing population 
 Reengineering services for older people 
 Using Local Government Act (empowering LAs) 
 Assessing needs in the community 
 Developing the workforce 
 
The Agreement requires additional local flexibility (especially in terms of workforce) 
to be able to achieve these goals. There is an Older People’s partnership Board 
responsible for the delivery of these goals and an Older People Service Executive 
Group linked to it with responsibilities on strategic development of health and social 
care and resource coordination. 
 
Action Status Organisatio
n 
Source 
City-wide panel to address offer of 
services to over 65 and access to Stroke 
Service 
Declared/ 
not 
specific 
initiative 
reported 
Ex-PCT 1 Local Plan 
2003-2006 
Work with social services to achieve 
national targets on hospital discharge and 
at home care for elderly people 
Declared 
by 2005 
Ex-PCT 1 Local Plan 
2003-2006 
Strategic intention to prevent avoidable 
admission for elderly: 
 Collaboration for primary care 
service and support to residential 
and nursing homes 
 Rapid access to outpatient clinics 
Declared 
in 2004 
Northern 
Hospital 1 
Strategic 
Plan 2004-
2009 
Hospital discharge team  Ex-PCT 4 Annual 
Report 
2005-2006 
“We have started to develop integrated 
services…We have used the Health Act 
2000 to pool budgets…this early 
experience has helped us to understand 
how different pays between health and 
social care staff are presenting barriers to 
recruitment and retention” 
 [Northern] 
First 
Agreement 
2005-2008 
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● Service redesign and community care 
Action Status Organisatio
n 
Source 
Case management system has been 
introduced in some wards to ensure 
patients are discharged in a timely 
manner. It also involves older people with 
orthopaedics problems. 
Ongoing Northern 
Hospital 1 
Annual 
report and 
accounts 
2005/2006 
“The vision of the PCT is to transform 
health care services for older people…..by 
providing consistent support avoiding 
unnecessary admission to hospital…The 
PCT has piloted a number of approaches 
and made investment in community 
nursing and established an older people 
care team” 
No 
specifics 
about 
the 
projects 
Ex-PCT 4 Annual 
Report 
2005-2006 
The PCT has activated a number of 
services: 
 The Tissue Viability Service supports 
community service to prevent ulcers 
 Intensive Case Management to 
provide individual support 
 Physiotherapy rehabilitation 
 Intermediate Care Unit (including 
staff at hospital and community 
team 
 There is a city-wide project to 
redesign services for older people 
including: 
 Additional beds for discharged 
patients 
 Day care facilities 
 Primary Health Centre to be 
opened in 2007 
 Services for older people with 
Parkinson’s disease 
 Ex-PCT 3 Annual 
Report 
2004-2005 
 
c) Orthopaedics 
 
● Service Redesign 
Action Status Organisatio
n 
Source 
Refurbishment of a orthopaedic ward in 
the [Northern Hospital 1] to help reduce 
the number of cancelled operations 
Completed Northern 
Hospital 1 
Annual 
Report and 
Accounts 
2005-2006 
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Case-study: Southern LHE 
 
● Organisational configuration 
The LHE is a large geographical areas, with the PCT covering one of the largest 
populations in England. The LHE relates mainly to 5 NHS Trusts, some of which 
operate across the border into other LHEs. Indeed, the LHE is an “open” system 
with a high degree of (patient and financial) flow and influence across its borders.  
 
Table 7. NHS Organisations in Southern LHE 
Southern SHA 
 Formed July 2006 from the merger of 2 former SHAs 
Southern PCT 
 Formed in October 2006 from the merger of 5 PCTs 
 Catchment population 1.2 million 
 New PCT initially works in localities of former PCTs 
Southern 
Hospital 1 
 Catchment population 450,000 
 Provides services from 2 hospitals:250 beds and 400 beds 
 Higher proportion of older people 
 Trust undertaking public consultation to become FT, June 
2009 
Southern 
Hospital 2 
 Foundation Trust since April 2005 
 700 beds 
 Catchment population 365,000 
 2,500 staff 
 Annual turnover £100 million 
Southern 
Hospital 3 
 Formed in 1991 
 570 beds 
 2,300 staff 
 Permission from SHA to apply to become FT, March 2009 
Southern 
Hospital 4 
 Formed in 1998 
 Catchment population 350,000 
 Over 2,500 staff 
Southern 
Hospital 5 
 Established in 1999 
 Catchment population 500,000 
 1,000 beds 
 Provides services from two hospitals 
 4,000 staff 
 
 
● Financial position and performance 
Southern LHE has faced longstanding financial difficulties. Several sources report on 
such difficulties. For example, according to the Audit Commission (2005), as of 
October 2005, NHS trusts and (pre-merger) PCTs in the Southern LHE were 
predicting a collective deficit of £75 million by 31 March 2006. The report also 
indicated an increasing number of organizations in deficit and some where the 
financial position had deteriorated. The LHE has proved short of capacity to deliver 
change, and the Audit Commission expressed concerns about the future “without a 
more effective and comprehensive performance culture” (p.5).  
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In the 2005-2006, Healthcare Commission Annual Health Check, three of the acute 
Trusts in the LHE were rated as weak in their use of resources with only “Southern 
Hospital 2” rated as excellent. Similarly none of the pre-merger PCTs were rated as 
excellent. Two PCTs presented particular concerns in terms of their financial 
position. Among the Acute Trusts, “Southern Hospital 4” showed a longstanding 
challenging situation. The size of the Trust’s financial difficulties and its recurrent 
problems have been the object of several reviews including a Public Interest report 
(in March 2005). In March 2006, the Trust had published a new turnaround plan. In 
its 2006 Annual Report, “Southern Hospital 4” anticipated to reach break even by 
June 2007.  The “Southern Hospital 4” did report a financial break-even in 2007-
2008 but an underlying deficit of £2.6 million. By 2008-2009, it was forecasting a 
surplus of £7.0 million (both net and underlying). Yet, its financial difficulties remain 
problematic given the historic deficit that had been accumulated. The Trust itself 
reported that it was “one of 17 trusts formally described in 2007/08 as ‘financially 
challenged’ by the Department of Health because of its past deficits and the amount 
of debt it owed (Trust Annual report, 2007-2008, p.25). 
 
The Chief Executive of the new Southern PCT reported that  
 
“One of the first things the new PCT has sought to do is improve on the 
performance of those localities where their situation is a cause for concern 
and regular meetings have been established” (Chief Executive Report, 
November 2006, p.4).  
 
This assessment was corroborated by the finance report of the PCT which indicated 
that  
 
“...the financial pressures facing the new PCT are considerable…..the plans 
that are being developed by the Locality Management Teams and the work of 
the Programme Management Offices….will be crucial to the PCT delivering 
the best financial position” (Conclusions, PCT Finance Report,, October 
2006). 
 
In its annual audit letter (2007-2008), the Audit Commission reported that the 
Southern PCT had a surplus of £425,000 against the Revenue Resource limit of £1.4 
billion (p.5). 
 
 
● Financial flows 
 
Table 8 and table 9 reports on the relationships between the pre-merger PCTs and 
Acute Trusts based on financial flows. From table 8, it is apparent that while 
Southern Hospital 1” and Southern Hospital 3” draws most of their activity from the 
LHE (81% and 83%), the catchment area of Southern Hospitals “2” and “4” go 
beyond the LHE (table 10). Table 9 shows that most of the resources from the pre-
merge PCTs of the LHE are spent with providers within the LHE borders. 
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Table 8.Southern LHE: proportion of the Acute Trust budget received from the 
`local’ PCT   
Acute 
Trusts 
↓ 
PCT 
→ 
Ex-PCT 
1  
Ex-PCT 
2  
Ex-PCT 
3  
Ex-PCT 4  Ex-PCT 
5  
Total 
Southern 
Hospital 1 
57% 24%    81% 
Southern 
Hospital 2  
 27% 11%   38% 
Southern 
Hospital 3  
3% 9% 69% 3%  84% 
Southern 
Hospital 4   
   8% 32% 40% 
 
 
Table 9.Southern LHE: Proportion of the former local PCTs contract spent in local 
providers 
Acute 
Trusts 
↓ 
PCT 
→ 
Ex-PCT 1  Ex-PCT 2  Ex-PCT 3  Ex-PCT 4  Ex-PCT 5  
Southern 
Hospital 1 
78% 36% - - - 
Southern 
Hospital 2  
3% 8% 62% 2% - 
Southern 
Hospital 3  
- - - 7% 66% 
Southern 
Hospital 4   
- 40% 15%  - 
Southern 
Hospital 5 
- - - 50% 3% 
Total 81% 84% 77% 59% 69% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 241  
 
Table 10. Southern LHE: Proportion of local NHS Trusts budget received from non-
local PCTs 
Acute 
Trusts 
↓ 
PCT 
→ 
PCT [i] PCT [ii]  PCT [iii]  PCT [iv]  PCT [v] Total 
Southern 
Hospital 1  
- - 12% - - 12% 
Southern 
Hospital 2 
45% 8% - - - 53% 
Southern 
Hospital 3 
- - - - - - 
Southern 
Hospital 4 
- - - 16% 35% 51% 
Source for all three figures: DH Purchaser-provider matrix  
 
 
● Organisational performance 
 
World Class Commissioning 
The PCT Trust Board received a paper in March 2009 which summarised its own 
view of the WCC Panel’s assessment. The paper stated that  
 
“The outcome is broadly in line with other PCTs both nationally and in 
[Southern SHA] with the majority of competencies at level 1 and 2.” 
Critically however the panel felt that [Southern PCT]  
“has strong potential for improvement, and would expect the PCT to continue 
to build on achievements to date over the next year.” 
 
The WCC Panel (2008) recognised that the Southern PCT had faced significant 
challenges across the LHE, notably in terms of achieving financial balance and 
organizational change. The Panel also noted that “Over the past 12 months the PCT 
have moved into a position of balance.”  
 
As for the future, the Panel recognised that, in the two years since the PCT was 
formed, it had been pre-occupied with financial balance and organizational change. 
However, it recommended that the PCT “move from a turnaround mindset to one 
which allows for strategic investment and delegation.” The challenges of this shift 
require moving more activity out of the acute sector, ensuring appropriate 
governance structures, and securing competent leadership.  
 
The PCT’s work in developing “relationships with acute provision” (focusing on 
performance management) was recognised as a positive development but this 
contrasted with the need for similar development in primary care.  
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In terms of the 10 WCC competencies, the PCT assessed itself as level 2 in 7 
competencies, level 3 in 1 area (“collaborate with clinicians”) and level 1 in 2 areas 
(“prioritise investment” and “stimulate market”).  Whilst the Panel agreed with the 
PCT in 5 of the 10 competencies, it rated the PCT lower than the PCT’s own 
assessment. In one competency (“collaborate with clinicians”), the difference was 
between level 3 (PCT) and level 1 (Panel). Overall, the Panel agreed with 11 of the 
PCT’s 30 self-assessment ratings.  
 
● Audit Commission: 
In November 2008, the Audit Commission conducted an audit of the PCT’s “use of 
resources.” As part of this assessment, it reported on the 2007 survey of patient 
perceptions (p.11). Only the last measure rated lower than the average.  
 
Table 11. Patient perceptions 
 Southern PCT Average (median) 
Offered choice of provider 96.9% 93.4% 
Phone access 86.4% 84.5% 
Able to get appointment 
within 48 hours 
88.5% 84.3% 
Opening hours 80.6% 84.6% 
 
It also reported that the PCT’s reference costs were 87.2 compared to an average of 
101.5 (median)(index 2006-2007 including MFF). 
 
 
● Healthcare Commission annual health check 
The performance (according to the Healthcare Commission annual health check) of 
these organisations is summarised earlier and in 2.3.6. However, here, the 
Healthcare Commission data can also provide a more detailed analysis of each 
organisation’s performance according to the national performance targets. This 
provides a more detailed assessment of performance compared to the `headlines’ in 
the table above. 
 
Southern PCT: 
Of the (new and existing) national targets in 2006-2007, the Southern PCT “failed” 
to meet 8 targets and “under-achieved” in a further 9 targets. However, by 2007-
2008, the PCT had failed to meet 7 targets and under-achieved on a further 8 
targets. Three of the `failed’ targets in 2006-2007 also failed in 2007-2008. Four of 
the previous `failed’ targets improved on this period by becoming `under-achieving’ 
whereas another 4 had gone in the opposite direction (previously `under-achieving’ 
and most recently, rated as `failed’).  
 
Southern Hospital 1: 
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In 2006-2007, the Healthcare Commission assessed this Trust as having “failed” 
only one target (`Rapid access chest pain clinic: two week wait’), recorded one as 
“satisfactory” (`experience of patients’) and two as “under-achieved” (`Cancelled 
operations and those not admitted within 28 days’ and ` Thrombolysis - 60 minute 
call to needle time’). Data were not available in three targets and one target had 
“data not returned.”  By 2007-2008, the Trust still only recorded one failed target 
and under-achievement  in 2 targets. With the exception of “experience of patients, 
all other targets were “achieved.” In addition, in January 2008, the Healthcare 
Commission found that the maternity services at “Southern Hospital 1” were 
deemed among the 20% which were “least well performing.”  
 
Southern Hospital 2: 
In 2006-2007, the Trust had performed well, as the Healthcare Commission rated 
all (new and existing targets) as achieved. Only the “experience of patients” was 
rated as satisfactory 
six targets were either not applicable or data were not available. By 2007-2008, the 
experience of patients was still deemed satisfactory but the target “Information in 
place to support choice” was rated as “under-acheived.” All other targets had been 
achieved. In addition, the Healthcare Commission rated this Trust’s maternity 
services as among the 25% deemed “best performing.” 
 
Southern Hospital 3:  
In 2006-2007, the Trust was deemed to have failed on 1 target (MRSA 
bacteraemia) and under-achieved on two targets (`Thrombolysis - 60 minute call to 
needle time’ and `data quality on ethnic group’). All other targets were achieved 
(with the exception of 1 target deemed satisfactory and 6 for which data was not 
returned or the target was not applicable). By 2007-2008, the Trust had improved 
its performance such that only 1 target was under-achieved, and 1 was satisfactory. 
(Two targets were deemed not applicable). In addition, the Healthcare Commission 
rated this Trust’s maternity services as among the 21% deemed “fair performing.” 
 
Southern Hospital 4:  
In 2006-1007, the Trust failed to meet the following targets: (i) Total time in A&E: 
four hours or less, (ii) waiting times for diagnostic tests, and (iii) Information, 
screening and referral for drug misusers. It also under-achieved or was below 
average for: (i) Cancelled operations and those not admitted within 28 days, (ii) 
Inpatients waiting longer than 26 weeks, (iii) Participation in audits, and (iv) 
Experience of patients. A further 5 targets were not applicable.  
 
In 2007-2008, the Trust was deemed to have still failed 3 targets (Total time in 
A&E: four hours or less; Inpatients waiting longer than 26 weeks; Referral to 
treatment time milestones) and under-achieved on 2 targets (Cancelled operations 
and Participation in audits). 
 
Its maternity services were rated the lowest category - “least well performing” – in 
January 2008 by the Healthcare Commission. 
 
Southern Hospital 5:  
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 244  
In 2006-007, this Trust did not fail any of the (new or existing) national targets 
although four targets were scored as “under-achieved.”  One target (Experience of 
patients) was rated satisfactory and a further four were not applicable. In 2007-
2008, the Trust failed on its “MRSA bacteraemia” target and under-achieved or were 
below average on another three targets (Cancelled operations and those not 
admitted within 28 days; Experience of patients; Referral to treatment time 
milestones).  Its maternity services were rated the lowest category - “least well 
performing” – in January 2008 by the Healthcare Commission. 
 
 
● Stated policy goals and approaches to key research themes (including tracer 
conditions) 
 
Research themes: 
This section cites extracts from local documentation in the Southern LHE which 
address initiatives that related to the core themes of the study: central-local 
relationships, national policies and local relationships in general. They are cited here 
to illustrate the broader themes which are explored in further detailed in the 
empirical fieldwork (see chapter 4) 
 
(a) Central-Local Relationships 
 
Quotes/Actions Organisation Source 
“Of course we are driven by national priorities 
but we are also heavily influenced by the 
needs and views of the local population” 
(page 2; emphasis added) 
Ex-PCT 1 Annual Report 
2004-2005 
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(b) National Policies 
 
Quotes/Actions Organisation Source 
Practice Based Commissioning 
introduced during 2004, high level 
of interest from practices 
Ex-PCT 1 Annual Report 2004-
2005 
Established a PBC local Board to 
oversee development of PBC in four 
clusters (2006) 
Ex-PCT 5 Annual Report 2005-
2006 
First wave applicants for the 
National Primary Care Collaborative 
in the former SHA area to help the 
development of PBC 
Ex-PCT 2 Annual Report 05-06 
“We are sure that the new PCT will 
want to maintain and strengthen the 
local partnerships that have been 
developed so effectively over the 
past four years” (Page 4) 
Ex-PCT 2 Annual report 2005-
06 
“Although the reorganisation of the 
PCTs had merged five PCTs... into 
one PCT, the previous PCTs would 
remain as localities of the main PCT 
in order to keep the business 
running.” (Page 4) 
Southern PCT Chief Executive 
report, Southern PCT, 
November 2006  
The PCT has also been working 
closely with local GPs to support 
Practice-Based Commissioning 
arrangements 
Ex-PCT 4 Annual Report 2005-
2006 
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(c) Local relationships 
 
Quotes/Actions Organisation Source 
 “We are strongly supported by our 
partnerships with [the County Council], and 
the borough councils” (page 24) 
 “We work closely with local hospitals, 
especially [Southern Hospital 1] to re-design 
patient pathways and provide as many 
treatments outside hospital as possible” 
(page 23) 
Ex-PCT 1 Annual 
Report 2004-
2005 
 “At the heart of all our improvements are the 
strong partnerships developed with our 
partners in social care, children services, local 
authorities, the voluntary and community 
sector and clinical and commissioning 
colleagues across the local NHS” (page 4) 
Ex-PCT 5 Annual 
Report 2005-
2006 
 Integrated Adult and Social Care Services 
(2002): “Such fully integrated approach is 
unique in this part of the country and has 
brought remarkable improvements (virtually 
eliminated bed blocking and reduced 
emergency bed days) (page 6) 
Ex-PCT 5 and 
[Southern] 
County Council 
Annual 
Report 2005-
2006 
“PCT and [County Council] are considering a 
number of opportunities to jointly commission 
services with the portion of pooling budgets 
where there are benefits in doing so” 
Ex-PCT 2 and 
County Council  
Local Health 
and Social 
Care Plan 
2006 
Better Healthcare closer to home programme Ex-PCT 4, 
Southern 
Ambulance 
Trust , Southern 
Hospital 5 and 
former SHA   
Mid Southern 
PCT Annual 
Report 2005-
2006 
Collaboration between Southern Hospital 1 and 
Southern Hospital 2 and with the private sector 
Declared in the 
strategic 
directions in 
2001 
Strategic 
Directions 
2001-2006 
The Trust has strong links with Ex-PCT 1 and 
Ex-PCT 4, being the main commissioners 
Southern 
Hospital 5  
Annual 
Report 2005-
2006 
The western area of the Southern LHE (including 
the three main providers) is working to develop 
sustainable models of care and reconfigure 
services around these models. A consultation of 
clinical leaders (which emerged in a number of 
recommendations but no formal decision making 
capacity) suggested that the goals for this part 
of the LHE should be to treat locally as many 
LHE patients as possible,  integrate services 
across these providers and so avoid duplication 
and improve quality through specialization and 
Southern PCT, 
Southern 
Hospital 1, 2, 3,  
Clinical 
options 
workshop, 
March 2007 
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over time to have a single organizational entity.  
An area of focus in the discussion was urgent 
care (see below) 
 
 
The five PCTs in the Southern LHE had been working together through the 
reconfiguration programme (2006-2008) with the aim of creating a local NHS that 
was sustainable and provided the appropriate care. A case-study of the 
reconfiguration finances are included in Chapter 4. 
 
 
● Tracers 
This section reports on issues that relate specifically to each tracer, including 
performance, organization of the service and local initiatives. These local initiatives 
have been categorised based on the themes of service re-design and access and 
integration. Where the documents reported a clear time range for the initiative, this 
is also reported together with the organization(s) involved and the documentary 
source. 
 
(a)Urgent care 
 
● Performance against targets 
Organisation Target 
Southern Hospital 4 In 2006, the Trust met the 4 hour waiting target 
Southern Hospital 3 In 2005, the Trust moved from being in the bottom 
three hospital for waiting time to be continually in 
the top five 
Southern Hospital 5 In 2005-2006, 96.5 per cent of patients were 
assessed, treated and either admitted or discharged 
from Accident and Emergency (A&E) in less than 
four hours. Although still short of the 98 per cent 
target for all NHS Trusts, achievements this year 
demonstrate progress was made over a short period 
of time. A number of factors, including a steep rise 
in the number of attendances at both A&E 
departments during the winter months, contributed 
to the Trust failing to meet the target of 98 per cent 
during 2005-06. 
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●  Service re-design (A&E) and access to urgent care 
Action Status Organisatio
n 
Source 
Reconfiguration of services: 
 Closed the A&E department on one 
site and on the same date opened a 
Walk-in Centre at the same facility for 
minor injuries  
 The reconfiguration will be facilitated 
by  a number of PCT-led schemes to 
reduce inappropriate admissions  
February 
2006 
Southern 
Hospital 1 
Business Plan 
2005-2006 
 See and Treat 
 Assessment and Treatment pilot project 2004 
ongoing 
Southern 
Hospital 1 
Ex-PCT 2: 
Local Health 
and Social 
Care Plan 
2006 
Trauma Services centralised on one site Actual Southern 
Hospital 1 
Trust website 
Participation to the 3rd wave of a national 
initiative to review emergency services 
Rapid Assessment and treatment area 
(together with Ex-PCT 2) 
2005-6 Southern 
Hospital 2 
Ex-PCT 2: 
Local Health 
and Social 
Care Plan 
2006 
Redesign of emergency services: 
 Medical Assessment Unit  
 Emergency Nurse Practitioners 
 Close work relationships among 
specialties across the hospital (no 
additional specification) 
 Fast track protocols 
2002-
ongoing 
Southern 
Hospital 2 
Ex-PCT 2: 
Local Health 
and Social 
Care Plan 
2006. 
Southern 
Hospital 2: 
2006 Annual 
Report 
Based on the principles behind Better 
Healthcare Closer to Home, the PCT’s 
Community Assessment Unit at [local] 
Hospital is providing a fast and effective 
alternative for patients who would have 
attended A&E. As a result of the initiative, 
more patients are being treated within the 
community and at home 
Ongoing Ex-PCT 4 Annual Report 
2005-2006 
Trauma Centre Planned Southern 
Hospital 2 
Annual Report 
2006 
Trauma Services  Actual  Southern 
Hospital 4  
Strategic 
directions 
2006-2011 
A Surgical Assessment Unit has been 
established which has improved the 
emergency care pathway for surgical 
patients and reduced waiting times in 
2004-1005 Southern 
Hospital 3 
Annual Report 
2004-2005 
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Accident and Emergency 
Service redesign: “Meet and greet” nurse 
 
2005-2006 Southern 
Hospital 5 
Annual Report 
2005-2006 
Centralisation of trauma and emergency 
services on one site 
Planned as 
part the 
“safe and 
sustainable 
service 
review” 
Southern 
Hospital 5 
Report 2005-
2006 
Emergency access plan: 
 Planned date of discharge 
 Clinical leadership 
Improve Epsom emergency be capacity 
 Capital funding  
 New emergency beds 
Close balancing beds 
 Southern 
Hospital 5 
Business Plan 
2006-2009 
 
 
●  Integration - change across the whole Southern LHE: 
The DH Emergency Care modernisation agenda has been developed in the Southern 
LHE into the Southern Emergency Care system programme, an IT- based integrated 
model of urgent care involving the whole LHE (Acute Trusts, Ambulance Trust, 
Social Care and PCT). As part of this programme, the Ambulance Trust (now 
merged into the regional Ambulance Service) has been managing a capacity 
management system aimed at continuously monitoring the number of patients in 
acute units within hospitals in the county. However, while the programme has been 
planned for years and received full support by all the key players in the LHE, it is 
still not fully implemented. The main barriers appeared to be lack of financial 
resources, and difficulty in joint planning and resource sharing across the whole LHE 
(Navein and McNeil, 2003). It is envisaged that the “Shifting the Balance of power” 
agenda will resolve some of these issues by providing PCTs with the capacity to 
facilitate change.  
 
● Specific initiatives from Southern LHE organizations -  pre-merger period 
Change Status Organisation Source 
“Work closely with Southern Hospital 1  to 
improve way patients are seen once they 
reach A&E” (page 12)  Part time GP on 
A&E of one site  as part of urgent care 
system re-design 
Pilot/ongoing Ex-PCT 1 Annual 
Report 
2004-
2005 
New Walk In Centre at Southern Hospital 3 2005 Ex-PCT 3 and 
Southern 
Hospital 3 
Ex-PCT 3: 
Annual 
Report 
2004-
2005 
Work to reduce waiting times in A&E and 
delayed discharges 
2005 – no 
initiative 
Ex-PCT 3, 
Southern 
Ex-PCT 3: 
Annual 
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specified Hospital 3 and 
County 
Council 
Report 
2004-
2005 
Collaboration to provide out of hours 
services (no specification of what specific 
initiatives) 
 Ex-PCT 1, 2 
and Southern 
PCT 
Local 
Health 
and Social 
Care Plan 
2006 
Western area of Southern LHE is discussing 
how to define models of care for urgent 
care and reconfigure services accordingly. 
From a workshop of clinical leaders (March 
2007),  the following suggestions emerged: 
 Stronger demand management and 
better access to community care 
 Closure of one A&E department (FPH 
won’t be closed as [Southern] is not 
main commissioners and the main 
commissioners have intention to keep 
it open) 
 Develop ,local emergency centres with 
clear clinical protocols and linkages of 
A&E departments to a trauma centre 
 Make sure the ambulance service work 
as a mobile clinical service 
 Southern PCT, 
Southern 
Hospitals 1, 2 
and 3 
Clinical 
options 
workshop, 
March 
2007 
 
 
(b)Elderly care 
 
● Organisation of elderly patient care in the Southern County Council 
 In 2002, the County Council was re-organised into 5 departments 
 The Social Service Department was separated into two services: Adult and 
Community Care and Children’s Services (A&CC) 
 There are five local  A&CC teams whose boundaries roughly coincided with 
those of the pre-merger PCTs 
 The medium term strategy of A&CC sets out how services will develop in the 
medium term. It includes objective of producing seamless services across 
health and social care and working closely with partners 
 Local Implementation Teams to oversee implementation of NSFs 
 
● Performance assessment of Social Care Services 
Overall, the performance regime (overseen by the (then) Commission for Social 
Care Inspection PAF) included 46 indicators across 5 domains (National priorities, 
cost and efficiency, effectiveness of service delivery and outcomes, quality of 
services, and fair access). The performance on older people care in the 2005-2006 
performance assessment can be summarised as follows: 
 Problems in moving older people to live at home 
 Assessment of older people timeliness still to improve 
 Rate of delayed transfers for 65+ for which the Council is responsible is 
dropping and better than national average 
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● Integration 
Action Status Organisatio
n 
Source 
Together with Southern Hospital 1 
and Adults and Community Care 
progresses made against the NSF 
standards 
Declared/no 
specific 
initiative 
reported 
Ex-PCT 1 Annual 
Report 2004-
2005 
Coordination for stroke services 
improved patients referred to 
community teams once discharged 
Ongoing Ex-PCT 1 Annual 
Report 2004-
2005 
Joint funding budgets 
 
Ongoing- 
no specific 
aspects 
reported 
Ex-PCT 1 and 
A&CC 
Annual 
Report 2004-
2005 
Joint planning (social support, falls, 
mental health, stroke, delayed 
discharges) on health and social 
care. The plan jointly identifies main 
issues in elderly care in the Ex-PCT 
1 area and  provides a number of 
actions to meet them that involve 
the different actors in the 
community  
Ongoing Ex-PCT 1, 
A&CC and 
three local 
Borough 
Councils 
Health and 
Social Care 
Improvement 
Plan 2004-
2006 
Developed service pathway for older 
people with complex needs for 
rehabilitation 
Ongoing Ex-PCT 3, 
Community 
and Adults 
Care, clinical 
staff and 
therapist 
Annual 
Report 2005-
2006 
New Key Care Service (older people 
receive appropriate care) 
Launched 
2004-
ongoing 
Ex-PCT 3 and 
County 
Council 
 
Appointment of a joint services 
director for older people 
2002-
ongoing (?) 
Ex-PCT 5 and 
A&CC 
CSCI 2004 
Report on 
elderly care 
in Southern 
LHE 
Fully integrated management team 
leading to operational integration of 
front line services: “We were 
particularly impressed by the level 
of partnership and mutual respect in 
[Ex-PCT 5 area] amongst key 
partners” (page 22) 
2004- 
ongoing (?) 
Ex-PCT 5 and 
A&CC 
CSCI 2004 
Report on 
elderly care 
in Southern 
LHE 
Co-location of A&CC area 
management team and health 
colleagues 
2004-
ongoing 
Ex-PCT 1 and  
A&CC. Ex-PCT 
4 and A&CC 
CSCI 2004 
Report on 
elderly care 
in Southern 
LHE 
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Improvement of care for older 
people who experience falls 
(overlapping between elderly and 
emergency care; no specific 
initiative reported) 
Ongoing Ex-PCT 2 and 
Southern 
Ambulance 
Trust 
Annual 
Report 
2005-2006 
Joint Planning on health and social 
care (page 17): 
 Created a multi agency Health & 
Social Care Planning Group 
 Quality of life and independence 
 Mental health  
 Stroke joint stroke coordinator 
with Ex-PCT 1 from Southern 
Hospital 1; similar approach 
explored for Ex-PCT 2 
2006 – 3 
years 
Ex-PCT 2 and 
A&CC and 4 
Borough 
Councils 
Health and 
Social Care 
plan, March 
2006 
Single Assessment process From 2004 Ex-PCT 2 and 
A&CC 
 
Specialist rapid response service for 
falls (aim to provide right service in 
the right place and avoid 
unnecessary visit to A&E) 
2004 Ex-PCT 2 and 
Southern 
Ambulance 
Service 
 
Working partnership with Social 
Services  number of delayed 
transfers of care reduced from 50 
plus at its worst to single figures. 
Ongoing Southern 
Hospital 3 
and Social 
Care   
Annual 
Report 2004-
2005 
Jointly funded a falls coordinator Ongoing Ex-PCTs and 
Borough 
Council  
Southern PAF 
2005-2006 
Joint strategy for older people with 
mental health problems 
 All Ex-PCTs Southern PAF 
2005-2006 
Partnership for Demential 
Collaborative 
Ongoing All Ex-PCTs 
and A&CC 
Southern PAF 
2005-2006 
The Annual Report 2004-2005 
declares : “The Trust has developed 
links with local authorities through 
the overview and scrutiny 
committee and through specific 
projects such as std 1 NSF older 
people – rooting out age 
discrimination” …“ The Service 
Improvement Plan for older people’s 
services has also seen some 
beneficial multi-organisational 
working” (page 8)  
 Southern 
Hospital 5 
Annual 
Report 2004-
2005  
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●  Service redesign and community care 
Action Status Organisatio
n 
Source 
 Community Matrons 
 Intermediate Care team for older people 
rehabilitation at home 
 Stroke services  
 Community Hospital expanded to become 
a rehab centre 
ongoing Ex-PCT 1 Annual 
Report 
2004-
2005 
 Falls prevention strategy 
 Orthopaedic patients suitable to be 
transferred to community 
Planned Ex-PCT 1  
Commissioning of beds to reduce 
emergency bed days 
Actual- 
2005 
Ex-PCT 5 Annual 
Report 
2005-
2006 
Community matrons team Ongoing Ex-PCT 2 Annual 
Report 
2005-06 
Rapid Access Clinic opened on one site to 
provide (mainly older) patients with speedy 
assessment and treatment in one place, 
aimed at preventing unnecessary hospital 
admissions. The clinic is staffed with 
specialist geriatricians 
November 
2005 
Southern 
Hospitl 1 
Annual 
Review 
2005-
2006 
 
 
(c)Orthopaedics 
 
●  Service re-design 
Action Status Organisatio
n 
Source 
Reconfiguration of services: 
 negotiation with Capio for an 
orthopaedic independent 
treatment centre at Southern 
Hospital 1 which should be 
opening during 2006 
 One site of Southern Hospital 1 
is set to become a centre for 
Day Surgery and elective 
Orthopaedic care (along with a 
new rehabilitation centre) with 
the majority of planned 
orthopaedic joint replacement 
surgery 
No further 
specification 
on timing 
and change  
Ex-PCT 1 and 
2  
Ex-PCT 1: 
Annual Report 
2004-2005. 
Southern 
Hospital 
Business Case 
for Service 
Reconfiguration 
2005 and 
Business Plan 
2005-2006 
Agreement with BUPA to establish a 
dedicated diagnosis and treatment 
December 
2002 
Southern 
Hospital 4 
Trust web-site 
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centre (DTC) for NHS patients 
using the BUPA unit co-located with 
local hospital. 
Expansion of a Multi-professional 
Orthopaedic Triage team, a 
community-based service 
Actual Ex-PCT 3  
Scheme for discharges in 
orthopaedics adopted by all 
orthopaedic consultant 
2005- 
ongoing 
Ex-PCT 5 Annual Report 
2005-2006 
As part of the development of PBC, 
one practice is reviewing ways of 
providing orthopaedic treatments in 
primary care settings and redesign 
it (no other indication on actions 
actually taken) 
2005-
ongoing 
Ex-PCT 2 Annual Report 
2005-2006 
The regional Elective Orthopaedic 
Centre is based on one site of 
Southern Hospital 5 and currently 
provides services for four acute 
Trusts. 
March 2004 Southern 
Hospital 5 
Annual Report 
2005-2006 
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Appendix 3. Tracer conditions 
 
Tracer: Care of the elderly  
Policy framework, guidance and main issues 
 
 
1.Introduction 
 
As in many Western countries, in England the number of people over 65 has been 
steadily increasing over time posing a tremendous challenge to the NHS and social 
care in terms of addressing their needs and demands. However there has been 
mounting evidence of widespread problems in elderly care including age 
discrimination, lack of  dignity and respect, inappropriate hospital admissions, 
delayed discharges due to lack of alternative service arrangements and early and 
unnecessary institutionalization of elderly. 
 
These concerns have progressively brought elderly care to the centre stage 
culminating with the NHS Plan 2000 that started a period of intense reform and 
investment characterised by a focus on the whole system (i.e. the complexity of 
services and actors, NHS and non-NHS, involved in the care of older people). The 
ethos of the reform agenda was centred on promotion of dignity and respect, access 
to services, promotion of independence and well-being, responsiveness to older-
people prevalent conditions (e.g. stroke, falls, mental health etc) and appropriate 
treatment of the elderly in hospitals and institutionalised settings. The focus on the 
whole system implied that joint working and coordination among the different actors 
involved was to become the model of delivering services. 
 
The National Service Framework for older people care (2001) is the centre of this 
programme of reform. Nationally, the implementation of this programme has been 
supported by a consistent investment, and the production of guidance, and 
monitored through the incorporation of elderly care in the performance 
management system, to be integrated with the performance framework for local 
governments.  
 
This review looks at the policy context for elderly care, in terms of its policy 
framework, and national guidance. It also describes current issues and challenges in 
elderly care and the way these challenges are dealt with nationally.  
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2. Policy framework 
2a. Policy planning and priorities 
The vulnerability and complex needs of older people necessitate access to a broad 
range of social and health-care services. These services encompass prevention, 
treatment, recovery and continuing care for those with disabilities impeding 
independent living  (see figure 1). Furthermore many of these services interact 
requiring the coordination of different agencies responsible for their provision, 
including the NHS, local authorities and increasingly the independent sector (Audit 
Commission, 1997). 
 
In the 1990s, reports suggested that the status of elderly care was not prepared for 
the challenges presented by a steadily aging population. Common problems 
involved age discrimination in both health and social care, considerable variation in 
access  to services (by geographical area and other factors such as race), lack of 
dignity and respect, poor assessment systems, poor specialist services for age-
related needs (such as falls, stroke and mental health) and lack of services between 
hospital and the community causing unnecessary hospital admissions, delays in 
discharge from hospitals and premature admissions to residential facilities. For 
example in a 1997 report on the status of elderly care services, the Audit 
Commission concluded that the provision of healthcare and social services was 
“locked in a vicious cycle” (p.39) characterised by the lack of community services 
(e.g.  rehabilitation services and other intermediate care) and an increasing focus 
on acute care and residential settings, which would further impede the release of 
resources to be invested in the development of these local alternative services. The 
main result of this cycle being inappropriate hospitalizations, delays in discharges 
and premature placement in residential homes. 
 
This conclusion was subsequently reinforced by the National Bed Inquiry (DH, 2000) 
suggesting that a significant number of elderly stayed in hospital longer than 
necessary, with a wide geographical variation in the use of acute beds and 
availability of alternative services. 
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Fig 1. Services to help older people 
 
The longstanding lack of clarity in the distribution of responsibility between NHS and 
local government, the differences in funding systems (the first organised and paid 
nationally and mostly free at the point of use, the second funded according to local 
decisions and means-tested in most areas), and in planning and budgeting cycles 
greatly contributed to the aforementioned problems, and significantly hampered 
integration and coordination across health and social services. 
 
Several policy initiatives have attempted to tackle the various issues related to the 
provision of care to older people.  For example, in 1998 the documents Modernizing 
Health and Social Services (DH), and the White paper Modernising Social Services: 
promoting  Independence,  improving protection, raising standards affirmed the 
commitment towards promotion of independence, including maintenance of 
independence for the healthy elderly, through prevention and rehabilitation centred 
in community-based care. Emphasis was given to partnership working across health 
and social care. To facilitate collaboration between NHS and local governments, 
changes to the legal frameworks were introduce with the Health Act 1999, where 
provisions were made under Section 37 that allow for pooled budgets, lead 
commissioning and integrated provision. 
 
Building on these ongoing efforts, the NHS Plan (2000) made elderly care a top 
priority and set the foundation for a major plan of reform cutting across health and 
social care services. The goal of such reform was to radically shift existing attitudes 
towards the elderly and to change and improve the system of service provision to 
older people. The reform program was grounded around a number of key elements: 
(i) standards of care; (ii) access to services; (iii) promotion of independence; (iv) 
prevention and promotion of older people health; and (iv) fairness in funding.  
 
“In future older people must not be left to find their own way 
around the system or left in a hospital bed when rehabilitation or 
supported care is what they need. They must receive the right care 
at the right time in the right place.” (NHS Plan, 2000, p.71) 
 
The plan identified joint working and integration between health and social care as a 
paramount instrument to deliver the reform agenda. For example access to services 
had to be improved through a single assessment process for health and social care 
aimed at defining a comprehensive package of health and social services for older 
people.  Joint working was to be built on the legal flexibilities provided by the Health 
Act  (1999), using Local Strategic Partnerships  as the umbrella framework. Two 
additional key aspects of this strategy were investments in health and social 
services, especially towards the enhancement of intermediate care and the building 
of capacity at the local level. Furthermore, indirectly, elderly care was to be 
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improved by tackling other issues addressed in the Plan, such as waiting times and 
clinical priorities (e.g. cancer and coronary heart disease). 
 
In 2001, the National Service Framework for older people operationalised the 
programme of reform set out by the NHS Plan (2000). This operationalisation 
revolves around three aspects: (a) standards of care to be achieved locally by 
health and social services; (b) definition of the performance management 
framework aimed at monitoring the delivery of the standards; and (c) national 
programmes to support the delivery of the standards. 
 
In line with the NHS Plan, the standards are around four major themes: (i) Respect 
of the individual; (ii) Intermediate care; (iii) Provision of evidence-based treatment 
in hospital settings and for stroke, falls and mental health; and (iv) Promotion of 
health and active life (see table 1). For the sake of clarity standards, aims, key 
areas (when applicable) and key interventions are summarised in table 1. 
 
 
Standard Aim Key areas Key 
Interventions 
Respect of the individual 
Std. 1. Rooting out 
discrimination health 
and social services 
provided regardless age  
Ensure elderly are 
not discriminated  
 
 Joint working 
 Managerial and 
clinical leadership 
 Policy review and 
rolling program of 
action 
 Workforce 
development 
 Communication 
Std. 2. Person-centred 
care NHS and social 
services treat elderly as 
individuals and enable 
choice  
Older people are 
treated as 
individuals 
receive 
appropriate and 
timely packages 
regardless of 
health and social 
services 
boundaries. 
 
 Personal and 
professional 
behavior 
 Provision of 
information to 
service users 
 Joint 
commissioning 
arrangements 
 Integrated 
approach to 
service provision: 
o Single 
assessement  
process 
o Integrated 
community 
equipment 
services 
o Integrated 
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continence 
services 
Intermediate care 
Std. 3. Intermediate 
care access to a new 
range of intermediate 
services from NHS and 
local councils for 
preventative care, 
rehabilitation and 
continuing care 
to provide 
integrated 
services to 
promote faster 
recovery from 
illness, prevent 
unnecessary 
acute hospital 
admissions, 
support timely 
discharge and 
maximise 
independent 
living 
 Response to 
crisis 
 Active 
rehabilitation 
 Continuing 
care 
 Integration  
across the whole 
system 
 Clear clinical and 
managerial 
accountability  
 Joint 
commissioning 
and pooled 
budgets 
 Community 
equipment and 
housing 
improvements 
Evidence-based treatment 
Std. 4. General 
hospital care elderly 
care delivered through 
appropriate specialist 
care and by staff with 
the right set of skills 
Ensure elderly 
receive specialist 
help in hospital 
and maximum 
benefit 
 
 Develop 
emergency 
response for 
elderly 
 Early assessment 
 Ongoing care in 
hospital wards 
(guidance for 
good 
management) 
 Discharge 
planning 
 Specialist old age 
team  and 
definition of an 
effective service 
model 
Std. 5. Stroke NHS 
take action to prevent 
strokesworking with 
other agencies; people 
who are though to have 
had a stroke have access 
to diagnostic services, 
are treated appropriately 
by a specialist  and 
participate to 
programmes of 
rehabilitation and 
secondary prevention 
Reduce the 
incidence of 
stroke and ensure 
access to 
integrated stroke 
services 
 Prevention  
 Immediate 
care 
 Early and 
continuing 
rehabilitation  
 Long-term 
support 
 Reducing risk 
factors: 
o Population 
approaches 
(e.g healthy 
eating) (std. 8)  
o Individuals at 
greater risk 
 Specialist stroke 
services within 
stroke unit (to 
coordinate with 
community 
professionals and 
primary care) 
 rehabilitation in 
hospital and 
coordinated care 
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planning after 
discharge 
 Continuing care 
(std 2) 
Std. 6. Falls The NHS 
with councils takes action 
to prevent falls; older 
people who have fallen 
receive treatment, 
rehabilitation and advice 
on prevention through a 
specialised falls service 
 
 Prevention 
 Diagnosis, 
care and 
treatment  
 Rehabilitation 
and long-term 
support 
 Reducing risk 
factors: 
o Population 
approaches 
(e.g safe 
pavements) 
(std. 8)  
o Individuals at 
greater risk 
 Specialist fall 
service 
 Staff 
development 
 Coordination  
 
Std. 7. Mental health 
Older people with mental 
health problems have 
access to integrated 
mental health problems 
by NHS and councils to 
ensure effective 
diagnosis treatment and 
support    
Promote good 
mental helath and 
support those 
with dementia 
and depression 
 promotion 
 early 
recognition 
and 
management 
 access to 
specialist care 
 coordination and 
integration 
 specialist service 
 care pathways for 
depression and 
dementia 
 
To reiterate, the NSF for older care people  focuses attention on the priority areas of 
prevention, promotion of health and independence, intermediate care, and specialist 
care for prevalent conditions (i.e. stroke, falls, dementia and depression). 
Underpinning these priorities are the following themes: 
 
 working across organizational and professional boundaries through the 
implementation of new procedures (joint commissioning, SAP, multi-
disciplinary teams),  
 definition of clear accountability and responsibilities, 
 development of a new range of services in the community,  
 leadership, and 
 workforce development.  
 
 
The integration agenda across health and social care envisaged by the NHS Plan and 
operationalised in the NSF for older care has been further promoted in subsequent 
policy documents. The 2005 Green Paper Independence, Well-being and Choice and 
the White Paper (2006) Our Health, Our Care Our Say bring forward the agenda 
with further attention on four key areas:  i) choice; ii)  prevention; and iii) 
promotion of health. The White paper also addresses issues of access to community 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 261  
services and support for people with long-term needs. Each of these areas involves 
older people. 
 
Partnership working and integration are confirmed as paramount instruments to 
deliver the change agenda. To support the achievement of good partnership 
working, the document sets out a revision of the framework within which local 
services work, including  the development of LAAs, the alignment of planning and 
performance management for NHS and local government, and  a strong role for the 
Director of Adult Social Care in terms of inter-agency coordination. The 
reconfiguration of PCTs, by creating coterminosity with local governments, is also 
envisaged to facilitate joint working. Furthermore the document points to direct 
payments and individual budgets as the mechanisms to empower choice and control 
for people who need social care services. 
 
The different funding regimes for health and social services still represent a 
significant barrier to integrated services. The 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review 
will address the funding of social care informed by the final report of the local 
government inquiry (carried out by Sir Michael Lyons). Also the independent report 
from the Wanless Social Care review, Securing good care for older people: taking a 
long term view (2006) provides some foundation for the forthcoming spending 
review. 
 
2b. Regulation and performance management 
 
The achievement of the standards set out in the NSF for the care of the elderly is 
assessed through the identification of specific performance measures within the 
performance assessment frameworks (PAFs) of social services and healthcare 
services respectively. The Health Care Commission has responsibilities over 
monitoring the implementation of the NSF. Its reviews involve both health and 
social care organizations.  The Social Service Inspectorate (the Commission for 
Social Care Inspection since 2004) has responsibilities over the monitoring and 
inspection of social services.  Since April 2002 the National Care Standard 
Commission inspects private and voluntary care homes, private health care sector 
and domiciliary care agencies. National oversight is carried out through the task 
force for older people within the NHS Modernisation Board, both established in 
2000. 
 
As the differences in funding system, the operation of parallel performance 
management systems for health and social services represents a relevant barrier to 
joint working and integration. The White paper Our Health Our Care our Say (2006) 
addresses this issue and envisages the alignment of the performance management 
systems for health and social care as the necessary step to reinforce and enable 
joint working and the delivery of common outcomes. This alignment is to be 
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facilitated by a proposal to merge the Commission for Social Care Inspection with 
the Health Care Commission by 2008. 
 
“If we want services to work together to deliver common outcomes, we need 
to ensure that performance measures for services reinforce and help deliver 
health and well-being outcomes”. We will therefore take forward the 
development of performance assessment regimes to achieve this, reinforced 
through inspection.” (pag 42) 
 
The White Paper sets out additional revisions to the performance management 
framework aimed at strengthening the incentives to joint working and to investment 
in areas such as prevention and community care.  These revisions include the 
development of performance measures on joint working activities of local 
governments and NHS organizations as well as on preventive spending. For 
example, the document proposes the inclusion of commissioning functions within 
the performance assessment framework to make sure joint commissioning becomes 
a major part of the commissioning work of PCTs and local government. 
 
“we will make commissioning more important in performance assessment. 
……..CSCI and the Healthcare Commission will inspect local commissioners to 
ensure joint commissioning becomes a major part of commissioning” ( White 
paper, 2006, pag 168) 
 
By the same token, Primary Care Trusts are to be scrutinised against preventive 
spending targets from 2008 onwards in order to promote spending on prevention.  
 
2c. Incentives 
The performance management system within which the delivery of the standards for 
older people care is incorporated is backed up by explicit financial incentives to 
strengthen joint working and collaboration across health and social services. As the 
NHS Plan 2000 states: 
 
“Local authorities, health authorities, primary care groups and primary care 
trusts will receive incentive payments to encourage and reward joint 
working. In the case of health organisations it will be through the National 
Performance Fund (see chapter 6). In social services £50 million a year will 
be available from April 2002 to reward improved social services joint working 
arrangements based on measuring performance from 2001. From April 2003 
the fund will rise to £100 million. It will operate as a ring fenced grant and 
will be focused initially on intermediate care performance. There will be 
common criteria between the funds” (p.72). 
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As an additional incentive to partnership working with the specific aim of tackling 
the issue of delayed discharges, since 2004 local authorities have been charged for 
avoidable discharge delays, where it is clear that they bear a responsibility 
(Community Care Act, 2003).  
 
Additional incentives to partnership working, development of community services 
and quality improvement of services are likely to be generated by a number of 
mechanisms introduced with the White Paper Our health, our care, our say (2006). 
First individual budgets and direct payments are aimed at empowering people and 
increasing choice. Second, PBC should provide the necessary incentives to 
commissioner to develop new models of care outside the hospital settings and 
strengthen prevention and early intervention. Third the introduction of PBR should 
support such development by making clear the cost of inefficiencies. 
 
“Payment by Results (PBR) makes real to commissioners the benefits of 
improving care for people with long-term needs, by making clear the costs of 
preventable illnesses, avoidable emergency admissions, poor medication 
prescription and use, and lack of preventative investment in social care. The 
combination of PBC and PBR will  encourage commissioners to seek out 
providers who offer better quality care, particularly for those that are the 
most intensive users of health care” (p.121). 
 
Refinements to the current tariff system with the aim of unbundling tariffs to reward 
PCTs for moving rehabilitation services outside the acute hospital setting are under 
consideration (Health Service Journal 19 October 2006). These refinements, if 
implemented, are likely to strengthen PbR-related incentives to change the system 
of care to older people. 
 
3. Policy guidance 
 
3a. Clinical guidance 
 
In line with the service models envisaged by the NSF for older people, NICE has 
published a number of guidelines. For example, in November 2004, NICE has 
published guidelines on the assessment and prevention of falls in older people living 
in the community.  Guidelines for Dementia have been published in 2006 and 
further reviewed in January 2007.  Other National Service Frameworks (e.g. NSF for 
coronary disease and mental health) includes standards that affect practice for the 
care of older people. 
 
3b. Guidelines, programmes and support 
 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 264  
Local delivery of the reform agenda for elderly care and the standards set up in the 
NSF (2001) have been variously supported by DH over time. The NSF itself provided 
for the establishment of a national work group to guide the implementation of the 
single assessment process, one of the pillars in which collaboration and integration 
across services was to be grounded. The work of this group resulted in the 
publication of guidance in 2002 with the aim of standardizing the approaches to 
assessment across agencies. Further guidance have been produced in the form of 
checklists to support particularly challenged localities. 
 
Other aspects of elderly care addressed in the NSF have been object of guidance 
from DH. For example, guidance documents were produced to support the 
improvement of care for older people in hospital settings according to Standard 4 of 
the NSF (General guidance on implementing standard 4 of the NSF and General 
Hospital Care – CE Check List, January 2004). Guidance have been produced to 
support the achievement of standards on falls through improved commissioning 
processes (How can we help older people not fall again? 2003), as well as standards 
on mental health.  
 
Mental health improvements are further supported by the programme Care Services 
Improvement Partnership’s older people’s mental health, that works through a 
range of projects to support mental health services across organizational 
boundaries. Everybody’s business, launched in November 2005 is an example of the 
Partnership work and has been identified by the HCC and the CSCI as the 
benchmark to be used for inspection of services. 
 
4. Current reflections on elderly care 
 
Since the publication of the NSF for older care in 2001, much progress has been 
made to change and improve health and social services to older people as reported 
by various source of assessments (HCC, Audit Commission and CSCI, 2006; Philp, 
2004, Wanless Review, 2006; Royal College of Physicians, 2004). However there is 
still room for improvement in many areas and several challenges remains to be 
faced. Table 2 summarises progresses, challenges and next steps looking at a 
number of areas that have been identified as key issues to ensure improved 
services to older people. 
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Table 2. Achievements and challenges in delivering change in services for 
older people 
 
Areas Achievements Challenges 
1. Dignity, 
discrimination and 
equality 
Improved access to key 
elective procedures (e.g. 
cardiac surgery) 
 
Still evidence of ageist 
practice or behaviour 
Access issues in mental 
health still relevant 
Issues of equality and 
diversity and 
geographical variation 
(rural versus urban) 
Still poor experiences in 
hospitals 
2. Service care systems 
redesign 
 
  
2a. Involvement, choice 
and control 
Uptake of direct 
payments is starting to 
grow 
Still little systematic 
involvement of older 
people in service planning 
and no shared vision 
based on their views 
Room for improvement in 
choice and control 
2b. Integration and joint 
working 
Shared vision starting to 
emerge 
Leadership stronger in 
local authorities 
 
 SAP across social and 
health care still not 
operational 
 Development of 
explicit strategies and 
plans 
 Joint commissioning 
strategies 
 Governance and 
accountability in 
partnerships 
 Partnership working 
at the operational 
level 
 System to monitor 
progresses 
 Usage of pooled 
budget 
 Leadership in the NHS 
 Joint workforce 
development 
strategies 
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 Involvement of the 
independent sector 
 Problems in large 
counties where also 
districts operate 
 Learning and sharing 
of good practices 
2c. Investment in 
community/intermediat
e care 
 Increase in 
intermediate care 
services 
 Increase in the 
number of people  
cared for at home 
 Increased capacity 
and choice for long-
term care needs 
 Reduction in delayed 
discharges 
 Variation in the level 
of services 
 Leadership and 
coordination in the 
development of 
services 
3. Stroke 
 
 Development of 
integrated networks 
 Development of both 
acute and community 
services  
 Stronger leadership 
 Development of acute 
specialist stroke 
service and stroke 
unit 
 Development of 
agreed joint protocols 
for referral and 
management of 
people with a mini 
stroke 
 Joint workforce 
training and 
development 
 More work on 
awareness and 
prevention by 
working on agreed 
protocols for 
prevention and 
management 
4. Mental health Limited progresses in the 
provision of integrated 
service 
 Challenges in the 
creation of integrated 
services 
 Lack of shared visions 
and planning 
(fragmentation of 
services) 
 Lack of joint 
commissioning 
 Underfunding 
 Lack of skills to deal 
with mental health 
problems 
 Lack of intermediate 
services 
 Lack of services to 
promote mental 
health 
 Inconsistent use of 
agree protocols for 
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depression and 
dementia 
5. Falls 74% of Trust have part of 
a coordinated integrated 
and multi agency service 
for falls (Audit from the 
Royal College of 
Physicians, 2006) 
 Further need to 
develop shared 
strategies 
identification of a fall 
coordinator and clear 
lines of accountability 
 Review of agreed 
protocols and 
monitoring of usage 
and impact 
 Coordinated 
interventions to 
prevent falls 
 Collection and use of 
data to inform 
commissioning and 
provision of services 
Prevention and 
promotion of health 
Increasing uptake of 
cancer screening, flu 
vaccination and smoking 
cessation 
Increasing attention to 
promoto well-being and 
independence of older 
people 
Widespread lack of 
explicit and coordinated 
approach to prevention 
and promotion 
  
The document A new ambition for old age: next steps in implementing the national 
service framework for older people (2006) takes up these challenges and defines 
the next phase for the implementation of the NSF for older people. The next phase 
involves ten programmes under three areas: (i) Dignity in care; (ii) Joined up care; 
(iii) healthy ageing. The recent document Our Health, our care, our say: making it 
happen (2006) provides further guidance and support to local actions for the 
implementation of the integration agenda. Table 3 summarises the aforementioned 
programmes: 
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Table 3. Next steps in the implementation of the NSF for older people 
 
Programme Main aims 
1. Dignity 
Dignity in care 
 Nutrition and clinical environment 
 Workforce competence and skills 
 Mental health 
 Quality 
 End of life 
 Human rights 
 Information and awareness 
Dignity at the end of life 
 Spread of best practice models 
 Best practices in commissioning, 
delivery and education in end of life 
in home care 
2. Integration 
Stroke services 
 Raising awareness  
 Rapid access to treatment for TIA 
 Emergency response to stroke 
 Recommend ways of working in the 
acute phase of stroke 
 Support survivors 
 Workforce development 
Falls and bone health 
 Extend local initiatives to improve 
falls prevention 
 improve emergency response to 
falls 
 develop fall assessment services in 
every economy 
 increase osteoporosis services 
 improve rehabilitation 
Mental health 
 Equality 
 Workforce development 
 Comprehensive specialist services 
 Promote mental health 
Complex needs 
 Coordination of care 
 Strengthen commissioning 
arrangements 
 Develop managed networks 
 To build on development sin 
intermediate care 
Urgent care 
 Redesign urgent care response to 
falls, mobilizing intermediate care 
to avoid inappropriate attendance 
of A&E 
 Redesign urgen care for people 
with mental health problems 
 Redesign urgent care response to 
TIA and stroke 
Care records 
 Fit SAP in the work of developing 
personalised and integrated record 
systems 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 269  
3. Healthy ageing 
Healthy ageing 
 Promote prevention 
 Improve access to services for 
older people socially isolated 
 Overcome barriers to active life 
 Improve physical fitness 
Independence, Well-being and choice 
 Increase use of assistive 
technology 
 Strengthen leadership and 
collaboration 
 Increase use of direct payments 
and individual budgets 
 Increase uptake of response to 
carer’s needs 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The review of the policy context for elderly care allows a preliminary assessment of 
the formal decision space available to local mangers in this area.  Not only has 
government made elderly care a priority of its health reform agenda, but also it has 
explicitly indicated the directions of this reform at the local level. The policy context 
for elderly care dictates a shift along the continuum of care towards prevention, 
promotion of health and recovery. This shift has been guided in a number of ways: 
first, through the definition of standards that encompass both expected outputs and 
the implementation of specific processes, for example specific instruments of 
collaboration such as SAP; second, through the incorporation of these standards in 
the performance management framework; and third, by setting a system of 
incentives towards the implementation of such processes (e.g. integration).  The 
production of NICE guidelines adds a further element to the treatment of elderly 
people with specific conditions. Overall, one could argue that the space local 
mangers have available from the top with regard to elderly care issues is quite 
constrained in terms of targets as well as routes to reach those targets. However, 
some room for local creativity remains in the way specific instruments are 
implemented and managed and collaborative initiatives are initiated. 
 
The review also highlights the relevance of service interdependences in elderly care 
as well as their complexities in spanning across the boundaries of  health and social 
care, and the voluntary and independent sector (mainly for continuing care), which 
has at least two consequences. First, these inter-dependencies imply that the LHE 
for elderly care is likely to be particularly dense and to involve several actors, 
although its shape will vary greatly across different areas. For example it will be 
different in areas with unitary councils versus areas with district councils. Second, 
they imply that individual and collective performance in elderly care will strongly 
depend on how these interdependencies are managed locally. Managing these inter-
dependencies is particularly challenging in the face of the historical structural and 
cultural divides across the different organizations involved. While some structural 
barriers can be addressed through policy changes (such as PCT reconfiguration to 
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make PCTs coterminous with local governments; same PAF), other structural 
barriers (the way different councils have organised their social care services) and 
cultural barriers (between social and healthcare professionals) will require local 
adaptation. 
Tracer: Emergency care 
Policy framework, guidance and main issues 
 
 
1.Introduction 
 
The problem of long waits and poor experiences of patients at each stage within the 
emergency care system was evident since the mid 1990s. As a consequence, 
emergency care became a priority in the modernization agenda set out by the NHS 
Plan in 2000. The ethos of the modernization agenda demanded a radical reform 
covering hospital care and A&E departments as well as ambulance services, primary 
care, community and social care. The approach has been that of increasing the 
resources available (to A&E departments, ambulance and community care), fully 
integrating emergency care in the NHS performance management framework and 
providing financial incentives. In addition, emergency care targets have been set in 
the context of a 10 year strategy and their achievement supported and facilitated 
by a number of initiatives by the Department of Health (DH). 
 
This review looks at the policy context of emergency care, in terms of policy 
planning and priority, incentives and  DH guidance and facilitation. This helps to 
identify the “outer” context. (Pettigrew et al , 1992) for emergency care. It also 
describes current issues and challenges in emergency care. Finally, the paper re-
discusses emergency care in terms of the theoretical concepts of “decision space” 
(Bossert, 1998) and LHE/inter-organizational collaboration. 
 
The paper is organised into five further sections: 
 The emergency care system 
 Policy framework 
 DH guidance on emergency care 
 Current issues in emergency care 
 Discussion 
 
2. The emergency care system 
Emergency care depends on a complex system of services of which A&E department 
is only a component. The experience of the patient in his/her journey through this 
system depends therefore on the functioning of the different components as well as 
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their coordination. Figure 1 describes the flow of patients through the emergency 
care system and highlights the components of the system. 
 
Figure 1: The Emergency Care System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key:               Telephone                          Referral by professional 
                       Self-referral                       Diagnosed and/or treated and 
discharged 
 
Source: National Audit Office 
 
The A&E department can be seen as the centre of this system. There are some 
components that sit before the A&E department. These components are comprised 
of services that function as alternatives to A&E (e.g. walk in centres etc.) and/or as 
channels through which a patient accesses A&E departments. 
These components are: 
 NHS direct 
 Other health-care professionals (walk-in centres etc.) 
 Ambulance services 
 GPs 
Of course, patients may refer themselves to A&E department or to other health care 
professionals. 
 
The functioning of and the ease of access to these services will determine whether 
patients go to the right place (where their needs can be appropriately attended to) 
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and how many of them arrive to the A&E departments, thus constituting a first 
element of potential influence on waiting times (Matthew Cook, 2004 SDO report). 
 
Figure 2: Patient Journey through A&E Department 
Source: Audit Commission, Accident and Emergency Acute Portfolio, 2001 
 
Figure 2 shows the pathway of patients within A&E. Patients are initially assessed 
and then seen by a doctor or a nurse who can diagnose and treat or refer to a 
specialist. Depending on the condition, patients can be discharged, admitted or kept 
for further observation in A&E. Specific categories of patients will need the 
intervention of specialists outside the hospital (e.g. mental health and social care 
 
Within the A&E departments, delays are determined by an imbalance between 
resources, typically staff availability, and workload,  as well as working practices of 
the department 
 
The outflow of patients from the A&E department (discharge or admission) depends 
on an additional cluster of services which involves the rest of the hospital (e.g. 
tests, specialists and beds) as well as actors outside the hospital such as mental 
care and social care providers. Bottlenecks at these levels  of care can cause 
obstruction of these outflows and are therefore responsible for further delays and 
waiting (Cook et al., 2004). For example, lack of bed availability due to “bed 
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blocking” phenomena (for example linked to deficiencies/gaps in social care 
services) will affect waiting time of those requiring hospital admission from A&E. It 
will also affect space availability in the A&E which in turn will influence the 
experience of other patients that do not need admission (Cook et al. 2004). 
 
3. Policy framework 
3a. Policy planning and priorities 
The problem of emergency care delays was apparent since the mid 90s. The Audit 
Commission examined the service in 1996 and 1998 finding increasing length of 
waiting times for both treatments and admissions to hospital from A&E. By 2000 
“there was well documented evidence of lengthy waits for treatment in A&E” (NAO, 
2004, page 10). For example, the Audit Commission’s Acute Hospital Portfolio 
(2000) concluded that waiting times, for both treatment and admission, varied 
greatly and had been deteriorating since 1996 (with an increase of the rate of 
deterioration since 1998). 
Along with this evidence, reducing waiting times in A&E was indicated as the second 
most important factor for improvement in NHS services by the general public and 
the first by patients actually using A&E (NAO, 2004). 
As a consequence of the evidence and given the public concerns, emergency care 
became a national priority in the NHS Plan (2000) to be incorporated into the 
national performance management framework. The range of targets relating to 
emergency care in the Plan (2000) is showed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: NHS Plan Emergency Care Targets 
Area Targets 
Primary care (p.105) 
 
“By 2004, patients will be able to see a primary 
care professional within 24 hours, and a GP within 
48 hours”. 
A&E departments (p.106) “By 2004 no-one should be waiting more than four 
hours in accident and emergency from arrival to 
admission, transfer or discharge”.  
Coronary Heart Disease (p.120)  “By 2001 the ambulance service should achieve 
a first response to 75% of Category A calls within 
8 minutes” 
  “By 2003, 75% of eligible people will receive 
thrombolysis within 20 minutes of hospital arrival 
as services are redesigned” 
 
 
A combination of investment and reform was identified as the way of progressing on 
this front. The NHS Plan (2000) indicated that change would require new money to 
recruit additional staff and increase capacity, new organizational arrangements 
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(both in primary care and within hospitals) and new working practices (through role 
redesign).  
 
In 2001 Reforming Emergency Care, (DH, 2001) set the NHS Plan (2000) targets in 
the context of a ten year strategy of modernization that specifies the steps to drive 
“local” change.  The strategy recognised that the reduction of waits depended on 
the functioning of A&E departments as well as on functioning of and coordination 
within and across different parts of the local emergency care system. Accordingly, 
the plan identified a number of problems and solutions that revolved around four 
areas as illustrated in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Reforming Emergency Care 
 
Area Problems Solutions 
A&E departments’ 
streaming 
 lack of staff and hospital 
capacity 
 competition between 
emergency patients and 
those with elective needs 
 delays in discharging 
patients 
 diagnostic and other 
services availability 
 single queuing  
 demarcation of work 
practices 
 New investments: 
   - staff (emergency  
consultants and nurses) 
    - hospital capacity 
    - social care services 
(freeing hospital beds) 
    - specialised centres for 
elective care (e.g. for cardiac 
care) 
 Organizational change: 
  - separation of elective and 
emergency workloads 
  -role redesign and 
expansion 
  -integration within the 
hospital,  
  -out-of-hours diagnostics 
services 
 
Assessment and 
Prioritization of emergency 
requests 
 inconsistent assessments  
  wrong place of care 
 standard assessment 
system  redirection of 
patient according to his/her 
needs. 
Integration and 
coordination 
 Fragmentation  emergency care leads (within hospital coord.) 
 Emergency Care Networks 
(across organizational 
boundaries coord.) 
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 Collaborative (to spread 
knowledge) 
Standards and monitoring 
for emergency care 
 Variation in quality 
standards 
 Creation of quality 
framework 
  - definition and uniform 
application of standards for 
emergency care 
  - definition and uniform 
application of standards for 
emergency care 
 - care pathways from NICE 
 - monitoring by the 
Commission for Health 
Improvement (CHI) 
 
Throughout the document, it was recognised that different localities may need 
different solutions and may need to adapt strategies to their own circumstances. It 
was also recognised the importance of “working across traditional organizational 
boundaries”. This was reflected in the strategy of creating networks and 
collaborative projects to favour the spreading of best practices as well as in the 
necessity of improving staff flexibility to allow working across the whole system and 
in different environments. 
 
Over time “there has been a significant and sustained improvement in waiting 
times. These changes have come largely through improved working practices and 
local investment within A&E […..]. [However] further major improvements […..] will 
depend on further improving  the way the whole hospital and other health and 
social care providers work to manage the flow of patients” (NAO, 2004, p.1). 
 
Accordingly, in 2006, urgent care was confirmed a policy priority in the white paper 
Our Care Our Health Our Say (NHS, 2006, Section 4.48 – 4.52). Attention was 
particularly placed on community care and integration across different providers. 
The document brought forward the notion that urgent care can be delivered in 
different settings depending of the patient’s needs and envisions a system that 
integrates the main actors in the community to ensure simpler access, consistent 
assessment and appropriate response to the patient. To this end, an urgent care 
strategy was under development to provide a “framework within which PCTs and 
local authorities can work” (para. 4.51). 
 
From April 2005, the DH no longer considered the four-hour-maximum total time in 
A&E a national target. However, “existing commitments on access to ambulances, 
primary care professionals and GPs, [and] A&E” are to be maintained (National 
Standards, Local Action: Health and Social Care Standards Planning Framework 
2005-2006 2007/2008 (DH, 2004d). In addition, among the new core standards in 
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the domain “accessible and responsive care” the standard  C19 states that “Health 
care organizations ensure that patients with emergency health needs are able to 
access care promptly and within nationally agreed timescales, and all patients are 
able to access services within national expectations on access to services”. Existing 
and new standards fed into the Health Care Commission (HCC) annual health check 
assessment 2006-2007, demonstrating continued strong performance management 
over emergency care issues. (http://ratings2007.healthcarecommission.org.uk/). 
 
 
3b. Incentives 
The strong performance management framework for emergency care has been 
backed up by financial incentives established by DH. In terms of A&E, DH ran a 
capital incentive scheme between March 2004 and March 2005 which awarded 
payments up to £500,000 to Acute Trusts meeting specific thresholds within a 
certain time range. A similar scheme was established for Ambulance Trusts that 
rewarded those making progress in achieving the 75% life threatening standard. 
Since April 2004, Primary Care Trusts are responsible for the provision of out-of-
hours care as GPs have opted out in accordance to the new contract. Provision of 
out-of-hours care has been incorporated in the NHS performance management 
framework and accompanied by a capital incentive schemes to PCTs. 
  
Additional incentives are likely to be generated by the recent provision of the White 
Paper (NHS, 2006) that indicates that changes are being made to the Payment by 
Results tariff “to create appropriate financial incentives and financial stability to 
better support delivery of urgent care in the NHS[…..]: 
 In the longer term we will develop a single tariff that applies to similar 
attendances in A&E, minor injuries units and Walk-in Centres, so that 
funding is governed by the type of treatment and not where it is delivered. 
As a first step, in 2006//07 there will be one tariff for minor attendances at 
A&E and attendance at minor injuries units.  
 A reduced rate tariff will apply to emergency admissions above and below a 
threshold. This will help manage the overall level of risk of inappropriate 
growth in emergency admissions and share the financial risk between 
providers and commissioners.  
 The short-stay tariff (which results in a reduction for stays of less than two 
days for defined Healthcare Resource Groups within tariff) has been revised 
to more closely align the tariff with the actual cost of short stays. “ (para. 
4.52) 
 
4. Policy guidance 
 
4a. Clinical Guidance 
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The patients pathways for emergency care that were envisaged in Reforming 
Emergency Care (2001) are still to be published by NICE. In terms of standards for 
emergency care, there are no specific National Service Frameworks. However, 
existing National Service Frameworks for coronary disease, elderly and children and 
mental health patients include some requirements that affect clinical practice in 
emergency care. Some examples are illustrated in Table 3 
 
National Service Framework Provision 
Coronary Heart Disease  “Door to needle”  for trombolysis drug 
Children  Pain killers 
 At least one registered children’s nurse 
available 24 hours a day to advise each 
A&E department 
 
 
4b. Service Improvement in Emergency Care 
 
The policy framework set the foundations for a number of initiatives aimed at 
delivering the strategy laid out in Reforming Emergency Care (2001) and improving 
emergency care services locally on the basis of the national targets (NHS Plan, 
2000). The approach endorsed by the DH has focussed on developing national 
initiatives to support change as well as producing checklists and toolkits to serve as 
guidance to Trusts in implementing change.  
 
Two national initiatives were managed by the Modernization Agency (formed in 
2001) and involved a series of structured programmes. The Ideal Design of 
Emergency Access (IDEA) program was initiated in April 2001. The ethos of the 
programme was to work across the whole spectrum of emergency care including 
primary care, ambulance services and social services and use successful 
manufacturing improvement methods such as ‘lean thinking’ and ‘supply chain 
analysis’ to improve the flow of patients through the emergency care system 
(Modernization Agency, 2001). The Modernization Agency started to work with two 
pilot communities and then extended the programme two nine additional 
communities. The second program, Emergency Services Collaborative (ESC), 
started in October 2002. The sites participating to IDEA where merged with ESC in 
spring 2003. Similarly to IDEA, the aim of the ESC was to support local teams in 
making improvements across the emergency care system by focusing on the whole 
system of emergency care, rather than individual departments. This time, however, 
the program endorsed a method of collaborative working among staff of different 
organizations to allow reciprocal learning and knowledge sharing (Modernization 
Agency, 2002). The programme ran between October 2002 and September 2004 
and involved every Trust in England with a 24-hour A&E department in six waves or 
learning sets. Participation from across the health and social care community was a 
main component to the success of the ESC. Each site was required to work on four 
groups: 
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 Group 1 Patients who can be treated and discharged relatively quickly, often 
following a simple diagnostic assessment. These patients will often have 
minor injuries or illnesses.  
 Group 2 Patients who require a longer assessment and observation, in 
addition to diagnosis and treatment. These patients are often treated in a 
Medical Assessment Unit or equivalent.  
 Group 3 Medical patients who require an admission to an acute hospital with 
significant lengths of stay.  
 Group 4 Patients who are admitted for emergency surgical procedures.  
For each group, a number of potential themes were looked at. For example, “See 
and Treat” was one of the principles introduced by ESC entailing assessing and 
treating patients with relatively minor problems as soon as they enter A&E 
departments.  
 
Over time, the Department of Health has also issued several guidance documents in 
the form of checklists and toolkits covering specific problem areas in A&E 
departments and Ambulance Service as well as specific target populations (e.g. 
elderly and mental health patients).  These documents were based on local analyses 
of main problems affecting the emergency care system. They were not meant as 
prescriptive indications to Trusts and mainly expressed in the form of 
recommendation and “should do”. For example, a second version of the 4-hour 
checklist: Reducing Delays for A&E patients (DH, 2004a) was published in 2004 and 
provided indications and recommendations on priority actions, analysis, discharge , 
bed management, community action, emergency department activity and 
admissions. Additional guidelines to streaming A&E departments specified the areas 
of bed management and specialists (DH, 2004bc) where a set of actions were 
suggested to reduce delays in access to beds and specialist for patients waiting A&E 
departments. 
 
 
5. Current reflections in Emergency Care 
 
5a. Achievements and challenges in waiting times 
Since 2000, there have been significant and consistent improvements in emergency 
care waiting times as reported by various sources of assessment (NAO, 2004; 
Healthcare Commission, 2005, Alberti, 2004; Committee of Public Accounts, 2005). 
However, general improvements mask differences that still exist across different 
groups of patients. Table 5 shows differences by relevant groups of patients (NAO, 
2004; Committee of Public Accounts, 2005): 
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Table 5: Achievement and Challenges in Waiting Time 
Groups Current Status 
Minor injuries or illness  great majority dealt with in less than 4 
hours 
Serious conditions Still delays  
Patients requiring admission (surgical or 
intermediate care) 
Still delays  
Mental health and elderly  patients 
(partially included among patients 
requiring admissions) 
Still delays 
 
5b. Key themes 
Cutting across the issues of waiting times for the different groups of patients are a 
number of key themes. One of these themes entails streaming in A&E and the 
broader hospital, a second theme looks at the emergency system outside the A&E 
department and the last refers to inter-organizational relations (across 
organisational boundaries). For the sake of clarity the themes, achievement and 
challenges and examples of methods/strategies of improvement are summarised in 
Table 6. The table also reports on the sources of assessment. 
 
Table 6:  Key themes in emergency care 
Area Assessment Methods Source 
Service redesign 
within A&E and 
Hospital 
 Working practices 
 Diagnostics 
 Access to specialists 
 Bed Management 
 Still working 
practices issues 
 Still delays in 
diagnostics (11% of 
all stays longer that 
four hours bc of 
diagnostics),  
 Still delays in 
access to specialists 
(24% of all stays 
and 27% of those 
admitted were 
caused by delays in 
obtaining a 
specialists) 
 Still issues in bed 
management 
 
 Process redesign: 
   - See&Treat 
   - Observation 
Units 
   - Creation of 
special units for 
diagnostics  
   - Discharge 
lounges 
 Job redesign 
   -  Expansion of 
roles for nurses in 
A&E 
   - Expansion of  
roles of radiologist 
and A&E staff 
 NAO Report 
2004 
 
Transforming 
Emergency 
Care, 2004 
 HCC, 2005 
 Committee 
of Public 
Accounts, 
2005  
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 Coordination 
  - Coordination with 
radiology 
department  
and specialists 
Augmenting 
alternative sources 
of care: 
 New services 
 Job roles/skills 
 Ambulance service 
 
Good progresses: 
 Increased number 
of Walk-in Centers 
and minor injury 
units 
 emergency care 
practitioners 
 Ambulance 
paramedics 
 Walking centers 
NAO, 2004 
Integration/joint 
working 
 Managing the 
interdependences in 
patients flows: 
 (e.g. transfer to 
intermediate care, 
patients’ return home, 
social care and mental 
health assessment) 
 Consistency of 
services through 
coordination of 
different providers 
(e.g. A&E and walk in 
centers, NHS direct 
and out-of hours care, 
Rerouting of patients) 
 
 Obstacles due to 
organizational 
boundaries:  
       - org work as 
separate entities 
       - Lack of whole 
system indicators 
 Networks: 
      - Lack of 
participation of 
relevant 
stakeholders  
      - Lack of clarity 
in objectives and 
responsibility 
     - Not all the 
issues identified for 
them have been 
addressed 
    - Lack of power  
and influence 
   - Few resources 
Existing networks 
Joint projects 
PCT/Acute care 
Trusts and local 
authorities 
Coordination 
Ambulance services 
and A&E 
 NAO, 2004 
 Committee 
of Public 
Accounts, 
2005 
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6. Discussion 
 
6a. Decision Space 
 
The policy background for emergency care defines its “outer context” (Pettigrew et 
al., 1992) and allows assessing the degree of formal decision space available to 
local managers in this area (Bossert, 1998).  Between 2000 and 2005, emergency 
care has been explicitly identified as a priority at the national level and “imposed” to 
local managers as a “must do” area.  This imposition has been signaled by the 
definition of specific targets and their incorporation in the national performance 
management framework thus minimizing the decision space in terms of the outputs 
of emergency care (Peckham et al. 2004; Bossert, 1998). Although, since April 
2005 emergency care is no longer considered a national target, existing 
commitments need to be maintained and are still part of Trusts’ performance 
assessment by the Healthcare Commission. Furthermore, emergency care reappears 
as a priority in the new White Paper (2006) and is included in the new core 
standards for 2006-2007 (DH, 2004d). Therefore, hierarchical authority over 
emergency care seems to be consistently quite strong.   
 
In terms of the processes (Peckham et al. 2004) by which localities are supposed to 
reach those targets and meet the standards, the degree of decision space localities 
have been allowed is less clear and seems to vary over time, by organization and by 
area of intervention. Between 2000 and 2004, the DH has appeared to be active in 
providing guidance and direction in terms of the means necessary to achieve the 
targets. For example, although the strategy set in 2001 has recognised the need for 
local adaptation, thus leaving at least some space for localities to devise “locally 
suitable” actions, it has reinforced the hierarchical authority already exerted over 
targets by identifying specific areas and potential solutions to be tackled. It has also 
indicated the necessity of appointing Emergency Care Leads in each organization. 
Furthermore, the strategy has been accompanied by national initiatives such as the 
ESC.  This programme was set with the intention of supporting and steering local 
change through knowledge sharing. However, each Trust with A&E departments had 
to participate, with no choice available, and it seems that at least for some 
innovations (e.g. See&Treat) the Modernization Agency has exerted quite a central 
role in their development and diffusion. 
 
In terms of the Checklists and Toolkits produced over that period, they are not 
prescriptive and are mostly presented in the form of recommendations “to help 
health care organizations streamline emergency care for patients” (DH, 2004), p.1). 
However, they endorse the DH approach to tackle specific problems (e.g. bed 
management, and access to specialists) and represent the strategies DH adopts for 
challenged organizations through the action of an Intensive Support Team (Alberti, 
2004).  
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Future directions will depend on the tones of the strategy under development as a 
result of the new White paper. Also, further constraints to the decision space of 
local managers might come if NICE will develop standards for emergency care 
pathways as envisaged by the 2001 strategy  and these will be incorporated in the 
performance inspection by Healthcare Commission.  
 
Finally, at the moment, localities seem to have some ”room of manoeuvre” in the 
way joint working can be organised and managed, having DH only provided some 
general guidelines in terms of how emergency care networks should be organised 
and being these not managed as other examples in the NHS (e.g. cancer networks) 
(NAO, 2004 ). However, evidence shows that joint working is often constrained by 
limits to decision space imposed over individual organizations through performance 
targets (NAO, 2004). 
 
 
6b. Local Health Economy 
 
The decision space discussed in the previous section refers to the formal freedoms 
for action left from the centre to local managers. However, key to the notion of local 
autonomy is the inter-dependency among health-care organizations. Where this 
inter-dependency exists, there is a need to consider the LHE and its nature in 
explaining individual and collective action and performance 
 
In terms of emergency care, the shape and relevance of the LHE depends on the 
aspects one looks at.  One of the themes, service redesign in A&E, is more internal 
to individual organizations. Each organization, given the terms of national policies, 
will take specific course of actions. The local context (e.g. performance, location, 
funds availability) in which the organizations is embedded will be relevant in 
shaping organizational responses (Bossert, 1998). In some respects, these 
responses are likely to be influenced by relational dynamics but these will be mainly 
linked to certain types of dependencies (e.g. financial) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Therefore, the LHE involved is likely to be restricted to few organizations (e.g. PCT 
and Hospital) and less complex. 
 
However, for some of the issues highlighted above (emergency admission, mental 
health patients and elderly), the theme of joint working and collaboration is as 
important as service redesign. These issues are clearly inter-organizational and 
involve strong service inter-dependencies (Thomson, 1967). For example, 
emergency admissions are influenced by internal service redesign (e.g. bed 
management) but also require strong collaboration among different actors (e.g. 
hospital and social care). Consequently, the LHE involved includes more 
organizations and the nature of the relationships and how they are managed 
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becomes a fundamental ingredient of the resulting individual and collective 
performance. 
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Appendix 4. Invitation letter to participants 
Dear <insert name of potential participant> 
 
New research into the impact of decentralisation upon the performance of ‘local 
health economies’ (LHEs)  is being conducted by a multidisciplinary team 
coordinated by the School of Management of Royal Holloway - University of London. 
This research has been awarded a grant for a three-year project by the National 
Coordinating Centre for Service Delivery and Organization Research, part of the 
NHS’s research and development programme and has received ethical approval 
from the London-Surrey Border Research Ethics Committee. 
 
In a period of further substantial change for the health service, the study is focusing 
on issues critical to the NHS. It aims to analyze the links between organizations in 
LHEs to determine how their “room for manoeuvre”, the incentives they face and 
the local context affects the performance of the local NHS. The findings will 
generate practical lessons for study participants as well as policy makers, managers 
and practitioners at all levels in implementing decentralisation, managing the 
implications of autonomy and incentives, and addressing performance management 
through incentives. 
 
Researchers are comparing two LHEs in England and involving constituent 
organizations (NHS and others) comprising the LHE. <insert organisation> has been 
identified as one of the constituent organisations in the <insert name of associated 
LHE> and I would appreciate the opportunity to learn about the relationships 
between local organizations and how this affects health service delivery. 
 
Please review the enclosed information regarding the study and what your 
involvement would entail, should you chose to participate. If you agree to 
participate in this research please contact <insert name of researcher> on <insert 
telephone number and e-mail address>. 
 
Alternatively, if you have any queries or require further information about this 
project, please contact the chief investigator, Dr. Mark Exworthy, whose contact 
details are provided on the attached information sheet. 
I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
<insert name/signature of researcher> 
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Appendix 5. Consent form 
 
 
Decentralisation and Performance 
Autonomy and Incentives in Local Health Economies 
 
Research Participant Consent Form 
 
Please read this form in conjunction with our Research Participant Information Sheet. 
            
 
 
 
1. I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet dated 25 October 2006, and I have had 
the opportunity to discuss details with a member of the research team, and to ask any questions. The 
nature and purpose of this study have been explained to me, and I understand what will be required 
if I take part in this study. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I may withdraw from this study at any time 
without justifying my decision and without affecting my normal working. 
 
3. I consent to the interviews being recorded, and I understand that the transcript of the record will only 
be seen by members of the research team. 
 
4. I agree to take part in this study as described in the Participant Information Sheet.   
 
 
Signature of participant 
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Name in BLOCK LETTERS 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
Date ____/_____/_____ 
 
Please Initial 
Box 
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I confirm that I have explained the nature of the study as detailed in the Participant 
Information Sheet, in terms which in my judgement are suited to the understanding of 
the participant. 
 
 
Signature of research team member 
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
Name in BLOCK LETTERS 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Date ____/_____/_____ 
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Appendix 6. Interview schedule/protocol 
Interview Protocol  
 
 
1. Context – personal and organizational 
a. What is your job title? 
b. How long have you been in this post at (name of the Trust) 
c. Which responsibilities/role are part of you position within the Trust? 
d. How long have you been working in the LHE (considering previous jobs) and 
where were you before?  
 
 
2. Strategic change (influences on decision making and organizational 
development) 
a. What are the current issues in (name of the organization) with respect to 
organisational change? 
b. Probe 
Are there major service redesign initiatives going on? 
Are there major change programmes going on? 
c. What do you see as the key factors influencing decision making and the 
implementation of change in this organization? 
d. Probe 
What are the key drivers behind change programmes and initiatives 
What are the key factors influencing the implementation of change 
a. external influences 
i. central control/ directions/guidelines 
ii. local context including local culture and historical links  
b. internal influences 
i. leadership 
ii. clinical engagement 
iii. organization history/memory 
 
3. LHE 
a. What are the current issues with respect to LHE-wide change? 
b. Probe 
a. Re-configuration 
b. Tracers: urgent care, orthopaedic and care of the elderly 
c. What role has been / should be played (by the manager/Trust) in LHE-wide 
change initiatives? 
d. What are the key factors that influence LHE-wide change (FFF)? 
e. Probe 
a. Problems/issues in the process 
b. Success factors in the process 
f. How existing/historical relationships influence LHE-wide change (including 
sharing of best practices and inter-organizational learning) 
a. Stakeholders involvement? 
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g. How is / has recent local re-organisations (eg. PCT merger) affect the LHE? How 
do you think it will impact on the LHE? 
h. Probe 
a. What are the implications for your organisation? How is the Trust 
affected and how is the Trust responding? 
i. What do you see as the role of an effective SHA (including managing the 
reorganization process)? 
j. What do you see as the role of an effective PCT (including managing the 
reorganization process)? 
k. Probe  
a. How do the SHA and the PCT shape the room for manoeuvre locally? 
l. How does the Trust approach collaboration with other organizations in the LHE? 
m. Probe 
a. How does the Trust initiate collaboration? 
b. What are the drivers to collaboration? 
n. What are the main factors influencing collaboration?  
o. Probe 
a. What are the main barriers/success factors in collaboration? 
 
4. System reforms (inspired by central government) 
a. How are (national) system reforms (e.g. PbR, patient choice, reconfiguration, 
Foundation Trusts, PbC) impacting on existing relationships in the LHE? 
b. Probe 
a. What does the presence of and FT mean for the LHE? 
b. How is the Trust affected by the (national) reorganisation processes? 
c. How is the PCT reconfiguration (including change in leadership) influencing on 
commissioning relationships and performance management? 
d. How does your organisation learn how to manage new systems and processes?  
e. How does staff turnover affect this process? 
a. Informal processes 
b. External support 
c. Past experience  
 
5. Performance 
a. In what areas is the Trust performing well and in what areas is performing less 
well? 
b. Probe 
i. Tracers 
c. Which are in your opinion the key factors accounting for this performance?  
d. How is the performance of the Trust affected by issues in the LHE? 
e. How is it affected by internal issues? 
f. How does this affect Trust’s activities and position in the LHE (including 
relationship with PCT and SHA) 
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Appendix 7. Interim feedback report, 2008 
 
 
Decentralisation and performance:  
autonomy and incentives in local health economies 
 
Interim feedback: July 2008 
Research funded by the NHS R&D programme: 
http://www.sdo.lshtm.ac.uk/sdo1252006.html 
 
 
AIMS 
k. To investigate the inter-relationship between decentralisation, governance, 
incentives and performance in local health economies (LHEs) 
l. To provide lessons for policy-makers & managers in implementing 
decentralisation, managing the implications of autonomy & incentives, and 
addressing performance management through incentives. 
METHODS 
Qualitative, three-year study using a comparative case-study design of 2 
contrasting LHEs – one in the “North” and one in the “South.” Fieldwork in the 
“South” case-study has involved: 
 Interviews: 23 interviews including chief executives, directors, clinical directors 
& service leads 
 Observation: Board meetings, executive meetings 
 Documentary analysis: reports, strategy & policy documents, annual reports 
 
MAIN MESSAGES 
1. Room for manoeuvre: Autonomy can be seen as “freedom from” (eg) the 
`centre’ and “freedom to” (eg) innovate, be responsive etc.   
a. Freedom from government has been hampered by the multiple and 
occasionally contradictory policies being implemented simultaneously. This 
leads to a dilution of management energy and resources, and diverts energy 
and resources to most pressing issues (eg. 18 week target). However, in 
some instances, targets and central initiatives have aided implementation of 
long-needed changes (eg. in A&E) 
b. Freedom to innovate and to respond depends on incentives and the 
willingness and ability of organisations to exercise their autonomy. There are 
signs that some incentives as still weak and that differing levels of autonomy 
amongst organisations and effect of other reforms have led to perceptions of 
an uneven `playing field’ locally. Some organisations used their autonomy to 
respond to incentives to improve patient experience and service delivery. 
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The combination of incentives and willingness/ability of organisations to 
exercise their autonomy suggests a pragmatic approach to implementing 
reform locally. For example, organisations have been cautious in the face of 
uncertain rules of the game Innovation and responsiveness also required 
changed mindsets, attitudes and leadership skills.   
2. Organisational relationships:  
a. On-going social and institutional networks have minimised the impact of 
central and local organisational changes. For example, loyalty (by patients 
and GPs to local providers) implies some resistance to reforms.  However, 
new staff (especially at senior levels) have yet to be fully integrated within 
local networks. Also, (organisational and service) reconfiguration and lack of 
transparency in decision-making have disrupted relationships and trust and 
created some tensions There is therefore a need to build further the mutual 
trust and shared ownership that underpins the presumed benefits of wider 
reform. 
b. In the context of policy turbulence and upheaval, good organisational 
performance is associated with long-standing relationships that engender 
trust and shared ownership. There is therefore a need to understand and 
nurture the existence of these long-standing relationships  
 
Further information: 
Dr. Mark Exworthy. Email: M.Exworthy@rhul.ac.uk. Tel: 01784-414186 
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Appendix 8. Advisory Group 
 
Research team: 
Dr. Mark Exworthy (PI): School of Management, Royal Holloway-University of 
London 
Stephen Peckham: London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
Professor Martin Powell: Health Services Management Centre, University of 
Birmingham 
Dr. Ian Greener: Durham University  
Dr. Jacky Holloway: Business School, Open University 
Professor Paul Anand: Business School, Open University 
 
 
Researchers 
Francesca Frosini: School of Management, Royal Holloway-University of London 
Lorelei Jones: London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
  
 
Advisory Group members (in alphabetical order): 
Professor Perri 6: Nottingham Trent University 
Miguel Castro:  Institute for Public Policy Research 
Dr. Pauline Allen: London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
Professor Celia Davies: Open University / LSE 
Dr. Stephen Dunn: Strategy Unit, Department of Health / East of England SHA 
Dr. Mary Edwards: Chief Executive, North Hampshire Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust 
Nigel Edwards:  Director of Policy, NHS Confederation 
Professor Ewan Ferlie: School of Management, Royal Holloway-University of London 
/ Kings College London 
Professor Geoff Meads : Medical School, Warwick University 
Dr. Dan Murphy: Head of Research and Evaluation, Healthcare Commission 
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Meetings 
 
 26 June 2006, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
 14 June 2007, Royal Holloway (offices on Gower Street, London. WC1) 
 19 June 2008, Royal Holloway (offices on Gower Street, London. WC1) 
 
We found that attendance at these meetings was patchy despite members’ 
willingness to participate. We therefore decided to contact Advisory Group members 
who could not attend meetings. Progress in the project and interpretation of 
emerging findings were discussed with these members.  
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Appendix 9. REC approval 
London - Surrey Borders Research Ethics Committee 
St George's University of London 
South London REC office 1 
Room 1.13,  
1st Floor, Jenner Wing 
Tooting 
London 
SW17 0QT 
 
Telephone: 020 8725 0262  
Facsimile: 020 8725 1897 
13 July 2006 
 
Dear Dr Exworthy 
 
Full title of study: Decentralisation and performance: autonomy and 
incentives in local health economies 
REC reference 
number: 
06/Q0806/60 
 
The Research Ethics Committee reviewed the above application at the meeting 
held on 12 July 2006.  
 
Ethical opinion 
 
The members of the Committee present gave a favourable ethical opinion of 
the above research on the basis described in the application form, protocol 
and supporting documentation. 
 
Ethical review of research sites 
 
The Committee agreed that all sites in this study should be exempt from site-
specific assessment (SSA).  There is no need to complete Part C of the 
application form or to inform Local Research Ethics Committees (LRECs) about 
the research.  The favourable opinion for the study applies to all sites involved 
in the research.  
 
Conditions of approval 
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The favourable opinion is given provided that you comply with the conditions 
set out in the attached document.  You are advised to study the conditions 
carefully. 
 
Approved documents 
 
The documents reviewed and approved at the meeting were: 
 
Document Versio
n 
Date 
Application 5.1 22 June 
2006 
Investigator CV 1 26 June 
2006 
Protocol 2 26 January 
2006 
Covering Letter 1 26 June 
2006 
Summary/Synopsis 2 06 June 
2006 
Peer Review 1 04 
November 
2005 
Letter of invitation to participant 2 06 June 
2006 
Participant Information Sheet 2 06 June 
2006 
Participant Consent Form 1 06 June 
2006 
Letter from funder 1 12 January 
2006 
Indemnity Arrangements 1 04 
November 
2005 
 
Research governance approval 
 
You should arrange for the R&D Department at all relevant NHS care 
organisations to be notified that the research will be taking place, and provide 
a copy of the REC application, the protocol and this letter. 
 
All researchers and research collaborators who will be participating in the 
research at a NHS site must obtain final research governance approval before 
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commencing any research procedures.  Where a substantive contract is not 
held with the care organisation, it may be necessary for an honorary contract 
to be issued before approval for the research can be given. 
 
Membership of the Committee 
 
The members of the Ethics Committee who were present at the meeting are 
listed on the attached sheet. 
 
Statement of compliance  
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance 
Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully 
with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the 
UK. 
 
 
 06/Q0806/60                                    Please quote this number on all 
correspondence 
 
With the Committee’s best wishes for the success of this project 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Mrs Sheree Manson 
Committee Co-ordinator 
 
Email: sheree.manson@stgeorges.nhs.uk  
 
Enclosures:  List of names and professions of members who were 
present at the meeting and those who submitted 
written comments 
 
Standard approval conditions  
 
         
Copy to: National Coordinating Centre - SDO Programme 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
99 Gover Street 
London 
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London - Surrey Borders Research Ethics Committee 
 
 
Attendance at Committee meeting on 12 July 2006 
 
Committee Members: 
 
Name Profession Present? Notes 
Dr Hervey Wilcox Consultant 
Chemical 
Pathologist 
Yes   
Dr Steve Hyer Consultant 
Physician 
Yes   
Canon Christopher 
Vallins 
Head of 
Pastoral Care 
Yes   
Mrs Sylvia Aslangul Lay Member Yes   
Mrs Wendy Brooks Stroke Nurse 
Consultant 
Yes   
Mr Derek Cock Chief 
Pharmacist 
Yes   
Mrs Anne Davies Chief 
Pharmacist 
Yes   
Mr Eddy Digman Lay Member Yes   
Dr Rim El-Rifai Consultant 
Paediatrician 
Yes   
Mr Christopher John ENT Surgeon Yes   
Mrs Louise Kedroff Physiotherapist No   
Mrs Sally Kerry Senior Lecturer 
in Medical 
Statistics 
No   
Mrs Rita Lewis Lay Member Yes   
Dr  Lawrence Webber GP No   
Mrs Nikki Evans Cancer 
Research 
Nurse 
Yes   
 
Also in attendance: 
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Name Position (or reason for attending) 
Ms Amanda Jackson REC Assistant 
Mrs Sheree Manson Committee Co-ordinator 
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Appendix 10. Summary of issues  
For the attention of the Health Select Committee regarding their 
inquiry into NHS Foundation Trusts (2008)  
 
Dr. Mark Exworthy1, Francesca Frosini1, Lorelei Jones2 and 
Stephen Peckham2 
1-School of Management, Royal Holloway-University of London 
2-London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
 
 
 
1. Summary 
Foundation Trusts (FTs) represent a significant phase in the decentralisation of 
the NHS. Allied to other reforms, FT status offers (high performing) Trusts the 
opportunity for greater autonomy in various functions from the Department of 
Health (DH)/centre. Here, autonomy can be seen (i) as “freedom from” the centre 
as well as “freedom to” be innovative and responsive, and (ii) as a key factor with 
incentives in promoting further improved performance (crudely, 
autonomy+incentives=higher performance).  
 The willingness and ability of FTs to exercise their autonomy will determine the 
impact they have both within their organisations and the wider NHS. Currently, the 
evidence suggests that they have yet to exercise fully this autonomy but have the 
potential to do (given their current evolutionary path and supporting policy 
developments). 
 
 
2. Lack of evidence 
In general, there is a lack of (research) evidence on the work and impact of FTs, 
given their significance to English health policy. The reports by the Health Select 
Committee (2003), Day and Klein (2005), Healthcare Commission (2005) and the 
Audit Commission (2008) are the major sources of evidence. Some studies have 
been conducted into specific aspects which relate to FTs, such as Payment by 
Results (PbR). Anecdotal evidence is much more prevalent.  
 
 
3. Synthesis of evidence 
 
This synthesis is informed by the provisional findings from our research (see 5). 
 
2a. Macro-level: Autonomy from the Centre:  
Recent reforms have transformed by the role of the `centre’ in that the DH is no 
longer the sole agency. For example, the Secretary of State no longer retains 
residual powers. Instead, Monitor (as regulator) has a key role in ensuring 
performance standards of FTs and acting as a buffer between DH and FTs. 
Generally, Monitor is well regarded by FTs. The role of the Strategic Health 
Authorities (SHAs) in relation to FTs has also changed given the removal of 
performance management function. The number of FTs by SHA area varies 
considerably and may imply a key role for SHAs in fostering FT development. 
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However, the DH and SHA also require a change in attitude and behaviour to reflect 
the changed landscape of FTs and their activities. 
 
2b. Meso-level: FTs in the local health economy: Despite autonomy, FTs’ 
actions are constrained to varying degrees by the context of the local health 
economy (or community). For example, PCT deficits or `competition’ from other 
providers might constrain service developments of or related to FTs. Provisional 
evidence suggests that FTs are `picking and choosing’ the issues on which they are 
cooperating (especially if it is in their self-interest). There are some perceptions that 
FTs have secured an unfair advantage in the LHE (for example, as a result 
transitional relief arrangements associated with PbR). PCTs still remain generally 
weak (in capability and intelligence) compared to FTs, comprising the strategic 
perspective of PCTs, 
 
2b. Micro-level: FT attitudes and behavior  
FTs have been the `high performing Trusts; this was the criteria for their approval. 
This biased sample indicates that their performance might also be strong as FTs but 
initial evidence suggests no significant improvements as a result of FT status. The 
willingness and ability of FTs to exercise their autonomy is debatable. Generally, 
they are able to exercise autonomy (under their new status as public benefit 
corporations) although FT status demands that senior staff  change their skills and 
attitudes. Equally, FTs appear less willing to exercise autonomy to a great extent, as 
they are still acquiring legitimacy as organizations in their LHE and internally.  This 
unwillingness might reflect their view of risk (aversion to it) given their greater 
degree of financial exposure, the uncertainty associated with the new policy 
environment (including on-going features of centralisation) and the impact that 
their decisions might have upon other local organizations. New governance 
arrangements are seen as an important development but have yet to translate into 
meaningful change. The relationship between the FT Governors and the Board still 
require further development.  
 
4. Contact:  
Dr. Mark Exworthy: M.Exworthy@rhul.ac.uk 
 
5. Funding:  
Our current research is funded by the National Institute of Health Research 
(Service, Delivery and Organisation R&D programme):  “Decentralisation and 
performance: autonomy and incentives in local health economies” (2006-2009) 
http://www.sdo.nihr.ac.uk/sdo1252006.html (Lay and scientific summaries are 
available on this web address). 
 
The research project involves a collaboration between Dr. Mark Exworthy (Royal 
Holloway, University of London; principal investigator), Francesca Frosini (RHUL), 
Lorelei Jones (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) Stephen Peckham 
(LSHTM), Prof. Martin Powell (Birmingham University), Dr Ian Greener (Durham 
University), Dr. Jacky Holloway (Open University) and Dr Paul Anand (Open 
University) 
 
June 2008 
    SDO Project (08/1618/125) 
   
 Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010 Page 300  
 
Appendix 11. Dissemination activities  
Dissemination  
(2006-2009) 
 
Presentations 
 
1. Exworthy, M. and Frosini, F. (2006) `Room to manoeuvre? Explaining the impact 
of English health policies upon local autonomy. Paper presented to the Health 
Politics (Political Studies Association) conference, Oxford, September 2006. 
2. Jones, L., Exworthy, M. and Frosini, F. (2008) `Discourse and power: Health 
service reconfiguration in England.’ Paper presented to the Organisational 
Behaviour in Health Care conference, Sydney, April 2008 
3. Exworthy, M., Frosini, F. and Jones, L. `Autonomy and collaboration: managing 
local organizational relationships in the English NHS.’ Paper presented to the 
European Health Management Association conference, Athens, June 2008 
4. Exworthy, M., Frosini, F. and Jones, L. `Decentralisation and Performance.’ Paper 
presented HSRN/SDO conference, Manchester, June 2008 
5. Exworthy, M., Frosini, F. and Jones, L. `Assessing performance in local health 
economies: going beyond the metrics?’ Paper presented HSRN/SDO conference, 
Birmingham, June 2009 
6. Holloway, J., Exworthy, M., Frosini, F. and Jones, L. `Freedom to perform? 
Exploring policy responses in local health economies.’ Paper accepted fro the 
OHBC conference, Birmingham, April 2010.  
 
Papers published in peer review journals and edited collections 
 
1. Peckham S, Exworthy M, Greener I and Powell M.  (2007) `Decentralisation and 
health care services in England.’ Chapter 3 (pp.27-40) in Hann A (ed)  Health 
Policy and Politics.  Ashgate. 
2. Peckham, S., Exworthy, M., Powell, M. and Greener, I. (2008) `Decentralizing 
health services in the UK: a new conceptual framework.’ Public Administration, 
86, 2, pp.559-580 
3. Exworthy, M. and Frosini, F. (2008) `Room to manoeuvre? Explaining local 
autonomy in the English National Health Service.’ Health Policy, 81, 2-3, 
pp.204-212 
4. Exworthy, M. and Greener, I. (2008) `Decentralisation as a means to re-organise 
health-care in England: from theory to practice.’ Chapter 4 (pp.46-58) in McKee, 
L., Ferlie, E. and Hyde, P. (eds) Organising and re-organising: power and 
change in health-care organisations.. Basingstoke; Palgrave 
5. Greener, I., Exworthy, M., Peckham, S. and Powell, M. `New Labour and 
decentralisation.’ Policy Studies, 30, 4, pp.439-454 
6. Powell, M., Exworthy, M., Greener, I and Peckham, S. `Going down the local 
(again): decentralisation and centralisation in sixty years of the British National 
Health Service.’ Financial Accounting and Management, forthcoming. 
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In preparation 
1. Jones, L., Exworthy, M. and Frosini, F. (2008) `Discourse and power: Health 
service reconfiguration in England.’ Submitted to Journal of Health Services 
Research and Policy. Peer review (in 2008) indicated major revisions. Currently 
undergoing such revisions. 
2. Peckham, S., Exworthy, M. Frosini, F. and Jones, L. `Local health economy: fact 
or fiction?’ Journal to be determined.  
3. Anand, P., Exworthy, M., Frosini, F. and Jones, L. `Autonomy and performance.’ 
Journal to be determined 
4. Exworthy, M., Frosini, F. and Jones, L. `Assessing performance in local health 
economies: distinguishing between formal and informal performance.’ Journal to 
be determined 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer:  
 
This report presents independent research commissioned by the National Institute 
for Health Research (NIHR). The views and opinions expressed by authors in this 
publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
NHS, the NIHR, the NIHR SDO programme or the Department of Health. The 
views and opinions expressed by the interviewees in this publication are those of 
the interviewees and do not necessarily reflect those of the authors, those of the 
NHS, the NIHR, the NIHR SDO programme or the Department of Health” 
 
Addendum: 
 
This document is an output from a research project that was commissioned by 
the Service Delivery and Organisation (SDO) programme whilst it was managed 
by the National Coordinating Centre for the Service Delivery and Organisation 
(NCCSDO) at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. The NIHR SDO 
programme is now managed by the National Institute for Health Research 
Evaluations, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre (NETSCC) based at the 
University of Southampton.  
 
Although NETSCC, SDO has managed the project and conducted the editorial 
review of this document, we had no involvement in the commissioning, and 
therefore may not be able to comment on the background of this document. 
Should you have any queries please contact sdo@southampton.ac.uk. 
 
 
 
